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THE INF TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

JANUARY 25, 26, 27, AND 28, 1988

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THE INF TREATY

MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SH-216, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Kerry, Sanford, Adams, Moynihan, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans, and McConnell.

The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will please come to order.

I and the ranking member will give brief opening statements, as will the minority leader, Senator Dole. We will then hear from the Secretary of State, and I would ask my colleagues that, if they have opening statements, they make them in their 10-minute segments.

The Secretary has indicated that he will be with us today as long as any questions remain to be asked. Accordingly, our intention is that we will recess at half past 12 and reconvene at 2, and he will stay with us as long as is necessary.

I would add also that, under the Senate rules, we are required to report a committee budget resolution by the end of this week, and at the appropriate time today when a quorum is present, I believe we should break briefly for a business meeting and vote on the budget. You can examine it in between and you might want to do this just before breaking at lunch or at 2 o'clock, just before the afternoon session.

Now, Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to welcome you here today, christening this new hearing room, and christening as well a new direction. It has been almost a decade since our committee has met with a Secretary of State to begin consideration of an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union.

I recall vividly how, in 1979, almost 10 years ago, most of us in the committee welcomed the SALT II Treaty with huge excitement and optimism. That treaty marked a decade, incidentally, of achievement in the field of arms control that included the Seabed Arms Treaty, the SALT I, the ABM Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Environmental Modification Treaty of 1975, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Today there are only five of us on this committee who were here during those heady days. It seemed then that we were part of a process, with growing momentum, that would produce a network of constraints greatly diminishing the likelihood that any kind of weapon of mass destruction would be used.

That expectation was dashed, however, first by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then by the arrival of an administration that appeared to reject the view of previous administrations that arms control had made or could make a solid contribution to enhancing America's security.

But lately the looms of arms control, silent for so long, have begun to hum again. The treaty being submitted to us today could be the first strands of a new pattern of arms control that could be stronger, more protective, and more durable than anything we have seen before.

Students of history have long observed that, while nations yearn for peace, they always simultaneously prepare for and engage in aggressive acts. Emotions rather than reason often prevail. Conflicts of varying types and intensity continue to punctuate our history. But at least over two score years now, no nuclear weapon has been fired in anger.

We believe that why this has not happened is because we know and fear the consequences of nuclear war. We believe the fear of nuclear war has deterred, at least in Europe, major conventional war.

But history has taught us that if a weapon exists it will likely be used. That is particularly the case if the possessor nation considers itself to be in extremis. And while many millions have been and would be killed in conventional war, civilization itself would be the casualty in a nuclear war.

That is why the journey on which we are hopefully embarking today with the INF Treaty is critical. It is not what is in this treaty itself that is particularly important itself, however desirable its provisions may be. What is really important is that this is the necessary first step in reversing the nuclear arms race.

As Robert Kennedy often said, and so did Confucius, "A journey of a 1,000 miles starts with a single step." We hope to bring to a halt an escalating nuclear elevator. I see this treaty as the beginning of a continuum of arms control involving reductions and constraints on all types of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.

Eventually, I would hope that we can realize the dream of both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev for a world free of nuclear weapons.

There are risks as we begin this journey, but there are even more risks if we do not. There are limits to what can be achieved as long as the United States and the Soviet Union are hostile rivals.

But the example of American-China relations gives me hope that we and the Soviet Union can come to terms one day. In the meantime, the kinds of verification arrangements contained in this treaty bode well for the future. As we move along, our goal is to make the use of nuclear weapons less likely, and that includes the diminishing likelihood of lesser conflicts that could trigger the use of nuclear weapons.

I believe that the Soviets have the same desire to see their children and grandchildren grow up as do we. That does not guarantee peace, but the changes that appear to be underway there under

Gorbachev offer what could be a unique opportunity to change the course of East-West relations.

It is our job as the committee with jurisdiction to weigh the merits of the INF Treaty. The American people overwhelmingly support it. I hope and trust that we will, too.

But it is not enough for us simply to make a recommendation to the Senate on this treaty. There is a grander scheme of things ahead out there and a consensus needs to be built to achieve it. I trust and pray that that process may begin here today in this room that we are christening with a change in direction in foreign policy in this direction.

Now I would turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Helms, and ask him for his statement.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning, Mr. Secretary. Happy New Year to everybody, I hope.

The INF Treaty is indeed a treaty about war and peace. As we open these hearings, it is imperative that all of us consider the treaty carefully and objectively. The purpose of the treaty is to strengthen and preserve the peace for future generations, and we must not, through haste or lack of care, allow it to be less than that.

If the treaty is deficient in its concept, if the parties to the treaty are not prepared to live up to its obligations, or if the treaty does not give us the ability to verify that its provisions are being obeyed, then we are setting the stage for a catastrophe. That catastrophe could be either conventional or nuclear war.

The alternative might be worse, in fact. It could mean the surrender of future generations to life under Communist systems.

That is why this INF Treaty demands intense scrutiny. We cannot leave any clause unexamined. We cannot ignore the historical record of Soviet cheating on past treaties, especially arms control treaties.

We cannot evade the question of what this treaty does to Europe or whether it makes war between the Soviet Union and China more likely. Nor can we focus exclusively on European theater issues, bypassing the impact of this treaty on the overall nuclear strategic balances.

Already, grave problems have emerged. The administration, for example, has given the American people the impression that this treaty reduces nuclear weapons. The President has said so. The Vice President has said so. The Secretary of State has said so.

But the truth is that not one nuclear weapon will be destroyed under the terms of this treaty. The treaty specifically exempts nuclear warheads and the associated guidance elements on both sides. Delivery vehicles would be destroyed, but not the nuclear weapons these delivery vehicles carry.

Now, that means that those nuclear weapons, the warheads, can be removed from missiles to be destroyed and rebolted on other missiles not covered by the treaty. I am told that the Soviet warheads are such that they can be very simply rebolted on other missiles with minor changes.

On the other hand, our warheads would have to be reprocessed in order to be reused. The moral appears to be that old Soviet warheads never die; they are just retargeted at the United States.

But the impact is even worse than that. The Soviets have 12 times as much megatonnage as the United States covered by this treaty. The treaty protects the Soviet advantage in nuclear destructive power and it locks in the United States disadvantage.

So, in fact, this is a treaty to protect nuclear weapons, not a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons.

Another problem is that we know very little about the most important of the Soviet missile systems that are supposedly eliminated under the treaty, that is to say the SS-20. We have never even seen an SS-20. We have never photographed it, and we have very little data about its flight testing, because the Soviets illegally put the electronic signals in code.

Now, key bits and pieces of information that we do have about the SS-20 do not match the information or the so-called photograph which the Soviets provided to us precisely at the time of the signing of this treaty. The SS-20 is always kept in a protective canister, like a cigar in a tube. There is no question that the Soviets can simply put it in a different canister so that we cannot inspect it under the terms of this treaty.

The cousin of the SS-20, the SS-25, comes in the same canister, except it is 10 feet longer. And if we look at an SS-25 canister, we cannot tell what is inside. And of course, the treaty stipulates that we will not be allowed to inspect any Soviet base where SS-25 canisters are on display.

Furthermore, we do not even know how many SS-20 missiles the Soviets have produced. The number the Soviets have declared is an absurdly low number, hardly more than half the number that appears in our intelligence community's unclassified estimates.

In fact, the number declared by the Soviet Union is only one-quarter the number that appears in some other unclassified estimates, and I have to ask, is our intelligence capability that faulty? I think our intelligence community is on the mark.

But in any case, if we want to go looking for the rest of the SS-20's that we think the Soviets may have, the treaty forbids it. We can look only at the specific sites declared by the Soviets.

Of course, if the Soviets were hiding SS-20's, the last place they were going to keep them would be the places they would allow us to look. I guess we could say that 99⁴⁴⁄₁₀₀ percent of the Soviet Union is out of bounds to our inspectors under this treaty.

But even if the Soviets do allow us to observe while they destroy the part of the SS-20 fleet that they have admitted exists, we still will not know what we are looking at. The missile data we are given for identification is all quantitative. There are no qualitative standards whatsoever.

We could be destroying a bunch of wornout duds and rejects that have been sitting in a warehouse, and we would be none the wiser about it under this treaty.

Now, the verification problems in the treaty, therefore, I think can be summed up in four points: We do not know what we are looking for; we do not know where to look for it; if we find it, we will not know what we have found; and if we do figure out what we have found, there is nothing we can do about it under this treaty.

Now, Mr. Chairman, this treaty is, as the saying goes, once and forever. Once the Pershing II's are removed from Europe, there will be no putting them back. NATO will retain no significant nuclear forces. Europe will be totally exposed.

But the Soviets, the Soviets will still retain all of their nuclear firepower on European territory.

I think we ought to remember that the man in charge of those Soviet nuclear weapons on European territory is Marshal Ogarkov. Mr. Ogarkov was the first chief of the Soviet Directorate of Strategic Deception. He raised deception to a fine art.

He was behind SALT I, he was behind SALT II. He was the man who went on television and defended the shooting down of Korean Airlines 007 when the airliner strayed too close to the site of an illegal Soviet ICBM test.

Ogarkov organized the Western Theater Military Operations for the first time in 1983, and he has been the Western Theater's commander since 1984.

The INF Treaty removes the major roadblock to the Soviet attack plans for Europe. It gives free play to Mr. Ogarkov's military forces. If there is a covert force of SS-20's which the Soviets are concealing, that covert force would be under the control of Marshal Ogarkov, the master of strategic deception.

Such military force would give the Soviets, one way or another, effective control over the destiny of Europe. Should that happen, we might as well bring our troops home. In fact, we might have to bring them home, less they fall hostage to Soviet domination of Europe.

But we must not look at the treaty simply in terms of what it does to Europe. By neutralizing the European front, it gives the Soviets the ability to concentrate on its eastern front in Eurasia, that is to say the Soviet posture toward China.

There are some who think that a war between the Soviet Union and China would be a good thing for the United States. But any victory for either side in that conflict would not be a victory for freedom.

Finally, the treaty puts the Soviets in a position to concentrate on their self-declared, frequently declared "main enemy," the United States. Even though the Pershing II's were deployed primarily as a deterrent against war in Europe, they are still the fastest retaliatory force under U.S. control.

If the Soviets attempted a first strike against the United States, a first strike that got its trial run, by the way, when the Soviets used Hawaii for target practice last fall, our Pershing II's would be the fastest and most survivable response to such a Soviet attack. And this treaty eliminates that response by us.

Mr. Chairman, I think that nobody, including the President of the United States who signed this treaty, will deny that the mainspring of the Soviet Union's international relations has always been duplicity and cheating. This treaty appears to me to be an engraved invitation to cheat. I am confident that the Soviets have plans right now to cheat.

In fact, they are cheating right now. So, my conclusion is that if there ever was a time for the Senate to be careful, to be deliberative, surely it is now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

We now have as our guest the minority leader of the Senate, Senator Dole. And we would be very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT DOLE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Helms and members of the committee, for letting me come in and take a few moments to indicate my support for the treaty.

I would ask that my complete statement be made a part of the record.

I have the feeling, in listening to the opening statements, that these hearings will probably continue for some time, so we may have a chance to come back again later on to address certain aspects in greater detail. In any event, I welcome this opportunity to state my strong conviction that the INF Treaty is in America's national security interest, and that the Senate should give advice and consent to its ratification.

As the leader of the Republicans in the Senate, I have pledged to President Reagan that I will work closely with him to achieve that important goal.

Two hundred years ago, the framers of the Constitution decided that the Senate should have a central, unique role in the treatymaking process. Throughout two centuries the Senate has taken its role very seriously and made many, many important contributions to our Nation by considering, by adding to, and on a few occasions, by rejecting treaties before it.

Every one of the 100 Americans who are privileged to be a Member of the Senate today intends to perform their roles in that same tradition.

Immediately upon completion of the negotiations leading to the signature of this treaty by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, I think like many others, I undertook my own intensive study of it. There were a lot of suggestions that the Republican leader should get on board right away. But I felt, since it took years to negotiate the treaty, we in the Senate at least ought to have a few days to make our own independent investigation.

Though strongly disposed to support my President whenever I can, I was determined to reach an independent judgment on the treaty's merits. The people from Kansas that I represent, and the Senate Republicans that I lead, expect, indeed demand, no less from me.

So, I took the opportunity to discuss the treaty with some of this Nation's most prominent leaders, including former Presidents Nixon and Ford. I must say, I spent a great deal of time with our first witness, Secretary Shultz, and I certainly want to commend you, Secretary Shultz, for your leadership and your patience. It was very helpful.

I also met with Secretary of Defense Carlucci and National Security Advisor Powell and I was briefed by Admiral Crowe. I did everything, I guess, that members of this committee do routinely.

I had a good visit with Max Kampelman, who heads our Geneva negotiating team. And I talked to many defense and arms control specialists outside the Government. For example, my fellow

Kansan, Gen. Bernard Rogers, who may not support this treaty, but he was very helpful. And I visited at length with Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick.

In light of the intense importance of the treaty to our NATO allies, and in the face of conflicting reports about the European view of INF, I also talked with Italian Prime Minister Goria. I placed a call to Margaret Thatcher. I did not know whether she would take the call, but apparently she had seen the Iowa polls, and I had a good visit with Margaret Thatcher. [Laughter.]

I also had a good visit with Helmut Kohl. All of them indicated, just as the Secretary had earlier, that our allies were fully on board. That is the same message that I received from all three.

So, I did my homework, and I think I can say, notwithstanding the role the Senate is going to play, that it is a good treaty. We have to ask the question, What makes it a good treaty?

It is the first agreement which will actually reduce, and not just limit the growth of, the nuclear stockpiles of the superpowers. It is the first agreement which will result in the elimination of two entire classes of nuclear weapons, though I share the view expressed by Senator Helms that we are not going to destroy the warheads.

Just as important, it is an agreement which firmly establishes the principle that in arms control equal reductions do not always mean fair or stabilizing or acceptable reductions. In fact, when the Soviets have more, they must reduce more. Anything less will not produce an agreement that preserves the security interests of the United States and the alliance.

This concept, asymmetrical reductions to equal levels, is a principle that we must adhere to as we move forward on conventional arms reductions in Europe.

Finally, INF is an agreement that can be verified. Because the treaty's "double-global-zero" levels ease the verification problem, the intelligence chiefs I consulted assured me that, with adequate resources—and I underscore that, with adequate resources—they can do the verification job.

So, those are my basic conclusions, the basic reasons why I believe the Senate should give advice and consent to ratification of this treaty.

But let me add this. I not only believe the Senate should give its advice and consent to this treaty; I believe we can strengthen the security of the United States, and the President's hand in future negotiations, as we have done with many, many other treaties throughout our history. I believe we can make constructive additions to this treaty in ways that will not require renegotiation with the Soviet Union—in other words, no killer amendments.

On December 17 when I met with the President to advise him of my decision to support the treaty, I also told him of concerns which I, and other Senators on both sides of the aisle, have which the Senate would want to address. I suggested that the Senate would very likely seek to make additions to the treaty, additions which could take the form of reservations, understandings, declarations, or even domestic legislation, but additions which would be constructive and aimed at strengthening our overall position, not at killing the treaty.

President Reagan assured me that he was prepared to work cooperatively with the Senate in just that vein.

So, I would just very quickly outline three areas which I have identified on which I believe the Senate can and ought to act:

First, treaty compliance. The simple fact is that the Soviet treaty compliance record is dismal. I do not want to see the INF Treaty we ratify this year turn up on the first compliance report the next President sends to the Congress. The Soviets need to understand up front that there will be serious consequences for cheating on this treaty. I look forward to working with the members of this committee to craft language which will address this important need.

At a minimum, the Senate should go on record first that the United States would view a violation as an "extraordinary event," justifying our withdrawal from the treaty; and second, demanding at the least that we suspend our treaty obligations, or take some other proportionate response, in case of a Soviet treaty violation.

That kind of declaration would send a strong political message to the Soviets that the Senate will back any American President who takes a tough stance in reaction to Soviet violations.

This committee will also be working with the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees in addressing two other areas which I believe must be addressed, verification and theater forces in Europe. I would like to share with you, as I will later with those committees, my concerns on these matters very briefly.

On verification, I believe we may well need to beef up our own capability to ensure effective verification under the regime established in the INF Treaty. Here I refer both to technical systems and to steps which will ensure the retention of the skilled, experienced professionals which we need to do the job.

Effective verification will not come cheap, but ineffective verification would exact a cost far higher than this Nation can ever afford to pay—the cost of a less secure America.

On theater forces, we should take full advantage of the opportunity the INF Treaty debate affords us to examine NATO's overall security posture. Eliminating INF systems from Europe requires that we focus our attention on those forces which will remain and which will bear the burden of discouraging, deterring, a Warsaw Pact attack.

We simply cannot allow our theater forces to be in a state which invites Soviet attack, Soviet threats, or Soviet bluffs. Therefore, I believe the Senate must focus on three specific aspects of the theater forces issue:

First, we need to make clear that our residual nuclear forces in Europe, short-range nuclear weapons, including dual-purpose aircraft and artillery, will remain in Europe until the conventional arms imbalance is redressed.

Second, we should declare our readiness to undertake those theater force modernization programs which are necessary to ensure the credibility of our deterrence, and we should expect no less from our NATO allies.

And finally, we should stress that a conventional arms reduction agreement covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals, and based on the INF principle of "asymmetrical reductions to equal and stabilizing levels" is the highest arms control priority for the NATO alliance.

Mr. Chairman, last Tuesday at the University of Iowa I spoke at greater length about some of these same subjects. In hope that my comments might be of interest to many, and I would like to put the text of that speech in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator DOLE. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the INF Treaty is a milestone achievement, but it is only the first step on a long, uncertain road. I believe there is probably unanimous agreement in this committee, in the Senate, and in this country about where we would like that road to take us—toward greater security for America, toward greater peace for the world.

But getting there is not easy. We have learned some lessons from the INF experience, lessons about dealing from strength, about preserving the deterrence which has kept us free and at peace, lessons about standing together as an alliance and as a country, and about sticking to our principles when we are right.

The fact is that, in the face of persistent criticism, President Reagan's steadfast pursuit of a good agreement, and nothing less, is what made the INF Treaty a reality. And I hope the Senate will take cognizance of those lessons and let them point the way for our own deliberations.

More importantly, I hope the country will consider these lessons, too, and they will shape our own strategies and policies as we conduct our relations with the Soviets, as we seek to strengthen our alliances, and as we look to further arms reduction agreements to make our own country and our own freedom more secure.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dole may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Dole.

Secretary Shultz, it is a great pleasure to have you with us. Thank you for your courtesy and your being willing to stay with us as long as there are questions in response to be asked.

Please proceed as you will. You may shorten your text in any way. I can assure you your whole text will be printed in the record as if read.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that we will not have opportunities to raise questions in response to Senator Dole's statement, but I would just like to exercise the personal privilege of commending his statement and strong leadership. At least those of us on our side of the aisle are very much appreciative of his analysis and the direction he has given us on INF Treaty deliberations.

I appreciate Mr. Chairman, this opportunity to make this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Secretary Shultz.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee.

I appreciate the three opening statements. Of course, I especially appreciate Senator Dole's unequivocal statement of support for this treaty, and I welcome the fact that he studied it carefully, and I had the privilege of meeting with him and helped in that regard.

I want to assure you, Senator, that the administration is prepared to work with the Senate to be sure that we do everything we possibly can on the three issues you identified, on compliance and on verification and on examination of the European theater forces subject. Those are all important subjects and they are treated to a fair degree, as a matter of fact, in my opening statement.

I welcome, Senator Helms, your call for a careful and thorough and intensive review of this treaty, and we are prepared to do that, to devote all of the time necessary to do that, and to provide materials that you may wish.

I have listened carefully to your comments and I think that as we go through this process they can be answered satisfactorily, at least I hope so, and we will work at all of them.

And Senator Pell, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your opening comments. I do hope to be able to bring out to your satisfaction that this treaty does not represent some sudden change of heart on the part of the Reagan administration. This treaty represents the result of a long and patient process, and brings us to the place that the President set out to get in 1981, not long after he took office.

So, there has been a continuous effort to bring this treaty about.

One of the things that I hope to be able to do here—and I do not want to take undue time of this committee, but you have emphasized the importance of being thorough and careful—is to review with you carefully the negotiating process that we went through, because I think it is a very instructive process in methods of dealing with the Soviet Union.

The President has forwarded to the Senate for its advice and consent the Treaty on the Elimination of United States and Soviet Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The treaty defines intermediate-range missiles as land-based systems having ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers. It defines shorter range missiles as land-based systems with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers.

It requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate their intermediate-range missiles within 3 years and their shorter range missiles within 18 months. Neither side can possess such missiles after they have been eliminated, nor can they produce or flight test them.

The treaty contains a memorandum of understanding on data giving the location numbers and characteristics of each side's intermediate and shorter range missiles. It also includes a protocol that sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment.

Finally, it contains a protocol that gives the detailed procedures for a variety of inspections associated with the treaty.

The treaty deserves and I am sure will get your careful, thorough, and complete examination. I particularly welcome this opportunity to testify today as you begin your consideration of the treaty, and I will look forward to working closely with you in that process.

The treaty is the result of our steady, patient approach to United States-Soviet relations on the basis of realism, strength, and dialog.

We got this treaty because we were persistent at the bargaining table and because our allies went forward with the deployment.

The way we and our allies successfully met the Soviet INF challenge shows that tough-mindedness, clarity of purpose, and resolve pay off. The INF experience offers important lessons on how to proceed as we confront other challenges to our security.

The INF Treaty strengthens U.S. and allied security. It enhances international stability. It may be opening a new chapter in arms control, the beginning of reductions. It reduces nuclear weapons rather than setting guidelines for their future growth.

It achieves United States-Soviet equality by eliminating substantially more Soviet weapons than American ones. It accomplishes the goals we and our allies set for ourselves 8 years ago, when the deployment of the SS–20 led to the NATO dual-track decision.

In short, the treaty is an achievement, as our allies proclaimed in December, "without precedent in the history of arms control."

Before I discuss the treaty in detail and the process that brought it about, I want to put it in context. This means going back to first principles. The first purpose of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens, both as individuals and as a nation. To this end, one of the objectives specifically listed in the preamble to our Constitution is "to provide for the common defense."

This sets the standard we must all use to assess this or any other arms control agreement. What are we trying to secure? Our strength and integrity as a nation? But there is more to it than that.

Our purpose is, again quoting the preamble, "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." From the beginning, Americans recognized that their security could not depend on wishful thinking. The United States has survived and prospered as a nation because our predecessors in both the executive and legislative branches understood the need for strength and realism.

Realism means recognizing what is right for the times in which you live. George Washington was right in his farewell address to warn his country against foreign alliances. A century and a half later, Harry Truman was right to commit his country to such an alliance.

Strength does not mean simply military might, although military strength is essential. For most of our history, we were able to get by with much less formidable military forces than many other countries. This is because for the century following the Napoleonic Wars two vast oceans saw to our country's security, while other countries maintained a balance of power across the Atlantic.

But the world does not stand still. Distance can no longer guarantee safety, and stability is always under challenge. Advances in technology have transformed the oceans from barriers into highways. The development of the airplane and later of the rocket engine added a new dimension to warfare, and the European balance collapsed in 1914.

In the 30 years that followed, Europe was twice convulsed by war. Both times, the United States at first tried to stay aloof. Both times, we ultimately joined with our democratic allies and fought by their side until the war was won.

Why? Because we recognized that our fundamental national security interests would be directly threatened by the defeat of democracy in Europe.

In the aftermath of World War Two, we joined with the European democracies to become part of the balance there, to ensure that the tragedy we and they had just suffered would never come about again. Since 1945, the principal threat to our security and to that of our friends and allies around the world has come from the Soviet Union.

It is a threat not just of open conflict, but of political intimidation as well. Therefore, an overriding objective of every American administration has been to prevent the loss of Europe to the Soviet Union, not by fighting a war but by deterring one.

Every administration has agreed that the way to do this is to make our commitment to defend freedom in Europe crystal clear. The advance of technology has forever changed the stakes for our national security. The awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons, especially when combined with the unprecedented speed and range of ballistic missiles, has given an added urgency to the need to build a solid structure of peace.

As President Reagan has reiterated many times, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". General Secretary Gorbachev has said he agrees, most recently in the Washington summit statement.

The fundamental means of preventing a nuclear war is deterring it. The U.S. strategic triad is the ultimate deterrent. The President has assigned top priority to modernizing all three legs: intercontinental ballistic missiles, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Together, the three legs of the triad complement each other and provide a solid base for deterrence.

Another essential element of our strategy of deterrence is our network of alliances with our fellow democracies. These alliances have an importance to us that goes well beyond their strictly military role, but the military role is vital to deterrence.

The U.S. strategic triad is one leg of the NATO triad. The other two legs are nuclear weapons based in Europe and conventional forces, just the two items that Senator Dole focused on in his comments. All three legs of the NATO triad are vital to the success of deterrence.

Their effect together is more than the sum of the individual parts. The U.S. strategic deterrent has a unique role, but the burden of the other two legs of the triad is widely shared. Thus, delivery systems for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are owned and operated by seven of our allies.

In the case of a short-warning attack, the vast majority of the NATO forces involved would be from our allies, not the United States—over 90 percent of the ground forces, over 75 percent of the air forces, and over 50 percent of the naval forces.

Maintaining an effective deterrent is thus the key to a successful national security policy. At the same time, the United States has also sought to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons.

As with the other elements of our security policy, this has been a bipartisan objective, carried out by Presidents and supported by Senators and Members of Congress of both parties. There have been important accomplishments. Chairman Pell mentioned some.

One was the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 which you mentioned. Another arms control achievement was the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. It remains the basis for our continuing efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty also obliges the nuclear weapons states to negotiate in good faith to reduce nuclear weapons.

In 1972 we agreed to the ABM Treaty, substantially reducing our right to defend ourselves against nuclear weapons. We did so, as the preamble to the treaty reflects, in the expectation that this would lead the Soviets to negotiate reductions in strategic offense weapons.

We have called both the premise and the promise of the ABM Treaty. So far that promise has not been kept. Whatever else they may have done, neither SALT I nor SALT II achieved nuclear reductions. No agreement did until now.

President Reagan knows that the only way to deal with the Soviet Union on arms control, as on other areas of our agenda, is to return to first principles, strength and realism. And he knows that to succeed we need another quality that we lose sight of at our peril, patience or, if you prefer, an ability to hang tough.

The President has understood all along that the important thing is not to lose sight of the objectives. His purpose is not to seek agreements for agreements' sake. It is to seek agreements that enhance our security. And one of his primary objectives is to enhance the system of collective security that we have established with our democratic allies around the world.

I have described the hard lessons that two world wars taught the American people. That is why NATO is a cornerstone of American security policy. That is why it enjoys wider bipartisan support than any other international institution.

It is also the reason we have entered into alliances in Asia and the Pacific with such partners as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

NATO faces a real threat. The Soviet Union occupies almost one-sixth of the world's land mass. It has a massive nuclear arsenal. The Warsaw Pact has conventional superiority over NATO in key categories of combat capability, such as manpower and equipment. It has the advantage of interior lines of logistics support, and it has the largest chemical weapons stockpile in the world.

In these circumstances, the U.S. nuclear guarantee has been and remains essential to the security of our allies. It is the basis of extended deterrence. When and if the leaders of the Soviet Union contemplate an attack against a United States ally, they must continue to conclude that the risks far outweigh any possible gains.

At first, the prospect of massive retaliation by U.S. strategic forces served to deter attack. But the passage of time brings changes and challenges. The alliance has never failed to respond, to evolve, and to grow. Thus, in 1967 NATO formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. Its basic premise is that NATO must deter and, if necessary, counter aggression at any level, at any place in the NATO treaty area.

This requires a wide array of forces so that NATO can defeat any attack at an appropriate level or, if necessary, can make the deliberate political decision to raise the response to a higher level.

I am not talking about a hypothetical "ladder" of escalation. I am talking about options available to NATO if they ever are needed.

The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, clearly linked to the other two legs of the NATO triad, remains the ultimate guarantor of NATO's collective security. The Soviet Government understands that risks cannot safely be limited and that any act of aggression against a United States ally could lead ultimately to strategic retaliation against their own homeland.

Flexible response clearly does not depend on any single weapons system. What is needed depends in part on the nature of the threat. Thus, when NATO considered all the options for the INF talks, it unambiguously decided that getting rid of all INF missiles, United States and Soviet, would be the best outcome from the standpoint of NATO's own security.

NATO would retain a variety of systems that could perform the critical deterrence missions. So President Reagan proposed the zero option for INF missiles and, because we and NATO held together for that goal, that is what we got.

What holds NATO together so well? We and our allies share more than a common threat. We share the same purpose I mentioned before, to secure the blessings of liberty. NATO is more than a military alliance. It is a community of common values and political principles that we are all committed to protect and to foster.

We share the goal of building a better life for our own peoples and of helping create the conditions that foster freedom and economic development elsewhere in the world as well. The fact that we and our allies share more than just a threat in itself bolsters deterrence.

A major part of the strength of the alliance derives from the shared values that it is committed to defend. Moreover, NATO is vital to our efforts to conduct a dialog with the Soviet Union. NATO's twin commitment is to defense and dialog.

It is an alliance truism, but true it is. It has shaped NATO's approach to East-West relations for decades. It continues to do so today. It is precisely because of the strength of the NATO alliance that we in the West are able to deal productively with the Soviet Union.

The strong bonds between the Atlantic allies and our democratic partners in the Pacific, Japan and Australia particularly, gives an even broader base to our dual approach of defense and dialog.

INF has been at the center of the NATO agenda since 1979. Many thought it would weaken or even cripple the alliance. In fact, the INF experience has strengthened it. As we prepare for a NATO summit in a little over a month, I see a real dynamism in the alliance. There is certainly change underway, because living things must change.

But the underlying facts are continuity, coherence, and cooperation within the alliance. A continuing peacetime alliance is new, not just for the United States but also for most of our allies. For centuries, many of them saw each other as enemies rather than as friends.

But support for NATO is as strong as ever in all 16 member nations, in some cases even stronger than before the SS-20 threat arose.

Historians may come to see the INF experience as one of NATO's finest hours. We may never know what decisionmaking process the Soviet leadership went through before deciding to deploy the SS-20. The Soviets may have misunderstood how we and our allies would act during a period of so-called détente. They may have misled themselves into believing that the West no longer would do what was necessary to maintain a strong deterrent, whatever the provocation. If so, they were wrong, just as they were wrong when the calculated the political and military costs before they marched into Afghanistan.

From the late 1950's, the Soviet Union had deployed intermediate-range missiles. These are systems which could threaten most or all of NATO Europe but not reach the United States. The United States had deployed no such missiles since the mid-1960's, although some NATO military officers felt such deployments to be necessary. and I am sure that when General Rogers appears before you, he will develop his views on that point.

In arms control terms, at any rate, these systems were not considered strategic. Thus, they were excluded from the arms control limits in the SALT process.

In 1977 the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20. It was a substantial improvement over its predecessors. It had longer range, greater accuracy and enhanced mobility. Moreover, it had three independently targetable warheads, where previous systems had only one. Both its range and its deployment pattern soon made it a threat, not just to Europe, but to all the Soviet Union's neighbors. By our count, 140 SS-20's with 420 warheads had been deployed by the end of 1979. When President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December 1987, the Soviets, according to their own figures, had deployed 405 SS-20's with 1,215 warheads.

NATO political leaders and military authorities carefully assessed this new threat and consulted extensively on how to counter it. They were concerned that, if left unmatched, this new Soviet capability could lead Moscow into believing that it could intimidate the alliance, or even cause the Soviet Union to miscalculate the risks of aggression.

To prevent this, in 1979 NATO foreign and defense ministers adopted what has come to be called the dual-track decision. On one track, the United States would begin in 1983 to deploy 572 single-warhead, intermediate-range missiles in the U.K., Italy, Belgium, the FRG, and the Netherlands. There would be 464 ground-launched Cruise missiles which would be deployed four to a launcher. There would be 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles, each on a separate launcher.

At the same time, on a second track, the United States would attempt to negotiate limits on United States and Soviet INF missiles at the lowest possible level.

As with so much else about NATO, INF policy has been fundamentally bipartisan. A decision taken under the previous administration has been carried out by the present one. Congressional support for our efforts on both tracks has also been essential.

I will turn to the deployment track.

The INF Treaty was signed almost 8 years to the day after the 1979 dual-track decision was taken. Neither the deployment track nor the negotiating track was easy. But we succeeded because we and our allies stayed the course on both tracks.

This took considerable political courage. In Europe, the so-called peace movement took to the streets to try to block U.S. deployments. In the United States, the freeze movement in effect wanted to reward the Soviets for deploying first by letting them keep their advantage and removing any incentive to negotiate reductions. The Soviet Union threatened a new Ice Age in East-West relations if United States deployments went forward.

In 1983, initial deployments of United States missiles were scheduled to begin in three countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The leaders of all three countries unambiguously supported following through on both tracks of NATO's 1979 decision. In each case they put their leadership to the ultimate test, the ballot. And in each case they were confirmed in power. Similarly, the people of Belgium and the Netherlands have kept in power leaders committed to the 1979 decision. All five of these allies have gone forward with the commitments they made to NATO in 1979. The result is the treaty you now have before you.

Opponents of our deployments have been proven dead wrong. If we had heeded the freeze movement or the peace movement, we would never have gotten this treaty. Instead, the Soviets would have kept their SS-20's and, worse yet, would have every reason to believe that they could bully and intimidate the alliance. This is not the peace movement's treaty. It is NATO's treaty. As President Reagan has said, "NATO is the real peace movement."

It is not for me or any American to speak on behalf of other countries, in Europe, Canada, or Asia. Our allies can speak for themselves, and they have. They all fully support this treaty. Ratification of this treaty will vindicate our friends, particularly in the INF basing countries who stood by their convictions and their commitment to NATO's dual-track decision. They knew that to strengthen the peace and safeguard our freedoms we must share the risks and responsibilities of deterrence. When the going got tough, they got simply tougher. They deserve our respect. The treaty they helped bring about deserves your support.

Turning to the negotiating track, U.S. INF deployments were absolutely necessary to our success in the negotiations, but they alone could not guarantee a good treaty. That took firmness, patience and hard work at the negotiating table to make good on the courage and steadfastness of our allies.

The President put some of our finest public servants in charge of this effort in Geneva. From 1981 to 1983, Ambassador Paul Nitze led the INF delegation, paired there with Ambassador Ed Rowney who was then chairing the START delegation. Both are present here. From 1985 to 1987, Ambassador Mike Glitman was in charge under the overall leadership of Ambassador Max Kampelman, both here. They did a simply splendid job.

Looking back over the negotiations, I think we can divide them into three periods. From the opening of talks in 1981 until the Soviet walkout in 1983, it is clear that Moscow was simply not willing to bargain seriously or in good faith. The Soviet goal was to block United States deployments while retaining their monopoly of INF missiles. They proposed variations on a freeze which would have left the SS-20's in place and kept us at zero.

The second phase began when the Soviets returned to the talks in 1985. They accepted the reality of U.S. deployments but were still insisting on terms for a treaty that we and our allies could not accept. Sometime in mid or late 1986 they realized this was not going to work.

The third phase began with the important progress the President made on INF at the Reykjavik summit. The Soviets finally agreed on many of the essential basic conditions for an equitable treaty. Wrestling the issues to the ground from then on, however, was a major effort. But we succeeded, including on the all-important verification issues.

The negotiating process was a very tough one. I believe it is quite instructive to go over the rhythm of it in brief so that you can see how we achieved what we did, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take the time to do it.

We knew what we wanted, and we held out until we got it. Our hand was substantially strengthened by the fact that on INF we carried out the most extensive consultative process in the history of the NATO alliance. Moreover, we consulted closely with our friends and allies in Asia and the Pacific. Soviet efforts to split the alliance or play Europe against Asia, flatly failed.

We established the following criteria for an INF agreement which the President set forth. There must be equality of rights and limits. The negotiations must deal with United States and Soviet systems only. Limits must be global, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia or vice-versa. There must be no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability. An agreement must be effectively verifiable.

From the outset our position also called for constraints on Soviet shorter range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of the treaty.

Throughout the negotiations, the United States was willing to consider any approach that met these criteria, but we made clear all along that our strong preference and that of our allies was the zero outcome that President Reagan proposed in November 1981. We persisted in pushing this proposal, even when many derided it as unrealistic, but it was what we and our allies agreed from the beginning would best enhance our security. Our hand was significantly strengthened as well by overwhelming votes of support for this proposal by both Houses of Congress in November 1981.

And I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to a resolution, Congressional Resolution 224, which explicitly endorsed the zero option. It says "Whereas, the President's willingness to cancel deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles"—that is our zero—"if the Soviet Union dismantles its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles"—that's the Soviet zero—"is a dramatic and bold step toward real nuclear arms reduction," and both the Senate and the House voted for that. The Senate voted unanimously. And I might say that every member of this committee who was in office in November 1981 voted for that resolution.

So, the outcome you voted for and endorsed in November 1981 is the outcome that is in this treaty.

Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I will go through the ins and outs of this negotiating process because, as I said, I think it is instructive.

The Soviets initially refused to negotiate insisting that NATO must first renounce deployments. NATO rejected this. The Soviets then proposed a so-called moratorium. As they defined this term, they would have kept their monopoly on INF missiles in Europe and continued their buildup in the eastern U.S.S.R. against their Asian neighbors. NATO rejected this, too.

Ironically, this Soviet approach transformed what had been basically a NATO issue into a broader one, a global one. The range and mobility of the SS-20 made it a threat to all of the Soviet Union's neighbors, wherever it was deployed, and Soviet insistence on excluding their missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. from treaty limits only reinforced our insistence and that of our NATO allies on global limits. As the negotiations proceeded, our NATO discussions were paralleled by intense consultations with our friends and allies in the Far East whose security was also at stake.

The standards I described above, not just global limits, but also United States-Soviet equality, no compensation for third country systems, no adverse impact on NATO's conventional strength, and effective verification, were all embodied in the original United States zero proposal. They were part of every interim proposal we later advanced. In contrast, the Soviets' opening position failed all five of these security criteria.

The Soviets' initial position would have allowed them to keep and expand their SS-20 force while prohibiting any United States deployments, would have thus locked in United States-Soviet inequality. The treaty would have included independent U.K. and French forces, placed no limits on Soviet systems in Asia, and all but eliminated from Europe United States aircraft which play a vital role in NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent. It had no provisions for effective verification. That is where they started.

This basic Soviet approach persisted through the 2 ensuing years of negotiations. So did SS-20 deployments. For its part, NATO went forward with the necessary preparations on the deployment track.

In February 1982, the United States tabled a draft treaty embodying its proposal. The Soviets followed suit in May. We took the initiative in establishing working groups to supplement the efforts of the principal negotiators. We sought to work out common language where there was some convergence in the two draft treaty texts. At the time, we got nowhere on the issues of substance. But this approach would bear fruit later.

The formal negotiations were sometimes supplemented by informal explorations and suggestions. Ambassador Nitze was authorized to probe and explore areas of Soviet flexibility. In June 1982 he initiated a series of private discussions with his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Kvitsinskiy, in an effort to move the negotiations forward. These negotiations came to be known as the "Walk in the Woods."

The two negotiators developed a package to present to their respective capitals for consideration. The details of the package are set forth in a 1983 NATO document, the Progress Report to Ministers of the Special Consultative Group. The package was closely studied in Washington when Ambassador Nitze brought it back. There was concern about certain elements of it, in particular that the Soviets might treat it as a new United States offer and try to split the difference between it and a less forthcoming Soviet position. However, Ambassador Nitze was authorized to continue conversations in the informal channel in the event Kvitsinskiy was prepared to do so.

When Ambassador Nitze returned to Geneva, his Soviet counterpart said he had been instructed by Moscow to reject both the substance of the package and the informal channel itself. The Soviet Union continued to insist on all the unacceptable conditions I have outlined above and was not prepared to destroy a single SS-20 missile. So, that was the end of that.

In March 1983, following extensive consultations with our knowledgeable allies in Japan, the President made a new proposal. While making clear that the zero outcome remained our strong preference, he called for an interim solution. The United States would reduce its planned INF deployments if the Soviet Union reduced its own deployed INF missiles to an equal, nonzero level on a global basis. In May, the United States tabled a draft treaty embodying this proposal. We did not specify a level for an interim outcome but made clear we favored the lowest possible number.

The Soviets flatly rejected our proposal. The extent of Soviet flexibility in the spring of 1983 was their agreement in principle with our position that warheads on deployed missiles could be the unit of account. I might say this was an important thing for us to pocket since we had been arguing not only in INF but in START that it is not just the launchers, it is the warheads and the throwweight that matter. So this as at least something.

Previously they had sought to treat their triple-warhead SS-20 the same as a single-warhead system. They still showed no willingness to engage us on the details of verification.

In September 1983, the Soviets stated they would "liquidate," their word, all missiles that were to be reduced by an agreement. The term was vague and never clearly defined. Amazingly, this announcement garnered a lot of publicity at the time. Can you believe it? In retrospect, it is hard to see why. If missiles that were reduced were not destroyed, what did it mean to reduce them. But it had taken almost 2 years of negotiations for the Soviets to get this far. Contrast this with the minutely detailed provisions that are in the elimination protocol of the treaty now before you.

Later that month, the President made a new proposal. The product of intense consultations within NATO and with Japan, it kept intact the principles I have outlined but dealt with three areas of stated Soviet concern.

Within the context of equal global limits, the United States was prepared to consider a commitment to deploy only part of its overall entitlement in Europe.

Since the Soviets had left a clear public impression that they were particularly concerned about the Pershing II, the United States was prepared to apportion reductions between Pershing II and Cruise missiles appropriately.

Finally, the United States was prepared to explore equal, verifiable limits on specific types, not all, just specific types of longer range United States and Soviet land-based aircraft, consistent with allied criteria for an INF agreement.

The Soviets refused to discuss all three initiatives, or any of them. Nor did they accept our procedural suggestion that the teams in Geneva supplement their plenary meetings with heads of delegation sessions or informal, we called them miniplenaries. Both ideas proved very useful when the Soviets finally accepted them in 1987. But in 1983, the Soviets were not interested.

In October 1983, the Soviet Union offered what it portrayed as a new package of proposals. The proposals may have been new, but the essential outcome was the same. No United States deployments, inclusion of third country systems, no binding limits on Soviet forces in Asia, and aircraft limits that included non-United States and sea-based planes. In other words, they tried to table something just before our deployments to throw off stride our allied plans.

The United States continued to press for progress. In November we proposed a specific global ceiling of 420 deployed INF missile warheads, which took an earlier Soviet number but put it in the context of the United States proposal. That same month, the parliaments of Great Britain, Italy, and Germany each voted to support continued implementation of the dual-track decision. On November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the talks, citing these votes. United States deployments began in December in accordance with the schedule NATO had agreed on. By our count, the Soviets had deployed 360 SS-20's with 1,080 warheads at the time the first United States missiles were deployed.

I make that point because sometimes people say our deployments were provocative, that we were causing the Soviet Union to deploy, but the evidence is stark.

I will not dwell on the Soviet threats about the dire consequences of United States deployments or the requirements they set for talks to resume. We were offered plenty of advice from peace groups and others who took Soviet propagandists at their word when they said Moscow would never again deal with the Reagan administration. But we and our allies simply proceeded with the deployment program that had been agreed in 1979. At the same time, we made clear that we were ready to resume negotiations at any time without preconditions. We were steadfast, and steadfastness paid off.

The Soviets agreed in January 1985 to resume negotiations on INF as part of an overall negotiation on nuclear and space arms. The new INF talks began in March 1985.

Just as the President had refused to make concessions to get the Soviets back to the table, he saw no reason to change our positions simply because they had returned. The Soviets began by proposing new variants of their old moratorium ideas. We rejected these on the basis of longstanding NATO policy that the 1979 deployment track would continue on schedule until a binding and verifiable agreement was reached.

Much of the initial time in the new negotiations was taken up with Soviet propagandizing. They argued that United States deployments were illegal because they circumvented SALT II. This was completely spurious. But we learned a lesson from this reckless argument. We were careful to keep language out of the INF Treaty that could be twisted by the Soviets in the future to make similar arguments whenever we and our allies act to maintain a strong deterrent.

The Soviets spent even more time trying to link INF to the START and space/defense negotiations. They suggested including United States INF missiles in the context of their START proposal, along with United States land- and sea-based aircraft within range of the Soviet Union. Comparable Soviet missiles and aircraft would be excluded. The Soviet START proposal, of course, was in turn linked to their demands in the defense and space negotiation in which they sought to cripple our strategic defense initiative.

The question of whether an INF agreement should be tied to agreements in other areas such as START was one which NATO had already considered in detail. NATO decided that such linkages were artificial and would only delay an agreement that was in Western interests. Accordingly, we have consistently ensured that our INF proposals stood on their own merits.

In November 1985 the President proposed a new approach to an interim agreement providing for equal global limits, while again stressing our strong preference for zero. We offered to cap deployments at the number of launchers scheduled for the end of 1985. In exchange, the Soviet Union would reduce its SS-20 launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number. It would also reduce its remaining launchers, those directly threatening our friends and allies in Asia, by the same proportion as the reductions of launchers in range of Europe.

In the November 1985 Geneva Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to work for an INF interim agreement. We saw this as an encouraging sign that the Soviets might eventually be willing to drop their linkage of INF to other areas of arms control.

In January 1986, the Soviets followed up by tabling a modified INF proposal which did not include a Soviet right to retain a force of SS-20's to match U.K. and French forces. It still called for commitments by those countries not to build up their forces, but for the first time there was an indication that the Soviets were getting the message on the need for United States-Soviet equality.

The next month, in February 1986, the President proposed the phased elimination of INF missiles in 1989, accompanied by detailed verification provisions. But the Soviets rejected the proposal and declined to discuss verification, but there were signs of progress.

By mid-1986, the Soviets were indicating their willingness to drop their demand to include aircraft in an INF agreement. Moreover, they had accepted the idea that shorter range missiles should be limited, although they would not go into details. And they were coming closer to the idea of including their Asian missiles in an agreement, although they were not there yet.

President Reagan wrote General Secretary Gorbachev July 25, 1986, addressing the full range of our agenda with the Soviets. On INF, he made clear his continuing strong preference for zero, but proposed to focus on an interim agreement to facilitate progress.

The letter led to high level discussions of arms control by experts in Moscow in August and in Washington in September, preparatory to a meeting I held with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze later in September.

In the Washington meeting, the Soviets made some informal suggestions which, while falling short of an official proposal, seemed promising. They suggested each side be limited to 100 deployed INF missile warheads in Europe and that we match the Soviet Asian number with systems in the United States

We responded that we could accept this in the context of an equal global limit of 200 warheads. Clearly, we were making progress, but the Soviets still refused to get down to details on verification.

The meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986 was the real breakthrough for the INF talks. Moreover, we made important advances in START and began to develop an approach to deal with the need for predictability as we moved forward on strategic defenses.

Reykjavik set the agenda for the future. From then on, it has been clear that the watchword for the future of arms control is "reductions," structured to enhance stability. In INF the President continued to make clear his strong preference for global zero. Mr. Gorbachev was not prepared to accept this yet, however, and the two leaders agreed to equal global ceilings of 100 warheads, with none in Europe.

This was in essence a variant of the approach the President had proposed in September 1983 and that the Soviets had refused to discuss. A treaty along these lines would have meant that the entire Soviet INF missile arsenal would consist of 33 SS-20's, a massive reduction in the threat to both Europe and Asia.

This would have been a very good result, but in fact we have done even better. Moreover, at Reykjavik the Soviets accepted definitively that neither U.K. and French forces nor United States aircraft were on the table in INF. They agreed that shorter range missiles were part of the INF agenda, although they were not prepared to accept equal global limits. And they at last agreed to some general propositions concerning verification.

Let me stop to compare this situation with what the Soviets were saying when the negotiations began 5 years earlier. Again, I will apply the five criteria I outlined above.

In three of them—United States-Soviet equality, no third country systems, and no impact on NATO's conventional strength—the Soviets had gone from totally disagreeing with us to accepting what we required. The Soviets accepted a fourth criterion—global limits for longer range missiles.

Important details still had to be worked out, none more so than in the fifth principle, verification. Working these details out took more than a year. It was not an easy year. I became personally involved in negotiating those details to a degree I would never have anticipated.

But we succeeded because we persisted. We thought through what we wanted. We never lost sight of our objectives, and we were tough-minded at the negotiating table. And we and our allies proceeded with deployments.

This is not a one-sided agreement. It clearly benefits us, but Mr. Gorbachev would not have signed it if he did not feel that it served his interests to do so. Arms control treaties must by their very nature be of mutual benefit.

Following Reykjavik, the first hurdle to clear was one the Soviets kept moving on and off the negotiating track, linkage with other areas of arms control. Mr. Gorbachev had again made INF hostage to Soviet efforts to cripple SDI. We and our allies simply refused to accept this, and in February of last year the Soviets fell off this demand.

In doing so, however, they began to equivocate about keeping shorter range missiles in an INF agreement. In March 1987, the United States tabled a new draft treaty based on the progress made at Reykjavik and containing detailed verification provisions.

After a brief recess, the Geneva negotiations resumed in April and continued without recess until the treaty was concluded in December. The pace of work accelerated. In April, the Soviets tabled a new draft treaty. On June 1, the United States and Soviet sides agreed on an initial joint draft treaty text. It was heavily bracketed, reflecting continuing areas of disagreement, but it formed the basis of the final treaty that you now have before you.

Meanwhile, in April I held discussions in Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. While there, I had an extended meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. I stressed that the Soviet Union should drop its insistence on retaining 33 SS-20's and instead accept a global zero outcome.

I noted the importance that the President attached to verification and made the point that verifying zero would be both simpler and surer than trying to verify any given number of deployed warheads.

Our allies in Europe and Asia were also hammering home to the Soviets their strong preference for global zero. While in Moscow, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze said that an INF Treaty should include a zero outcome for shorter range missiles in Europe. I told them that any limits on shorter range missiles had to be global. These systems were highly mobile. It simply did not make sense to try to establish regional limits.

After some discussion, Mr. Gorbachev accepted this point and said he would be willing to accept global zero for shorter range missiles. I told him we were agreed that the outcome must be on the basis of global equality. I added, however, that the United States and its allies needed to consider the question of whether zero was the right number.

I stopped at NATO headquarters, which was always my plan, on the way from Moscow to begin a process of consultation on this subject. At this point the United States had no shorter range missiles deployed. We had zero, although we had a number still in storage in the United States.

Thus, as we analyzed it the choice was between accepting the concept of zero such missiles or of going forward with a new deployment program in NATO Europe. It made no sense to reject the idea of zero if we were not prepared to deploy ourselves.

After consulting with allied leaders and thoroughly considering the options, the President decided to propose a worldwide elimination of United States and Soviet shorter range missiles as part of the INF Treaty. This position was formally endorsed at the June meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

In July, the Soviet Union said that it would accept global zero, not just for shorter range missiles, but for intermediate-range missiles as well. The pace at the talks became even more intense. The hard work of our delegation in Geneva was supplemented by several meetings between me and Minister Shevardnadze.

Together with our senior experts, we addressed remaining INF issues, as well as the rest of the President's four-part agenda. Depending on whose capital they occurred in, either the President or Mr. Gorbachev were directly involved in these meetings as well. So, there was directly provided a way for the heads of state to talk to each other.

In INF there were basically three key tasks remaining: Dealing with the issue of Federal Republic of Germany Pershing IA missiles, an issue which the Soviets had elevated to sudden prominence; reaching agreement on the details of effective verification; and ensuring that all of the agreements reached were faithfully and clearly reflected in treaty text.

We met our objectives in all three areas. On the first point, the treaty completely protects our position of principle that there be no limit on third country forces and no impact on existing programs of cooperation with our allies.

Our program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany on their Pershing IA's continues. Chancellor Kohl announced last August that if the INF Treaty entered into force and if the agreed timetable for eliminating INF missiles were adhered to, the Federal Republic of Germany Pershing IA missiles would be dismantled with the final elimination of United States and Soviet INF missiles.

At that point, in accordance with a sovereign German decision, our program of cooperation would have ended. Only then will the U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the German Pershing, IA's be subject to the elimination procedures of this treaty.

On verification, you will be hearing in great detail from other witnesses, but let me stress that this agreement has the most stringent and comprehensive scheme of verification in the history of arms control. We worked at our verification regime thoroughly in Washington, with full interagency participation.

We also consulted closely with our basing country allies whose territory will be directly involved. It took time, but it was well worth it. When the Soviets were finally willing to discuss verification, we were ready. They did so on the basis of thoroughly considered U.S. proposals.

The treaty's verification provisions will ensure our ability to monitor treaty compliance with confidence. They include onsite inspection. National technical means are essential, but we simply are not willing to go back to the days of SALT II, when they were all that was allowed.

One of the most important elements of the INF Treaty is the precedent it establishes in this area, including onsite inspection. The structure of the verification regime has built-in redundancies. This sort of doublechecking is what gives it its power. One layer of the regime builds on another to provide a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Among other things, the treaty provides for a detailed exchange of data, updated periodically, on the location of missile support facilities, the number of missiles and launchers at those facilities, and technical parameters of those systems, continuing notification of movement of missiles and launchers between declared facilities—that happens once the treaty comes into force—an initial baseline inspection to verify the number of missiles and launchers at all facilities declared in the data exchange, an elimination inspection to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers, closeout inspection to verify that the treaty-prohibited activities have ceased at each of the declared facilities, short notice onsite inspections for 13 years at declared and formerly declared facilities, the right to monitor the Soviet SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk around the clock to be sure that it is not being used for SS-20 assembly, and enhancement of national technical means.

Specifically, six times a year the Soviets must, on 6 hours' notice, open the roofs of those SS-25 garages that are not subject to onsite inspection, in order to show that no SS-20's are concealed within, and must display the SS-25 launchers in the open.

In addition to its security advantages, the zero option makes verification easier and more certain. Once the elimination period is over, the existence of any intermediate-range or shorter range missile would be a violation. We can never know for certain that a banned missile is not concealed somewhere in the Soviet Union, but the treaty does not permit the Soviets to maintain essential infrastructure for banned missiles or to conduct flight tests.

Both testing and infrastructure can be detected by national technical means. Without them, the systems simply become obsolete.

Finally, there is the question of the fine print. It is all there for you to see. There are no secret understandings. My transmittal letter to the President includes a detailed explanation of the actual structure and functioning of the treaty and its associated documents.

I believe you will find that the more you study the treaty, the more impressed you will be by the quality of what Ambassador Glitman and his team have negotiated. It took years of bargaining to get where we are today, but the allied position prevailed. It did so because we and our allies made clear to the Soviets that an INF Treaty had to meet NATO security criteria.

We held out for a good treaty and we got it. The treaty reaffirms the principle of equality. There can be no other basis for United States-Soviet arms control.

Because the Soviets had deployed more, the treaty also establishes the principle of asymmetrical reductions. The Soviets will eliminate deployed missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as those eliminated by the United States.

It keeps third country systems and programs of cooperation with our allies completely out—essential precedents for future negotiations.

It does not rely on Soviet goodwill, but rather requires the most comprehensive verification regime ever, including onsite inspections.

It eliminates the SS-20 threat which directly led to the dual track decision. It does not limit U.S. aircraft, which make a critical contribution to NATO's defense. It strengthens deterrence by significantly complicating Soviet attack planning.

From now on, they are denied options that for 30 years they have been able to rely on in any consideration of an attack on NATO. Moreover, by banning shorter range missiles, it also improves NATO's conventional military posture by eliminating systems which could target nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads against NATO's ports and airfields.

I want to take a few minutes to address head on one question which I am sure is on your minds and which Senator Dole mentioned. The Soviet record of compliance with treaties is far from perfect. What does this mean for the INF Treaty?

The basis for the negotiations in the first place is that the parties involved seek to agree on an outcome that is in their mutual interest. The Soviets would not have assumed the obligations in the INF Treaty if they had not found its terms satisfactory.

But we have also learned from experience. We have incorporated into the treaty some lessons we learned the hard way. Its terms are more detailed and precise than those of any of its predecessors.

By making clear what its obligations are, the treaty reduces—it does not eliminate, but reduces—the prospect that the Soviet Union will be tempted to exploit ambiguities or to take actions that may seem to fall in a nebulous grey area.

The structure of the reductions will give us a basis to assess Soviet compliance early on. After the treaty has been in force for 30 days, we have the right to conduct onsite inspections to check data the Soviets have provided us.

From 90 days after entry into force, if the Soviets have any deployed shorter range missile outside a declared elimination facility, that will be a violation. The treaty requires the Soviet Union to destroy all its shorter range missiles within 18 months. From that time on, the existence of any Soviet shorter range missile will be a violation.

This front-end loading means that we will be able to see from the outset whether or not they are complying with treaty obligations of real military significance. The United States will be corraling and destroying shorter range systems in the same timeframe, but for us this will affect missiles in storage, not deployed systems.

The reductions in intermediate range missiles will also be asymmetrical. Both sides will be reducing deployed intermediate-range systems from the outset, but we will keep a substantial force of Pershing II's until well into the final months of reductions.

This should provide a further incentive for the Soviet Union to comply with the timetable it agreed to. At no time during the period of elimination will we be left without missiles of our own.

Moreover, the verification provisions I outlined earlier are unprecedented. Increasing the likelihood of getting caught clearly decreases the attractiveness of cheating.

All of these safeguards are important, but no treaty in and of itself can fully guarantee compliance with its terms. No responsible U.S. official can tell you that we do not need to consider possible cheating. We must react vigorously to questionable Soviet activities.

We have to have the willpower to press them on our concerns. This administration has not hesitated to do so. We have made energetic efforts to get the Soviets to take corrective actions. We have used diplomatic channels with the Soviets. We have reported the facts candidly to the Congress and we have consulted extensively with our allies.

If we detect a Soviet action that seems in violation of their INF Treaty obligations, we will press them on it. Besides regular diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, we will now have a new compliance forum. Article 13 of the treaty establishes the Special Verification Commission, or SVC.

If we detect a suspicious activity, we will initiate an immediate meeting of the SVC. The Soviets cannot refuse. At the SVC, we will have the right to describe our concerns and require a response. The Soviets may be able to demonstrate that the activity in question was not a violation. The SVC will be the place to determine that.

If our concerns are not resolved, we will call for corrective action. If the Soviets were to persist in violating the treaty, we would have to react. There must be a penalty for cheating.

In this area, the administration has shown its determination to take the actions necessary to safeguard our security. Faced with continuing Soviet refusal to live by the rules set by SALT II, the President took an appropriate and proportionate response. Specifically, he decided in May 1986 that future United States decisions on strategic forces would be based on the nature and the magnitude of the Soviet threat, not on standards set by a treaty that was being selectively violated by the Soviet Union.

He has implemented this decision with prudence and restraint. We have identified the Krasnoyarsk radar as a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. We will not agree to any further obligations regarding that treaty until that violation is dealt with satisfactorily.

The pattern of Soviet behavior is not one of wholesale violation of arms control treaties. Their violations have been selective and specific. We must prepare to respond specifically and selectively, with the focus squarely on what is in our own interest.

I believe, for the reasons I have set forth today, that the INF Treaty is in the security interest of the United States. If the Senate does give the President its advice and consent to ratification, it will be because you agree with his judgment and thus, if we ever were to determine that the Soviets were not complying with this agreement, this President or any future President should be able to count on the Senate's support to deal with that fact.

We as a country can safeguard our security only if we are willing to do what is needed to maintain and enhance our strength. If the Soviets cheat on this treaty, the President must be able to count on Congress to help him take the measures necessary to preserve our security and that of our allies, for that is one of the key lessons of INF. If we have the willpower and the strength to see to our own security, we will succeed. If we do not, we have no one to blame but ourselves when we fail.

I have spoken at some length because I wanted to put the INF Treaty in the context of our overall approach to East-West relations. I wanted to explain how it fits into the strategy with which we and our allies have preserved peace and freedom for four decades, a strategy which the Soviets set out to challenge in the 1970's.

I have made clear that this treaty is a substantial achievement. It strengthens Western military security. It sets new standards for arms control. It is a political success for the alliance. Our common achievement, based on close consultations, further strengthens the trans-Atlantic partnership.

The INF Treaty, for all its benefits, leaves us with many challenges still unmet. As we and our allies move forward, we must draw the right lessons from INF. We succeeded in getting a good treaty because we persisted in our approach. If we and our allies had not gone forward with deployments or if we had not had the courage of our convictions at the bargaining table, none of this could have been achieved.

There is much more to United States-Soviet relations than arms control, and we need to conduct those relations for the long term. We must not be misled by atmospherics. We need to watch the substance.

It is just as dangerous to fall victim to euphoria when things are going well as it is to succumb to hysteria when there are problems. In dealing with the Soviet Union, INF shows that the key to success is strength, solidarity, and a clear-eyed understanding of what we ourselves want to accomplish.

That is the only basis on which to build a structure of peace that will weather good times and bad. We and our allies face many challenges. NATO must continue to field the forces necessary to carry out its commitment to flexible response.

There are substantial United States nuclear forces in place in Europe, including weapons on aircraft, that can reach deep into the Soviet Union. Together with the U.S. troop presence, they constitute a convincing deterrent in their own right and a clear link to the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee.

In 1983, NATO adopted the Montebello Nuclear Modernization Program, which they agreed was essential whether or not we reached an INF agreement. We must proceed with it so that our nuclear forces in Europe maintain their capability to fulfil their mission of deterrence.

This treaty does not resolve the conventional imbalance in Europe. That was not its objective. The security criterion which we established was that, in improving the nuclear balance, the treaty not harm NATO's conventional capabilities.

The treaty more than meets that standard. NATO has agreed that the next priorities in arms control are 50 percent START cuts, a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, and establishing a stable and secure conventional balance in Europe by eliminating disparities. In all these areas, the INF Treaty sets precedents that will serve us well, including asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification.

And the treaty shows the importance of negotiating from strength and of being patient, determined, and purposeful at the bargaining table. In START, as in INF, the initial concept proposed by the President is turning out to be the basis for a possible agreement. In the case of START, the President set the goal in his May 1982 proposal of significant reductions structured to enhance stability.

At each of his meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, the President has moved us closer to this goal. At the December Washington summit, we agreed on essential constraints and counting rules and on verification guidelines that go even beyond the advances of INF. As we saw in INF, the indispensable next step is to translate these advances into treaty text. Doing so is a top priority for our team in Geneva.

We have an ambitious agenda. The INF Treaty in no way signifies that we can relax our efforts. Instead, the treaty is a concrete demonstration of the fact that in conducting our relations with the Soviet Union, we must hold true to our policy of realism, strength, and dialog. And it also is a concrete demonstration that NATO, now nearly 40, with both the wisdom of time and the vigor of youth, continues to preserve peace and freedom for ourselves and for our allies.

Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for your forbearance with my lengthy statement, but the subject is important, and I wanted to give you as full an accounting of what happened as I possibly could.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for a full and articulate presentation of the viewpoint that we should ratify this treaty.

For a moment I would like to recess the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene this same day.]

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask, if I could, that the timekeeper be sure to limit all of us to the maximum 10 minutes. Any of us who feel they do not want to use their 10 minutes, their views will be gratefully received.

The first question I would like to ask the Secretary is what would be the risk if we did not go ahead and ratify this treaty, or if we accepted an amendment requiring renegotiation with the Soviet Union?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, of course, if you will advise us that it must be renegotiated, that will be a very difficult matter because the treaty represents a long process of negotiation. But if there is something of substantive importance that somebody brings up that we have not thought of, of course, we want to hear about it.

I believe that it has been thoroughly gone into and that that will not be necessary. But I am not saying we are perfect. We have tried to do a very good job here, and I think it will hold up.

The CHAIRMAN. But what would be the political impact if it were, the extreme example, if it were rejected?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this treaty deserves your support on its merits, for what it does. I have described for you the detailed process of consultation and the sense in which this is our treaty, but really it is a treaty of the NATO alliance. It was never more clear to me than when, following the ceremony here in Washington, which was highly publicized, I went to NATO. In fact, my plane took off about 15 minutes after General Secretary Gorbachev's took off, and I spent the following period in Europe.

And following lunch on that Friday we had another signing ceremony. At that ceremony, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, of the Federal Republic of Germany, of Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and I signed agreements, and those agreements were necessary for our treaty to go into effect because those countries had to agree to Soviet inspectors coming onto their soil and arranging the conditions for that to be so.

So, it dramatically illustrated how tied-in together we are with our allies on this, and I have reported to you how strongly our allies support this treaty. And there have been many statements of support made by virtually all of the main political leaders in Europe. And I would be glad to read them out to you should you wish to.

So, obviously there would be immense disappointment if this treaty were rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The most important criterion in judging and arms control pact to my mind would be whether or not it reduces the risk of nuclear war. In this regard, do you believe that this treaty would reduce the deliberate initiation, stupid as that action might be, but that it would reduce the deliberate initiation of nuclear hostilities.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I believe that this treaty helps us in our deterrent capability both in conventional and the nuclear sense, as I have explained. So, I do think thereby it reduces that risk, perhaps just a little. There are lots of nuclear weapons left. So this is, as many have said, perhaps a first step. Personally I hope that that is the case, but there is a lot of work to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it in your view affect the nuclear threshold in Europe?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, to the extent that it improves the conventional situation a little bit, it does that. But I think the way to work at the so-called nuclear threshold is to be sure we follow through on the modernization decision, the Montebello modernization decision, and look to the strength of our forces, our conventional forces, and of course, on that basis, also be ready to negotiate about these asymmetries in conventional forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

In your statement you touched on the verifiability of the treaty with the view that this treaty is effectively verifiable.

What would be your stand—and nothing could be 100-percent verifiable, but might the uncertainty be a small percentage, 2 or 3 percent? Or do you see this being larger than that?

Secretary SHULTZ. The way I have organized my own thinking on this is as follows. Let us identify the things that we can monitor and know about with virtually total confidence. Then let us identify the things about which our confidence is less and see what our estimates about those matters are and how the Soviet declarations match up with them. And then let us see where in the treaty provisions there may be, from the redundancy I mentioned, some way of giving us reassurance on the things we are less confident of.

So, having said that, what are the things that we can know about with great confidence?

We are quite confident, and the Intelligence Committee is, of knowing the number of deployed SS-20's and the other missiles. When we observe the elimination of them, we can be quite confident that that will have been done.

We can monitor the production at the SS-25 assembly facility, which was also the assembly facility for the SS-20. We have a right to examine everything that comes out of that plant that is big enough to carry an SS-20, to x-ray it, and we can on a random basis sample six per year by opening the canister and examining it by means that allow us to have a more thorough investigation even than what amounts to an x-ray. So, we have a good reading on the production.

Finally, we can know if any SS-20 is flight tested.

Now, what we do not know as confidently is the number of nondeployed SS-20's or the other missiles. On the other hand, of course, our intelligence community makes estimates about these matters, and with all of the missiles involved in this treaty with the exception of the SS-20, the Soviet declarations that we have so far fall completely consistent with our estimates. In the case of the SS-20, most of the intelligence community's estimators feel that what they have submitted is perfectly consistent. There is some difference of opinion about that.

So, that leaves you with a question mark. That is where the zero option comes into play because the zero option means that there is no flight testing, let alone training of infrastructure. And the flight tests can be detected.

In order for a weapon system to be operable, you have to test it. The Soviets are big testers in their programs, and they would test the SS-20, as I understand it, some 10 to 20 times a year. So, if they cannot test it, it in effect becomes obsolete, and therefore, if our estimate of nondeployed missiles is off, or if there is cheating, I will put it that way—it is not whether our estimate is off but whether there is cheating—then that is a way of dealing with it.

So, taking these things all together and putting it together with the incentives the Soviets have to go ahead and conform with what they have agreed to, my own comfort level is a reasonable one on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

I was struck with your statement that a nuclear weapon, in order to be operable, has to be tested. I think you are right, and that is why some of us support the test ban. But that is a separate subject.

Secretary SHULTZ. That is a different kind of testing. The kind of testing that you observe is the testing of the missile, and you see it fly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

What would be the difference, as a source of giving you some assurance in verification, what would be the difference between the Special Verification Commission and the present Consultative Standing Committee?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we think it will be good to give this process some new life, and in the concept of this new commission, it is something that can be called by either party whenever it wishes to call it; that is, whenever there is something bothering you, you can have a meeting and the other side must come and so on, as distinct from the idea of a standing group that is just sort of there and develops its own routines.

And we think perhaps that will mean that when a meeting is held, it appears to be something of special significance because a problem has been identified that calls the meeting into being, and therefore it will be a more vigorous effort, and we will not have somebody who is just appointed for that, and that is that person's job. The attendance at the meeting and the representation at the meeting will be at a level called for by whatever the problem is.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

My time has expired.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I, as did other Senators, made a lot of appearances during the holiday season, and I was both surprised and pleased at the interest in this treaty. There are a lot of skeptics, there are a lot of people who want to accept any treaty. You have a full range of opinions.

I guess the most unusual comment that I heard was in Florida when a man came up to me and said "All of you ought to be put under oath, hold up the Bible, swear you are telling the truth," which indicates the confusion and the distrust that has built up because of SALT I, SALT II, and other treaties, ABM, involving the Soviets.

Secretary SHULTZ. It might not be a bad idea for all of us on all occasions.

Senator HELMS. I am willing.

Secretary SHULTZ. Whenever you are out campaigning, or any time. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. In any case, it is not necessary because anybody who misleads a committee of the Congress or the Congress itself is committing a felony under the law, as you know. So, it is not necessary.

Mr. Secretary, I guess all of us have more paper on our desks than we can read. I'm sure you do. I do. I got back here last Thursday from North Carolina, and a document was brought to me dated the day before, last Wednesday, and when I read this classified document, I realized that in my judgment, at least, it was of paramount importance to our national security, and I felt frankly that I would not be responsive to my duty as a Senator if I did not do my best to make sure that this document was studied at the highest levels, including yourself and the President of the United States.

Perhaps you have read it, perhaps you have not. I do not want to take a chance on that. I am going to ask somebody who is cleared to take this document to you. I assume that everybody behind you is cleared and has top clearance.

Mr. Chairman, I want to use part of my time for the Secretary to read this brief document and then tell me whether it is authentic.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would point out that I would have a hard time with this. It is labeled top secret. There are cameras all around. People can take pictures. I just do not think this is a place to open this document up for, in effect, public inspection.

I do not know what it says, but you have a label on it of classified.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me ask you this. Has Judge Webster talked to you about my letter?

Secretary SHULTZ. I have read your letters, more than one.

Senator HELMS. Well, then, you read the attachment to it, then, is that so?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have read an attachment to a letter. Whether I am talking about the same one as you, I do not know.

Senator HELMS. Well, I did not send but one.

The attachment that you read, do you consider that authentic, native, good intelligence?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it represents itself as being a set of quotations from highly classified materials that are in the hands of the intelligence people.

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Secretary SHULTZ. And how you came to have that, I have no idea. You have a better access than I do to whatever they are doing. But in any case, that has been examined. Personally, from what I have been able to ascertain in the time that I have had to check into that or have people check into it, the problems can be dealt with satisfactorily.

But I think you have to discuss this in a closed hearing.

Senator HELMS. I agree.

Secretary SHULTZ. And you need to do it with the people who originated these documents.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am encouraged that you have read my letter to Judge Webster, and my enclosure.

Secretary SHULTZ. Could I get this hot document out of my hands?

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Secretary SHULTZ. Before I violate the law?

Senator HELMS. Give it back tc me.

Well, just to satisfy the record on this thing, at 9:30 this morning I had a hand-delivered letter from Judge Webster which says "Dear Senator Helms: I am responding to your letters of January 22, 1988, to General Odum and me. We have reviewed the highly sensitive, classified information cited in the attachment to your letter. This information is, in fact, contained in a recent draft of Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 4/11/88. The information is substantively accurate, although the final wording in the published version will in some cases be slightly different."

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask unanimous consent that Judge Webster's letter be made a part of the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Secretary SHULTZ. What is really getting to me as part of the administration, Senator, is that you seem to have access to the early drafts of what the intelligence community is doing, let alone what they finally conclude.

Senator HELMS. I have a lot of people around town.

Secretary SHULTZ. I am lucky to get what they finally conclude.

Senator HELMS. I have a lot of people around town trying to be helpful.

Secretary SHULTZ. You have got them penetrated, as they say.

Senator HELMS. You did not answer my question.

Will you as a favor to me, and I think a favor to the country, call this to the attention of the President and make sure he takes a look at it?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President certainly will be fully apprised of this, and probably is already. I have not seen him since Friday.

Senator HELMS. But you will make sure that he is or has been?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I will.

Senator HELMS. I thank you very much.

I still have a little time before I get to the red light.

Senator EVANS. Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me that we are supposed to be operating as a committee. This conversation has gone back and forth sailing over the heads of everyone on the committee with the exception of the ranking member, and to a degree, I guess, the Secretary of State.

I think that if this matter is important and has anything to do with the ratification of the INF Treaty, it ought to be subjected to a special meeting of the committee so we can all be apprised of what this is about. That would certainly be better than having mysterious communications going back and forth during an open hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on Friday we will have Judge Webster and the CIA up here to brief us in a secure location.

Senator HELMS. I thank the Senator for his suggestion, and I thank the chairman. I think we should have an executive session on this, perhaps over in the Capitol room.

Meanwhile, any Senator who wants to see this, it is on file now with the Senate Intelligence Committee, and if you have any difficulty about finding it, we will provide somebody to point out exactly where it is in the files.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry without it being taken from Senator Helms' time?

Senator HELMS. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator SARBANES. I notice that the letter from Director Webster to Senator Helms from which Senator Helms quoted, goes on to say "In some cases the citations omit reference to important caveats and additional observations. These statements are excerpts from a much broader set of judgments and issues regarding the monitoring of the INF Treaty, and in my view, by themselves do not constitute a sufficient basis on which to draw conclusions about the overall monitorability of the treaty."

I take it this letter is now in the public record?

The Chairman. Correct.

Senator Sarbanes. Fine.

The Chairman. Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Any Senator who wants to judge for himself as to the importance of this, the Senate National Security Office is in S-407 of the Capitol. It is not the Intelligence Committee.

Let me just ask one question, and I am not being argumentative.

Why do you suppose that so many errors were made not only by the President, not only by the Vice President, not only by yourself, not only by a myriad of Senators on the floor of the U.S. Senate in December about the destruction of warheads?

Secretary Shultz. I do not recall any errors I made on that subject.

Senator Helms. Well, I think you did say, and I will give you at least the quote——

[The material referred to reads as follows:]

> * * * This treaty, which is now basically complete, will for the first time, by agreement, result in major reductions of nuclear arms.
>
> It is an important first step. The Soviet side will eliminate about 1,500 deployed INF warheads. The U.S. side will eliminate about 350. The numbers of warheads is asymmetrical because the deployments have been asymmetrical. [George P. Shultz, Press Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, November 24, 1987, Department of State Press Release No. 223]

Secretary Shultz. Let me describe the warhead process which is essentially what we have agreed upon. Each side takes from its missile, which sends a reentry vehicle at you, takes this reentry vehicle and may remove from it the fissionable material, the nuclear explosive device, and if you choose, the guidance system. You then return that to wherever you store such things.

Then what is left, some people call that a warhead, some people call that a reentry vehicle, whatever you call it, whatever is left—and it is a substantial and important piece of equipment because it provides you with something that comes back into the atmosphere, withstands the heat and all of that—that is crushed, destroyed.

So, whatever you want to call that, that is destroyed. It is not usable anymore. So, there is no projectile to send it anywhere, and there is no capsule or whatever you want to call this reentry vehicle, for a nuclear charge or explosive to be in.

That is the way restrictions and eliminations have always been conducted. And the reasons for that are that each side does have a nuclear arsenal. We depend today, whether we like it or do not like it, on nuclear deterrence to keep the peace. And so unlike the case of a, say, SS-20 missile, which will not be produced anymore, there is no limitation whatsoever in this treaty against continuing to produce nuclear fissionable material.

So, you do not really achieve very much. And the process of destruction of something of this kind is not the easiest thing. In fact, even removing them from the reentry vehicle and so on is something you do with extreme care.

So, I think that the confusion that has been caused, if there is any, is a result of not making clear exactly what piece of this process you are talking about.

At one time toward the end of our negotiations, the Soviets pulled a propaganda trick, and a lot of people fell for it They said they want to destroy warheads and the United States does not. Their position in Geneva was precisely the same as our position. But that got a lot of furor, and many people sort of fell into that trap that somehow the Soviet Union wanted to deal with these nuclear charges, as they call them, and we did not. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

And it was from that that much of this furor started. But that is a description of the process that has been agreed to, and I think I am substantially accurate. I had better just check.

Senator HELMS. Well, Mr. Secretary—I will wind up here in just one moment, Mr. Chairman—the treaty talks about a nuclear warhead device. That is the treaty language.

Now, we can talk about the fissionable material, where you got your opinion on that, but I know that there is no question about what the treaty says with respect to the destruction of the warheads.

Now, let me just ask you one more time—and this is my last——

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. In other words, the treaty sets out what I just described. It gives you an explicit process, describes it.

Senator HELMS. Well, just let me ask you a yes-or-no question because other Senators have questions.

Are nuclear warheads and their associated guidance elements to be eliminated and destroyed by the terms of this treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have just described what is to take place, and I will try it again.

The reentry vehicle that holds the nuclear charge and in some cases has a guidance system connected with it is taken by each side, and the nuclear fissionable material is removed. And if you choose, the guidance system can be removed.

Then, what remains, whatever you want to call it, let us call it a reentry vehicle, is then brought to the elimination area and is dealt with decisively, crushed, I guess.

Senator HELMS. Well, Article II, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Elimination reads as follows: "Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed."

Incidentally, the day that you referred to, the fact that the warheads would be removed, was November 24, 1987. I wanted to give you that. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have always had in mind this process because it was after this little propaganda effort on the part of the Soviets that they came here, and we called them on it and said, "Here is what we agree to, here is what you agree to." Is that right? Yes? Well, all right. Let us specify it.

And that is what we did, and that is always what I have had in my mind.

Senator HELMS. Well, maybe we can explore what is in everybody's mind on this thing as we proceed with these hearings, and I thank the Secretary very much.

Chairman PELL. Thank you, Senator Helms. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, I would like to begin by commending you on your excellent presentation and your skillful negotiations, and say that I am always happy to be on the same side when possible.

I would like to add that this time I am enthusiastic in my support, which may hurt your efforts.

Secretary SHULTZ. Indeed, you are a full voting Member of the Senate. One vote is important.

Senator BIDEN. That is true, and I appreciate your generosity, Mr. Secretary.

Before I get to my questions, I would like to follow up, within my time on the point made by Senator Helms. Senator Helms and others who oppose this treaty are in good faith, I think, attempting to paint a picture that I do not see as accurate. They are attempting to say in layman's terms, that you are going to take the nuclear bombs off the missiles and you are going to destroy the missiles Then you are going to be able to take the nuclear bombs as they are and place them on top of new missiles (or on old missiles that are not covered by the treaty) in the Soviet Union. And therefore nothing is really changing.

My question in simple layman's terms is, assuming one is in compliance with the treaty, if the fissionable material and the guidance system is taken out of the reentry vehicle, can those two things (the fissionable material and the guidance system) without any reconfiguration or without any change, simply be taken and put on top of another missile and still work?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I am not competent to answer that question, and I am not so sure that is a good question for an open hearing. But I do not know the answer to that, literally.

I assume there are some missiles of different ranges that might be so configured. I do not know. In any case, what you have is fissionable material and it can be reconfigured.

Senator BIDEN. The point is that it has to be reconfigured. But I will get back to that. I am sure we are going to hear about this a lot, and I mean that in all sincerity. It is going to be an issue that I hope we will resolve.

Secretary SHULTZ. What cannot be done is to have any missile of the ranges specified here in operation, and I might say with conventional or nuclear warheads or chemical warheads, which is one of the points I made particularly in connection with their shorter range systems which we eliminated and which I think does have some meaning for us.

Senator BIDEN. I understand, Mr. Secretary. But I do not think that is the point the Senator from North Carolina is making. But I will go back to that later.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is important that we all state up front what is at stake here. What is at stake here is much more than this particular treaty. What is at stake is the future of arms control, the health of the NATO alliance, and the future of United States-Soviet relations.

I believe that is why Senator Helms and those in the Senate who oppose this treaty or who want to attach killer amendments to the treaty and those outside the Senate who are going after this treaty are so vehement about it.

The INF agreement covers only 4 percent of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. That is not the reason its opponents are so excited in my opinion. The reason why they are so excited is they wish very much to see to it that there is no START agreement. They wish very much to see to it that there is no agreement with the Soviets on strategic nuclear weapons.

So I would like to suggest that the fact that you are here on behalf of this administration indicates that you offering a clear affirmation of the truth that previous administrations have in fact taken as a basic premise—namely, that arms control can enhance American security.

And I hope we can use these hearings to build a broad consensus based on that principle.

Secretary SHULTZ. Before Senator Helms goes out of the room, may I just make a comment?

Senator BIDEN. If it does not come out of my time.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not accept that he is necessarily opposed to this treaty. He has raised a lot of searching questions about it, and I hope to persuade him.

Are you persuadable, Senator?

Senator BIDEN. Good luck, Mr. Secretary. [Laughter.]

I hope you are not as naive with the Soviets. [Laughter.] Or optimistic.

Now, Mr. Secretary, my, time is about to go and I would like to get to my questions. It has been alleged by some that our European allies hold private views about the INF treaty that differ from their public declarations. I wish to note that at Senator Pell's request I traveled to Europe earlier this month to examine this question. After extensive consultation with Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Thatcher and scores of European officials and parliamentarians, I conclude that our NATO allies overwhelmingly favor prompt ratification of the INF treaty.

I got a slightly different message than that which you have conveyed here. I heard descriptions such as, if we do not ratify the treaty, it will be a catastrophe. Margaret Thatcher said it will be the end of U.S. presidential authority.

Others, high ranking officials, including people who had opposed the treaty, like Defense Minister Giraud in France, also said it would be catastrophic. So what I heard from European leaders, from hour-long meetings in private with Chancellor Kohl to similar amounts of time with the others, is that they think it would be absolutely devastating to the alliance if the INF treaty is not ratified.

And they point out further that INF deployments are over, anyway. The idea that if we do not ratify the treaty but would expect to continue to deploy Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe is a preposterous notion, according to the leaders with thom I spoke.

I think two initial points need to be made about the treaty. Since your statement seeks to differentiate the INF Treaty as a unique achievement in the history of arms control——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden, if you would forgive me for a moment, there is a rollcall vote going on and we have about 10 minutes, perhaps 8 minutes, left.

Senator **Biden**. Good. If I keep going, I will get my time in.

So without wishing to detract from the treaty, I would like to move to a few points.

Secretary **Shultz**. Could I make a comment on what you said on the allies views?

Senator **Biden**. Yes.

Secretary **Shultz**. I tried to say in a gentle way what you said. I believe what you said is true.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you.

Secretary **Shultz**. However, the reason I put it in a gentler way is that I believe this treaty stands on its feet as a meritorious treaty.

Senator **Biden**. I agree.

Secretary **Shultz**. There are people saying this is a bad treaty, but you have to ratify it now that it has been negotiated, basically for the reason that you say. But that to me is not the reason why you should ratify it.

You should ratify it because it is a good treaty.

Senator **Biden**. I might add, each of those leaders said that also.

Secretary **Shultz**. Thank you.

Senator **Biden**. President Mitterrand said that. Chancellor Kohl said that. Prime Minister Thatcher said that all by itself it is a good treaty and is a great victory for the alliance—an incredible victory for the alliance.

But notwithstanding that victory, there are now two concerns I would like to address. And I am not going to get a chance to hear your answer because we are going to leave, and maybe when we come back you can pick up on the answer.

Senator **Biden**. The first concern I would like to raise is that, notwithstanding the fact that the INF treaty is a good agreement, should we not end up with a significant START agreement, the Soviets still have the ability to use existing noncovered systems such as SS-25's to cover targets that are now covered by the SS-20's being removed in Europe.

Without any SALT limitations the Soviet Union still has the ability to replace long range systems that can do exactly what the intermediate range systems do and remain totally in compliance with the INF Treaty. In effect the result may be to render the positive military impact of the treaty null and void, because all the Soviets have to do is, every place there is an SS-20, put in an SS-25 or put anything else in that is not covered by the treaty.

And so I would like to raise at some time when we are going to have more time with you, the possibility of seeking assurances from the Soviet Union that they will not exceed, while you are negotiating a START agreement, the existing number of launchers—I realize that we are not talking about warheads—that they now have in their arsenal. Warheads are not covered.

The second point that I would like to raise is that there is a volume of joint hearings which were conducted last year by the Senate Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees entitled "The ABM Treaty and the Constitution."

These documents treat the problem in detail of whether or not the notion of reinterpretation of a treaty is appropriate and what is the proper interpretation of a treaty. One of the things we are going to have to do (and what I am considering doing and would like your input on) is to present a proposal during the markup of the resolution of ratification for a two-part condition.

The first part would be a so-called category I condition, a condition that is binding on the United States and our own behavior. It references the text of the treaty as currently understood by the executive branch and the Senate as the sole basis of the U.S. interpretation of a treaty throughout the life of the treaty, as required by the Constitution.

The second part is a so-called category II condition, which requires that the President formally inform the Soviet Union at the time of ratification that the United States intends throughout the life of the treaty to interpret the treaty in accordance with current understandings of that text and will regard any other interpretation of the treaty by the Soviets as a violation of the treaty, warranting an appropriate response.

I would hope that this two-part condition would prevent any application of the so-called Sofaer doctrine by future United States administrations or by a Soviet counterpart of Mr. Sofaer in future years.

Mr. Secretary, now let me turn your attention to my earlier comment. Naturally, all of us hope for a successful negotiation of a START treaty. But as realists, we must recognize that such a treaty could be years, maybe not months, away.

I hope it is only months away, but it could be years. What confidence do you have that the INF Treaty will not be rendered meaningless or at least less significant by an unlimited proliferation of strategic systems by the Soviets that are not covered by the INF treaty?

And more specifically, should we not attach a condition to the INF Treaty that does something to prevent circumvention by at least locking the parties into some level of total numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles?

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course, this treaty does not in any way limit the production and deployment of systems that go beyond the ranges that are limited in this treaty. Therefore, obviously, you can do exactly as you say.

The reverse was true and in a sense led to the INF negotiations. The strategic arms treaties left out of a count missiles that had a range that was not intercontinental. So it was, so to speak, a loophole.

Therefore, as the President set out his arms control approach early in the administration, it was comprehensive and we continued to push for a START treaty. So, I can only say that the problem that people have in their minds we have in our minds, and it is why it is important to try to get if we can a good agreement on strategic arms.

But it has got to be a good agreement.

Senator BIDEN. When I was in Moscow—and I apologize for the interruption, but the vote is about to be called. When I was in Moscow the week before last, I was led, after meetings with Mr. Gromyko and others, to believe that the Soviets were willing to voluntarily abide by the SALT limitations on total numbers of delivery vehicles. That is what I was told.

Now, have they told you that, and can you give us any assurance that they are likely to live within those limits and not just proliferate new systems while you are negotiating the START agreement?

Secretary SHULTZ. We had for a while a no undercut policy. The President reluctantly had to drop that policy because of Soviet violations of the SALT II treaty as we understood it.

This gets back to the compliance issue that we were discussing earlier. Now, once you start negotiating some aspect of the SALT II treaty—you are out of time.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. You are right, I am out of time, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, I hate to do this. We are going to reconvene at 2. If we could start at that question, I will not ask any more questions, but if you could finish your answer more fully at that time so that the committee is not deprived of the answer.

The hearing is recessed until 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met at 2 p.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Sanford, Adams, Moynihan, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans, and McConnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will please come to order.

I believe that, when we had recessed, Senator Biden had finished with his questions, but that there is still an answer to be forthcoming from the Secretary. So, before turning to Senator Lugar, maybe the Secretary would be kind enough to give his answer to that question.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, would you be kind enough or would the Secretary be kind enough to summarize the question?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been suggested to me that we hold off on that response to Senator Biden until he comes.

Secretary SHULTZ. And then he can paraphrase his question.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, I would turn to Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I simply want to start by offering my congratulations to you and to President Reagan for the skill and dogged determination with which you pursued the negotiations leading successfully to the INF Treaty that we now have before us.

I commend the President and you for your willingness to involve Members of the Senate in the consultation process. For that reason, in my judgment there are few surprises for us in this treaty.

At the beginning of the negotiating process, the administration laid out a number of objectives to be accomplished. The Secretary has affirmed this morning—that those objectives were achieved.

Mr. Chairman, many of the views and concerns expressed by skeptics of the treaty, as I think we have discovered already, may have less to do with the treaty itself than with the lessons that are to be drawn from it. And drawing the right lessons is certainly important, but it is no substitute for a thorough review of the issues and the treaty's text, which you have certainly given us this morning.

The course of the debate in the Senate, particularly with respect to the post-INF environment in Europe, could have greater impact on allied thinking and politics than the anticipated political and military consequences of the treaty itself.

A debate exaggerating either the supposed accomplishments or the deleterious impact of the treaty on the NATO alliance and U.S. force postures could have a profound negative influence on the allied psychology of deterrence, as well as the political will to undertake the needed force posture improvements in the conventional as well as nuclear areas.

Many of the most wrenching debates within the alliance on military strategy and the credibility of extended deterrence have originated in the United States, among Americans, with primarily domestic political origins, and then transferred to Europe, with detrimental political and military consequences.

Our debates in the Senate should be instructive, pointing the way toward an appreciation of the limited scope of this initial treaty, as well as the needed adjustments to be taken in light of the treaty.

But the debates could be destructive, casting unwarranted doubts on the utility of the alliance, our force structure as well as a strategy which has served American national security interests well in the postwar era.

I make these points because I think at the outset of these hearings and the debate in the Senate we ought to note that the proper role of the Senate itself in the treatymaking process is in question. Some Members wish to avoid a controversy that has attended recent interpretations of the ABM Treaty, but others may wish to use the debate and the treaty as a vehicle for revisiting issues associated with SALT II, with nuclear testing, with the ABM Treaty, with SDI, and with other issues.

In short, some opponents as well as some supporters of this treaty, will wish to use the occasion to fight past battles or to set the terms for future ones. It is incumbent in my judgment on the Senate to acquit itself in a careful examination during debate on the provisions of this INF Treaty if an appropriate and responsible role for the Senate in the treatymaking process is to be firmly established in the minds of this and future administrations, Congresses, and, most of all, the American people.

Arms control cannot be expected to carry the full weight of the burden of the Soviet-American relationship. This INF Treaty cannot be expected to carry the full weight of arms control and force modernization programs across the spectrum of strategic, conventional, chemical, and battlefield nuclear forces.

To be sure, much of our debate may be as much about force modernization as force reductions. And that is not necessarily bad, because arms control agreements must be placed in a proper national security context, as supplements rather than substitutes for a sound national defense posture.

The test of any arms control agreement or force modernization program is whether it enhances the national security interests of the United States; that is the test that we should apply to the INF Treaty.

Mr. Secretary, let me just commence by saying that, already in the short time you have been questioned both of the fears that I have with regard to the debate have been expressed. On the one hand, it seems to me there is a school of thought in the Senate, that does not favor any serious negotiations with the Soviet Union, that does not believe such treaties are worth the paper they are printed on, and that suggests that our security is weakened by the very process of negotiations.

But there is another school of thought that abounds in the Senate, by friends of this treaty who will seek to use it to pursue other issues and to further other agendae,

It seems to me, quite rightly, this morning you dealt with the importance of this treaty. It has limited importance. It is a strong step in the right direction. It stands on its own terms as an important work.

Mr. Secretary, you also dealt with a very important set of definitions that I would hope you and others would reduce to writing and publicize widely, the definition of "warhead" for example. This particular term is likely to plague us throughout the debate if we do not fasten down very early on precisely what we are talking about.

And I see one further catch developing as the hearings proceed, and that is the so-called but misnamed noncircumvention article. Article 14 did not come up this morning here, but it is one of those areas about which there seems to be considerable doubt even among members who I gather are friends of the treaty. They are not certain what this article means, why it was included in the treaty or what specifically it covers with regard to ongoing modernization programs.

So, I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you and your colleagues would address article 14 so that this relatively obscure provision, but one which holds importance for many, might be clarified for all.

For my own part, I believe the treaty has been skillfully drawn, but I suspect that we need to become better informed about the treaty's verification provisions—that is, the prospects for adequate monitoring of Soviet activities, the redundancy of the monitoring procedures, as well as the consequences of Soviet noncompliance.

Let me just ask one question which was raised by Senator Dole in his opening statement. How do we react if, in the inspections that are called for after the signing of the treaty we find violations?

You mentioned in your testimony that we reserve the right to make appropriate responses to that. It is not clear, I think, to many of us what types of responses would be appropriate, or if the administration pledges to respond at all or simply reserves the right to do so.

This may be a question that has not been thought through. But I would hope that you are prepared during the course of the debate to indicate how seriously the United States would take the detection of cheating, and what we were likely to do about it.

Do you have any comment at this juncture on that?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I do. Let us take the example you gave. Suppose there is something we observe that raises a question of possible violation early on. That was your example. What would we do?

First, we would convene the Special Verification Committee, and if we make a request, according to the treaty, then the Soviets must come. We would present our evidence and our concern, and we would hear what response they had.

Maybe they will have an explanation. Maybe it is not a violation. If it is a violation, the first thing to be done is to have it corrected. So that would be one possible action.

Now, as I brought out in my testimony, however, the process through which the missiles that are deployed and in inventory are destroyed is heavily front-end loaded, which means it is very disproportionate. We have no deployed short-range missiles as defined in this treaty. They have many.

All of them must be destroyed within 18 months, and those that are deployed are to be moved within, I think, 90 days. These are all things we can see. It does not affect the status of our deployment at all.

Similarly, since their deployments are very asymmetrical as compared with ours, we have a schedule according to which missiles are taken out of deployment status and moved toward destruction and destroyed, in which they come down, obviously, much faster than we do, until we reach a point of equivalence well along in the process.

So, once again, on the longer range missiles there is an asymmetric pattern of taking them out of operation. What that means is that we continue to have deployed missiles on hand, and if we felt that the violation was serious we could call them off, without having to redeploy.

So, those are examples, and that is in response to your specific question.

When you come down to the end, however, after the treaty is in force, everything has been destroyed and you are sort of in a steady state, if there is some major violation that is militarily significant, then there has to be a presumption that the Congress as well as the administration is ready to do something about it.

And this administration has shown that it is ready to take actions in response to violations.

Senator LUGAR. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Senator Biden is with us. Maybe you could answer the question that he had posed here before.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. If I could take just one more minute, Senator Lugar referred to the noncircumvention provision. There is no noncircumvention provision. We refused to put one in because such a provision had been in SALT II and it was used, we felt, in an unwarranted way.

So, article 14 is not of that phraseology at all, and so it has a much narrower, more operational focus to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Perhaps you could answer Senator Biden's question, or maybe you would like to condense it?

Senator Biden. Yes. As we had to break for the vote, Mr. Secretary, I had asked what assurances, if any, we have from the Soviet Union that they will not increase the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that they have in the absence of a START agreement. I am concerned that the Soviets may circumvent in the most direct way the INF treaty, without violating it. This could undermine the very laudable and positive effects of this treaty, which is the elimination of SS-20's, all targeted on Europe?

Have they agreed, as they told me they were willing to, to limit themselves to the SALT II limits?

Secretary Shultz. They say they are abiding by the SALT II treaty, but they are not.

Senator Biden. In terms of total delivery vehicles?

Secretary Shultz. Even in terms of totals, there are problems. Now, it is because they are not that the President explicitly said that we would depart from the policy of no undercut.

Now, what the President has done is put into place another policy, which is intended to give them incentives not to build up. I would like to read to you what the President said, the undertaking on behalf of the United States. It is called "an interim restraint policy." I will not read it all. I will just read the operative part:

> The United States announced in May 1986 that it would henceforth base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on the standards contained in the expired SALT I interim agreement and the unratified SALT II treaty.

That is in the light of the violations that we documented. [Reading.]

> Consistent with this policy, the United States ceased technical observance of the SALT II treaty in November 1986, upon deployment of the 131st heavy bomber equipped with ALCM's. At that same time, the United States indicated that it would continue to exercise the utmost restraint, in particular as it proceeds with the strategic modernization essential to its security and that of its allies.
>
> The United States will continue to retire older forces as national security requirements permit. No appreciable growth in the size of United States strategic forces is anticipated and, assuming no significant changes in the threat as it modernizes, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

That is an undertaking on our part. And our sense is that that is probably the right place to leave it. It is responsive, not in precisely the way you want, you suggested, but it is responsive to your question.

Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I am not worried about the Americans. I am worried about the Russians. What assurance do we have from the Russians that they will not display strategic nuclear delivery vehicles above current levels?

Secretary Shultz. Our problem is that they said certain undertakings about SALT II, but they did not live up to them.

Senator Biden. But you are prepared to sign this agreement with them?

Secretary Shultz. We have a very strong verification regime here and, I think, have learned a lot in the content of negotiating this treaty. I just mentioned the noncircumvention matter, which is a piece of learning in this as compared with SALT II.

So, this is how the President addressed the issue that you raised.

I would like to back up just a bit on your question, to put matters I think in their proper historical context. In the 1970's, the Soviet Union, knowing that it could produce intercontinental ballistic missiles more or less as easily as it could produce intermediate range missiles and could have done just what you fear—and I think your concern is a well thought out and justified one—it could have easily then have produced those missiles and targeted them on Europe.

On the one hand, it saw that we were negotiating about strategic missiles, but on the other hand what it saw was a chance to say, here is a missile that can hit Europe, but not the United States, a way of putting into this equation a method of dividing us from our European allies.

I think it is fair to say that was the political purpose for this military decision. Now, as we saw that unfold, NATO reacted. And among the purposes of our deployment was to say, as the Soviet deployment tried to delink us, our deployment relinks us.

And now, by getting rid of the whole thing, we get back to the fundamental linkages that are there. In other words, the political reason for the military decision has been thwarted.

Senator BIDEN. I think it is also fair to say that one of the reasons they did it, Mr. Secretary, is because there was a SALT regime being negotiated, contemplated, and/or signed.

But my time is up and I will get back to that later.

Secretary SHULTZ. As I said, both of these things, were considerations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, first of all let me commend you for scheduling these hearings so promptly, on the very first day of the opening of the new Congress, and for the comprehensive and thorough hearing agenda which you have prepared.

According to hearing schedule, by the end of next month we will have completed the hearings and will be in a position to commence the markup of this legislation. At the same time, I think this schedule gives us an opportunity to take into account unexpected developments that may arise.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and that is our intent.

Senator SARBANES. Second, I am pleased to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, before the committee together with your colleagues, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, and Ambassador Glitman. I simply want to echo the fine words others have said about their efforts.

I think it was very important, in dealing with a Soviet delegation that had considerable experience in these matters, to have been so ably represented, and I am very pleased to see that team here with you today.

Secretary SHULTZ. Ambassador Rowny is also here and he played a strong part in all of these matters.

Senator SARBANES. Forgive me, I did not see him. Of course, I want to include Ambassador Rowny in that group as well. I apologize to you, Ambassador. I did not catch sight of you there.

Many regard this treaty as a critical juncture in the United States-Soviet relationship, and there is clearly a sound basis for that view. The treaty may affect our relationship in other critical areas. It may be important for Soviet internal developments, which in turn could effect their external relations, with us and with others.

It may have important significance for subsequent arms control agreements, including, in particular, strategic nuclear arms limitations agreements, but also for conventional forces and chemical weapons. And it obviously has important implications for NATO and our relationships with our European allies.

I fully agree, however, with the proposition which you and others have emphasized that the treaty must be judged in and of itself. In other words, we cannot base our judgments about a treaty of this sensitivity and significance purely upon these other considerations.

On the other hand, in making those judgments I do not think we can afford to lose sight of its consequences in other areas.

I am concerned about one aspect of our consideration of the treaty, an aspect that, in time, you may need to focus on as well. Because United States-Soviet relations are wide-ranging and extremely complex, I see some danger in efforts to try to add provisions to this treaty, whether in the form of understandings or amendments or reservations of some type, which would seek to deal with all the problems in the United States-Soviet relationship.

In other words, how much can we link to the INF Treaty? It seems to me that the treaty ought to stand on its own, unless one can show a very pressing or compelling reason to depart from that. In saying this, I want to underscore the fact that it takes only a bare majority to add items to the treaty.

In other words, and here I am really speaking more to myself and my colleagues, while these other matters can be appended to the treaty by a bare majority, it will ultimately require a two-thirds vote to ratify the treaty.

So as we consider the treaty, I think we have to be careful not to weigh it down with issues which, while obviously of concern to us, would distract attention from the immediate documents that have been put before us.

I think the administration needs to be sensitive to that concern as we proceed to consider the treaty.

Mr. Secretary, I am pleased to see that you are scheduled to come back toward the end of the hearings. I assume that you and your colleagues will have to be spending a great deal of time with the Senate as we consider this matter, and I certainly encourage you to do that. The investment of time, and energy you have put into the treaty is critical, and I hope this will be its final hurdle.

Let me ask you just a couple of questions. First, you say on page 32 of your statement:

> This is not a one-sided agreement. It clearly benefits us. But Mr. Gorbachev would not have signed it if he did not feel that it served his interest to do so. Arms control treaties must by their very nature, be of mutual benefit.

This only underscores the point that if we are going to find security in the nuclear age, we must find it together; we cannot find it alone.

I think it would be helpful if you would develop for the record how, in your view, this treaty serves Mr. Gorbachev's interests and why in serving his interests it also serves our interests.

Secretary **Shultz**. First, let me say that I appreciate the comments that you made about the importance of looking at this treaty in its own terms, and not loading it up unduly with things that are unrelated. I subscribe to that, and I want to say to you, as I have to the chairman, that we will be working as closely with you as you will permit us to in examining every bit of the treaty and gaining understanding. Ambassador Glitman is here with his team. He is spending his full time on this and all of us are ready to work hard on this.

As to why it is that the treaty is to the Soviet advantage, of course, it is for the Soviets to say. I cannot answer the question as such. I can speculate about it. To the extent that their SS-20 deployments were designed to divide the alliance and to divide us, not only from our NATO alliance, but also to disrupt our relationships with our friends in Asia. It must have become apparent by mid-1986 that it was not working, that it was going the other way, that this was tending to make the alliance stronger and for us to see, and our friends to see, that we had a common cause here.

So, to the extent that the purpose was that political purpose, and I speculate that it was, it was clearly not being served. So, they would be better off backing off. Second, from a military standpoint, we had weapons, now on European soil, that could reach into the Soviet Union and, in the case of the Pershings, very quickly. I think the flight time is estimated to be 13 minutes, if I am not mistaken. So that is a military threat, and I imagine that Mr. Gorbachev perhaps is saying in the Politburo my predecessors blew it. They got those missiles installed in Europe and I got them out. But I am just speculating Senator. I do not know. They may have other reasons.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, assuming that is the reason——

Secretary **Shultz**. They also have said that what they want to do is reduce the total number of nuclear weapons, and we have had a lot of discussions with Mr. Gorbachev along those lines. You have to start somewhere, and this is the place to start.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, assuming the reason is that they wanted this threat out of Europe, how does it help us to remove it?

Secretary **Shultz**. It helps us if we could have it in and get their missiles out, of course, we would prefer that. But what we get is the removal of four times as many deployed warheads, and I might say deployed on mobile launchers, so they are not as subject to being taken out as the mobile Pershings or GLCM's, which must operate in more restricted areas. And there being more of them, the targeting problem for us was much greater than the targeting problem for them. So, from our standpoint, it is, I think, a very good deal. So I feel more confident in expressing our point of view than I am in knowing how they may look at it. I am just speculating there.

Senator SARBANES. What do you see coming next, subsequent to the INF Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are hard at work on a strategic arms agreement, and we have made a tremendous amount of headway, particularly if you look back to the time when the President first proposed the U.S. positions on strategic arms back in 1982.

Just to review it for you, we have an agreement on a 50-percent cut general standard. That brings us to 6,000 warheads. We have agreed that no more than 4,900 of them can be ballistic missiles. We have agreed on 1,600 launchers We have agreed on a bomber counting rule. We are pretty much agreed on the ballistic missile counting rule. We have not agreed on the ALCM counting rule, as of yet. We have agreed on 1,540 heavy missile warheads on 154 launchers. Getting a hold of the heavy missile question has always been a matter of tremendous importance to us. We have agreed on the outlines of a verification regime that goes considerably beyond the INF regime, although it draws on the experience we had in negotiating the INF regime.

We, of course, and I am acutely aware of how difficult it is to translate general undertakings into all of the detailed operational language on verification, but that is the task we have ahead of us. We have not agreed on how to handle sea-launched Cruise missiles. We have not agreed on mobiles. There are a variety of other things that, in a general way, have yet to be wrestled to the ground, but we have come a long way and we are working hard on that, so that is getting a great deal of attention.

We are in the process of negotiating a mandate for a new conventional arms negotiation which would involve 23 countries, 2 alliances, NATO and Warsaw Pact, with a concept of the Atlantic to the Urals. In NATO we are developing our ideas about the right types of proposals to make, and we feel that probably a different approach than that, taken in the MBFR talks that have been so fruitless, should be undertaken. We certainly will point to the principal of asymmetrical reductions established in the INF Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev has made a number of public statements recognizing that asymmetric deployments should bring asymmetric reductions, so we will pound away on that.

At any rate, just when that mandate will be completed is uncertain. For one thing, it is in the CSCE context, and we must insist on a good human rights outcome to the Vienna meeting to go with an arms control outcome. So, we put the human rights subject and its priority at a very prominent place in that, we are working hard on a ban on chemical weapons. That also is extremely difficult because it is so difficult to feel confident of verification and, in this case, to be of any significance it has to include all of the chemical weapons capable states, which are a great many. So you are talking about a regime that is on the order of the nuclear nonproliferation regime to be meaningful.

But, at any rate, we are addressing all of those issues and again, there has been a fair amount of progress, but it will be a hard and laborious job to complete those. Those are the principal arms control matters that are up on the front burner right now, and that is on the whole NATO's priorities, as well as U.S. priorities.

Senator SARBANES. My time is up. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to add my congratulations to you, and to your negotiating team, which has certainly lent skill and perseverance over a long period of time to these efforts. And I would also say congratulations to President Reagan. I have believed that if anyone could achieve a substantive arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, it would be President Reagan, who has been very determined and firm in his relationship with the Soviets.

There is going to be much analysis made of this treaty. I think it has value in and of itself as a first step. But, obviously, one of the successes of a deterrent strategy has been, and has rested on, the importance of a balance in our arms. You state on page 11 that NATO unambiguously supported getting rid of all INF missiles, and you have also stated that this treaty supports our deterrence strategy. I would like to ask you how this treaty affects deterrence. How this treaty affects deterrence is one of the central issues facing us in the review.

One of the criticisms is that it removes all of our systems, in particular the Pershing II's, which have been very accurate and have a short flight time. What I would like to ask you is to elaborate further. You did touch a little bit on why you believe this treaty will not undermine flexible response, and why our NATO allies share this view.

Secretary SHULTZ. "Flexible response" means that you have to have available, in the event of some form of hostility, a variety of ways of responding to it. NATO does have a variety of ways of responding. NATO has very considerable conventional force capabilities. NATO has short-range, shorter than defined in this treaty, nuclear weapons that are ground-based. NATO has dual-capable aircraft that have the ability to strike into Soviet territory, and deliver accurate weapons. NATO has assigned to SACEUR 400 submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads. So, NATO has a considerable and variable nuclear capability consisting of over 4,000 warheads remaining after all of this has taken place. And, of course, NATO has the U.S. strategic triad behind it. So, all of these things have been present. They were present before the interjection of the intermediate-range missiles by the Soviet Union. They are still present when you take those missiles out. So, the NATO flexible response posture and possibility is there.

Now, what must we do? First of all, we have to modernize, as was agreed in the Montebello decision, our conventional forces and the nuclear forces associated with them. That is something we need to do. We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union about that, we do that. We are ready to engage in a conventional force negotiation, and where we see the large asymmetries, as in tanks or artillery and various forms of weaponry, we hope that it may be possible to deal with those. The stronger we are in our unconventional force structure, the more incentive there will be for the Soviets and for a SALT pact to negotiate about that. At any rate, we will proceed with that. So, that is basically the way I think I would address your problem.

Senator KASSEBAUM. As a follow-on to Senator Biden's question before we recessed this morning, he was asking, and perhaps it was answered, that if indeed we do not make these significant agreements that we hope we will achieve with START or with the conventional reductions, can this treaty stand alone?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. It has always been thought of as standing alone, and our position has been developed with that in mind. I took a flyer, maybe unwisely, at saying what the Soviets get out of this. But, from our standpoint, we get considerable benefit out of this. We get the removal of a ratio of 4-to-1 weapons against us, and, in the case of the SS-20, a mobile missile that is a more survivable missile than the mobile Pershings and the ground-launched Cruise missiles that must operate in more restricted areas. So, from the targeting point of view, we are much better off.

We also get in the short-range missiles, the removal of missiles that had a range that could target ports, airfields, and other military facilities of NATO, and deliver on them ballistic missiles not only with nuclear warheads, but conventional warheads and chemical warheads. So, to that extent, we redressed the balance somewhat. So, it is my opinion that, taken overall, this treaty just by itself, without anything else, makes some improvement in the balance from our standpoint. That does not mean that it is a satisfactory situation as we see it, and that is why the modernizations are being advocated. That is why we are prepared, if we can work out the right mandate and in Vienna get the right human rights outcome, we are prepared to move on to conventional negotiations.

Senator BIDEN. Would the Senator yield for 10 seconds?

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would be happy to.

Senator BIDEN. The Secretary has twice now referred to the comparison between the SS-20 and the P-II, the Pershing II, as if they did not have the same attributes. Is the Pershing II not a mobile missile?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is mobile, but I think the SS-20 is more practiced.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Senator KASSEBAUM. More practiced?

Senator BIDEN. More practiced? Is that what you said, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is what I said.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I may be showing my ignorance, but I do not know what that means. More targeted?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is a missile that has been in place longer and they have exercised with it longer, and so at least at this moment, probably better practiced with it.

Senator BIDEN. Moving it around?

Secretary SHULTZ. Moving it around.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Oh, all right. I see.

Secretary SHULTZ. And they have much larger terrain to move it around in.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I understand. If I have enough time to get into this, Prime Minister Thatcher commented on the importance of France's additional support to the military equation of NATO in a speech in January. It seems to me that that was an important comment that she made, and I wonder if you could comment on whether you think indeed this could be of some significance and of help, France and Spain actually both, to conventional strength in NATO.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, they certainly add a lot to NATO. Neither one has integrated its military forces into the military command structure of NATO. Nevertheless, they are associated in the alliance, and so those forces would be basically there. And obviously they add to us.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What I am asking is, Is there a possibility of greater integration?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is a possibility, and I think it would be desirable, but I cannot sit here and say that it is likely to happen in the near future.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. Those are all the questions that I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I want to yield to the Senator from Connecticut, Chris Dodd for one question because he has some other compelling purpose that will take him away from this hearing.

Senator DODD. I thank my colleague from California. Mr. Chairman, let me join Senator Sarbanes and others in commending you for holding these hearings as promptly as you have, and Mr. Secretary, welcome to the committee. I ask, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that a prepared statement be included in the record in which I go into some specifics.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd may be found in the appendix.]

Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary, I think you and your team and the President, as Senator Kassebaum said, deserve the lion's share of the credit, in fact full credit, for this achievement, and I am delighted and pleased that you recognized in your statement the nature of the bipartisanship that surrounded the INF agreement. I think it is important that that is stated over and over again. Many times the American people assume we can never work on anything together and this was a classic example where, in fact, we did. I think the results of that effort are borne out by the fact that we are here today, and more than likely will ratify a very important agreement.

Senator Kassebaum and others have raised the issue of NATO. Obviously, one of the problems we will face with ratification is trying to attach to this particular agreement important issues, which you and I and others may fully agree with but would oppose linking them to this particular agreement. My generation does not have the same relationship with our European allies as my father's generation did, a generation forged in the trenches of conflict in the post-world war period where they knew each other on a first name basis. My generation does not have that kind of relationship.

Many have written about the important nature of this agreement. It is obviously a milestone in Soviet-United States relations, but there is a particular question that concerns me, you, and others, and that is, what is the future of the relationship with NATO? What new direction should it take? The crisis that is mentioned by many as a result of this agreement is that, it changes what has been policy for five administrations and that is reliance on the nuclear deterrent of the United States. That is No. 1. No. 2, at a time of severe budget concerns getting new systems online will be difficult. Also, you have the notion that the U.S.S.R. can threaten Europe while sparing the United States the Charles de Gaulle question, would the United States be willing to sacrifice New York for Paris? Not whether we have the technical capacity to strike the Soviet Union, but whether or not we would have the will to do it. With Soviet conventional force being as strong as they are, would we be willing to respond, or would we recoil?

The question arises, then, do the Europeans begin to maneuver between East and West, do they build their own nuclear capacity, do some nations do that? Clearly, we cannot affect all of those trends, but we can channel some of them in a constructive direction. I would be curious to have you respond, on how we might deal with those, and, two, what can we do to channel those relationships in a new, constructive direction.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the questions that you have raised are important questions, and to a certain extent, perennial questions. You have an alliance that has been around for about 40 years. It has seen its doctrine evolve as it has gone along. It has seen countries added to it, and it has faced new situations and has had to adjust to them. It is a living thing.

Right now, what the alliance has done is go through this INF experience. The INF experience, I think from an alliance standpoint, has been basically a very reassuring one. It has been an experience that has lent coherence to the alliance mainly because a threat was identified, a strategy for dealing with it was developed, it was put in place, it was adhered to, and it has worked. At this point in time, all of the people feel pretty good about it. So, that is a plus. However, you still have to keep looking around and asking yourself what are the problems and what can we do about the problems, and there are plenty of problems. You identify some of them.

In my statement on flexible response, and many of your questions revolve around that, I tried to develop the nature of deterrence, starting with our strategic triad which in itself is one leg in the NATO strategic triad. There you have the NATO nuclear weapons, and you have the conventional forces. So, you have to look at all of these pieces and see that, on the one hand, you are doing them as well as you can, so you have budget questions. I think, for example, right now, our defense budget is being reduced such that, to take an example, we have to reduce the number of active-duty airwings of the United States. It does not seem like a very good time to do that. That is a budget problem, and we have to confront that, and other countries have to confront such problems.

That is not because of the INF Treaty. That has a different set of arguments. There is not any more reason to assume now than some years ago that we are unwilling to exercise our strategic deterrence. Obviously, anyone is tremendously reluctant to think about it. But, on the other hand, it is there, and it will not be much of a deterrence unless it has a reality to it. So, it is there, and it is part of the deterrence that goes with nuclear weapons. Basically, I think we will all be better off if we can reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, if we can do it in a manner that enhances stability and rely less, and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. But there is nothing to be said for making the world safe for conventional war. We have seen what has happened with that in your father's generation, which happens to be my generation.

Senator DODD. Well, I said my father, I did not want to put you in that position.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I know.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. The NATO question is to be a very important one that has been raised by a lot of people. Secretary Kissinger, your predecessor, has written extensively on it. I think it is one that really is a perfect opportunity to address in this kind of forum. So those concerns, the American people's concerns, the European allies concerns, could be allayed substantially if this is not perceived as some abandonment of that relationship. I think you have just emphasized that point there.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think actually this experience is quite to the contrary. As I have seen the history of NATO, people have always been worried about it, and it has always been sort of about to collapse, but here it is. As I said, the INF experience, in and of itself, was a strengthening experience for the reasons that I outlined.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, and I thank my colleague from California for yielding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Next is Senator Boschwitz, and then my understanding is that Senator Cranston will be using up Senator Dodd's time at that time. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Does Senator Cranston want to use up the balance of his time now?

The CHAIRMAN. He will defer to you.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also wish to extend my welcome to the Secretary and to his negotiating team. As he knows, I believe him to be one of the outstanding Secretaries of State that this country has ever had. I want to congratulate you and your entire team on achieving this treaty. When the President first proposed the zero option, critics charged that it was so ambitious, that it was proof that the administration really was not serious about negotiating arms control, and that the Soviets would never agree. After all, it required a lopsided Soviet concession. Indeed, we had no missiles at that moment to give up, and they had the SS-20's in place. So, it was a position that many critics said simply was not realistic, and was proof that we did not intend to negotiate.

Yet the reverse has occurred, as you have pointed out. I think the success of the treaty is also a testament to the principle that peace come through strength and the continuing vibrancy of the Western alliance and NATO that you have spoken about in response to Senator Dodd and others.

I think that the administration stuck to its vision through 6 rather hard years when it did not look like things were moving forward particularly well a number of times, and in those 6 years, interestingly, I think there were four different leaders of the Soviet Union, and that, too, must have been quite a complicating factor.

You have talked a good deal about the NATO alliance, Mr. Secretary, and I know that many people have felt that the glue that held the alliance together was the resolute decision to place those missiles in Europe, and certainly our allies are to be commended for going forward and deploying those missiles on their soil at considerable political risk.

Now, as Senator Biden said, from his trip to Europe, our allies say that the treaty is a great victory for the alliance, and that it would be absolutely devastating, quoting Senator Biden's remarks, in the event that it was not ratified, but yet many people feel that some of the glue that has held NATO together would be removed.

You have felt that there is a great vibrancy to NATO and that it will survive this. Just on the basis of history? On what basis do you feel that this vibrancy will continue beyond this INF agreement, beyond this glue that was supposed to be the very structure of the NATO alliance?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think really the glue is the values that we share and the common recognition that we are all going to be better off defending those values if we work together to do it, and we see that the Soviet Union poses a very considerable threat to each of our countries and to those values.

That I think is basically the glue.

Now, the point I was making with respect to the INF experience was that it was something that we went through together that was difficult but it represented the identification of a threat, the development of a plan and a strategy, the implementation of that strategy in which different countries had to do different things which were in various ways difficult, and by and large people stood up to those responsibilities, or they did stand up to those responsibilities, and as it has turned out, we basically achieved the result that we sought.

And when you do something like that, you get a—it adds something to the feeling of cohesion and meaning.

Now, that does not mean that we do not have plenty of problems. We do. And we will have to go about the business of dealing with them, and some of them have been mentioned here. And some of them will probably get people arguing pretty hard, and I can tell you, in many NATO meetings I have had some stiff arguments with people. Everybody does not go there and just slap each other on the back. We struggle about this.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. One of the problems that is often mentioned that might be the outgrowth of this treaty is that the Soviets, who have always been much more of a land-based power, we have been more of a maritime power than they, although recently that is changing a little bit, that now an imbalance will exist because the Soviets have such an advantage in conventional forces over ours.

You said in response to an earlier question that we have to modernize and that our European allies have to modernize. Yet our efforts to get the Europeans to spend more on defense and to raise their percentages—they spend, with the exception of Great Britain, either one-half or one-third as much as we as measured by the gross national product—have not been too successful.

What makes you feel that the Europeans will now rise to the challenge and spend more money and restore a conventional balance?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not know that they will, but I think we have to work at it, and we also have to work at ourselves. I hope we, having gone way down and then having built up, we are not in the United States going into a kind of a down cycle that is unjustified by the realities that we face, and it seems to me in democracies you are always fighting to do adequately for your security in time of peace because people see that you are spending money on these matters, and if you spent it on something else, maybe you would be better off, or left it to the taxpayers.

But we have to keep reminding ourselves that security is a fundamental aspect of our standard of living, if you want to put it that way, and we must spend the money that is necessary to do it.

But I do not have to tell you in this body that we struggle at that and the Europeans struggle at that, and we just have to keep jacking each other up.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, I hope that is the sound of optimism with respect to the democracy——

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not know that I was altogether optimistic. I was trying to be realistic, that it is a hard problem. It is a problem right here in the United States.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. There seldom is a consensus in democracies to spend money on defense, and yet it is a very necessary element of the continuation of these democracies.

I was interested in the line of questioning that arose earlier this morning about the fact that the warheads were removed, not destroyed, and the guidance systems as well, and I think the question arose whether or not you could just pop them on some other type of carrier, some other type of booster. And you did not pursue that. I wonder, in the event that you cannot pursue that or do not know, are not familiar enough with the answer, whether or not—I see that your whole team, Ambassadors Kampelman, Nitze, Glitman, and General Rowney are here.

Secretary SHULTZ. Somebody back there must know the answer.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Yes, somebody back there must know the answer.

Could you just take these things, put them back together, and pop them on another booster and be back in business?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all, you have to reconfigure. If you take something out of a reentry vehicle, I will call it, we think that there are three parts to this process. There is the reentry vehicle, the nuclear fissionable material, and the guidance system. If you remove two of those from the reentry vehicle, you have got to get another one.

Now, the question is whether or not in systems to deliver these materials that are not in the ranges that are prohibited by this treaty—you see, you cannot put them on anything that is prohibited by this treaty—there is a reentry vehicle lying around that is compatible. And I do not know the answer to that question. But I do not think it is just a simple little business of pulling a plug out from the wall and plugging it in somewhere else by any means.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, I presume that.

Secretary SHULTZ. However, there are some highly classified and technical aspects to this question as well involving how, for example, we construct a nuclear explosive and how they do. And we do not care to have them know how we do it. They probably do not care to have us know how they do it. So, you are dealing with some things that are very, very sensitive here.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The same applies to the guidance systems, I believe.

Secretary SHULTZ. The same applies to the guidance systems. We think we are ahead of them. They probably think they are ahead of us, I do not know, but at any rate, that is our view.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I presume that there is nothing in the treaty that prevents the parts from being made and stored somewhere else in any event, and prepared to pop together, if that is the right term, and it is probably too simple.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, pop together is an image that I do not think quite fits the reality of these weapons, although I am not an expert on these weapons, and you should get somebody who is.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It will certainly slow them down to have them disassembled and to have them in separate places.

I read shortly after the treaty was signed that there were some problems in obtaining a picture of the SS-20, and that it was obtained, according to the report I read in the paper, the morning of the signing of the treaty, but that it came in as a telephoto and that it was not particularly precise.

Have we received more accurate pictures or additional pictures of the SS-20 and the SS-23, and are we now satisfied with what we have?

Secretary SHULTZ. The sequence, I believe, went something like this. The SS-20 missile is put into a canister and sealed at the factory. That is what happens at Votkinsk where we want to observe. And that is taken out into the field, and it is put on its launcher, and when it is fired, it is fired from within that canister. The canister is never opened.

So, what the Soviets gave us was a picture of the canister. We said, "That does not allow us to see the missile that is in the canister. The canister picture does not fill our needs." And we argued that point back and forth, and we insisted, and it was not until the morning of Tuesday before the treaty was signed that we received a facsimile that they had sent. There were—I will not bore you with all the ins and outs of the argument about why it was or was not possible to have a picture.

And of course, a facsimile is not satisfactory, but it was a picture which we got and which they undertook to supplement with a real picture, which they have done. And as I understand the view of the intelligence community, it is a satisfactory picture.

In the case of the SS-23, there was a discrepancy between the picture and the measurement that we got in the memorandum of understanding, and so we raised that question, and the difference was in something that linked the missile with the warhead, and so the discrepancy basically was explained, and I think the problem that people felt there might be with that picture was taken care of.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Secretary SHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to correct the record, or perhaps I can correct it when it gets circulated, but I have been informed by Mr. Glitman that I am wrong in my statement about the Pershing II, and I had somehow in my mind that since it had been deployed for not as long as the SS-20, perhaps we were not as experienced, but he points out that we have the experience with the Pershing IA which was similar, and that our Pershing II is every bit as mobile, and we are every bit as experienced with it as the Soviets may claim to be on the SS-20.

So, to the extent that I gave another impression, I want to correct that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. They are both "practiced"?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. However, Mr. Glitman, who is obviously more authoritative, since he corrected me, will be before you tomorrow, and you may want to pursue this matter with him.

The CHAIRMAN. We will practice it with him then.

Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank you for your leadership in bringing us to this well-prepared point in these hearings, and I thank you, Mr. Secretary, very much for your presence, your responsiveness, and all the hard work you have done on this.

I would like to start by alluding to the references made this morning by Senator Helms regarding secret and nonsecret material relating to this treaty.

A story in this morning's Washington Times makes it very plain that the issue—and this is now public—relates to SS-20's. The public material also is pulled together in a document, "Memorandum to Republican Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee" from Senator Helms. In it, in regard to the SS-20's, much of the material is based upon a newspaper report with a chart showing "declared SS-20's", "DIA unclassified estimates of SS-20's" and a "U.S. intelligence estimate of total SS-20's produced."

This, however, is based upon a 1976 newspaper story written by William Beacher in the Boston Globe, September 5, 1976, and the Helms report, in commenting on this, says newspaper reports have indicated that some intelligence analysts believe the Soviet SS-20 force could be as high as 2,250. That is based upon a 1976 newspaper story.

Senator Sarbanes read this morning from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Webster's letter to Senator Helms responding to questions that Senator Helms asked of him about a recent draft of the National Intelligence Estimate on issues relating to the treaty. In his response, Mr. Webster makes it very plain that what he is referring to and what Senator Helms is quoting from is a recent draft. Webster grants that the information is somewhat accurate, but goes on to say, "The citations omit reference to important caveats and additional observations. These statements are excerpts from a much broader set of judgments and issues regarding the monitoring of the INF treaty, and in my view, by themselves do not constitute a sufficient basis on which to draw conclusions about he overall monitorability of the treaty."

During the lunch break I took it upon myself to go to the secure room and to read the highly classified document that Senator Helms referred to. It consists of the extracts from the National Intelligence Estimate, and as Mr. Webster indicated, it is indeed replete with caveats and hedges like "there is a good chance," "possibility," "can't rule out the possibility," "if," "might," "may have," "uncertainties."

The document that I went to read consists of one and one-half pages of carefully selected excerpts from three hefty volumes that comprise the National Intelligence Estimate. These extracts, of course, are intended to raise public questions about the INF Treaty that the President, that you, Mr. Secretary, and others have negotiated. Yet even these very carefully selected extracts are full of hedges and qualifications.

I am far from convinced by my reading of these 1½ pages that the INF Treaty is fatally flawed by uncertainties about how many Soviet SS-20's there are.

I and other members of this committee will want to study the full three-volume report. It, of course, covers many matters beyond SS-20's. Not all the volumes are yet available to us, however, so we have not had an opportunity to look them over with any detail thus far.

I would now like also to go to some questions that follow on to matters that have already come up today.

So, first, may I ask you, Secretary Shultz, did the United States seek Soviet agreement on destruction of nuclear warheads as well as missiles?

Secretary SHULTZ. No. The nuclear fissionable material, we did not seek the destruction of that, nor did they.

Senator CRANSTON. Was the United States prepared to have the Soviets inspect nuclear warheads and monitor their destruction?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator CRANSTON. And a related question, are we prepared to have them inspect all of our nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants?

Secretary SHULTZ. As I said earlier, the construction of a nuclear explosive device, just how that is done is regarded as a highly sensitive, classified matter, and we have no intention of disclosing our methodology, and probably they do not either.

Senator CRANSTON. Have we yet devised a process and verification regime for destroying nuclear explosive devices?

Secretary SHULTZ. I cannot answer that question. It obviously is difficult. Look at the problems we have with nuclear waste disposal, for example, from powerplants. So, it is a matter of some delicacy and concern, and there is a great deal to be said about it.

I am very uncomfortable in a public hearing discussing it very much, frankly.

Senator CRANSTON. Is it your view that with some 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world, the "destruction" of a limited number of nuclear warheads is not as great a priority, at least not yet, as the destruction of missile systems that can deliver those warheads to targets?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is the key here, of course, that in order for them to attack us, and for our deterrent to be effective, you have to have a system to deliver this nuclear charge to a target in a precise way, and it is that ability that is, from the standpoint of certain ranges, dealt with in this treaty.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much.

I do want to make one observation about your opening statement which I thought was otherwise very outstanding. I am glad you took the time to go through the whole statement and that it was so thorough in its background and its analysis of the treaty and its implications.

I have found one fault with it though. I regret your tactical decision, and I think it was that, to knock the movement of millions of Americans who have been supporting the peace effort. You really are part of that peace effort yourself, of the peace movement. Your handiwork advances it goals, and the political fact of life is that concerns about the dangers of nuclear war expressed by countless Americans and by Europeans, too, have helped focus our Government and their governments on the task of quelling the arms race. Indeed, that is the way democracies are supposed to work, as you well know, responding to the expressed hopes of the people while differing with those people, perhaps, on the ways and means of fulfilling their hopes.

I want to say now in what I prepared as an opening statement, but I did want to get to those other points first, that I believe this treaty is a vital first step toward constructing a more stable relationship with the Soviet people and their leaders. The Senate's task today is made all the more important by the disappointments of the past, the failure to transform the SALT I and Vladivostok accords into a meaningful treaty, the failure to ratify SALT II, the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty. The INF accord is modest. We will hear it deprecated, we already have, for what it does not achieve. Yet it is a crucial beginning, a ray of hope amid the anxious gray enshrouding superpower relationships.

It is manifestly in the national security interest of our country, and through its ratification, our Government can begin the process of reaching agreements on more substantial, mutual reductions in the bloated, dangerous, costly superpower arsenals.

I welcome indications that the INF text has generally won wide support in the Senate and in the country and in Europe. We must not condition the INF agreement upon the attainment of other goals, however, no matter how desirable those goals might be, and it is essential that the Senate avoid any action while drafting a resolution of ratification for INF which would undermine prospects for sound followup accords.

I am concerned that if the battleground shifts to the next agreement, and I think it may, we might burden the START process with unrealistic requirements that would sink it.

So, we must block killer amendments imperiling this INF Treaty or killer amendments endangering the prospective START Treaty, or killer amendments blocking further steps needed to reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of this task. Fortunately, Senators offering killer amendments will need 51 percent of the Senate to prevail. Our challenge now is to put in place the first foundation stone of a safer world, a world which both the American and Soviet peoples yearn for, need and aspire to create.

If we ratify the modest INF agreement, and I expect we will, it will be the first time the United States has ever ratified a treaty with the Soviets to destroy any offensive nuclear missiles. A major impediment to past efforts has been a series of concerns like linkage, compliance, verification, and strategic doctrine. So, when my turn comes again, I want to elicit your views on a few of those matters.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Secretary SHULTZ. Could I comment on one thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is I hesitate to argue with Senator Cranston. He seems to be on our side, so far be it from me to pick a quarrel, but on the question of the peace movements and the freeze movement, which it was here, I am not in any way derogating the objectives that they may have had, but I think the method that they advocated would have not gotten us where we want to get.

If we had agreed with them and frozen when we were at zero and the Soviets had, say, 1,000 deployed warheads, I think it is very doubtful that we would have gotten this treaty.

So, it seems to me we have this question of tactics, I suppose you would call it, played out constantly in our diplomacy, and I am very much convinced myself that strength and diplomacy go hand in hand, and if you throw one of them away, you are going to be helpless. And I am always impressed with the symbolism in our Great Seal, which you probably have around there in front of you, but as you well know, it is an eagle, and in the eagle, in one claw is an olive branch, and in the other claw are arrows, and it has always been interesting to me that when I look at the 200-year-old wonderful furniture on display in the diplomatic reception rooms, the eagle there is always looking at the arrows, maybe reflecting the fact that the British had just burned the White House and various other things.

President Truman, as I understand it, observed this direction of view of the eagle on a seal in the White House right after World War II, and he decreed that henceforth, in any official rendering, the eagle would always look at the olive branch to show that the United States would always seek peace, or to take this case, that we would seek an agreement, but that the United States would also always hold onto the arrows to show that we understood that if you did not have strength, you would not get peace.

I think that basic lesson comes out of this INF experience, and it plays through many subjects that we debate about where we ask ourselves how much strength do you need and what can you expect to achieve through diplomacy, under what kind of circumstances.

I bring that up because I think it is a rather fundamental aspect of the way the INF Treaty negotiation went.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent to place my opening statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRESSLER

Senator **PRESSLER**. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary, his team, and the President have worked long and hard on this matter.

I think it is good that these negotiations have been held. Let me say that one area of slight disagreement with the Secretary concerns the Senate's treaty role. I do not view amendments as killer amendments.

They could be improvement amendments, certainly. And under our Constitution, regardless of what people define as amendments or efforts to improve the treaty, our Constitution does provide a significant role for the Senate.

So I, as one Senator, feel strongly that we have an obligation to consider amendments, and I am amazed at how easily they are referred to automatically as killer amendments.

Let me also say that I think we have to understand the details of this treaty. I hope these hearings will help do that. For example, I read in the New York Times that President Reagan had promised our allies that we will increase defense spending in Europe in the aftermath of this treaty. That issue must be explored.

I recently received a briefing from some of our military leaders during the recess, and was told that indeed we will modernize some of our existing weapons. There will be proposals which will increase military spending as a result of this agreement. I do not think that is widely understood.

Let me also say that I am concerned about the adequacy of verification provisions.

But as the recent Czechoslovakian film crew tour of the United States illustrates, parts of our country that would be closed to onsite inspectors are open to other people to go freely, whereas the parts of the Soviet Union that are not open to onsite inspectors are not.

So, there are legitimate concerns of Senators. And I for one am a little distressed by the view that unless the Senate just goes along with everything, consents to it, that somehow this destroys an agreement.

I do not agree with that. Several treaties that have come through the Senate have had amendments, reservations, and other conditions attached to them.

That leads to my first question. I have filed an amendment in the Senate, and I am flexible on it—it might be improved, which says that this treaty shall not enter into force until the President of the United States shall have certified to the Senate that the conventional force imbalance between the deployed and reserved conventional forces of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the reserve and deployed conventional forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Pact does not exceed a ratio of 3-to-2.

That would even let the Soviets keep an advantage. Now they may have a ratio of 4-to-1. Or we could change the ratio to 1-to-1, to parity.

But in the event, Mr. Secretary, what would happen if the U.S. Senate attached an amendment to this treaty which just called for parity? That simultaneously an agreement would go into effect before this treaty became effective that would call for parity in terms of conventional forces in Europe.

Now, that should not take a lot of extra time because the MBFR meetings have been going on for years in Vienna. It should be able to do this within a matter of weeks. Under the Constitution, the Senate has a very great responsibility to offer amendments if it feels it should.

Let us say that we got 51 votes for an amendment on parity for conventional forces, would you go forth then to seek Soviet agreement to a protocol to that effect? What would be your stance at that point?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all, I would say if you are going to do something, do it right.

We do not want to have some piece of legislation come out of the Senate that says we are willing to go along with the Soviet 3-to-2 advantage over us. We should insist on equality.

Senator PRESSLER. All right, then. Make it 1-to-1.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would not like to see the amendment. But if you are going to have it, for goodness sakes, let us not throw away our position in the form of the amendment.

I think the fact that the MBFR talks have been going on now for, what, about 15 years, 13 years, is not evidence that they are about to conclude. It is evidence that it is difficult.

We are trying to get something out of the MBFR talks and we are staying in there. But it is not an encouraging picture. That is why we see now the effort to negotiate a new mandate for new talks involving 23 countries and 2 alliances, with a geographical concept that is different. Not central European but Atlantic to the Urals.

This will include France, which was not in the MBFR talks. As we have worked at this in NATO, on the one hand it has been a big struggle to get the mandate into the shape it is, and it is not agreed yet, the Soviets are continuing to insist that very short-range nuclear weapons be included in the mandate. And we will not do that. And I hope that in the end, we will work that out.

Then NATO is in the process of producing its position in these talks, and that is a matter of lots of discussion. I think we have been getting along pretty well at it.

But when you consider that what we are talking about is 23 nations, 2 alliances, a rather complex negotiation involving forces that are mostly not ours, very disproportionately European, and our experience with speed in this kind of negotiation is that it is glacial.

I think attaching that kind of amendment would probably mean, people would interpret it as meaning that the INF agreement will not go into effect for quite a while.

However, we should work hard on the conventional talks. But part of doing that is working hard to modernize and improve and do as well as we can by our own basic defense structure.

And that is a reason why I think it is unfortunate, as we are doing this, that our defense budget is being cut. It is going in the wrong direction.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, Mr. Secretary, following along that line, and following up Senator Boschwitz' questions, it is indeed true that our defense budget has been cut.

But as I mentioned earlier, the President said on December 14 that there would be an increase or he had communicated to our European allies that there would be an increase in our spending in Europe, which surprised me because that would have to go through Congress. But he would propose that.

Of course, the Joint Chiefs have to make their recommendations to increase some of our defense spending for such programs as making the Lance missile go further and so forth.

Do you anticipate that this agreement would mean an increase in the military budget request for spending in Europe?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we have a modernization program that was agreed to first in 1983, it is known as the Montebello decision.

Under that program we remove, I think, over 1,000 nuclear explosive devices from Europe, but we modernize, improve the accuracy and in other ways modernize the forces that we have left there and work on the other forces. And we are working hard to get that decision carried out.

It involves us doing things. It involves our European allies doing things. And it is always a struggle in peacetime, in democracies, to get the right amount of spending. But we have to do it.

Senator PRESSLER. So, you would anticipate a request for an increase in spending in conventional forces in Europe as a result of this treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Not as a result of this treaty. The Montebello decision was made in 1983, and it was taken as something we should do, whether we got the INF Treaty or did not get the INF Treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Secretary, our former Ambassador to France, former Ambassador Evan Galbraith, stated in a letter he sent, I suppose, to all Senators, a long letter, his opposition to the treaty, and says that most French leaders privately oppose the treaty but are reluctant to do so for a number of reasons. General Rogers also opposes it, our former NATO commander. What is your reaction?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, people have different views. They are entitled to them. And I do not say that everybody thinks the same.

As far as French leadership is concerned, I have got quotations from people, I do not know whether you, you are all politicians, I am not, but when politicians say something I assume, about an important subject that they have studied, I assume you should take them seriously.

So, let me find what President Mitterand said. November 26, 1987, President Mitterand of France. Maybe you say you should not believe anything he says. Maybe that is what Ambassador Galbraith thinks, I do not know.

What Mitterand said is, "I rejoice. It was the good direction to take. Disarmament is one of the most necessary things, if one wants the world to continue. I waited for it. I hoped for it."

Prime Minister Jacques Chirac on December 12 said, "Current events are dominated by the accord on INF just signed in Washington by President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. I have expressed myself over and over again on this event, which has been anticipated for several months, and in which I rejoice."

Now, there are others in France who have a different view. For example, Presidential candidate Raymond Barre, on December 7, said, "It is absolutely necessary to engage in an arms control process and reduce arsenals. But to begin by intermediate-range nuclear forces is to create a hole in deterrence." So, he has a different point of view.

I would say there are more negatives expressed in France than any of the other countries. All of the other countries are uniformly, both in the majority parties and the minority parties, seem to be expressing support.

France, of course, was not involved in these, was not part, and it always makes a point of saying it was not part of the 1979 decision. So, it has held itself aloof from these negotiations.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to make former Ambassador Galbraith's letter a matter of the record. Apparently, he hears different things.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. And he will probably be a witness before us too before long.

[The letter referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, one final question. Mr. Secretary, would you give your definition of what you think the Senate's constitutional role in this treaty should be regarding amendments, reservations, and so on?

Of course, you favor no amendments, et cetera. But if the Senate did come up with an amendment, you would take it back to the Soviets. Would you not?

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course. The Senate's role is defined in the Constitution, and your job is to examine this treaty and see whether or not it advances the interests of the United States, which in this case has a big bearing on our alliance.

But I am a law-abiding Secretary of State, and if you direct me to do something I will do it. But that does not mean I think it is a good idea. There are lots of laws around that I do not think are any good at all. But that does not mean I can disobey them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I join with all of my colleagues in congratulating you on the structure that you have put together for these hearings and the promptness with which we are proceeding.

Mr. SECRETARY, I think I have said this to you personally, but I would say it again. I think many of us are deeply grateful for the enormous energy and persistence of your team, your very able team, and yourself, in pursuing this treaty.

There are many of us who literally feel that it places us perhaps at a moment where we might be able to change the history of the arms race. I think each of us is going to be guided in our approach to the treaty by different concerns. That has been evident thus far in the questions asked and statements made.

I think there are essentially, and Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry may be found in the appendix.]

Senator **Kerry**. Let me just say in summarizing it that I think there are three key questions, at least, which are guiding this Senator.

The first is whether or not the treaty is going to increase stability on the East-West border in Europe, thereby making the likelihood of a crisis less.

The second is whether the treaty is going to improve the overall military balance, so that if there were a crisis the opportunity for the West to be jeopardized and our allies to be jeopardized is less.

And third, do both of those combine and do all the other interests of this treaty combine so as to meaningfully improve U.S. national security.

And I think those ought to be the questions which guide us here. And if the answer to those is "Yes," we ought to vote for it. And I suspect that we are going to.

Before I ask a series of questions relating to those larger questions, you did spark my curiosity, one particular curiosity, on one statement in the prepared text, page 44.

You said, we have identified the Krasnoyarsk as a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. We will not agree to any further obligations regarding that treaty until that violation is dealt with.

Do I understand, is that a statement of new policy with respect to the ABM Treaty?

Secretary **Shultz**. This is just a statement of our position. And we have a negotiation going on in Geneva. And it had three groups.

Now, one of them is completed. Now it has two groups. One negotiating strategic arms, and the other in what we call defense in space. That discussion has to do with the ABM Treaty.

For example, we and the Soviets have agreed on the concept of a period of nonwithdrawal in exercise of rights under the ABM Treaty. We have not agreed on what the time should be, but we have agreed on that time.

But that is by way of saying that in the end we will not be willing to conclude a kind of agreement that deals with those issues until we are satisfied that the Krasnoyarsk radar violation has been dealt with.

Senator **Kerry**. I understand that. Let me just ask you, by way also of a series of preliminary questions regarding these overall hearings, we have received the legal analysis of the obligations undertaken under the treaty per request of the chairman.

We received this morning the treaty text, the protocol of the treaty, the memorandum of understanding, the basing countries' agreement, and the President's transmittal letter.

Are there any other documents which any Senator needs with respect to this, in addition to your testimony and the testimony of other members of the executive department, that we need in order to be able to determine the proper meaning of this treaty?

Secretary **Shultz**. There are two protocols, not one, and I think they are all included and considered to be part of the Treaty.

The treaty, the memorandum of understanding, and two protocols. One on elimination, and the other on inspections.

Then there are the other matters that you mentioned, and I think there also has been made available a statement of interpretation that is available to you. This represents our view of how to interpret various things in the treaty.

As I said in my testimony, we have made an effort to spell things out in as much detail as we were able in the treaty itself to eliminate gray areas, ambiguous areas, to the extent we can.

I am sure that we have not eliminated them all. And there are always problems. But we have tried to make it as clear as possible so that the text, so to speak, stands by itself.

Now, the negotiating record is to be made available to Members of the Senate. And we are working on the procedures for doing that. As I understand it, that is practically worked out.

I do think that some procedures such as, if there is a question about the meaning of the treaty that you have, then we should take that on board, study it, develop an answer based on the records, let it be cleared within the executive branch, and give you, so to speak, an authoritative response. And that is the kind of response that you can rely on.

This administration, the President, would not obviously quarrel with it because it would have been done carefully. So, I will try to answer questions as I can here. But there may be certain points of ambiguity that emerge, and I think you are entitled to that kind of careful response, which we will do.

Senator KERRY. I think that will be very helpful, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Let me, if I can, come back to a question which was raised both by Senator Biden as well as by Senator Kassebaum. Am I running out of time?

The CHAIRMAN. No. If you would yield for just one second, I think there was one other document too, and that was a letter for me asking for the total number of the detailing of the obligations under the treaty.

That is yet to come, I believe. I just wanted to keep the record open in that regard.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we are having a discussion, Ambassador Kampelman is in charge of it in the State Department, and we are trying to satisfy all of these things properly. I do not know its status.

The CHAIRMAN. It is under discussion, but it is not yet received.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, Senator Kassebaum asked a question about, can this treaty stand alone without further reductions? And Senator Biden asked also the question about SS-25 deployment. I would like to come back to that, if I can.

This treaty permits both sides to freely substitute strategic nuclear missiles to target locations previously targeted by the shorter range missiles. That is, in fact, at least a potential giant loophole. Whether the loophole is taken advantage of depends largely on the attitudes of both sides.

Now previously, people criticized SALT II for limiting weapons instead of eliminating them. INF does the reverse. It eliminates intermediate short-range weapons, but it limits neither side in the ability to replace them with other categories of nuclear weapons.

So, in fact, if you do not have further strategic reductions, and one side or the other were to proceed to deploy some kind of weapon, if the Montebello agreement puts in some kind of tactical weapons they see as a threat, or if they on the other hand deploy strategic weapons targeted at the very things that were targeted by INF, you swallow up the whole treaty.

So how, if you do not get a strategic arms reduction, does this treaty stand alone?

Secretary SHULTZ. The treaty stands alone in that, in and of itself, from our standpoint, it is positive.

But it does not solve all the problems. It is just a piece. And as you say, it is limited to weapons with certain ranges. So, therefore, it does not limit other ranges.

I do not think it is a question of whether or not the two sides will target the targets that they think are the most lucrative. They certainly will.

And we certainly will target in the Soviet Union, with our strategic forces, targets that might have been in the range of the weapons being eliminated. I assume that the Soviets will do the same thing.

So, it is certainly the case that it is desirable to have a strategic arms agreement. And that is why, when the President put forward his program in the early 1980's, it was comprehensive in nature.

Senator KERRY. Would you view such a deployment as incompatible with the intent of the treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I would not.

Senator KERRY. You would not?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator KERRY. So it would not be viewed as a breach?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator KERRY. Joining with Senator Cranston, I also was struck by the comment you made in describing the tactics here and specifically saying this does not represent a treaty of the peace movement, it is specifically NATO's treaty, and that the freeze would have been the wrong way to go.

I think it ought to be pointed out that while the INF deployment may be one strategy, and in fact it has worked and we congratulate you, you should not ignore the fact that during the time that we have been pursuing that, SS-24's, SS-25's, major advancements in submarines have been made, which threaten us directly, which would not have taken place if we had put into place a bilateral freeze.

This treaty eliminates weapons pointed at Europe. Those weapons have been pointed at us in those intervening years. So, many people may feel there could have been a different strategy that would have worked. However, I think this is not the time to debate this issue, but I took umbrage that in your testimony you so chose to raise that debate, because I think it runs contrary to the bipartisanship of this effort to get this treaty through at this point in time.

Secretary SHULTZ. But I am seeking to not only talk about what the treaty does, and what the merits of what it does are, but also to reflect on the process through which it emerged.

And I have given you my view of the lessons learned. And as I have said, I do not want to go through it all over again. But I think one of the lessons learned, and it is a pretty obvious lesson, is that if you do not have the will to defend yourself it is going to be very difficult to persuade somebody to let go of the ability they have to attack you.

And the idea of strength in diplomacy that goes together, I think, is a very common idea. If you want to sit down at the table to play poker, you have got to have some chips. Or you cannot get there. It is the same basic notion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Secretary. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have the privilege of listening to your rather lengthy but very thorough history of the negotiations, which I thought gave a high degree of comfort for the intensity and the concern that went on during the deliberations to ensure that we did indeed assert our own very best interest.

I would like to refer to a point in that history, I think it was covered around page 32, where you are reflecting on the proposed withdrawal of the SS-20's from Europe.

And if my memory serves me correctly, there was consideration of a redeployment somewhere east of the Urals, possibly. And then our removal of the Pershings for perhaps placement in the United States.

And the application of the limited range of the Pershings seemed to dictate at one time that they may be placed in Alaska.

Secretary SHULTZ. That is what got your attention?

Senator MURKOWSKI. It got our attention. That is correct, Mr. Secretary.

I am wondering if you would care to indicate the degree of leverage that this notion produced on the Soviets, and whether indeed it might have led to the merits of the zero-zero option?

Secretary SHULTZ. The question arose in connection with the fact that the Soviets, after they got to a certain level of deployments on Soviet territory but within the ranges of Europe, in other words aimed, targeted at European targets, they started deployments in the Asian part of the Soviet Union aimed at other neighbors of theirs.

And we particularly emphasized then, although we had always had the view, that the only concept that made sense was a global one. Their deployments versus ours on a global basis.

In part that was because these missiles are mobile. So if you permitted them in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and prohibited them elsewhere, they could be moved. Ours are too. So, that only emphasized the desirability of a global concept.

Now we came down toward the end, and as I developed in my testimony, at one time there was the notion of a global ceiling of 200, 100 of which in Europe. And then, for a while, and this was where we stood after Reykjavik.

There was the notion of a global ceiling of 100 with none deployed in Europe. None of ours and none of the Soviets. And that did leave the question of Where would ours be deployed?

We never had to give an answer to that question. But I think the nature of our geography makes the nature of that answer fairly obvious, although we could have deployed anywhere in the United States.

We left that there, and we also emphasized the great advantages in verification. And I am sure that our other allies weighed in very heavily.

Japan did, Korea did, perhaps the Chinese did, on the desirability of a total global zero. So, last July, I think it was, finally, the Soviets agreed to the global zero as distinct from this 100 mixture.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You indicated, Mr. Secretary, that we were the politicians and you were not. But I think by that answer I can certainly deduce the capability of your negotiations, and of course we in Alaska are pleased that we were able to perhaps play a role as a point of leverage to achieve the objective, which was the zero-zero option.

Be that as it may, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to have my statement entered into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Murkowski maybe found in the appendix.]

Senator MURKOWSKI. I would like to pursue a question that I believe was raised by Senator Lugar with regard to article 14.

As you have already referred to, the brevity of that particular reference, the parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions.

My specific question, Mr. Secretary, is Where does that specifically leave us in new technological advancements or, say, utilization of air- or sea-launched capabilities, now that we have done away with ground-launched capabilities?

I am concerned that this may be taken to limit the application of either new technology or a substitution of existing launch capability.

Secretary SHULTZ. There was in the SALT II Treaty a clause which said that the parties undertook not to circumvent the treaty, or words to that effect. And it became known as the "noncircumvention clause."

And we were opposed to including such a clause in this treaty as we saw even in arguments on INF that it was being used to argue that certain activities were prohibited that we thought were all out of bounds. For instance, the Soviets use it to argue that we could not deploy INF missiles.

So, in the discussion with them, we arrived at article 14, which we regard as a rather narrow and precise statement.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Which I agree it is.

Secretary SHULTZ. Namely, that what we are talking about here is we shall not assume, we will comply with the treaty obviously and not assume any international obligation which would conflict with its provisions.

Now, we have existing programs of cooperation. I discussed in that testimony what happened to the one, or what is in prospect with the one, with the Federal Republic of Germany, that existing programs of cooperation are not affected by this treaty.

On the other hand, if we were to make an agreement with some other country to supply them with weapons that are prohibited by this treaty, we would obviously be undercutting it.

For one thing, we are not allowed to possess or produce those weapons in the first place. So, that would be an example.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, that would cover proposed new technology?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are talking about missiles that deliver these weapons where the missiles have a certain range. That is what the treaty is about.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Within the range capability?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is specific as to what it deals with.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Let me ask you specifically, Mr. Secretary, would it exclude an air-to-air or a sea-launched missile?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, those could be substituted for the elimination of the ground-launched missile?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have in NATO now dual-capable aircraft. That is, aircraft capable of carrying nuclear explosive devices. And they have a considerable range.

Those are not affected by this treaty. We have them, they have them. The treaty deals with certain things. It deals with the land-based weapons of a certain range, and the specific systems are actually identified for the purpose of being sure that we did not have an argument about whether the SS-23's did or did not fit into the range. We identified the system.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate asking that the Secretary or his colleagues provide us with a rather narrow definition with regard to the range so that we can understand quite clearly that this article 14 does not restrict from a future capability that we may want to initiate at some point in time.

Mr. Secretary, I am one of five Senators who has the privilege of sitting on two of the three committees that deal with the INF.

And I would hope that in the Intelligence Committee that we can get into some of the particulars, since it will be closed, with regard to the issue of, really what we are doing here is, we are eliminating missiles, the warheads are still there, and the question of how the plutonium is handled, disposed of, utilized, reprocessed, is something that I think would be of interest.

I again commend you, Mr. Secretary, for a very thorough response and wish you a good day. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.

Secretary SHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could, let me say this. I think it is really in a way a rather simple point.

The treaty defines intermediate-range missiles as land-based systems having ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers. It defines shorter range missiles, as used in this treaty, as land-based systems with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers.

It requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate their intermediate-range missiles within 3 years, and their shorter range missiles within 18 months. Neither side can possess such missiles after they have been eliminated nor can they produce or flight test them. That is the nub of what the treaty provides.

Senator MURKOWSKI. It could eliminate new technology within those ranges.

Secretary SHULTZ. But you would not be permitted to evolve some new technology that produced a missile that flew in those ranges. Those ranges are eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sanford.

Senator SANFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to, at a later date, place a statement into the record. I would simply feel more comfortable not defining my position until I have heard most of the testimony, maybe all of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

Senator SANFORD. I have observed that this discussion, like most discussions, breaks out between those who have a positive attitude toward difficult problems and those who have a negative attitude, those who look for ways to solve problems and those who look for reasons that things ought not to be done because they are difficult.

There is a difference between being fearful and self-confident. I know very well that if we continue to distrust our ability to monitor the Soviet Union in such actions that we are going to continue to stumble forward toward nuclear extinction.

I am not suggesting that this Senate ought to be reckless. Certainly it ought not to be careless. But I have known Max Kampelman a long time. I know his associates by reputation.

They have been anything but reckless and anything but careless. They have been extremely meticulous in working out all of the details, and anticipating as much as humanly possible all the contingencies. And I must say that I am one who greatly admires Secretary Shultz and his wisdom and good sense.

I commend the President, who I think has brought tough leadership. He has brought optimism to this great problem that we have had now for many, many years. And he has brought with it a positive attitude. I am delighted that we now have this treaty before us for consideration and I thank you.

I would, if I may, ask a couple of questions. First, the MBFR negotiations have been going on, as you say, for 13 years. Is that the best way that we can go about coming to a conventional arms reduction agreement? Or could we establish a forum, something like the one we used for the INF Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the MBFR negotiations have not gotten anywhere. So, to the extent you say, or you suggest that they are a way of getting somewhere, well, they do not.

Senator SANFORD. No.

Secretary SHULTZ. The problem is inherently difficult because you have so many countries involved. It is not as though two countries mainly negotiate with each other about their own forces.

The MBFR negotiation had a geographic scope that was narrower than perhaps is desirable. And it had a participation that was narrower than perhaps is desirable. So, what is being undertaken in the new mandate is a larger, geographic scope from the Atlantic to the Urals.

So, there are much more Soviet forces involved. And France is added to the total picture as obviously a key and important country.

Now, as we have struggled with this in our discussions in NATO, we have asked ourselves if the thing that seemed to hand the MBFR negotiations up forever; namely, exchanging data, or having confidence in the data, stated about levels of manpower, is really the right way to go about it.

So, there is a tendency now to switch and to focus more on such things as tanks or artillery, on the assumption that manpower levels, while important, tend to follow from the restrictions on the weaponry.

At any rate, NATO is developing a posture that will be structured a little differently than the posture that the countries involved in the MBFR talks had. We will just have to see where it goes.

But I think it is a hard negotiation. Although there is more sense of readiness to work at things now than there has been in a long time.

And I say this not only with respect to obviously the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, the chemical weapons, the conventional weapons, there seems to be more possibility of discussion on some of the regional points of tension.

So, there is an unusually possibly promising period for diplomatic effort right now.

Senator SANFORD. I certainly understand what Senator Pressler is expressing when he talks about his proposed amendment on conventional force reductions. Over the recess I had an opportunity to meet with the Command of Southern NATO and discussed this issue with them.

There is a feeling that if the conventional force reductions or adjustments are not made before the strategic reductions, that they never will get made.

What would be your attitude toward a resolution that did not relate at all to this treaty, but simply said that before there is a strategic reduction treaty the matter of conventional reduction or adjustment needs to be taken care of?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we could posture ourselves in the strategic arms area, as we are, to obtain a result that in and of itself is desirable. And I think the questions that were raised first by Senator Biden and then others about over a long period of time the inherent relationship between one system and another are perfectly valid points.

It only underscores the importance of trying to get a strategic arms agreement, and we would want to do that.

Senator SANFORD. Even if you do not get in advance of that a conventional force agreement?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I think so. But we need to be working on all of these things together. But I do not think we should get into the posture of feeling that until you do everything you should not do anything.

Senator SANFORD. I do not disagree.

Secretary SHULTZ. In that sense, I am sort of an antilinkage person, not totally, but I think that sometimes we get things too tightly hooked in with each other.

Senator SANFORD. Well, I am not attempting to quote anybody in that command, but I got the absolutely clear statement that failure to ratify this treaty would be disastrous for NATO.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary SHULTZ. Senator Biden spoke eloquently on that this morning, reporting on the statements made to him in Europe. And I think that is true.

However, it does not appeal to me to ask you to ratify this treaty on those grounds, because it is sort of saying that whether the treaty is really good or not, we have it and you are sort of stuck with it. I think it is a good treaty and it ought to be examined on its merits, and I think it will stand up on its merits.

But I nevertheless think the point that you have made and that Senator Biden reported from his European trip is correct.

Senator SANFORD. Well, I did not mean to convey that the impression I got in Naples was that we have got to pass it. I found a real enthusiasm for it.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that is true.

Senator SANFORD. I would not want to give any other impression.

I have one final question that is related to what Senator Sarbanes was asking you earlier, and has been written about several times in the past 2 or 3 weeks, and that is: What is it that Chairman Gorbachev was up to? Why all of a sudden is he so agreeable? Has he got some trick that he is holding back?

Why do you think?

Secretary SHULTZ. You would have to ask him, Senator. I do not know. I speculated a little, and I almost kicked myself for doing it. I always believe that other people should speak for themselves and that I should not be doing it.

There are all sorts of theories about what they are trying to do. In fact, he wrote a book about the subject, that I read carefully. It is worth reading, "Perestroika."

Senator SANFORD. Well, thank you very much, and thank you for your very thoughtful testimony.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Senator Sanford.

Senator Trible.

Senator TRIBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me welcome you, along with all of my colleagues today, and at the outset congratulate you and President Reagan for a major achievement embodied by this agreement. Also, I want to applaud your negotiating team.

Many years ago I served in the House of Representatives—not that many years ago, I guess—and was elected by the Speaker to serve as a congressional observer to the SALT II team.

I remember traveling to Geneva and spending the better part of a day there with President Carter's negotiating team. I remember Ed Rowney invited me out to dinner that night. It was a delightful dinner and I had a real dose of realism that night.

I learned some very valuable lessons, and hopefully I can bring those to bear in an evaluation of this treaty. But in Ed Rowney and his colleagues, we have a first-class team that has shown resolve, realism, tenacity, and success. So, my compliments to all of you gentlemen for a job well done.

Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that I hope this committee's hearings will form a drama in two acts. They will focus first on the INF accord itself, its character, its implications for American security and that of our NATO allies, and whether it can be strengthened by the Senate; second, that we consider the principles embodied in the treaty as a basis for further reductions in nuclear arms.

I support President Reagan's treaty. It is a tribute to the persistence and patience of this President and his negotiators. The accord embodies certain principles crucial to any arms control negotiations: The right of onsite inspection to help prevent the cheating that has marred past arms agreements; proportional reductions, so that where the Soviets are stronger than we are, they will give up more than the United States and our allies; and the elimination of arms from the Soviet and American arsenals, not merely the reshuffling of the nuclear chessboard.

The treaty also has some implications for NATO, and you have spoken to those today. The INF accord caps a long and difficult process, one which has required an unmatched degree of cooperation and consultation within NATO. In every difficult stage of the process, from the initial dual-track decision of 1979 to the actual deployment of our INF weapons, the alliance has spoken, sometimes with difficulty, but with one voice.

The treaty is a success for NATO, and that bodes well, I think, for the future of the Atlantic alliance and is vital to our future, because surely that alliance will be tested time and time again by our adversaries.

When this agreement was signed by President Reagan, he said: "We can only hope that this historymaking agreement will not be an end in itself, but the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other urgent issues before us."

The hope of improved relations obviously is one that we all share. I would ask you to speak to that. You have in bits and pieces today, but perhaps in a more coherent fashion, would you share with us your current evaluation of the state of the United States-Soviet relationship, and where you believe this relationship is going?

What are the next steps? What can we anticipate over the course of this next year and beyond?

Secretary SHULTZ. If you look at the United States-Soviet relationship today and compare it with its nature, say 4 years or so ago, you will see that we have a tremendously greater amount going on across the board. We have more productive meetings on various issues of arms control, and we now have an INF agreement.

We have a variety of things going on in our bilateral relationship that were not going on then, as for example in the people-to-people exchanges. But there are many other examples.

We have a dialog on regional issues that I cannot say has been particularly productive, but it at least has been perhaps damage limiting. And the exchanges that we have had are increasingly frank. So, they are more productive than they were at the outset. This is the sort of thing that has to grow.

We got somewhere as a result of this, for example, on the Iran-Iraq conflict, and got going in the United Nations on that, although that seems to be stalled at the moment. But at any rate, that is an example.

In the field of human rights, which I saved for the last because in many respects I think it is the most important and kind of a key, we have seen people allowed to leave that we have been representing and asking to be allowed to leave for a great many years.

We have seen the number of cases where divided spouses and families are separated by virtue of not being allowed to emigrate reduced very considerably. We see emigration levels higher than they have been for the past 4 or 5 years, but at the same time nowhere near as high as we believe they should be, judging from the numbers that we believe wish to emigrate and not as high as the numbers of some past years.

We have very little ability to engage in discussion with the Soviets about these matters. Four or 5 years ago, they simply said in response to our questions and undertakings that this was an internal matter for them and they would not talk about it.

There has been an evolution of that and we now have a very extensive discussion, and when the President and Mr. Gorbachev meet that is a subject for them, and working groups are put into place. And at my meetings with Mr. Shevardnadze, it is always the No. 1 item on our agenda, and we have had very long meetings between experts on our side. Ambassador Dick Shifer, our Assistant Secretary of State for Human Affairs, chaired them.

And practically every question that you could think of is put on the table and is talked about, it is argued about. It does not mean that we agree, but at least we talk about it. We talk about their laws, why we think their laws ought to be changed in certain respects.

We talk about numbers, we talk about cases, and so on. And they, of course, insist that they want to raise questions about our human rights performance, and they do. So, we discuss that.

So, if you just described—if you took two snapshots 4 or 5 years ago and now, you would see a very different picture. Now, if you say, "Well, what is the likelihood that this is a moving picture and it is going too quick for us, I do not know the answer to that." It depends upon them, it depends upon us.

Our view is that we need to be ready, and this is the NATO view, defense and dialog; that we need to be ready to talk in good faith across the board, that we must keep our full agenda in play at all times, not have this turned into an arms control relationship—we have succeeded in that—and be ready to do constructive things as they may come along.

We are somewhat less hooked on the idea of linking everything together than some past administrations have been, and I think this is beneficial. For example, if it turns out that the Soviets do get out of Afghanistan by the end of the year, as they have said they will—and I do not know whether they will or not.

But if they do, it will not be because of any kind of linkage whatever. It will be because the freedom fighters in Afghanistan have given such a terrific account of themselves and we have given good strong support to that. In other words, I think there are many of these problems that you have to confront, so to speak, with facts on the ground, and it is only in response to facts on the ground that you can expect to get someplace.

Now, of course there is a kind of broad linkage and altogether unacceptable behavior can throw everything into a cocked hat. But I was impressed with President Reagan when, at the height of our fury over their shooting down of the Korean airliner, he made a point of sending our negotiators back to Geneva.

He sent Ambassador Rowney at the time, I think it was, and Ambassador Nitze back to that negotiating forum.

When we had a furor about espionage, about last April, I guess it was, 60 Senators voted that I should not go on my planned trip to Moscow. If I had not gone, I think we would have missed—that turned out to be a very productive meeting.

I went anyway. We did not allow ourselves to get too bound up in saying that everything falls in place or nothing falls in place.

So, that is our approach. Rightly or wrongly, that has been the approach the President has taken. He has said, "Let us be realistic all the time, do not kid yourself; let us be as strong as we can be, but also let us be ready for reasonable dialog."

That is the approach the President has taken. And we have got where we are, and where it will take us in the future remains to be seen. But I think the signs at the moment are encouraging.

I am very much of the view that the way to go about this is with a steady approach. Do not throw your hat in the air about anything, but at the same time, if something goes a little sour, do not go into a fit of despair, either. Instead of having this kind of pattern [indicating], let us just have it a little bit like this [indicating], with maybe an upward trend. I think that is the way to manage this.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Trible**. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but may I just add 1 minute's worth to what has been said, just a personal note if I might.

In the last year, Secretary Shultz and I had the assignment of meeting in somewhat similar circumstances when the Iran-Contra Committee was holding its hearings. Let me say, sir, your testimony in my judgment was the high point of that very sad occasion, as you spoke in the most eloquent terms about the importance of things like truth, trust, the rule of law, and the Constitution in our free society.

I think it is quite appropriate, indeed important, to note that here today a man who has lived that in his public and private life is representing the administration in presenting to the Congress perhaps its most lasting achievement.

I applaud you, sir, and I wish you well.

Secretary **Shultz**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. I would add amen to that.

Senator Adams.

Senator **Adams**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to express my thanks, as other members of the committee have, for your holding and arranging these hearings in the fashion that you have.

Mr. Secretary, there are four things I would like to discuss with you. I want to start by saying, One, that this represents an opportunity for the development once again of a bipartisan American foreign policy.

We have a great opportunity. We should seize it and support you, and not have amendments to this treaty that will require you to go back to the Soviet Union. This Senator for one will do everything possible to accomplish that.

The second thing is that I think we should fight the red herring amendments and the others that do not affect the basic thing that you, the negotiating team, and the President of the United States have accomplished. If we are going to discuss fissile materials—I learned what that word meant the hard way during the last year, Mr. Secretary, because my State happens to be one of the largest producers of fissionable materials for warheads.

You are absolutely correct, and anybody that says that you can take these materials out of a warhead and simply have them bolted onto something else, or that you can easily destroy them is wrong. It is not an issue. And I will do everything I can to try to keep that from becoming an issue or a burden to you.

Your decision was correct. We do not know what to do with this material. This material has to be returned to the stockpile, reprocessed or handled, and that is a highly classified and very difficult process.

And I might also state to my colleagues here that those who think you can walk into the Hanford plant in Washington State just on a lark on an afternoon had better think about the fact that they are going to face some very large military people with very large weapons and that they are not going inside. So, your decision was right, and what little we can do to help you on that, we hope to do it.

The third thing I want to say is that I am very pleased with your statement on page 40—I will not repeat it, but I will refer to it—that this treaty strengthens NATO. I agree; and still, we have much to do. But the fact that you have been able to establish a treaty that will take out the missiles that threaten the rear areas of NATO with conventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons is a great step forward in security.

We may have much to do, but this is a treaty that is in our self-interest.

The fourth point I will make is that people like yourself and myself are really in a transition. We knew the Depression, we knew World War Two. We refer to it still as "the war." A new generation is coming on.

I have read "Perestroika" and I agree with you, we should not speculate on the motives of the Soviet Union. But I think we can state that both the United States and the Soviet Union act in their self-interests.

In this particular case, I recommend everyone who has not read "Perestroika" to read it. Gorbachev writes that there is a self-interest between the superpowers, that it is important that we agree in steps on a way to take the burden of the arms race from our backs, so that we may compete in a world that is a new world and a different world, with a new generation of people, and do it with stability.

My question to you after the four points I have tried to make is this: Please tell me what the effect of the changes in the INF Treaty will be on a flexible response for Europe.

How do we best answer for the next two decades, because I think we do have a window in time right now with these treaties that we can complete? And is it your plan to try to come up with a START treaty? Because I agree with Senator Kerry, we have got to reduce the total number of weapons.

What steps do you recommend that we take to change flexible response? Are you recommending sealift? Are you recommending counterattacking forces?

Do you have something you want to say to us, or at least to this Senator, as to how we say to our colleagues, this treaty still provides for stability in Europe and is a step toward stability for this new generation for the next 25 years?

You tell me, I will repeat it.

Secretary Shultz. Well, thank you, Senator. I think that the sort of surface description of what happens is in many ways the best answer. When they take out four, as compared with one, that tends to affect whatever balance is there a little bit in our favor as we see it.

In the process the alliance, which set a plan for doing this and achieved what it sought, gets reassurance that solidarity works.

Now, does that mean that we now rest on our laurels? No. Within NATO we need to follow through on the Montebello decision. That is something we have to do. It is something our allies have to do.

And there are a lot, many difficult things in connection with that. That is a working process that has been going on independent of the INF Treaty, but nevertheless necessary.

At the same time, agreeing with you that maybe there is a window of opportunity here. What we should do is conduct ourselves in such a manner that, if it is there, then we can take advantage of it, but be realistic and do not do dumb things.

So, I think we should pursue a START agreement. We are working hard on that. I do not underestimate the difficulties of a verification regime for START. It will be much harder than the INF because of the advantages for verification of zero.

But it is not impossible. So, we will work at it and try to get there during this administration, if we can. And we are dedicated to doing that, the President is.

Meanwhile, many have called attention to the asymmetries in conventional forces, and I think it will be desirable to get that going. It is kind of reversing myself slightly here. I said I was not a believer in tight linkage, but at the same time there is some linkage in our approach in the CSCE process.

We have always felt that you had to go forward with the "human rights and economic baskets," as they are called, along with the arms control. So, we are looking for human rights performance in the Vienna discussions, and we want to see that there before we agree on a conventional arms mandate. But I think probably we will get there.

So, those are the things it seems to me we should do. But NATO is a living, breathing alliance of free people, and we have all of the strengths and the weaknesses that go with that. But in the end, I think the strengths have proven to be very important.

And nowhere did this come through more clearly than when in the clutch the NATO allies came through on the deployments in the case of the INF missiles. And it was not easy for many of them.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you.

My time is up, Mr. Secretary. I have talked with members of the NATO alliance from the parliamentary side and they completely support your position.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Adams.

Senator Evans.

Senator ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous consent to put my full statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be done.

[The prepared statement of Senator Adams maybe found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start out by asking that my full statement be inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Evans maybe found in the appendix.]

Senator EVANS. I would tell the Secretary that I would add my encomiums to those which have already been expressed. I suspect that you would like to reserve some of those for future dates, instead of having them all come at one time.

There have been contentious and difficult appearances before this committee. I hope that maybe this goodwill will last and become even traditional, that when you appear there will be equal congratulations from all of us.

I would like to refer to a couple of things which really I do not think have been said. They come from my opening statement. I believe in a very real sense as we begin deliberations on this treaty we should also reflect on what the treaty itself represents.

It is a real tribute to diplomacy. It says to all that governments, even governments as ideologically opposed as ours and the Soviet Union, can settle differences, can improve relations, and make it through negotiations and agreement.

Such diplomatic success seems sadly absent from our world today and we seem incapable of finding peaceful solutions to the world's conflicts. I would hope that others still engaged in conflict may look at this accomplishment, and the successful Senate ratification of this treaty, as a better way to resolve disagreements than the ways they have chosen, much more violent in nature.

We must not lose the opportunity to hold up this agreement as an example of what can be done if we are willing to undertake the slow, painful work that successful diplomacy requires, to show governments what happens as we put aside ideological views and ignore those demanding instant results and instead carefully and deliberately pursue agreement.

Third, I thoroughly disagree with those who squawk loudly about the Soviet duplicity and who believe that no verification procedure will keep the Soviets from cheating. They are among the small and unrelenting band who agree that no agreement with the Soviet Union short of their capitulation is worth signing.

I disagree wholeheartedly with this narrow perspective. It is not in the long tradition of successful American diplomatic and security policy.

We have talked today on a number of occasions about conventional force imbalance, but there is one other imbalance which does concern me and it should concern all of us. We should also consider the increasing imbalance in our respective diplomatic corps and the conditions under which they operate.

I need not remind my colleagues that we barely managed to avoid disaster with this year's appropriation for the Department of State. But the threat to the very mission of that Department remains. As we cut back on funding for the employees and the services of the State Department, the Soviets are increasing all over the world their diplomatic presence.

The determined efforts on the part of many Members of Congress to emasculate the State Department may ultimately end up being as threatening to our security as any military race.

I hope that those who are so appreciative of the diplomatic work which has been done in bringing us this far will remember this as we begin to deal with the budget of the State Department.

Let me only say in direct commentary to the assertions of some that we ought to embellish this treaty or to bring everything else into it, that if there is a crude comparison, it is probably that we should not make a CR out of this treaty.

We have had an example just a month ago of what an awful mess we get into when we try to jam everything into one bill, and I suspect we will get into just as big a jam if we put everything into this one treaty.

Let me follow from there with a question concerning the order of things that might come next, if you would like to speak to them or can. You did mention that, even if we fully carry out the INF Treaty, it is possible for both sides to substitute weapons which could be targeted at the same areas, and it would be perfectly within the treaty requirements.

Tactical battlefield weapons are not covered by the treaty. Air- and sea-launched short- to medium-range weapons, which could essentially carry on the same functions, are not covered.

We have also talked about the START Treaty, conventional imbalances, and the problem of chemical weapons. All of these need to be worked on.

Where should all those fit together in your view? I would not like to see, and I suspect you would not either, any of those be tied directly to the INF Treaty ratification. But what are the priorities for these four elements: The so-called substitution weapons, the chemical, the conventional, and the START elements.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all, on this question of the role of strategic weapons and targets that are involved in the INF weapons, there is no restriction in the treaty on where either side targets its strategic weapons.

On the other hand, you have lots of targets and some of them require certainly more than one warhead to hit it if the result is going to be what you want. So you have to set priorities.

And if you remove from the picture a large number of warheads, as the Soviets will do, four times as many as us, then they have a priority selection problem that is complicated for them. So, it is not just something that makes no difference.

Over a long period of time, if there are no constraints, eventually, if it is chosen to do so by each side, you produce more and more of the strategic weapons. But at a moment of time, you have choices to make. So, it is not just quite a simple proposition.

I think the three main areas that we have talked about and that you referred to—strategic, conventional, and chemical—we start by recognizing that they are very different in how the negotiation goes and in the ease or difficulty of doing key things with them.

Therefore, it is hard to act as though they are kind of a team of horses and you are going to drive them along together and work on them all. But they are different, and let me identify.

In the case of START, we are talking about the United States and the Soviet Union, nobody else. That makes it a little simpler. On the other hand, the verification provisions will be very difficult, and we know especially that we have very contentious issues on mobiles and on sea-launched Cruise missiles, and they will be hard to solve.

In the case of conventional arms, here we have a negotiation that involves 23 countries and 2 alliances. It may very well be that verification issues, particularly if we focus on the types of physical equipment a little bit more that we have been talking about, will be a little bit easier. I do not know. And onsite inspection probably helps you a little more readily in that area.

But you have got 23 countries and most of the forces we are talking about are not ours. So, it is not as though this is something that we can sit and decide. Others are going to have as much of a voice, maybe more of a voice, certainly together more of a voice.

Chemical weapons is again a very different proposition. We have called for onsite inspection on demand. It may be that something like that can get agreed to, but as far as I can see all of the experts feel that, even with that, verification will be far from satisfactory.

So, you have to weigh the merits of having something where you know going in that you are not going to be satisfied with verification. On the other hand, the genie of chemical weapons and their use is out of the bottle, and it is a very dismaying prospect.

So, the question is, How do you get a hold of it and can you get hold of it by having a treaty that, once again, it is not going to be negotiated by alliances; it is going to be negotiated in Geneva. We will be a big part of it and the Soviets will, and our friends and theirs.

But in order for this treaty to mean anything, it has got to be agreed to by a big range of countries all over the world who have a capacity to produce chemical weapons. And that means they have got to agree to have their chemical industry inspected and all kind of things.

So, that has difficulties of a different order. But as I have said, I think it is important that we work at all of these, and we have. We have proposals going. We have good people working to push them all as far as we can. But they are different animals, so to speak, and you cannot hook them up to the same sled and think you can pull it in harness.

Senator EVANS. I understand that my time is up. Let me say that I understand the difficulties when several different parties are involved.

But is there a priority that you would care to assign, assuming that they could all take the same amount of time to negotiate?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we have the resources to work on all three simultaneously. I am sure that in the coming months there will be an intensive effort in strategic arms to see if we can get that finished. Assuming the President has a summit meeting in Moscow, that would be a desirable thing.

There are many who are afraid of that for fear that we will get a deadline created and then will do stupid things in order to complete a treaty. I feel confident that the President will not do that.

Therefore, I do not mind having the summit set and be working on this, and there are ways in which deadlines perform a function. They cause you to decide things. So, deadlines are a problem in some ways, but they also have a positive aspect.

So, that will get a lot of attention in the coming months.

The conventional arms, as I said, the mandate for starting those talks is under negotiation. So, whenever that mandate is finally agreed on in the Vienna talks, then the actual talks will start. And I do not know just when. I would assume some time this year that that will get accomplished.

But just when, whether it will be in the spring or the summer, I am not sure. It depends in part on whether or not we see a satisfactory human rights picture emerging out of Vienna. So, there is an interplay there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator MOYNIHAN.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, I know that you are anxious to get on with the second round of questions, so I will be fairly brief in asking mine today. I will say what an extraordinary performance it has been all day, Mr. Secretary, with more than just the normal courtesies of someone who has been one of the arms control observers, going back and forth to Geneva, to state my, our, boundless gratitude and admiration to General Rowney, to Ambassador Glitman, and Ambassador Kampelman, and the venerable Paul Nitze.

I would make two points and ask one question. The first two points are connected. I hope you will listen with great care to Senator Biden's comments, and particularly those concerning the interpretation of treaties.

I am one of many Senators who will be very carefully guided by him on that. I would suggest that there is an aftermath to excessive zeal in the executive branch. The consequence is that the legislative branch just says, "No, there are things we will not put up with." I would hope there can be some linkage in the partisan commentary on foreign policy in the next year.

I remember on the night of the Friday before the arrival of Mr. Gorbachev, I was on one of the evening television stations. A former White House speech writer was one of the moderators. The evening began with a film clip of a prominent supporter, sometime supporter of the President, referring to him as a "useful idiot."

Lacking anybody else about to volunteer, I said, a "useful idiot" was Mr. Lenin's term of contempt for liberals. And I said I do not think that is quite fair to the President, or whatever I said.

Anyway, we have only got one President at a time. I got no support out of the former White House speech writer, who thought maybe the term was correct or at least did not disavow it.

This evening we are going to start hearing more about Nicaragua. Lou Cannon, who is as fair-minded and open and useful an advocate—I mean reporter. Strike that, strike "advocate." I mean "reporter."

Senator BIDEN. How about "useful"?

Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes, useful.

In his column this morning, "The Politics of Surrender," he said: "President Reagan is about to make what is supposed to be a last stand on behalf of the Nicaraguan rebels, whom he calls freedom fighters. Even White House officials acknowledge that they are likely to lose and they are already blaming Democrats for the surrender of Nicaragua, a country that the United States does not own." It goes on in that pattern.

Those things are going to connect, sir, and it is that pattern here with which we are going to have to deal. I hope some attention will be paid to that. I will not ask you to comment, but I thought I had better say it because we are getting into that season.

The larger point that I would suggest is that I think it is quite right that you would not want to comment on what you think was in Mr. Gorbachev's mind. And yet, there has been a very pronounced change in Soviet behavior. The damage is reflected in their coming forth with verification agreements that really surprised some of us at the time. I think you said that.

There has got to be a theory of the case here. Has something happened? Can this just be a superficial random event? Hardly.

We hear over the weekend that the administration is examining Soviet probes about entering into the world economic institutions, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

You know, are we thinking in those terms? Can I just suggest that you give us some sense of this. But you must be thinking this way, and the people around you are thinking this way. Having your thoughts would help us.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you. I appreciate your comments. I think a lot about that subject. As I said, I have taken the trouble to read Mr. Gorbachev's brief. I think whether you agree or disagree with the book or probably have a few grains of salt around to sprinkle through the pages when a person in that position writes a book like that, it is worth reading to see what he says.

And having met with him a great deal, my own judgment in reading the book is that it is his book, because it sounds like him. He talks like that.

So, I have read that. I have talked extensively with Soviet experts and I have, as we all do, as you talk to people and meet people, and I have had lots of occasions to meet with my Soviet counterparts, sometimes in very intensive discussions.

You are always reflecting and asking yourself about what is taking place, and that is a process that must go on. What I notice, however, is that our experts on the subject often miss the boat, and I am sure I miss the boat sometimes, maybe as much as they do.

So, what I conclude from that is that our ability to know what is going on in the Kremlin and why the Soviets are doing this and that has real limitations on it. And I get concerned if we get too fixed on what we think is the explanation for something or other.

There are many who think, for example, that the Soviet economy is in deep trouble and, because it is in such deep trouble, they will do practically anything to shed this armaments burden. Well, if you convince yourself of that, that will cause you to behave in a certain way, and you may very well be wrong.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Could I just interject? Taking down their SS-20's is not shedding any burden for them. They have already spent the money. Maintaining them is not much of a burden as against a tank division.

Secretary SHULTZ. But if you take down your strategic arms and you take down your conventional arms and so on, and you do all of that, I assume in the end that will save some money.

Conventional arms is what saves money, not strategic arms. Anyway, people talk like that.

On the other hand, if you read Mr. Gorbachev's book, what he says is: "I know there are people talking like that, and of course we would like to spend more of our resources; but anybody who thinks that the Soviet Union will not do what it has to do is mistaken."

So, he argues the other side of that. So, I think we should think hard, but that we should mainly say to ourselves, what do we think is good for us, and go after it. And if we get it, fine.

In a sense, it is up to them to see what kind of response we are going to get to these initiatives. And of course, we will look at their initiatives, and Mr. Gorbachev has plenty of them. He has got a proposal a day almost. So, we have to evaluate them.

But I hesitate to get myself too convinced that this is the reason why they are doing something or other, for fear that I will wind up misleading myself and misleading the people I advise. And I am better off, we are better off, I think, as I said, looking at what makes sense for us and proposing it and advocating it and listening to them and bargaining and trying to get somewhere with it, obviously, looking for things where there may be in the judgment of each party something of mutual interest.

Now, you mentioned the question of admission of the Soviet Union to the various economic organizations. That is one of these interesting Washington events. There was a big story in the New York Times about that.

There was no foundation in fact for that story, none. How it got written is beyond me. But we have been on the one hand praised for doing that and reamed out for doing that. There has been a big kafuffle about it. But it was a nonevent. It was a newspaper story based on nothing.

There was another newspaper story in the Times based on nothing, a story that General Powell went around Central America threatening to take the money away from all of the democracies if they did not do what we wanted. The reporter who wrote it wrote it from a transcript of an interview, and we got the transcript of the interview and we went over it with the Times and said, "Show me where in this transcript you find that?"

And you could not find it, and yet they wrote an editorial on the basis of that.

So, you triggered me off by asking about this economic initiative which does not exist.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I plead with you, Mr. Secretary, do not get into a war with the New York Times at this crucial moment in this Treaty procedure.

Secretary SHULTZ. I take it back.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Moynihan may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator McCONNELL.

Senator McCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to commend you, Mr. Secretary, and your team for your landmark agreement. I think it is going to be ratified. That is why so many of the questions and so much of the discussion here today is centered around the post-INF environment.

Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of my statement I would like to have my opening statement put into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator McConnell may be found in the appendix.]

Senator McCONNELL. Mr. Secretary, I listened carefully to your response to Senator Evans' request that you sort of prioritize the various extant areas of discussion for arms reduction. And I have listened to you at various times during this rather lengthy day, express your reservations about any linkage between any of these discussions.

I think your answer to Senator Evans indicated—and I really do not want to misquote you—that the principal reason for going forward with START standing alone is that it was more simply done, that there were two parties involved here, as opposed to a conventional agreement or a chemical agreement, in which we had a multiplicity of countries, parties, and interests to deal with.

My question is, just because it is more simply done—admittedly it is not simple—but because of the presence of only two parties, is that sufficient argument to proceed down the START path without some consideration as well to conventional force levels, which it seems to me are a matter of considerable concern to our allies?

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with you that we should be working at all three of the areas that Senator Evans asked about, and I tried to describe the manner in which we were doing so. And I also tried to describe the manner in which they are not necessarily one easier from the other, but they are different from each other in very important respects.

Having said that, I think that an agreement to limit strategic arms—to reduce them, I should say, not limit, to reduce—to the levels that we have lined out already with the Soviets in our START negotiations, would be a good thing in and of itself.

And so if I felt that it would only be a good thing if a bunch of other things took place, I would certainly want to phrase it that way. But I do not. I think it would be a good thing in and of itself, partly for reasons brought out by Senator Biden in an earlier question.

The conventional arms, reducing those asymmetries, would be a good thing in and of itself in my opinion. The chemical weapons, if we can do something satisfactory, is very important.

Here we will have to make a judgment and you in the Senate will have to make a judgment, because if we bring back a treaty and we say to you, "Here is what is agreed, but our level of confidence in being sure that people are abiding by it is not very high, but in the interest of trying to get at this proliferation we should be willing to do thus and so," you will have a different kind of problem in front of you.

I wrestled with that problem myself a lot: What is the right way to go here? So, I am not trying to dodge this issue of priorities, but I do feel that each of these is important in itself. They are important to work on and they are very different kinds of negotiations.

Senator McConnell. So, you think, in a sense, the outlines of the START agreement provide no incentive for the Soviets to pursue conventional force reductions? I gather you think they want to do this on their own and they need no incentive, is that correct?

Secretary Shultz. Well, I think that actually, if you ranked the START subject matter and the INF subject matter as to the relationship with conventional arms, you would have to put the INF a little bit closer, because we are talking about Europe and that is where the conventional arms discussion is centered. It is not centered everywhere.

I do not really see a close connection on the subject of START.

Senator McConnell. I gather that you would agree with me that to do anything significant in the conventional field, Gorbachev would have to really deal with his military complex. However, the elimination of personnel, it seems to me, would be what would threaten the Soviet military establishment.

How confident are you that he fully understands his military and is in a position to grapple with those folks, if not this year, then sometime in the immediate or near future, and to come up with some kind of significant conventional force proposal?

Secretary Shultz. I think the best way to answer that question is to put up reasonable propositions and to try to work them out, and we'll see what happens.

They have made a lot of statements that are mildly encouraging. But you don't know until you get down to the details. The phrase that everybody was using as we were negotiating toward the end of the INF, which is true in all these things, is "the Devil is in the details." It surely is on all these things. So, you really don't know until you really are struggling where you're going to come out.

But we should try. I think it is through the effort that we find out what the other side is willing to do.

Senator McConnell. How confident are you that our European allies have the political will to carry out the kinds of conventional improvements that we all know are probably needed as an incentive—possibly just like deployment of our own medium and short range missiles—to get a conventional force agreement in the next few years?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that we'll have plenty of problems, and we will have to work at it, struggle with it, and argue about it. I hope in the end that it will work out. It is a decision taken some time ago, with everybody involved. So, we'll want to carry through on it.

There are things that we have to do here, in the United States, as part of our contribution to carrying out that decision. So, that will also be part of the problem.

Senator MCCONNELL. So, you think we could live with a situation in which the INF Treaty is agreed to and out of the way, the START agreement is taken care of, roughly along the lines that have been suggested, and we are left after that with the conventional force levels that we have today on both sides? You are not concerned about that post-INF environment, that post-START environment, in which we are left with the current conventional imbalance?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I don't say that.

I say that we have an imbalance. I would like to interject that I don't write our guys off quite as much as it seems to be popular to do. I think we give a good account of ourselves.

Nevertheless, there are some big imbalances in some key pieces of military equipment. So, we want to rectify those.

You can rectify them by building up or you can rectify them by negotiating equality.

I think if we can do it, it is desirable to negotiate the equality, to negotiate it down. Probably if we are going to be successful in that, we have to show that we are certainly ready to do what is needed to carry out the Montebello decisions.

So, do not get the idea that I am happy with the conventional imbalance. I am not.

Senator MCCONNELL. Shifting to the southern flank for a minute—I don't think there has been any discussion of that today—most of the southern flank nations of NATO have had the benefit of the flexible response shield without, what some would argue are the difficult political problems of deploying Pershings or GLCM's. In the process of securing this treaty for Europe's protection, have we made the southern flank more vulnerable?

In particular, I am interested in your feeling about the Turks and their reaction to the post-INF environment.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think that Italy is considered to be in the southern flank, and we did have our GLCM deployments in Italy.

In the case of Turkey, I have a tremendous admiration for what they are doing in their movement toward democracy and their movement to open up their economy. I think one of the main problems there is that we are not giving the support in terms of security assistance to Turkey that they, by our agreements, have a right to expect.

Senator MCCONNELL. I couldn't agree with you more, but that's not my question.

Secretary SHULTZ. We need to keep working at that.

Senator MCCONNELL. I could not agree with you more.

I was there last summer and share some of your observations. However, that was not my question.

How do they feel? What do they tell you about their own sense of vulnerability in the post-INF environment?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the Turks, as our other NATO allies, are in favor of the INF Treaty. So, they think they are better off with it than without it.

Now, that does not mean that they are happy without it. They are making a major effort to develop their capabilities within NATO, and we are making a major effort to help them. We are not making as much as an effort as at least I think we should.

Of course, the Turkish situation is complicated by the longstanding tension between Greece and Turkey. They are both in NATO, but they are both looking at each other, too. That is part of the problem and part of the picture.

Senator MCCONNELL. I know that I'm out of time, but one final question, please, because I know I probably will not get another round.

With regard to the possibility that there might be some conventional force buildup on our side necessary to ultimately get a conventional agreement, where are we on the basing rights negotiations that are going on that have been somewhat troubled with some of our NATO allies?

Secretary SHULTZ. There are two active negotiations at the moment in NATO—one in Spain and one in Greece.

In Spain, we are basically pretty much well along toward completing it. It is, I think, from our standpoint, unsatisfactory that the Spanish have concluded that our 401st Airwing should leave. They insist on that. We wish they did not insist on that, but they are. And so, that is something that they have a sovereign right to do, and they are doing it.

We are now in the process of following a NATO procedure that is to be gone through whenever there is a change in force structure. It may be that another country will decide, and hopefully one in the southern area, to accept that wing. I don't know whether that will be the outcome or not. But, at any rate, we're working on that.

Leaving that to the side, I think that the agreement that is in prospect with Spain is a very good one, and I hope that we can follow through with the things that have been set out. If so, I think, when you see that, you will feel that it is a good one. I know that it has been briefed to some Members, though I don't know to how many, to have that.

In the case of Greece, we are not anywhere near so far along. It is always an active thing, negotiating with Greece on these things. This will be my second time around, as I was Secretary of State when we concluded the previous agreement.

You always seem to go through stages where everything seems to be lost, but in the end it turns out.

I have personally worked a lot with Greece in a step-by-step process, as we called it, to try to improve our relationship and to lay the groundwork for this negotiation. It is very much in the midst now, and I don't think it is particularly useful for me to comment beyond that on the ins and outs of it.

Senator McCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We now come to our second round. I wonder if my colleagues would agree that we limit ourselves to 5 minutes.

Senator BIDEN. I would object, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SANFORD. How about a half a minute. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we will keep it at 10 minutes.

You are very patient to be with us this long, Mr. Chairman. This may exhaust us, or we may have another round, still. I honestly don't know.

Secretary SHULTZ. I'm here. I have a date with my wife for dinner at 7, and I won't stay beyond that.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably you should be able to make it. Thank you.

I join you in having read "Perestroika." I was particularly struck with the way he leapfrogged backward to the NEP and the pragmatism of the new economic policy, skipping much of what had happened in between.

I have just one question, and that is in connection with the Special Verification Commission. We touched on this before.

I still do not quite understand why the SCC, which I think has done a sterling job under General Ellis, would not have been just taken or absorbed, or, to put it the other way around, why not put the SCC into the Special Verification Commission.

Why keep them separate?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we felt that we should do something that was special to this set of problems, and that we ought to try a little different approach, as I said, namely one in which the Commission would meet on demand, or call, as distinct from a standing committee. So, we'll see if this will be more productive, energetic, or somehow work a little better.

The CHAIRMAN. But will they both keep going, both basically centralized in Geneva?

Will General Ellis be in charge of the Special Verification Commission?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is no thought to end the Special Consultative Commission that has its duties with respect to other treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I have several questions that I would like to submit in writing, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Before I begin my very brief set of questions, Mr. Secretary, you might be interested to know that your agnosticism on the question of whether or not you should guess the intentions of an adversary were precisely those voiced to me by President Mitterand in his office. You may be interested in the way he phrased it, slightly differently than you.

I asked him the same question about what were Soviet intentions, and he said—and I wrote it down because it struck me so—he said, "We must judge by the objective, not the subjective. If my adversary is willing to behave in a way I wish him to behave, what do I care if I later read in his memoirs that he was hoping to deceive me?"

I thought that was interesting. Obviously, you find it of no interest, so I'll move on. [Laughter].

I thought it was kind of funny.

Secretary SHULTZ. I thought it was fascinating.

Senator BIDEN. I have two areas of concern that I would like to touch on very quickly. First is the question of how to interpret the treaty.

Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the obligations entailed by this treaty are clearly formulated and that we and the Soviet Union understand those obligations in the same way?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, insofar as we can. I don't argue for a minute that there may not be things that come up in the future on which there might be disagreements, or in which some gray area might appear.

But we have tried to pin down details, even to such things as how you man a station in Votkinsk, where we observe what comes out of the plant. Probably some of those things may have to get modified a little bit because they are prospective and very detailed. But we try to err on the side of pinning things down.

But I don't say that there are not going to be differences in the future.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, do you believe and expect that these obligations which each side is incurring should be carried out through the life of the treaty in accordance with the understandings of these obligations, as we understand them now, assuming the treaty is not amended? Is it correct to state that those areas where there is clear understanding between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as to how the treaty is understood at this moment are to endure for the life of the treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, they are, and the treaty is of indefinite duration.

Senator BIDEN. Now, if either side wishes to change an understanding of any provision or any section of the treaty as both sides now understand it, if they wish to change it in the future, would that require amendment of the treaty or a negotiation to amend it?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there is a sense that there are certain things that I'll call "technical details," such as how many people are you allowed to have to perform a certain function in onsite inspection. Now, we have never performed such a function before, and neither have they. We are breaking a lot of new ground.

But, as I said, we tried to be as specific as we could be.

It may very well be that we will find that we need more people, or perhaps we don't need as many, and there is a mechanism built into the treaty for making those kinds of adjustments. We don't see that that's any big deal.

Senator BIDEN. And that would not require amendment——

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator **Biden** [continuing]. Because, in fact, the treaty contemplates that?

Secretary **Shultz**. Exactly.

Now, on the other hand, if somebody says "Well, after all, wouldn't it be a good idea if we each had 100 of these intermediate-range missiles," that obviously would be a complete change and would have to be negotiated.

Senator **Biden**. Or if someone came along and said——

Secretary **Shultz**. And I don't have any sense that anybody is contemplating any such kind of change. But I am just trying to be responsive.

Senator **Biden**. Oh, I agree. By the way, I don't have any sense that anybody is contemplating any change either.

But if, in fact, at a later date the Soviets came along and said that they were going to enhance the range of an existing short-range system that they have—and they have a number of them—to a range of 1,050 kilometers——

Secretary **Shultz**. That would be a violation.

Senator **Biden**. OK.

Now, do you believe that if there are obligations under this treaty that need to be altered that are not contemplated, such as saying we're going to have 20 or 50 or 100 and it now says zero, that the two sides must agree to that alteration and that on the U.S. side, such a change would require a concurrence of the U.S. Senate?

Secretary **Shultz**. Absolutely.

Senator **Biden**. With regard to the matter that I raised and that subsequently was raised by others in their questioning, with respect to deployment of strategic weapons that could, in effect, circumvent the treaty, or at least could, in effect, take the place of the missiles that are being withdrawn by the Soviets—in this case the SS-20—I have two questions.

What is the Soviet policy as best you know it—not their intentions, but policy—with regard to staying within the current levels of total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles?

In other words, to the best of your knowledge, are they willing to stay at their current levels pending negotiation of a START treaty?

Secretary **Shultz**. I believe I am correct in stating—but I will check this—that in our judgment, they currently exceed the SALT II limits slightly, by about 40, as against a base number of——

Senator **Biden**. Of 2,400.

Secretary **Shultz** [continuing]. Of 2,400. So, slightly.

In our judgment, there is exceeding there. They, I think, do not agree.

Both sides have shown considerable restraint in this regard, and I read out to you earlier this afternoon the President's policy on restraint, which states what we are doing.

So, I think there is a kind of understanding in place, and I am reminded by this note [indicating] that the Soviets are currently destroying SS-11's, as they deploy SS-25's. So, they are not simply adding one. They are taking the others out.

They also dismantle submarines as new ones are deployed.

Senator **Biden**. If I could clarify that point, 2,400 is the total ceiling, and 820 MIRVed ICBM's, 1,200 MIRVed ICBM's, SLBM's, and

1,320 MIRVed ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers—those are the subceilings. The only argument about the total number, and I say this also to your negotiators behind you, is that as it relates to the number of vehicles allowed by SALT II the Soviets may be 40 over. I am not talking about encryption, I am not talking about other provisions—just the total number of vehicles.

The point that your staff just made in the note was that even if the Soviets are 40 above, they are based upon what they are destroying in order to make replacements at least staying, to the best of our understanding, within the 2,440, if that, in fact, is an accurate number.

They say it is 2,400; we say 2,440. But their policy appears to be, if I understand what you are saying, to not exceed that total number.

Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think it is not a good idea to take a treaty apart and say you're complying with this part, even though not on some other parts. These treaties are negotiated as a unit. So, we have to look at it that way.

But what I guess I am saying in response to your question is that there is a kind of uneasy recognition that a major breakout here is probably not a good idea at this time and nobody is doing it. They are not doing it and we are not doing it, so that we've let it alone.

Senator BIDEN. I want to clarify a point, if I may.

Because I made a reference earlier to SALT II, I think that throws things off a little bit.

The essential point that I am trying to explore here, if not make, relates not to all the limitations contained in SALT II, which I clearly understand the administration's position on, but only to the portion that would, in fact, have the ability, in the minds of some, to render the military accomplishments of the INF agreement less significant than they are. That is the addition of additional delivery vehicles that would have the effect of adding to the Soviet arsenal.

Now, I am not asking and I am not proposing and I am not suggesting that we are now abiding by the SALT II unratified agreement in total. My view is that we should, but that is not what I am asking you here.

What I am asking you is, Is there an understanding that the Soviets will not increase the total number of delivery vehicles presently in their arsenal and if there is not such an understanding, would such an understanding be desirable while you are doing the Lord's work of moving toward a START agreement?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is not any direct understanding that has been worked out between us. There is a kind of de facto sense of restraint, and I read you out the President's sense of this.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course, I noticed you very carefully, and you pointed this out this morning when you raised this question, are distinguishing between delivery vehicles and warheads.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course, it is the warheads that really count the most. As we have said many times, we think that is one of the problems with the SALT agreements, in that they permitted a big increase in warheads, and, in fact, were destabilizing in the MIRVing that took place.

But that is what has led us to focus on warheads, and any understanding to be really a comfortable one, would need to focus on that.

I do have the sense that what we should be focusing on in the strategic area right now is negotiating the big reductions that we have underway, and that if we have a reasonably restrained situation, we ought to put our emphasis and our effort and our resources and everything into trying to complete that treaty and not divert ourselves into what would be a separate negotiation, because you don't want to agree on something and not be able to verify it and work all that out and so on. It suddenly becomes very complicated, and you wind up on a detour.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up, but Senator Sarbanes has been gracious enough to suggest that he would yield me 2 more minutes to finish this line of questioning, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator BIDEN. The impression I got—and, again, I do not in any way try to paint myself as some expert on Soviet intentions, nor does one visit to the Kremlin every 4 years give you any insight. I want to make that clear at the outset.

But my impression is that the Soviets are willing to stay within the limitation on the number of delivery vehicles, whether or not it is related to SALT II. And, if that is true, then the relevant question is, Could the United States verify such a cap on strategic nuclear vehicles if such a cap were to be extended during this interim period between INF and START?

Now, maybe it is not appropriate to ask you that question, Mr. Secretary. Maybe I should save that for the negotiators and/or the intelligence people.

Secretary SHULTZ. That is a technical question about, in this case, the effectiveness of national technical means against this category of weapons.

Senator BIDEN. Correct, in terms of counting those vehicles.

Secretary SHULTZ. That would be the form of verification that you are talking about.

Senator BIDEN. That's correct.

Secretary SHULTZ. I believe it is fair to say that there is reasonable confidence in verifying the number of strategic delivery vehicles.

Senator BIDEN. That is my understanding also. I thank you very much.

Secretary SHULTZ. But I think that is a good question for you to put to the experts.

Senator BIDEN. I thank my colleague from Maryland and the Chair, and I thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I take it, though we have discussed the importance of future arms control agreements, it is your view that the INF Treaty ought to be judged on its own terms, and unrelated to what is to follow on other arms negotiations.

Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. How do you answer the critics who assert that part of our deterrent capability would be eliminated?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it is part of our system of responses possible in the flexible response strategy of NATO.

It is, from our standpoint, a relatively new entry. The deployments have been there basically since beginning in 1984; in late December 1983, they actually started. So, here we are, in 1987. It isn't as though they have been there a long time.

They were put there—and I am sure there are those who would like to have them stay—but they were put there as a result of a dual-track decision that was a response to the SS-20 deployments primarily. In the year 1983, in particular, which was the year in which the deployments started, as you know, there were many undertakings made in the basing countries by us and by the leading politicians of those countries. People said we must deploy these missiles if we are going to have a chance in these negotiations, and if the negotiations don't pan out, we have to have them as part of our defense given those SS-20 deployments.

However, said the leaders of the basing countries and said we, in our undertakings, what we want is to get the Soviet Union to take out this force, and if they will take it out, we will take it out.

That was an undertaking made in this very intense period, when the deployments were being challenged.

I think to go back on that undertaking would be political dynamite, and we should not want to do it.

Senator SARBANES. So, their deployment was, in effect, a move to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and not an answer to the decoupling argument?

Secretary SHULTZ. In a way, the Soviet intermediate-range missiles themselves, the SS-20's, as I said earlier, were, in part, a decoupling kind of weapon; that is, they were targeted on Europe; and our deployments were a kind of recoupling move.

So, if we move them both out, then we are back where we started from. We are coupled in the manner that I described in my testimony.

Now, everyone is always nervous about it, because they read about statements made here about bringing troops home and so on. But, basically, we have kept those troops there, and we do have a close relationship with NATO, and I hope that we keep it. I think that is the general sense here. I don't get any sense of moving away from NATO at all. Quite to the contrary.

So, I think that basically our capacity to exercise the flexible response doctrine is as strong today as it has been in the recent history of NATO.

Senator SARBANES. My next question is just to set the stage, and then I will go on.

Do you think the nuclear deterrent has prevented major conventional war?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you have to believe that because we have had an absence of war, and the thing that is different now, as compared with the earlier periods, is that we have a NATO alliance with a nuclear deterrent capability. That does not mean we should not seek to work to change that pattern. But that has worked, and so, you reduce it and work at it, but you do it cautiously.

Senator SARBANES. And as you look to the future, do you think we will continue to need a nuclear deterrent to prevent major conventional war?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think that is the foreseeable future.

The President has said and the General Secretary has said, and, as a matter of fact, I think in the resolution that you all voted on in 1981, you said—this is your resolution—"and reaffirms its desire to work with him"—to work with the President—"so that the threats of nuclear war can be reduced and perhaps eliminated in our lifetime."

That is what you wrote it for and I believe—yes—you were among those voting for that resolution.

So, that is an objective that people share. Nobody likes the idea of a nuclear exchange. At the same time, we do have to recognize that it has kept the peace, and it probably keeps some kind of handle on these chemical weapon threats that are getting all too strong.

Senator SARBANES. And the nuclear deterrent that will be available to us after the implementation of this treaty is the strategic nuclear force and the very short-range nuclear force, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have these categories of nuclear weapons in Europe.

First of all, there are land-based weapons with, I think, in the neighborhood of around 2,000 warheads. Please check me on this. There are dual-capable aircraft, with great potential range, that have another roughly 2,000. There are submarines dedicated to NATO—U.S. submarines—that are within the command structure of SACEUR. All of this, any nuclear decision, is above him. But, nevertheless, they are there, and they have about 400 ballistic missile warheads on them.

So, there is a very considerable capacity there. And when people say that this treaty does not solve all the problems, they are right. It doesn't. There are still lots of nuclear weapons.

But it is a careful step in the right direction, and, in my opinion, we keep working at these matters, and our priorities should be START, conventional, and chemical, not further reductions in the Europe-dedicated nuclear weapons at this time.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are several concerns that I intend to explore with a good many of the witnesses when they appear before us. Several of them have been covered, so I don't have too much left to ask you, just a few questions.

First, on compliance, to what extent are questions about Soviet compliance with arms agreements what we might call demonstrated, unquestioned violations, or disputes about ambiguous interpretations, or ambiguous conduct? I know you have already expressed yourself about that radar installation. But beyond that.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the President has made a report to the Congress and classified things that we think are questionable insofar as whether they are a violation or in various categories, and that is our best considered judgment. There are quite a few violations, and, of course, you do not confine yourselves to arms control matters.

I personally think the lack of conformity to the undertakings in the Helsinki Final Act and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are in many ways, the most distressing.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, that is an obvious and major discrepancy.

On arms control agreements, to the extent we have them, is our own U.S. compliance record unambiguous and 100-percent perfect?

Secretary SHULTZ. So far as we can be. We have no intention of violating any treaties that we undertake. They make accusations about it, and we examine them. But we don't think they have foundation.

Senator CRANSTON. There have been some questions raised by them, as I understand it, not necessarily during this administration, where it was, perhaps, an interpretation question and where we have agreed to modify certain behavior that they felt was not in line with understandings. Is that not true?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that is right.

Senator CRANSTON. On force asymmetries, the Soviets, as you well know, have more heavy land-based ICBM's, the United States has more SLBM warheads, the Warsaw Pact has more tanks, the NATO forces more antitank forces; the age and capabilities of our respective weapons differ greatly. The experience and reliability of our forces and those of our allies, compared to those of the Soviets and their allies, vary rather widely.

How do these quantitative and qualitative differences in United States and U.S.S.R. forces relate to the issue of ratification of the INF Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, that is a curve you are throwing at me. I am trying to figure out how to answer you.

Senator CRANSTON. I did not mean it to be a curve.

Secretary SHULTZ. It is just not a question that has occurred to me. I don't see that it does.

Do you mean that ambiguities that may exist elsewhere should bother us in terms of this treaty?

Senator CRANSTON. It is not ambiguities, but asymmetries in the force structure; it's their forces on the one hand, with their allies, and ours on the other. There are obviously some major differences. But need we take those into account as we consider the wisdom of ratifying INF?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I said that in my opinion and in the alliance design of our INF strategy, we wish to see an INF Treaty be something that stood on its own feet, that was good in its own right. That is our view, and I think that is the view of our allies.

That does not mean that we are satisfied with everything else. But it does mean that we think that, on balance, this is a contribution.

Senator CRANSTON. Finally, on INF-START relationships, there are some indications that there may be proposals to attach to the

INF provisions which would bind our negotiators as to the manner in which they should approach the START Treaty.

I assume that you think that would not be wise, and, if that is true, I wish you would spell out a bit what sort of problems that sort of approach might create.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't know what the instructions would be, but I think that the conclusion of the INF Treaty shows that our negotiators have the capacity to work things out, we believe in a very satisfactory way.

I might say that the INF negotiation is one in which the Congress in its votes—and I have cited the one in November 1981, but there have been numerous exchanges and visits to Geneva and so on—there has been a general, very supportive, bipartisan attitude toward this and no interposition of this, that, or the other condition.

So, I think it has made for a good negotiation from our standpoint, and I hope that perhaps the same approach could be taken in the next few months toward START.

You are welcome in Geneva any time. I think the visits—and I would have to confess that I was a little uneasy at first about the Senate observer groups and the House observer groups, that you might be getting into our hair all the time, such hair as I have—but it has not turned out that way. It has turned out very well and I think it has been a very positive thing. The discussions that Members have had with the Soviets have given them the feeling, which I think is true, that these are matters on which there is a unified view and they should listen to our negotiators.

So, I think if we keep approaching it that way, we have the best chance of success.

Senator CRANSTON. I share that view.

I want to thank you, as others have, for your very fine and long testimony today. This committee has very great and high trust and regard for you, and it is very helpful to have you with us today.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I appreciate the fact that you are tackling this right away, as others have said, Mr. Chairman, and that you are digging into this. Obviously, the questions are well-informed questions. People are thinking about this. I feel comfortable that this treaty will get a good, square, thorough consideration, and since I think it is good, I think in the end that is what people will conclude.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I have no further round. I just want to clarify a mistake that I made.

I indicated that the Soviet delivery vehicle number was 2,400. That is what the treaty called for. They were somewhat above 2,500 in 1979. They have not moved from that number.

So, the number I was really referring to was the 2,500-plus, the 2,504.

Secretary SHULTZ. It's 2,504, says the expert.

Senator BIDEN. That's correct.

Your expert and my expert are both right, and I just hope they stay at 2,504 or whatever number we agree they are at. It would be nice to have that somehow enshrined. But that is for another time.

I thank you, Mr. Secretary, very much for indulging us.

Secretary **Shultz**. If I could just interject in the spirit of keeping the record correct, we had an exchange having to do with things that would call for a change in the treaty and so on. Ambassador Glitman handed me a note which reads that the number of inspectors covered by a treaty obligation—we would probably need an amendment to change that. That was an example I used.

A better example is adding to the list of types of acceptable measuring devices if we come up with a new, better device.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I have no further questions at this point, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the Secretary. I recall one occasion when he appeared before our committee, one of the members asked him whether he found the time he had to spend with the Congress a drain and in some respects unfair. The Secretary responded very strongly at that point and said "No, he regarded it as a very important part of his responsibilities."

It has always put him in good stead, I think, with the Congress.

I think we are going to need more of your time and effort as we examine this treaty over the next few weeks. We appreciate your leading off our hearings today in such a positive and helpful way.

Secretary **Shultz**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Alan.

Senator **Cranston**. No more questions, thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being with us. I would leave with you to be answered for the record some written questions, which we have not gotten around to asking. I would hope you could answer them at your convenience.

I would thank you very much indeed for the time that you gave us and for the clarity of your views and for your support of this treaty. We look forward to working with you on it.

We wish you a good dinner with your wife, and before 7 even.

Secretary **Shultz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m, the committee adjourned to reconvene on Tuesday, January 26, 1988 at 10 a.m.]

THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Kerry, Sanford, Adams, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Evans, and McConnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will please come to order.

Ambassador Kampelman, Ambassador Glitman, we welcome you here today, and on behalf of our committee, we thank you and congratulate you for what you have achieved.

Yesterday, Secretary Shultz said that you did a simply splendid job in negotiating the treaty. I could not agree more.

For the last several years, I have served as co-chairman of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. As a member of that group, I have participated in dozens of briefings here in Washington in the course of the negotiations, and I have traveled often to Geneva to observe our negotiators in action with the Soviets.

During those years, I could not have been more impressed by the skill, the tenacity, and the patience you displayed in pursuing your objectives.

Mr. Shultz gave us an excellent overview of the treaty yesterday, presenting the historical and strategic context in which the treaty was developed, as well as describing the different phases of the negotiations and the key provisions finally arrived at.

Today, we are going to look more closely at the treaty itself. It is important that we understand exactly what the treaty commits the parties to and what it does not. We need to know exactly what is prohibited and what is permitted under this treaty.

In the controversy that has ensued over the ABM Treaty, Reagan administration officials have asserted that testimony by members of the ABM delegation in 1972 was in key aspects misleading, inaccurate, or ambiguous. As a result, I am sure you can understand how important your testimony, specifically your testimony today, is.

I would urge you to ensure that every important feature of this treaty, however obvious and self-evident, is clearly and unambiguously presented.

If there is anything you would not wish to see reinterpreted by this or any other administration, I strongly suggest you take great care to be as precise and comprehensive as you can.

Senator Helms, do you wish to make a statement?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad to see Max and Mr. Glitman here this morning, and I am sure it will be an enlightening session for all of us.

I'll say publicly what I said privately, Max. I like your tie. I think all members of the news media ought to look at it.

Perhaps we will be able to examine this morning in somewhat greater depth the actual provisions of the proposed treaty. I think this is important because I was fascinated back in December when, by actual count, 52 members of the Senate said they were in favor of the treaty before it was even in their hands. They didn't know what was in it.

Now, it may be that all questions that some of us have can be resolved. But I doubt it.

In any case, I think under the advise and consent provision of the U.S. Constitution, every Senator has a duty to know what is in a treaty before he or she advises and consents.

In any case, the underlying question we must assess is, Does the text of the INF Treaty fulfill our negotiating goals and carry out the treaty's expressed intentions?

We need to be certain that the treaty is what it has been sold to the public as being. For instance, the Senate and the American people need to understand, as we discussed at some length yesterday, that, contrary to some of the public assertions, this treaty does not destroy even one nuclear warhead. If we do not understand anything else about the treaty, I hope we will understand that today.

Now, I recognize that these gentlemen and many others have spent countless hours on this treaty and have devoted a good deal of their lives to negotiating it. I don't disparage them. I have known Max Kampelman a long time. I have not known Mr. Glitman all that long. But I admire both of them.

At the same time, I found during the recess that a lot of Americans are concerned that after years of apparently cautious and meticulous work, it appears that in the closing weeks, the State Department was rushing pellmell toward concluding a treaty that could be signed with fanfare during Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Washington. I give him an A-plus on PR, but something less than that in terms of what this may mean to the security of the Free World on down the road.

Concerns have been expressed about what important issues we gave up in those closing weeks in order to complete the treaty in time for that Washington visit from Mr. Gorbachev.

For instance, in the closing weeks of deliberations, almost 100 unresolved—so-called bracketed—items were concluded. The United States gave up what had been considered fundamentally important issues during this period.

For years, as I understand it—and we can go into this later this morning—it had been a firm tenet of the United States negotiating position, as it should be, that the treaty should include United States inspection of "suspect sites," meaning those locations where we believed missiles to be, but where the Soviets denied the presence of such missiles.

As I understand it, as late as October 1, 1987, publications of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency showed that the U.S. negotiating position was that a treaty should include, and I quote, "short notice inspection of certain missile-related facilities in the United States and the U.S.S.R. at which illegal missile activity is suspected."

Yet, no guarantee of inspection of suspected illegal missile sites is included in this treaty.

Does this not mean that we can look only where the Soviets say we can look? Of course, we won't find any illegal missiles where they tell us to look. We need to be looking where they don't want us to look.

I wonder why the State Department negotiators ultimately conceded on this point, after holding firm on it for years and years. That is a very important question.

A second important question is what, if anything, did we gain from this concession and other concessions.

These are the hard questions. They may lead to amendments. I don't know. I am fascinated, Mr. Chairman, by the constant reference to "killer amendments."

In driving to the Capitol this morning, I decided to define in my own mind what is a "killer amendment." It is an amendment that needs to be offered to correct a defect and which those who call it a killer amendment do not want it voted on.

I heard the same outcry back during the Panama Canal Treaty debate by some of the same people who cry today "killer amendments."

Well, if we had had a killer amendment or two during the Panama Canal Treaty consideration, we would not be in the fix we are in in Panama today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Helms.

I would add for the convenience of our guests and our witnesses, our intent is that we should recess at 12:30 and reassemble again at 2 for as long as may be necessary.

Now it is our pleasure to hear from Ambassador Kampelman.

Proceed as you will, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND CHIEF U.S. NEGOTIATOR, NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I proceed with my formal testimony, I would like to inform you and your staff and the members of the committee that last night I concluded that the objectives of your deliberations would be better served if I modified my prepared testimony to take account of yesterday's extraordinarily clear and full presentation by Secretary of State Shultz, which was interspersed by the valuable exchanges between the Secretary and members of this committee.

You will, therefore, find deletions so as to avoid extensive repetition, as well as some few additions to reflect yesterday's proceedings.

I have a complete text for the reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full text will appear in the record. Proceed as you will.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I am privileged to be invited to testify before you this morning in support of the INF Treaty.

As counselor of the Department of State and as head of the U.S. delegation on the nuclear and space talks since they began in March 1985, these negotiations have been a major responsibility of mine.

In that connection, let me assert that your negotiators are no more State Department negotiators than they are Defense Department negotiators. We are negotiators representing the U.S. Government, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

I am accompanied today by Ambassador Maynard Glitman, our negotiator for the INF talks, whose testimony on the INF negotiations, in which he played a vital and significant role from the beginning, will, I am certain, be of value to this committee as he discusses the history, purpose, objectives, and the effects of these negotiations on U.S. and allied interests.

Here, too, his important professional service representing the United States in NATO will be of value. We both want to be helpful to your committee.

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, many well deserved compliments were exchanged across both sides of this hearing dais and across both sides of the aisle. I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation and that of my colleagues for the very positive role which the Senate and many individual Senators have played during the course of the INF negotiations.

From the time of the formation of the Senate Observers Group in 1985, when the INF negotiations resumed as part of the nuclear and space talks, the members of the Senate Observer Group, some of whom are members of this committee, have visited Geneva regularly to observe the negotiations, give us the benefit of their advice, and meet with the Soviet negotiators frequently, thereby giving us a helping hand.

I am convinced that the Senate is better informed about the progress of the talks and their substance as a result of their visits and the steady flow of briefings that have taken place in the Capitol.

I personally have benefited enormously from this constant interchange with the Senate observers, and I trust it has been mutually beneficial. This has been a successful and noteworthy pattern of cooperation between the executive branch and the Senate, and it has been bipartisan.

Yesterday, Secretary Shultz discussed the INF Treaty very fully. I will try not to cover the same material in the same way. But I will have some observations on the original 1981-83 negotiations and the resumed negotiations from 1985-87, including the Soviet efforts to link INF to other nuclear negotiations.

I believe it is also appropriate that I comment on our continuing negotiations now underway in Geneva. In doing so, I may be responding to some of your expressed interests.

In retrospect, we can see why our initial INF negotiating effort in 1981-83 had little hope of success. We were, in effect, attempting to persuade the Soviets to trade a bucket of coal for a bucket of ashes. We had no negotiating assets—only implied threats and promises. We had no long-range intermediate nuclear force missiles, those within a range of 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers, on the ground in Europe.

European-basing countries had made political commitments for deployments, but such commitments were under fire from domestic critics willing to make nondeployment an election issue.

The theme from the Soviets and their sympathizers was that United States deployments would make an INF agreement impossible. Does anyone wonder that the Soviets thought that a walkout from the negotiations could be an effective tactic against deployments by Western democracies facing elections?

In any event, the Soviets had little to lose and much to gain. If the allies or the United States had broken ranks and altered their deployment commitments, the Soviets would have effectively reversed a major NATO security decision. And if Western cohesion held, Moscow could always return to the negotiating table.

For the long-term objective of preserving Western security, we were fortunate that we and our allies held firmly to our commitment to deploy, while still seeking negotiations to limit these systems at the lowest possible level.

Furthermore, the Soviet walkout soon proved to be a serious political blow to them in Europe.

To slightly modify an old adage, "The Soviets follow the election returns." Indeed, in late 1984, the Soviets renewed their interest in nuclear arms control negotiations. They insisted on new INF negotiations to be combined with negotiations on strategic systems and defensive space systems under the umbrella of nuclear and space talks.

It was not easy for them to sit down in the same seats they had earlier dramatically vacated; and there was no need for us to sharpen the point.

The main Soviet theme of these resumed negotiations was tight "linkage" between the three areas: INF, START, and defense and space.

In contrast, the United States urged that we make progress in each negotiation independently, reaching agreement in each area as it was ripe. Frequently, during the negotiations, the Soviets sought to hold agreement or progress on INF and strategic arms issues hostage to United States concessions on SDI. They sought to maximize joint negotiating sessions integrating INF, START, and defense and space.

For a time at the outset, they sought to limit opportunities to address specific individual negotiations. The most blatant public illustration of this tactic was General Secretary Gorbachev's linkage of the progress achieved on INF at Reykjavik in October 1986, to U.S. restrictions on SDI.

At that juncture, clearly the Soviets were hoping to generate pressure from NATO allies anticipating an INF agreement to force the United States to accept restrictions on SDI. The United States rejected such a linkage, as did our allies, and the Soviets ultimately delinked in February 1987, resuming their pre-Reykjavik agreement that an INF Treaty could be negotiated independently.

The Soviets attempted not only to link INF to other nuclear arms control negotiations, but, within the INF negotiations, they repeatedly attempted to link discussions on INF missiles both to the nuclear systems of other NATO nations—the United Kingdom and France—or to other United States nuclear systems, such as dual-capable aircraft. Indeed, we were battling linkage in one form or another virtually until the end of the negotiations. Its final manifestation for INF was repeated Soviet pressure for a specific treaty commitment to follow-on INF negotiations, a major element of which would have been dual-capable aircraft.

The Soviets did not drop this demand until the Geneva discussions I held with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov on November 15 to 17, 1987.

I emphasize this persistent U.S. opposition to linkage in Geneva, because I believe it made it possible for us to achieve the effective results being considered by your committee today, the INF Treaty.

Having prevailed in our successful negotiating approach in Geneva, you can perhaps understand why we are reluctant to see the reintroduction of linkage as a part of the ratification process in Washington.

Although Ambassador Glitman will review in detail the effect of the INF agreement on the NATO Alliance, I wish to emphasize one point in particular.

A repeated canard suggests that under various conditions, an INF agreement could be dangerous to the NATO Alliance. Critics are contending that the treaty should carry some sort of political label, "Caution, INF Treaty could be dangerous to your security."

Let me here clearly assert that U.S. Government officials were keenly aware throughout the INF negotiations of the need to maintain the U.S. spectrum of deterrence, nuclear and conventional, strategic and tactical, to prevent Soviet intimidation of friends and allies and to maintain deterrence.

We have moved to reinforce U.S. commitments. These include our longstanding political and military alliances, the maintenance of more than 300,000 American troops and about 4,000 nuclear weapons, including a variety of nuclear delivery systems in Europe.

I can assure you that our Government's commitment to NATO's strategy of flexible response remains firm, and your negotiators made that very clear.

Let me also here inform this committee that your negotiators were in constant and continuous consultation with our NATO allies. Our normal pattern was to visit Lord Carrington and the North Atlantic Council in Brussels at or near the beginning of every round of talks; at the end of each round; and frequently in the middle.

Many of our NATO foreign ministers and other diplomatic representatives visited us in Geneva where we would carefully review negotiating details. Each of us, as negotiators in Geneva, visited

European capitals, where we met at foreign ministries and with their parliaments. This was all in addition to visits by Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny, Secretary of State Shultz, and other U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the White House.

I am convinced that there could not have been a closer, more successful, or better appreciated program of allied consultation.

The effectiveness of our consultations and commitments is highlighted by the fact that those most directly affected by the treaty—the Europeans themselves—fully support the agreement. This is clear to me as I have traveled in Europe. Every European country has endorsed it. Every major political party and political leader in and out of power within the NATO countries strongly backs the INF agreement.

Polls suggest that an overwhelming majority of European public opinion supports the agreement.

While an unpopular position should never deter a critic, it is useful for us all to realize that the critical view is a distinctly minority one.

Whatever the merits of the INF agreement, and I think they are many, it is only one element in the spectrum of arms control negotiations. The treaty stands on its own as a contribution to our security. It is, we hope, not an end, but, rather, a beginning and a first step toward a more secure and stable peace.

Let me now specifically address the next steps as they pertain to the nuclear and space talks.

The President places the highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear arms. In particular, we are seeking reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear weapons—heavy, intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

There has been considerable progress in the START negotiations. Our negotiators in Geneva are now working from a joint draft text, which reflects areas of agreement reached between the President and Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985, and in Reykjavik in October 1986 for 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. Specifically, this draft text reflects agreement on ceilings of 6,000 warheads, on 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles for each side, a ceiling for heavy ballistic missiles and their warheads, and counting rules for heavy bombers and some of their armament.

At the most recent December summit in Washington, there was further START progress, including agreement on a sublimit for ballistic missile warheads of 4,900, a procedure for counting warheads on existing ballistic missiles, and, building on the INF Treaty verification provisions, guidelines for verification.

Important differences remain: On mobile ICBM's; a warhead sublimit for ICBM's; sea-launched cruise missiles; and the details of an effective verification regime. The verification regime for START is a much more difficult problem than for INF, since a large strategic nuclear force will remain in contrast to all INF systems being eliminated; and it is simpler to verify a zero than a fixed number.

We believe it is possible to reach a START agreement in the months ahead. But I make no such prediction. The task is formidable and we must be vigilant and careful as we work to protect our interests. Both sides have instructed their negotiators to work to complete such an agreement, if possible, in time for signature in the first half of 1988. But our overriding guidance from the President, as we all heard last night, is "better no agreement than a bad agreement," the same direction we received in negotiating the INF Treaty.

Our Geneva negotiators are also continuing work on strategic defense issues.

At the recent Washington summit, the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to try to work out an agreement to commit both of our countries to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

Simultaneously, we are seeking to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offenses and defenses. We wish to discuss how, if effective defenses prove feasible, the United States and the Soviet Union could jointly manage a transition to deterrence based increasingly on defenses, rather than exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation.

One point should be apparent to all of us. Modern technology and science are moving at an unbelievably rapid pace. New developments will affect the military force structures of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. The great challenge we all face is how to make certain that the impact of the new technologies will be stabilizing.

Our negotiations in Geneva resumed during the second week in January, when round IX opened. I have only recently returned from the opening sessions of these negotiations. On January 22, we tabled a draft treaty in the defense and space negotiations embodying agreed principles. The Soviets gave us the written version of their proposal a week earlier. We hope to develop a joint working draft. Our START negotiating team is already at work on the joint draft treaty. Both we and the Soviet delegation understand there is a great deal of work to be done. We are proceeding seriously and carefully.

I assure you, our delegation is well prepared.

I would like to conclude with a special note of tribute to Ambassador Glitman and the INF delegation.

Since the INF negotiations resumed in 1985, he has provided the vigorous, dedicated, professional leadership necessary to drive the treaty toward a successful conclusion. His leadership was complemented by a highly qualified, interagency delegation, characterized by their exceptional energy, experience, technical proficiency, and ability. Ambassador Glitman and his delegation have every reason to be proud of the treaty they've produced.

I am proud to have been associated with them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me now turn, if I may, to Ambassador Glitman for his statement, after which we will both be available for questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kampelman may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Glitman.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAYNARD W. GLITMAN, U.S. NEGOTIATOR ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador GLITMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also be extracting from my statement, but I would like to have the entire document submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so printed.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to testify in support of the INF Treaty.

Soviet INF missile systems, defined as those ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, have posed a major problem for U.S. and alliance security for many years.

We sought on several occasions to constrain these systems via arms control negotiations. But they escaped capture. For almost two decades, the Soviets had a virtual monopoly on longer range INF missiles, free from any limitations.

Then, during the time when the Soviet Union began to reach strategic parity with the United States, the SS–20 made its appearance. That, in turn, triggered off the series of events which culminated nearly over 11 years later in the signing of the INF Treaty.

That treaty not only captures INF missile systems, it provides for their elimination. The class of Soviet nuclear weapons which for decades has threatened our allies in Europe and Asia, decoupling weapons with a proven capability for political intimidation, will cease to exist under this agreement.

In accepting this treaty, providing for the demise of this class of weapons, the Soviet Union recognizes the legitimacy of the United States and its NATO allies joining together in collective security arrangements to deter Soviet pressure against NATO Europe via the deployment in Europe of United States nuclear forces.

The treaty is a legal document, and its detail and phrasing reflect this. But in its essence, it incorporates the basic arms reductions goals and policy that the United States, in close consultation with its allies, has pursued since the formal INF negotiations opened in late 1981.

These goals and this policy in turn had their basis in NATO's December 1979, decision to overcome the challenge posed to alliance security by the Soviet intermediate-range missile force, through a dual-track approach of counterdeployments and negotiations.

The negotiating approach the United States and its allies agreed upon was based on five principles: Equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union; limitations on United States and Soviet systems only; global application of limitations; unweakened maintenance of NATO's conventional defense capability; and effective verifiability of any agreement.

In addition to these principles, the United States and its NATO allies also made inclusion in the treaty of constraints on shorter range INF missiles a basic tenet of the U.S. approach to the negotiations.

President Reagan made clear from the outset to his negotiators that any INF agreement must fully incorporate these criteria. There was to be no agreement just to have an agreement.

The President's approach, blending statesmanship, fortitude, and enlightened self-interest, was to be our guideline throughout the 6 years of the negotiations.

First I will discuss equal rights and limits.

This fundamental principle is grounded in the United Nations Charter's provision for the right of collective defense. In concrete terms, it provides the foundation for the United States and its allies joining together to protect freedom and independence, including through the basing of U.S. forces and systems in Europe. A substantial portion of the negotiation was devoted to achieving Soviet recognition of this principle.

The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles that could strike targets in Europe and Asia, but not, it was claimed, the United States. Thus, so the Soviets contended, dealing with such Soviet systems was essentially an intra-European affair. However, United States systems deployed in Europe, it was argued, were more akin to strategic forces since they could strike the Soviet Union. Hence, the very basis for a negotiation on United States and Soviet INF systems was denied.

The deployment in the mid-1970's of the SS-20, capable of threatening targets throughout Europe and elsewhere on the periphery of the Soviet Union, including much of Asia, marked a fundamental turning point in the area of INF missiles.

In the context of Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the United States, and as the Soviet SS-20 missile force grew, our European allies became concerned that, with no comparable United States INF force on the ground in Europe and with no limitations on Soviet INF missiles, Moscow might come to believe, however mistakenly, that United States forces could be decoupled from the defense of Europe.

Consequently, Western European leaders stressed the need for a NATO response to Soviet SS-20 deployments to foreclose a potential perceptual gap in NATO's deterrence, as well as to address the military threat posed by the SS-20.

Well over a year of intensive alliance consultations culminated in NATO's December 1979, two-track decision. One track would redress the imbalance of INF through modernization and deployment in Western Europe of 572 U.S. longer range INF missiles, eventually defined as "intermediate-range missiles," with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers.

On the second track, the United States would call for negotiations with the Soviets to establish a global balance in United States and Soviet longer range INF missiles at the lowest possible level, which was understood to include zero.

The Soviets initially refused to negotiate, attempting to impose the condition that NATO must first renounce its modernization track. In essence, this argued that the United States had no right to deploy INF systems in Europe to help its NATO allies counter the threat of the Soviet SS-20 and similar Soviet systems.

The opening Soviet position thus directly challenged the principle of equal rights and limits.

Finally, during the summer of 1980, the Soviets agreed to negotiate. A short set of preliminary talks was held that fall. Formal negotiations began in November 1981.

From the outset, the United States, under President Reagan's leadership, stressed the principle of equality and proposed the global elimination of all United States and Soviet longer range INF missile systems. This equal global zero option remained the U.S. preferred outcome throughout the negotiations.

The Soviets, for their part, called in essence for a moratorium on INF deployments in Europe. This would have codified the Soviet INF missile monopoly which NATO had just rejected and in effect would have denied legitimacy of the equal rights and limits principle.

Obviously, it was not acceptable.

In March 1983, in an effort to find common ground with the Soviet side, the United States, while continuing to prefer a zero outcome, proposed an interim agreement for equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads at any number below the planned United States deployment level. Both of these proposals, equality at zero or at a number above zero, were rejected by the Soviet side.

Soviet unwillingness to accept the fundamental principle of an equal outcome made the negotiations untenable. Eventually, the Soviets, unable either to impose their negotiating position on us or to derail the deployments, walked out of the negotiations in November 1983.

In March 1985, contrary to the prediction of some and to their own rhetoric, the Soviets came back.

During the course of the renewed negotiations, the United States continued to stress that any INF agreement had to be based on equal rights and limits. The Soviets, after renewing their freeze proposal, came up with several variations on a theme, the theme being to force the removal of United States INF missiles from Europe, while the Soviets retained their monopoly.

Thus, we were offered a zero outcome—a zero for the United States and a zero-plus for the Soviet Union, with this "plus" being equal to United Kingdom and French nuclear forces.

We were told that "equality" meant equal reductions, not an equal outcome.

Despite the obvious one-sidedness of this and similar approaches, it took months of persistent effort inside and outside the negotiations to persuade the Soviets that neither the United States nor its allies would accept any result along these lines.

That effort was ultimately successful.

Slowly, but surely, the Soviet position began to evolve until, by the summer of 1986, the issue of equality was, in essence, resolved on the basis of the principle of equal rights and limits between the two parties to the negotiations. That principle is now fully incorporated in the INF Treaty. Its focus is on an equal outcome between the United States and the Soviet Union, not on equal reductions. Indeed, by its very nature, the treaty will strengthen the precedent for asymmetrical reductions to an equal level.

Next is exclusion of third country systems.

This principle is closely connected to and indeed is a subset of the issue of equal rights and limits for the parties to the treaty.

As part of its argument that the INF issue was an intra-European affair, the Soviet side, for much of the negotiations, argued for the inclusion of or compensation for British and French systems.

The United States insisted that any INF agreement, like the negotiations themselves, must be bilateral and limited only to United States and Soviet systems.

Behind this argument lay the conviction of the United States and its allies that United States INF deployments provided a legitimate counterweight to Soviet INF and that any negotiations concerning nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union should deal only with the systems of those two countries.

For much of the 6 years spent at the negotiations, this issue was the prime topic of discussion. The Soviets sought to use the inclusion of United Kingdom and French forces as a means to prevent or remove United States INF deployments under the guise of an "equal" outcome among "European" states. In effect, they sought to balance off only a nonstrategic class of Soviet weapons against the entire British and French strategic arsenal, to gain leverage on the size and shape of British and French nuclear forces via their negotiations with us, and to establish the principle that INF was an intra-European matter in which the United States was an outsider. That principle, had it been accepted, would have called into question the very foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as our security arrangements with Asian allies.

What followed was a major effort in Geneva and in the public arena to persuade the Soviets that an agreement was only possible if third country systems were completely excluded. Here again, that effort was successful.

The Soviets began to modify their position in October, 1985. But it took another year before the Soviets, in essence, adopted our approach.

The INF Treaty is a purely bilateral one. The British and French nuclear forces are not included in any manner. Neither, as Secretary Shultz spelled out in his testimony yesterday, are the Pershing missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany under an existing program of cooperation included in the treaty.

The principle that nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union will deal only with the forces of those two countries has been accepted and incorporated in the final outcome.

Next is the global application of limitations.

The capability of the SS-20, especially its range, mobility, and transportability, permitted it to impinge on the security of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, regardless of its deployment location.

Yet, for most of the negotiating period, the Soviet Union rejected United States proposals to apply limitations on INF missiles on a worldwide basis and sought to limit the treaty to Europe.

In contrast, the United States argued that an INF agreement limited to Europe and not leading to reductions in Asia would neither provide real security for Europe nor provide equal treatment for Asia.

The United States held firm to this principle throughout the negotiations. There were several hints of Soviet recognition of the validity of our argument during the first part of the negotiations, up until their walkout in 1983. While not meeting our requirements, the Soviets did implicitly acknowledge that their Asian systems were relevant to the INF negotiations.

During the resumed negotiations, beginning in March 1985, the Soviet argument shifted somewhat. They began to assert that Soviet SS-20's in Asia should be kept out of an agreement because they were deployed solely to counter United States naval and air forces in the Pacific, conveniently ignoring their counterpart air and naval forces and the questionable military utility of using SS-20's against ships.

However, they also reaffirmed some of their earlier positions and their implications of accepting our basic ideas.

The United States, for its part, remained firm. INF limits would have to apply on a global basis; anything less would not meet our or our allies' security requirements.

No real movement was made in this area for several months with Soviet proposals continuing to be variations on the same theme. Implying recognition that their Asian SS-20's were part of the INF problem, but not putting this into meaningful concrete terms.

Not until the Reykjavik meeting did the Soviets finally accept in essence our position—an equal global ceiling putting concrete limits on Soviet INF missiles in Asia as well as in Europe and providing for a similar number of United States INF missiles to be deployed in the United States.

The final outcome, however, went beyond this. We secured not only global limits on Soviet longer range INF missiles, but on Soviet shorter range INF missiles as well.

As a result, the INF Treaty fully incorporates the principle of global limitations, which we and our allies had sought from the outset of the negotiations.

Next is maintaining NATO's conventional capabilities.

This principle is directly related to the question of whether to include dual-capable aircraft in the INF negotiation.

The Soviets initially argued for their inclusion. In essence, the Soviets sought to create an equation between only some of their INF aircraft on the one hand and all dual-capable United States, British, and French aircraft on the other. Moreover, the level they proposed would have effectively left little or no room for U.S. aircraft in Europe.

The United States firmly rejected this patently one-sided approach. Instead, we argued that an INF agreement should focus on missiles only, and stressed a determination not to accept an outcome which would weaken the U.S. contribution to NATO's conventional defense.

In the fall of 1983, the United States, in an effort to find common ground, offered to discuss inclusion of selected INF aircraft in an agreement, but at levels that would not impact adversely on NATO's conventional defense. The Soviets refused to discuss our proposal.

They did, however, offer a counterproposal, which moved somewhat in our direction; but they continued to include allied aircraft and U.S. sea-based systems in the permitted NATO total, with the result that our contribution to NATO's conventional defense would have been weakened.

The aircraft issue reappeared when the talks resumed in 1985. However, the Soviets soon began to deemphasize the subject, concentrating, as did we, on missiles.

Indeed, by mid-1985, the subject ceased to be a matter of serious discussion, and thereafter effectively disappeared from the negotiations.

The end result. The INF Treaty covers only missiles. U.S. aircraft levels are not affected by the treaty, and U.S. dual-capable aircraft are available to help strengthen NATO's deterrence and conventional capabilities.

Next is effective verification.

The procedures for verification in the INF Treaty are more comprehensive than for any previous agreement. The complex of constraints, inspections, and notifications, coupled with national technical means, will greatly help ensure compliance with the treaty.

Getting to this outcome, however, took patience and persistence. The Soviet position, as the talks opened, was to argue that national technical means was sufficient to verify compliance. The United States, while not discounting the value of NTM, argued that, given the relatively small and mobile nature of INF missiles and given the record of compliance problems, more would be needed for INF verification, to include onsite inspection.

The United States sought from the outset to engage the Soviets in full discussion of verification. The Soviets resisted, arguing that verification could not be considered until there were agreement on reductions and limitations.

At the time of the Soviet walkout, the question of verification, because of this Soviet stance, had not been given the full treatment it required.

The pace of work on verification began to pick up with the resumption of the talks in 1985. Soviet public rhetoric began to shift toward acceptance of more stringent provisions, until, eventually, even onsite inspection was not precluded.

Inside the negotiations, the Soviets continued to shy away from discussing concrete measures, but they did state a willingness in principle to accept effective verification measures.

The United States worked to transform the Soviet public support for effective verification into real treaty provisions.

In February 1986, we tabled the elements of a comprehensive verification regime. Initial Soviet reaction was to say, in effect, "Yes in principle; but no to working on it." Indeed, they suggested putting off developing key provisions until after the treaty was signed and assigning this task to the SCC.

We continued to argue for concrete work on all aspects of verification during the negotiations in parallel with work on other treaty provisions.

Progress was made at Reykjavik with the Soviets moving in the direction of matching practice to rhetoric. But details remained open.

The United States continued to press for deeper negotiations on verification, putting forward in March 1987, a further elaboration of our approach. We added that verification would be facilitated in a zero environment, citing this as an additional reason for the Soviets to agree to eliminate the 33 deployed SS-20's in Asia, which they would have been entitled to keep under the Reykjavik formula.

Finally, in April 1987, the Soviets tabled their own draft verification regime. While it followed the structure of the U.S. approach, it was more generalized than the U.S. proposal.

Among other aspects, it omitted onsite inspection of baseline data, but called for onsite inspection of U.S. military bases in third countries. Nevertheless, the sides had begun to engage on the subject.

In subsequent months, with the United States taking the lead, specific articles on verification were tabled, along with the memorandum of understanding on data and the elimination and inspection protocols.

By the summer of 1987, the Soviets had joined us in moving ahead on fleshing out the details. This effort continued until the end of the negotiations.

In the process, new ground was broken for the construction of the unprecedented stringent verification regime of the INF Treaty. The principle of effective verification is thus fully incorporated in the treaty.

Lastly is the shorter range INF missiles.

From the outset of the negotiations in 1981, the United States called for treaty provisions placing constraints on Soviet shorter range INF missiles—eventually defined as missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers.

This was necessary because Soviet shorter range INF missiles could perform many of the same missions as Soviet longer range INF missiles.

After some hesitation, the Soviet side agreed with the concerns expressed by the United States, and indeed included provisions dealing with shorter range INF missiles in its initial draft INF Treaty.

The United States, for its part, agreed to the application of such constraints to its shorter range INF missiles.

However, while the United States remained constant in its view of the need to constrain these systems, the Soviet Union, when the talks resumed in 1985, raised objections to including shorter range INF missiles in the proposed treaty.

Instead, the Soviets argued that these missile systems should be dealt with in a follow-on negotiation.

For well over a year, the Soviets once again applied the technique of producing variations on this same theme.

At Reykjavik the sides agreed on the need to place constraints on shorter range INF missiles in an initial INF agreement, but disagreed on the level.

In early 1987, the Soviets backed away from even this limited area of convergence, calling again for separate negotiations on shorter range INF missiles.

Finally, beginning in the spring of 1987, the Soviet position began to evolve, with the first hints that the Soviet side would be willing to consider the elimination of its SRINF missiles, at least in Europe, as part of an INF outcome.

By midyear, the Soviets had moved to accept the global elimination of shorter range INF missiles, which the United States, in close consultation with its allies, was also prepared to accept.

The result is fully incorporated in the INF Treaty.

Not only does it constrain Soviet shorter range INF missiles concurrently with limitations on longer range INF missiles, but it provides for their elimination, along with the elimination of the longer range missiles.

In a situation where we had zero deployed shorter range INF missiles and only nondeployed missiles in storage in Colorado, the Soviets accepted, in effect, an asymmetrical reduction which approached the unilateral.

Mr. Chairman, I will skip over the specific parts of the treaty provisions. I am sure we will come to all of those in great detail during the questioning. I also want to give the committee more time and opportunity to ask those questions.

I will move on to the concluding sections of my statement.

The INF agreement is of historic proportions. The suggestion that INF missiles are superfluous, when compared with the vast number of strategic systems, begs the question of why they were built and deployed in the first place, and forgets the deep concern which Soviet INF missiles engendered in Europe and Asia.

Elements of the INF Treaty can provide useful precedents for the emerging conventional stability negotiations, as well as for START. Each of these negotiations, of course, has its own dynamics and requirements. Neither envisages a zero outcome.

Nevertheless, recognition of the principle of equal rights and limits and of asymmetrical reductions to reach equality can be useful precedents in other arms control negotiations. The sides could also draw upon procedures in the INF elimination protocol and build on aspects of the INF inspection protocol in future negotiations.

More generally, the INF Treaty is a positive example of United States and Soviet determination and ability to resolve controversial issues.

It remains fundamentally true that improved East-West relations cannot, however, be based solely on arms control. Arms alone do not create insecurity. Arms are as much, if not more, a manifestation of tension as the cause of tension.

Progress in arms control alone cannot, therefore, resolve United States-Soviet differences if we remain at odds over the rest of the spectrum of our relationship.

To be of lasting benefit, movement in arms control must be paralleled by the resolution of problems in other areas, such as human rights and regional issues.

Nevertheless, while there is more to be done in these fields, as well as in arms control, the successful negotiation of the INF Treaty demonstrates and illustrates the point that, even though initially separated by major political and security differences, the United States and the Soviet Union can ultimately find the way to agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by reflecting on a few personal points and lessons.

My own involvement with INF dates back to the summer of 1976, when the United States first briefed its NATO allies on the SS-20. From that time, until the present, whether in Washington, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, or at the Geneva negotiations, I participated in the work which led to the deployments, to the negotiations, and eventually to this treaty.

Over this period, the United States maintained tactical flexibility, but there was constancy in our strategic approach. Our goal, and NATO's goal, was to preserve and strengthen our mutual security by overcoming the challenge posed to that security, to our freedom and to the peace by Soviet INF missiles. That goal was articulated in the 1979 NATO decision to deploy and to negotiate.

We and our allies carried through on both tracks. The provisions of this treaty are not only consistent with the 1979 decision, they are based on it—in spirit and in letter.

The constancy of our strategic approach to the INF issue, to the deployment and negotiating tracks, provided the essential basis for achieving the results of this negotiation. NATO's 1979 decision has been carried out.

The INF negotiations had a very high political content. This is not to underplay the enormous destructive potential of INF missiles. Indeed, without that potential they would have had little political impact. But their ability to intimidate, their potential for inciting fear of decoupling the United States from its allies, are what gave Soviet INF missiles their real force.

They did not have to be used to be effective. They just had to be seen to exist in a situation where they were uncontrolled and unmatched.

Because of the importance of the political aspect of the INF issue, perceptions, for example of NATO's ability to deter Soviet pressure, or the United States willingness to continue to join with its allies in supporting that deterrence, or of our and our allies' view of how best to deal with the problems posed by Soviet INF missiles played, and still play, a key part, even today, as we debate the treaty, in determining how the INF issue impacts on our security relations with our NATO and Asian allies.

The political content of the INF issue also created a situation where the INF negotiations were conducted almost as much in the public arena as at the negotiating table. The democratic governments of the West carried the greater burden, but also garnered the greatest gain from this phenomenon.

For, while our open societies engender open and often raucous debate, they also provide, via the ballot box, a clear-cut and powerful indication of how our peoples want an issue to be resolved.

In the case of INF, this was unequivocal: Deploy and negotiate, but only accept an agreement which incorporates NATO's agreed criteria. As I have demonstrated, this agreement does that.

Furthermore, in entering the public debate, the Soviet Union also, to an important extent, found itself forced to play by the rules. It could not, for example, expect to sway our publics when it made positive statements about verification in public, but did not follow through at the negotiating table, or when it called in public for improved relations with Asian states, but sought to retain a residual force of SS-20's capable of being targeted against those states.

It could not, as we pointed out to the Soviets and to the public at large, expect to maintain negotiating positions at variance with its public statements without having to change one or the other.

The INF Treaty meets the negotiating requirements we and our allies established in 1979. It effectively counters the threat posed by the Soviet INF missile force by eliminating that force. In so doing, it will remove a major source of concern to our allies. It will deprive the Soviet Union of the ability to think it could create a fear in the minds of our allies that, because its INF missiles were not "aimed" at the United States, the United States would be less likely to come to their aid were they threatened by these weapons; in other words, to create an atmosphere of decoupling, in capital letters.

While the treaty does what we set out to have it do, it cannot be expected to overcome other problems affecting Western security interests, be they in the conventional, chemical or strategic areas. Nor will it relieve the United States and its allies from the continued need to maintain a solid defense, so long as fundamental differences in other areas continue to be a source of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty will eliminate some options for us and our allies. But, more importantly, it will eliminate far greater Soviet forces, as well as Soviet military and political options and opportunities.

How we and our allies respond to the continuing challenge of maintaining deterrence, to the perceptions we Americans and our allies create concerning the role each of us is prepared to play in meeting these challenges, our joint willingness to ensure that the heart of our security relationship remains solid, all this remains very much in our hands and well within our ability to resolve effectively.

The successful conclusion of the INF agreement, the strength of purpose, the constancy and the solidarity we and our allies maintain throughout a long period of trial are proof that the heart of our relationship is strong and that we can meet the remaining challenges.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Glitman may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Glitman.

Now we will start our questioning. The committee staff has assured us that the lights will work this time. So, after 9 minutes the yellow light will go on, then the red. I would hope my colleagues would try to limit themselves to that period.

Ambassador Kampelman, in your statement on page 9, you bring up the question of the Special Consultative Commission, saying that it is not necessary to review the experiences associated with it.

I have long been an admirer of the SCC and particularly of General Ellis and the way it is run. I am just curious. This is the same question I asked the Secretary yesterday.

What was the motivating factor to getting rid of the SCC in this case and having a Special Verification Commission? Were there some experiences that you regret in connection with the SCC? Did the Soviets provide the impetus to move to the Verification Commission?

What was the reasoning for it?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Let me first say, Mr. Chairman, that the SCC was specifically organized to deal with problems in the ABM Treaty. Therefore, there was no necessary followup to use the same instrument with respect to any problems in connection with an INF Treaty. So, it is not that we have dropped something. It was not created in order to take care of an INF Treaty.

Now, obviously, in deciding how to proceed to resolve possible differences of opinion, one looks at the SCC as an option. The SCC, rightly or wrongly, now has a history of resolving many issues and of not resolving other issues. The thought was to begin with something new, which did not have a history, good or bad—it simply did not have a history—to start with something new, to start fresh. That is why the decision was made to create the new group, which would deal with the INF Treaty, whereas the SCC deals with the ABM Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would it be sitting? Or would it just be an ad hoc body?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. It's an ad hoc body, to be called into play as necessary by one or the other of the parties.

The CHAIRMAN. As opposed to the SCC, which met regularly, every 6 months, if my recollection is correct.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. And could meet more frequently if it wished to, or less frequently, if it wished to.

The CHAIRMAN. This one will have no regular meeting time, but just be on call.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. When problems arise. Obviously, we are assuming there will be problems. We don't know how frequently they will arise. Our hope is they will not arise too frequently.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Also, there is another question. On page 13 of your testimony you mention that you hope to develop a joint working draft on the START negotiations.

My understanding was that for some weeks now we had had a similar piece of paper, or the same piece of paper for both sides, with bracketed paragraphs where the differences were. Am I correct in that?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. You are correct.

The reference that you are looking at is that we hope to have a joint working paper with respect to the defense and space group. The START group already has a joint draft treaty text, and they are working from that joint draft treaty text.

It would be useful if we could come to that point in the defense and space group. Each of us now has on paper our own views as to how to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no questions further at this time. Thank you.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I am going to direct my questions to either or both of you gentlemen.

Let me say that your presentations this morning were fascinating to me, and I think they ought to be made sort of required reading for people who don't know what negotiators go through. The process must have seemed tenuous to you a great deal of the time.

Anyway, I commend you.

Yesterday, you may have followed the slight disagreement that the Secretary of State and I had over how warheads are to be dealt with in this treaty. I find that there is a lot of misunderstanding among some otherwise erudite people about a missile and a warhead.

A missile is the carrying case and the warhead is the thing that goes "boom," and kills you. A missile itself does not kill you unless it falls on you and cracks your head open.

Anyway, the Secretary talked about a procedure involving fissionable material.

I spent a lot of time over the holidays going through the treaty, the protocols, and all the rest of it, and doggone it if I could find anything about fissionable material in there. So, I looked through the protocol again, the protocol on elimination, last night, to see if I could find such a procedure. But the only procedure I could find was as follows: It says for the SS-20 missile, (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*)—it's talking about the elimination, which means destruction. That is the language of art for destroying.

It says, "Front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened."

Now that clearly, it seems to me, says that the part of nuclear weaponry that kills people and destroys property is excluded. They don't get destroyed.

But maybe I'm wrong.

Are there any other procedures, of which I am unaware, Max, for dealing with warheads required in this treaty? Is there something I have not been able to find?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, I am aware of the fact that you do study carefully these issues and ask questions that deserve to be responded to and understood.

Ambassador Glitman has asked me for an opportunity to go into the response to your question, but I'd like to make a few introductory comments in connection with it.

Senator HELMS. Fine.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. The fact of the matter is that what you have read talks about nuclear warhead devices. The main component of these is the fissionable material.

Neither side, indeed no agency to my knowledge in the U.S. Government, nobody consulted on this question, thought that there was any way effectively to work out a procedure of destroying fissionable material in any kind of a safe way.

Furthermore, the thought was that this fissionable material, therefore, would be set aside, would be sent back to the stockpile.

There was an interesting byplay yesterday afternoon, Senator—I don't know if you were present or not—when Senator Adams talked about his experience with this area of work in the Hanford, WA context.

Obviously, we are all aware of the waste problem with respect to fissionable material, the danger involved if you try to destroy it by crushing it or exploding it, and so it was understood between us, all of us, that the fissionable material would be set aside, would be set back.

Now, the fissionable material by itself is not dangerous. The fissionable material by itself could be used for peaceful uses, it could be used for war uses. I do not deny the fact that it could be used—revised, modified, worked on, and used—and become dangerous.

The danger involved with respect to the fissionable material within the SS-20, for example, is when it is linked to that which shoots it, which directs it.

The warhead, as we see it—not just warhead devices, as you have read, but the warhead, as we see it, comprises a number of components—this fissionable material, guidance systems, casings, other materials. And except for that which you have read as "minus," that all gets destroyed.

So, a significant portion of the warhead does get crushed, does get destroyed.

Senator HELMS. Where does it say that, Max?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Let me turn now to Ambassador Glitman.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Let me start from the beginning, Senator, because I think this issue needs to be understood by everyone.

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Ambassador GLITMAN. We used warheads as a unit of account for a very important reason—to deal with the MIRVing. If we did not say that this treaty was going to put limitations on warheads, but, rather, on missiles or on launchers, we would have found that we were at a disadvantage because we have only one warhead on each of our missiles and the Soviets have three warheads on the SS-20.

Senator HELMS. Right.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That's the origin of why the phrase "warheads" got into the treaty in the first place. We very much wanted it in there for that reason.

The Soviets resisted that at first, and we finally prevailed. That is point 1.

Second, we and the Soviets had lengthy discussions about how we will eliminate the missiles and all the parts of them, and what sections we will keep. We and they fully understand amongst ourselves, the two sides fully understand what it is that will be destroyed and what it is that will not be destroyed.

For reasons Ambassador Kampelman cited, it is not possible to simply take a sledgehammer and smash the front end of a nuclear missile because nobody wants to be around when that nuclear material is spread about. It won't explode, but it won't be healthy.

The same applies to the other techniques which we have agreed upon for destroying missiles, that is, explosive devices. You cannot explode a missile for safety reasons with the nuclear material in it.

So, we had to find a way to get that nuclear material out of the missile. It was in our interest and it was in the Soviets' interest. When you take it out, if the other side were there to watch that process, if the other side were there to see how you took that, and we'll call it for simplicity "nuclear device," how you took it apart, you'd be giving them information on bomb designs. Both sides would. And neither side was prepared to do that.

Now, for a period, the Soviets, in public, were arguing that they were ready to destroy all this nuclear material. But, in fact, inside the negotiations, it was apparent to us that that was not their intent. They were seeking to achieve a certain amount of propaganda gain.

We did get agreement inside the negotiation that the front-end section, which is what we agreed we would call that front part, will be destroyed. That you will find in the elimination protocol.

But what is inside that front-end section, some parts of it can be taken out. We had an interest in that just as they did. Maybe ours was a little greater.

We sat down with them and we exchanged diagrams. I would be happy to show you copies. Here is ours. This is an unclassified diagram which we had [indicating], showing the front end of a Pershing missile.

Senator HELMS. I am familiar with that.

Ambassador GLITMAN. You are familiar with that.

As you can see, this is what we call the front end [indicating], and it is going to be crushed. Inside of it you have the radar, which is part of the guidance system; you have the nuclear warhead device; you have the rest of the guidance system. The nuclear warhead device and the two pieces of guidance will be removed, and that front end is going to be crushed, and we will see it crushed.

The Soviets turned over to us schematic drawings of the front end of an SS-20, and here that is [indicating]. These [indicating] are the reentry vehicles, the three of them. This [indicating] is the dome that goes over them. Inside there [indicating], that is the nuclear warhead device. And these are pieces [indicating] that all fit together.

They are going to take this nuclear warhead device out in secret, just as we are going to take ours out in secret. And then they are going to have to put this stuff back together in some form and they are going to have to crush it.

We agreed, as I said, that this part would be called the front end for them [indicating] and this [indicating] would be called the front end for us. That is how the treaty reads. The Pershing missile, in the Cruise missile, the 4's, the 5's, the 20's, they are all a little bit different. But we sat down with them and we agreed on what we would call these things. We worked together with them. We know what we mean and they know what we mean.

As Ambassador Kampelman said, as strong as we are, it is very hard to pick up one of these internal warheads, nuclear warhead devices, and it's easy to slip—I just did—and throw it at somebody. It has to be carried in the missile, and that missile and this whole front end are going to be destroyed in front of us, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, that's precisely the point.

I don't question your expertise at all. But some other very credible experts insist that they could be rebolted onto the SS-25.

Do you say that that is not possible?

Ambassador GLITMAN. My understanding—and I am not an expert; I have never built one of these things and would not know where to begin——

Senator HELMS. Neither am I.

Ambassador GLITMAN [continuing]. My understanding is that you cannot simply take one of these things, [indicating], pull out [indicating] and put it on an SS-5.

Senator HELMS. I didn't say it was simple.

Ambassador GLITMAN. I understand it can't be done.

Senator HELMS. Do you say it cannot be done?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is my understanding. To the best of my knowledge, that is correct.

Now, someone else may have a different opinion. But that is what I have been told.

Senator HELMS. Is there anything in this treaty to prevent that from being done?

Ambassador GLITMAN. This treaty seeks to destroy the SS-20 missile and that type of missile.

Senator HELMS. I understand that.

Ambassador GLITMAN. It permits both sides to retain that nuclear material. We are free to do with it what we want, and they are free to do with it what they want. For the reasons that I pointed out, there is no way to verify that, other than to open up bomb design, and we are not going to let them see our bomb design or our guidance.

Senator HELMS. I might want to pursue this a little bit later, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I was going to go off on another subject, but it seems to me it may be worthwhile to pursue this because either I am confused, which is very possible, or the Senator from North Carolina is confused.

Let me phrase it another way.

Assuming we ratify INF, if either side, the Soviets or the United States, wanted to go on a binge of producing new nuclear warheads of any dimension, of any kind, is there anything at all that presently prohibits the Soviet Union or the United States from producing new warheads with various yield capacities?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. No, Senator. That is a thought that I was going to express to the Senator if we had continued with the last question and followed it up.

Senator BIDEN. Let me follow through this so that I understand it. Let me take it a piece at a time, if I can.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Would you yield?

Senator BIDEN. Not on my time, I won't, because Senator Pell is a strict taskmaster.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I just want to ask if there is any way you can check that, or if there is any verification.

Senator BIDEN. Well, you can ask that, if you don't mind, Rudy, because I know he is going to cut me off in 10 minutes, and this is at least important to me.

The second question I have is this. You pointed out, Ambassador Glitman, that the primary, or at least one of the overwhelming reasons for concern in Europe about the SS-20 was not its military capability, although it had a serious military mission, but the political impact that it had in Europe. This is because Europeans argued that the Soviets are building these missiles, the so-called SS-20, that can only strike Europe but can't strike the United States.

Therefore, this situation presents a problem for Europeans that it does not present for the United States, which could be decoupling. That raises the whole political argument.

So, one of our objectives in eliminating the SS-20 was not only to get rid of a new Soviet military capability, but to deal with the political dimension that was negative for the alliance.

Now, my question is, Is the purpose of the INF Treaty to prohibit the production of nuclear warheads or to prohibit the production and possession of a missile that can fly up to 5,500 kilometers? Which is the purpose of the INF agreement?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The purpose of the INF agreement is to eliminate that class of missiles.

Senator BIDEN. Right—that can fly. It relates to the distance.

Ambassador GLITMAN. It relates to the distance. Exactly, Senator.

Therefore, if you put the nuclear material on a missile which could fly further, that political impact which motivated and drove this issue is not present.

Senator BIDEN. And, as a matter of fact, even if all of the fissionable material could be destroyed, thereby not even allowing the specter to be raised of whether or not a warhead remained, if every single piece of an SS-20 could be destroyed—every piece of it—it still would not, in any way, allay the concern of the Senator from North Carolina. This is because the Soviets would be able to reproduce that same warhead, if they wished to, and try to attach it to a mobile SS-25 or replace it with an SS-24. Now I want to make sure that I get this right—the SS-24 has 10 and the SS-25 has 1 warhead. The Soviets could move the SS-20 warhead onto another missle if they wished to, or they could reconfigure or build additional or different yield warheads on their SS-17's, which have 4 warheads, or their SS-18's, which have 10 warheads, and their SS-19's, which have 6.

They could do all of that, couldn't they?

Ambassador GLITMAN. They could. But they would not get the political impact.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting that they will.

So, it seems to me this is a red herring. It seems to me this is much ado about nothing.

It sounds like it is a flaw in the treaty. But the purpose of the treaty is to eliminate, in this case, two classes of missiles that have ranges, of from 500 to 1,000 kilometers, and from 1,000 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers—what is known as "double zero."

Is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That's correct, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Now that's what this treaty does. It eliminates those two types of what laymen refer to as "missiles." It makes no distinction between warheads. It is how the warhead gets to its destination that has its impact upon Europe and NATO.

Now, let me move on to my set of questions and if I can, move into this next point. I am going to come back to a number of items, if I may, in a second, third, fourth, or fifth round, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The treaty does not deprive, as I see it, the Soviet Union of any category of military capability, as opposed to a category of weapons, because the capability to strike all the targets that an SS-20 could strike existed before the Soviets built an SS-20 and will remain after they dismantle all the SS-20's. They can retarget existing ICBM's and under the present treaty, in the absence of any other agreement, they can add to the number of their existing ICBM strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Is that correct?

I'm not saying that they will, but they can.

Ambassador **Glitman**. [Nods affirmatively.]

Ambassador **Kampelman**. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator **Biden**. Now my question to you, Ambassador Kampelman, is what has been discussed in the START negotiations about United States and Soviet intentions with regard to the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles during the interim period, between the time we ratify INF, God willing, and we complete a START agreement, God willing? You acknowledge in your statement that this could take 2 months to 6 years, and it may never happen.

Has anything been said in the START discussions about limitations on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles not covered by the INF agreement, which includes the land-based 17's, 18's, and 19's, and the mobile 24's and 25's? Forget the bombers for a moment.

Has anything been said on what will happen to the total number of those systems?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Senator, the START negotiations have been addressing what each of the parties does once the treaty is signed and ratified by both parties. It does not address what the parties do prior to the point of signature or ratification.

I listened very attentively to your comments yesterday, your questions yesterday, of the Secretary of State, in which you were attempting to find a formula—and I know the approach was constructive—to find a formula under which we could, in effect, supplement the INF Treaty, by putting a lid——

Senator **Biden**. On strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Ambassador **Kampelman** [continuing]. On strategic nuclear vehicles, before or in between the time that the INF Treaty goes into effect and a START Treaty goes into effect.

Senator **Biden**. Right.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. As I tried to explain briefly in one sentence in my statement——

Senator **Biden**. I'm going to cheat. Don't forget your thought. The light is about to go on, but answer also the question of whether or not we know the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles the Soviets now possess and whether we could verify that number.

Go ahead, please.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. What I want to say is that we are reluctant to provide that kind of linkage for lots of reasons. I will only for the moment deal with one that comes to mind, which is that it is our experience this would take time. You have questions of verification that have to be addressed.

Senator **Biden**. Do we have any problem, Max, verifying the total number?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. We have a pretty good idea about what it is. But is it a treaty that would have to be organized to do this? If it is an informal understanding, then I did hear the Secretary of State yesterday indicate the willingness of the President to abide by an informal understanding along the lines of his suggested statement.

Senator **Biden**. I trust the President, not the Soviets.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. But we do not know whether the Soviets would respond to that. There have been absolutely no indications that the Soviets would respond to the President's proposal of restraint, which is, in effect, what the President's proposal was.

Senator **Biden**. My time is up. But could you ask them.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Is my answer also up, or can I continue with the answer?

The **Chairman**. You may continue.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. OK.

What I do want to point out, Senator, is our feeling is that we have a good shot at getting a START Treaty in the next months, and we would much rather put our energies into that highly complicated process. To give you an illustration—and I am not at all suggesting, Senator, that you are proposing different kinds of ceilings—but to give you an illustration of the differences between what we are seeking to attain and indeed have attained in principle from the Soviets, and let's say what the SALT limits are, which we talked about a little bit yesterday, we are trying to get a ceiling of 1,600 launchers. The SALT limits are 2,400 launchers. Why settle for more than 1,600?

We want 6,000 warheads—they have agreed to it—instead of 16,000 warheads, which would be the other ceiling.

We want 4,900 ballistic missile ceilings, and we are getting it. They have agreed to it. Why go to 10,000-plus ballistic missiles?

So, our efforts are designed to work in this new area, rather than concentrate our energies and sitting down with the Soviets and negotiating an interim, partial approach.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator **Biden**. With the permission of the chairman, I will come back to that later.

Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Senator Lugar.

Senator **Lugar**. Mr. Chairman, I remember that at a briefing both Mr. Kampelman and Mr. Glitman gave to some of us in Geneva, the question of this fissionable material arose. It was a revelation, I suspect, to each one of us who had not thought through the problem that once you agree in a treaty to eliminate a missile, a warhead, or a front-end section, the progress of destruction must be carefully negotiated.

As you testified at that time to us, a great deal of technical work was being done by our Armed Forces, and by the Soviets in trying to figure out, once you agree to destroy, how do you do it. We have no experience in this area. Few arms control treaties have led to a reduction of missiles before, quite apart from the elimination of warheads or nuclear explosive devices.

Now, it may be argued in this debate that not a single warhead is going to be destroyed, not a single bit of nuclear material; but you just don't go about dropping a nuclear explosive device on the ground and hitting it with a hammer.

We don't want that to occur. And it is not going to occur.

So, the allegation that somehow or other fissionable material is not disappearing is right. It is going back to storage, to safekeeping, for the good of all of us.

Now, as a second practical matter, we don't want the Soviets inspecting every single element of our nuclear warhead designs. That would be ridiculous in terms of national security.

So, to say that we are not destroying our nuclear explosive devices, not permitting inspection of it piece by piece, is right. We are not doing so deliberately. And the Soviets have adopted the same position.

I think it is time to get over the rhetoric about warheads and to get down to an appreciation of the very complex job involved when we start destroying missiles. We had better go about doing it right, in terms of our own national security, and our national security is served by extracting the nuclear explosive devices before we destroy the missiles.

I think you have described that process very aptly.

Of course you could use the fissionable material again, or the nucler explosive devices. By and large, people don't use 1935 Chevy engines in 1988 Cadillac cars. The state of the art changes. This idea of just bolting an old warhead on a new missile and sending it off again, I suspect, is conceivable, but is hardly practical.

It just seems to me that again what we are facing is the nature of the limits of this treaty which deals with the elimination of missiles within a specific range. As Senator Biden has pointed out, we were not prohibited from building up any number of missiles and warheads, or to deploy wherever we wanted to do so, if we had the political will here in the Congress to do that.

But for the purposes I thought that both of you pointed out so well today, we decided, given the strength of NATO, of the European relationship, the threat to our allies, the potential disintegration of that alliance, to try to negotiate the end of a specific range of nuclear systems, and that we have done.

Now, I want to pin that down, if I can, because it appears to me that we are really getting off the track with these criticisms that not one nuclear explosive device is being destroyed, in fact, a great deal is occurring in this treaty.

But as we have also pointed out—and Senator Biden's question illustrated this—This treaty still leaves a good many nuclear missiles and warheads in this world. A lot remain. In fact, apparently 96 percent, after we implement this treaty.

I would like to raise another issue that I brought up just briefly with Secretary Shultz yesterday. This takes the form of an alert on an issue that requires clarification.

Specifically, with reference to article 14 of the treaty, would this article prohibit a continuation of "existing patterns of cooperation" with some of our NATO allies in the area of force modernization?

Second—and perhaps you can deal with these two together—would article 14 place any restrictions on our ability to cooperate in the nuclear area with those two allies who possess independent nuclear deterrents; namely France and the United Kingdom?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Thank you, Senator. I am happy to deal with that subject of article 14.

First, a little bit of background.

The Soviets opened the talks with a specific proposal for treaty language which went even beyond the SALT language, which talked about noncircumvention and undertaking no obligations which conflict with the treaty. They went so far at one point as to suggest that we should have language in the treaty that said there can be no exchange of blueprints or patterns or designs, or anything.

If you look at what we got at the end, we have only one element left in the treaty, and that is the point about no obligations which conflict with the provisions of the treaty. That is a more concrete thing, because an obligation or undertaking such as the Helsinki Final Act or as an Act of Congress—it is very important that we got it defined that way in Russian as in English—is very restrictive, because it means you have to have something on paper or otherwise formalized.

So, basically, we could go ahead and plan and talk and do so on and so forth.

What the treaty will prohibit us from doing is producing or deploying, for example, any missile that has a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. We could not make these available to anyone else, but our existing pattern of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany can continue.

But you are aware from Secretary Shultz' testimony yesterday how that will evolve, and in the end that pattern will lapse, it will end.

But, until that time, legally, under this treaty, we could do so. We do not have a pattern of cooperation or a program of cooperation existing for these two classes of missiles with any other country. So, we could not do it with anyone else. We could not start it again.

But, insofar as other aspects of NATO are concerned, this article will not prohibit it.

Let me tell you that we talked to the Soviets about this and we made it very clear to them that this language would not prevent us from working with our NATO allies to maintain our defense and our deterrence.

So, what we are obliged to do under this article is to follow the treaty's requirements, and that we will do, as will they.

But we are not obliged to do what is not covered by the treaty.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. May I make a comment, Senator, on the first part of your statement, just quickly.

Senator **Lugar**. Yes, please.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Your explanation explains why it is that I resist the statement, the accuracy of the statement that under the INF Treaty no warhead will be destroyed.

The fact of the matter is that under the INF Treaty, every warhead will be partially destroyed. That is important, I think, to keep in mind if you have a concept of what a warhead is.

Senator **Lugar**. Let me ask specifically this. Questions have been raised as to the modernization of our Lance missile. How would that be affected by the INF Treaty?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The INF Treaty would not prohibit the modernization of the Lance missile—plain and simple—as long as we keep it below 500 kilometers in range.

Senator LUGAR. Are there any patterns of cooperation with Great Britain or France? You have mentioned the one with the Federal Republic of Germany. Do we have cooperative agreements with France or Great Britain?

Ambassador GLITMAN. We have that well-known cooperative agreement with the United Kingdom. It will not be affected by this treaty.

Senator LUGAR. No agreement with France at this point?

Ambassador GLITMAN. None that I am aware of.

Senator LUGAR. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we are pleased to welcome you to the committee. I have been struck, I must say, by the tough-mindedness of the treaty verification regime you have created here, and by the very clear, definite responses you have provided as we have probed each area. I welcome that very much.

Mr. Glitman, could we work from the diagram of the missile that you showed us earlier, the Pershing? Was that the first one you displayed?

Ambassador GLITMAN. This [indicating] is the Pershing, sir, and this [indicating] is the SS-20.

Senator SARBANES. I can see that one [indicating] a little better from here.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador, but would you keep the microphone a little closer, please.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Would you like some copies?

Senator SARBANES. If you would, just hold it up as we work from it.

Now, the warhead is the diagram at the top, is that right?

Ambassador GLITMAN. This diagram at the top here [indicating] is the entire missile.

Senator SARBANES. The entire missile. OK.

Ambassador GLITMAN. This section, from here [indicating] to the end, is called the front end or the front section in the treaty, this part here. This [indicating] is a blowup of it. You see these little fins on it help to direct it and so on.

Senator SARBANES. All right.

Now, looking at the blowup, which shows the front section enlarged, what is planned under the treaty is that both sides will remove the fissionable material and the guidance system.

Is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, and here they are [indicating].

Senator SARBANES. Now, the remainder of the front section will be destroyed; is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. So, to some degree, the so-called warhead will be destroyed. At least the balance of the warhead, other than the nuclear material and the guidance system? Is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That's correct.

May I just interject there, Senator, that it is probably better. It's just as this says, "Pershing reentry vehicle." All of this reenters the atmosphere. All of this is a reentry vehicle. Again, we have our problems with terminology, which is complex. But the reentry vehicle will be destroyed.

Senator SARBANES. We are not destroying the nuclear material because that presents very real problems both technically and in terms of safety.

Is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. And we remove the guidance system because we don't want the Soviets to have access to it, and I assume they don't want us to have access to theirs.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is also correct. Without having access, you could not verify its destruction.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, and in providing access to the guidance system, we would reveal things we don't want to reveal. Is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Precisely, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. OK.

Now, can you get the nuclear material, which is the explosive element, from here to there, assuming from here to there is some distance—in this instance, 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or in miles, 300 to 3,300 miles—without a missile?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, you might do it by some other means, but you certainly would not have the penetration. We certainly would not be able to just drive it in, let's put it that way.

Senator SARBANES. Yes. You would not have a weapon, in other words, without the missile.

Ambassador GLITMAN. You would not have a weapon without the missile.

Senator SARBANES. All right.

So, when you destroy the missile, including the warhead other than these two items, you eliminate the capability to deliver the weapon, do you not?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. It has been asserted that the nuclear material can be used somewhere else. That's true, as I understand it. I mean, we could do that and the Soviets could do that. Is that right?

Ambassador GLITMAN. We can take whatever material is inside this thing, or the thing itself, if it were possible to use again, and use it again. That is entirely up to us and entirely up to them, what is done with it.

Senator SARBANES. Even if this material were destroyed, either side could produce new nuclear material and use it on some other missile not covered by this treaty, could they not?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Absolutely correct, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. So, the fact that the nuclear material is removed does not really change the equation in any way. Both sides could reuse it. If it were destroyed, both sides could create other nuclear material to be used in missiles with different ranges than the missiles covered by this treaty.

Is that correct?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is correct, Senator.

Senator **SARBANES**. So, what this treaty was designed to do was to deny the Soviets the ability to retain missiles with a 300- to 3,300-mile range—in other words, missiles that were targeted on Europe and Asia.

Is that correct?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That's correct, Senator.

Senator **SARBANES**. Therefore, the treaty succeeds in eliminating that threat. The Soviets cannot—they are forbidden to—bring back missiles with that target range. Is that correct?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is correct, Senator.

Senator **SARBANES**. Now it is also true, as some have asserted, that the Soviets could take their strategic missiles, those with ranges in excess of 3,300 miles, and use them to hit Europe. Is that correct?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is also correct.

Senator **SARBANES**. But, of course, in order to do that, they would have, to divert the missiles from their original targets, which are in the United States.

Is that correct?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is correct, Senator.

Senator **SARBANES**. Now, the START talks that you are engaged in are, of course, designed to reduce significantly the numbers in the strategic area as well. Is that not the case?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is correct as well.

Senator **SARBANES**. And if you succeed, you will, further limit the Soviet capacity to target either the United States or Europe or Asia, for that matter.

Would that be the case?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is also correct.

Senator **SARBANES**. Let me ask one other question that has developed along these lines.

You used the reference "warheads," I take it, in places in the treaty and in this discussion. It was, in fact, essential to our interest that this term be used at times because our missiles covered by the INF Treaty have only one warhead, while the Soviet missiles, have three warheads; is that correct?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is correct, for the SS-20.

Senator **SARBANES**. For the SS-20.

Was that the rationale, therefore, for including the reference to "warheads," because you wanted to encompass the fact that the Soviets had three warheads to each missile?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is exactly right, Senator.

Senator **SARBANES**. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to make the observation that it seems to me this explanation holds up very well under questioning. What has happened, of course, is that we have eliminated this missile and with it the capacity, in effect, to hold Europe hostage with missiles that could not reach the United States, which is what precipitated our deployment and the INF negotiations in the first place.

I would like to ask Ambassador Kampelman a little bit about the negotiations, but very quickly because I see the light is changing on me.

On page 6, you said, "Having prevailed in our successful negotiating approach in Geneva, you can perhaps understand why we are reluctant to see the reintroduction of linkage as a part of the ratification process in Washington."

I take it that you are saying, in effect, "Why limit our options in the negotiating process?" In other words, we can move on this treaty, so why try to place conditions on it regarding another treaty, or a regional issue? I mean, we can try to link it to the whole panoply of United States-Soviet issues, highly contentious problems, about which we want things done. But I question whether we enhance our negotiating position by tying to this treaty requirement on other such matters.

What is your view on that?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I think, Senator, that you have accurately expressed my own view about this.

The INF Treaty stands on its own feet. It is defensible and in our interest on its own feet.

All of us have other aspirations with respect to advancing United States-Soviet agreements in related areas and in other areas. All of us have a wish list of one kind or another.

I am suggesting to you, however, that we can perhaps best address that by thinking of this conceptually as a step at a time. And, as we take a step, perhaps we help create an atmosphere which helps us improve, helps us move toward solving the rest of our wish list.

This is the philosophy under which we have proceeded in this area.

It is not that we don't share the same objective. We do, I think—those who are advancing, let's say, a tie in to conventional armaments or a tie in to strategic, or a tie in to human rights, or a solution to the Afghanistan problem. The question is, What is the best way to achieve these goals?

I think if we wait to tie them all up in one ball of wax, it is not the way to proceed and we may end up with our making no progress in these areas at all.

This is why we are reluctant to have these conditions attached to the ratification of this treaty, which stands on its own feet as beneficial and in our interest.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize to Ambassador Glitman and Ambassador Kampelman that I missed your testimony this morning when you presented it. I will have to read it. I was at the White House, where we had a meeting with the President, where we discussed this, together with some other items, a fairly regular meeting. The Vice President was not there this morning. After telling off Dan Rather last night he apparently now has gone off to Wyoming.

But I want to pursue what Senator Lugar and Senator Biden and Senator Sarbanes have begun, and that is this. Let's say that the treaty is ratified, that the treaty becomes operable, and let's say then that the Russians decide they want to go on a binge of building parts to missiles similar to those that exist today. Let's say that we ourselves wanted to go on such a binge and start making parts, whether they are the warheads, the fissionable material, the guidance systems, or the parts of the missile that propel it.

Is there any way that we could really verify those kind of actions on the part of the Russians?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The answer is "Yes."

We have to be clear which parts it is that we are talking about, though.

The ability of the Soviet side, or ourselves for that matter, to produce nuclear materials like this of course is done in secret, so we would not know that and neither would they. It is not verifiable for either party.

The treaty does, however, explicitly prohibit the production not only of missiles but of the stages of the missiles. This we would have an opportunity to verify because we are at zero. A stage by itself for the Soviets, so far as we can tell, is not very useful.

For us it is different. Our individual stages could be reconfigured into individual missiles. But they cannot, or so they tell us and our experts think that is correct.

Second, we did find out during the course of the negotiations that one stage of the SS-25 is, as they put it, outwardly similar but not interchangeable with the first stage of the SS-20. The 20 and the 25 have similar first stages.

This did cause us concern.

So, we insisted, and they agreed, upon an arrangement under which we will, in fact, be monitoring the production of the SS-25 ICBM not otherwise covered by this treaty, to ensure that what comes out is not an SS-20, and we will not only be able to monitor production, but on a random basis, eight times a year, we will be able to open up one of those canisters in which the missile is shipped and look inside and measure it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And I understand look inside with technical means—not just to open it and take a peak.

Ambassador GLITMAN. No, sir, with technical means.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Right.

Ambassador GLITMAN. We will be using fairly sophisticated measuring devices, optical devices, to do that.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So, in the event the Soviets got it into their minds—this is at one plant, I believe, these inspections.

Ambassador GLITMAN. It is at one plant.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. In the event the Soviets decided they were going to build yet another plant, it is conceivable that if they wanted to violate the treaty, in their society, which is quite closed, they might be able to do it.

Ambassador GLITMAN. If they move that production of a similar type missile with an outwardly similar stage to another plant, the treaty will permit us to go to that plant as well. We will follow that issue. As long as they continue to produce a stage outwardly similar to the SS-20 stage, we have a right to monitor production wherever that is happening.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So, there are considerable restrictions that do not exist today with respect to the inspection and the production of such missiles?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct.

In addition, we will have the right to visit any former SS-20 base, which had been converted to an SS-25 base, onsite. We will be able to view the missiles, and there are devices that we can use on the outside of the missiles to be confident that these are not SS-20's inside—although why they would want to put an SS-20 with shorter range inside the same canister in which an SS-25 is is another question, and apparently it is not technically feasible, I am told, anyway.

We also have provisions for a unique short notice inspection by national technical means. So, at bases which are not converted from SS-20's, but at which SS-25's exist—and these are ground-mobile, as well as road-mobile systems—they will have to open the roofs at our request, at a time of our choosing. You can be sure that it will be bright daylight, when there is lots of sun and no clouds, and when our satellites are ready. We will be able to ask them to roll out the missiles and roll back the garage roof so we can take a picture to ensure that there are not any SS-20's in those bases as well.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Let's focus on the fissionable material and the guidance systems just again for a moment.

It is conceivable that that could be produced, both the guidance system and the fissionable material, which are relatively small, could be independently produced in the event that the guidance systems and the fissionable material were—I don't know how to destroy fissionable material, but let's presume that both of those elements of the missile were destroyed. Presumably, the Russians, or ourselves, for that matter, could make these without detection, even though it violated the treaty.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, what is important is that the treaty prohibits them from producing either the missile or its stages. That we can verify.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is that a stage? That is not really a stage.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is a front-end section, which is to be eliminated by this treaty. We will watch that be eliminated.

But the treaty will not permit them to produce the stages which boost that thing up into the air. So, it really would not be very useful to have it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is not very useful to have one part of the missile, whether it be the fissionable material or the guidance system, without being able to have the other part.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That's correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That's correct, obviously.

And it is the assembly, really, of all those parts into a very large missile that becomes detectible and becomes verifiable, I presume?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, and the presence of that missile, as well, and the fact that the missiles are out. In other words, another important point to bear in mind is that we are dealing with a zero environment.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That's correct.

Ambassador GLITMAN. So, they would have to run the risk of never, ever letting us, of our seeing one of these things. That means that they would have to be very careful about getting them out of doors. Well, if you cannot get them out of doors, your ability to train with them, your confidence in them, the fact that you cannot produce and that you cannot flight test, all of these things working together—the fact that we do have onsite inspection rights at the most likely places, the most easy places for them to put these missiles back into—all of this ties together and creates a web of constraint which we believe certainly will greatly deter their interest in cheating.

Senator **Boschwitz**. That is what I was getting at, that a web of constraint really is produced by this treaty, and that web of constraint is fortified by there being a zero option; that a violation of the treaty is not really very questionable or in doubt. If those things are done, it is, de facto, a violation of the treaty, and you cannot say, "Well, those are the 100 that we agreed to exempt or a portion of a number of missiles that we agreed to exempt."

So, it seems to me that because of the difficulty of putting together the fissionable material and also the guidance system, together with something large enough to act, and also the impossibility of testing, because testing, obviously, is very easily verified; is that not correct?

Ambassador **Glitman**. That is correct, yes.

Senator **Boschwitz**. So, the treaty really does put considerable constraints on both sides, despite the fact that the fissionable material or the guidance system is not actually destroyed.

Ambassador **Glitman**. Correct.

Senator **Boschwitz**. And one could say that we are a good deal better off with the treaty than without the treaty, because all of these constraints simply do not exist today at all.

Ambassador **Glitman**. That's true.

Senator **Boschwitz**. So, I think, as the Senator from Maryland said, under questioning it holds up well.

May I conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that technology moves—and I wonder if you would comment on this statement in the form of a question. Technology, as Senator Lugar indicated, moves very rapidly, and in a short period of time, it would be unlikely that you would put an old motor into a new automobile, as Senator Lugar stated it. The same thing certainly has applied to missiles and to armaments and to guidance systems, and, therefore, this fissionable material and also the guidance system will soon be outdated, I presume.

Is that a fair statement to make?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Well, I think it is fair to say that technology moves very rapidly. I cannot say whether they will be outdated soon. But certainly there is an incentive to continue. You know, as long as we are going to have these weapons, we are going to want the most technically effective ones that we have.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join the others in welcoming both of you to this session. Your testimony is of great value, and the work you both have done is, I think, of very great value to our country.

I know that you, Max, have been in charge of the panoply of negotiations, overseeing them all on many, many fronts, and I think the work you have accomplished is magnificent.

In connection with this particular treaty, I want to pay tribute to you, Maynard, for the great work you have done. I know that for 3 long years you have been in charge of the negotiations and have devoted a great deal of time and an immense talent to this effort. I think we have a great product, and much of that is due to your diligence and to the knowledge that you have pulled together on this front. We are all, the whole country is, deeply indebted to you.

I had intended to cover the warhead issue, but I think Senators Biden, Lugar, and Sarbanes have, with your cooperation, very effectively disposed of that issue. I don't think there really is a true issue on that front confronting us with regard to this treaty.

So, I want to go to a few other questions, some of which I posed to Secretary Shultz yesterday, and which cover some major concerns, like linkage, compliance, verification, and strategic doctrine.

If we approve the ratification of the INF agreement—and I expect we will—it will be the first time that the United States has ever ratified a treaty with the Soviets to destroy any offensive nuclear missiles.

I would like to elicit your views on a few of these central issues that relate to all of this and which will help to determine the attitude of the Senate.

First, on linkage, you have already expressed yourselves to some extent on this, but I would like to ask one more question on this subject.

Do you believe it would be wise or unwise for the United States to condition achievement of one national security goal, specifically ratifying the INF Treaty, to the achievement of other desirable goals, like Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, compliance with Helsinki, or compliance with other arms agreements?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I do not believe, Senator, that it would be wise. I do not think it would move us forward toward solving those other problems.

Senator CRANSTON. I gather from testimony that you have given and that Secretary Shultz has given that Soviet efforts to achieve linkage was one of the major impediments to the negotiations.

Is that true?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. It was, and it was constant, really, up until the last moment. As I indicated in my testimony, they did not really, on the INF part, fully drop it until just this past November.

Ambassador GLITMAN. I would add to that, Senator, that as far as our own negotiating approach was concerned, from our side, from the very beginning we argued against it. At the very first meeting that we had with the Soviets, I emphasized this point, and we never left that view of ours that this treaty, that INF should not be linked with either the strategic or the defense and space areas.

Linkage was on or it was off. But I never gave up a belief that in the end it would stay off, and it did stay off.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Let me, interestingly enough, point out to you that at the very beginning of our talks, we had an impasse for a number of days, as Ambassador Glitman will remember, because, as a matter of fact, it appeared as if the Soviet delegation really did not want to break up into three groups, but would prefer to keep into one group. We were able to get that changed.

Senator **Cranston**. It seems to me "ironic," to use a carefully chosen and modest word, that after you spent so much time having to fend off Soviet efforts to achieve linkage, now we have to seek to fend that off in the Senate, as we consider ratification.

On the matter of compliance, to what extent are questions about Soviet compliance with arms agreements what we might call demonstrated, crystal-clear violations, or to what degree are they disputes about ambiguous interpretations or ambiguous conduct?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Senator, there is no doubt but that ambiguities continue and exacerbate the irritations we have with Soviet violations. One of the things that motivated us in these negotiations is to do the best we could to reduce those ambiguities. This means reducing ambiguities not only in the English language but also in the Russian language, which adds a complexity, of course, to the negotiating process.

But my own examination of the various compliance reports that we have issued also indicates quite clearly that commitments made by the Soviet Union are all too frequently, regrettably, not lived up to.

So, in our negotiating approach, we had to act on the assumption that the commitments might not be lived up to, and, therefore, we emphasized as much as we did, the verification component of these treaties.

I must say it was not as if we were negotiating with the British or the French, where you act on certain assumptions. We could not do that. I think this treaty reflects in a sense that wariness on our part.

Senator **Cranston**. Going back over the history of our own compliance with treaties—this is a period that obviously started long before the current administration took office—is our U.S. compliance record unambiguous and 100-percent perfect?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I'm not in a position to answer that question as a technician. I am in a position to say, however, that I believe we want our compliance to be totally conforming with our obligations. The Soviets are frequently raising issues with respect to our compliance with various international obligations.

I don't mind saying that I have, on more than one occasion, pointed out to the Soviets that if this were not an automatic reflex on their part; namely we accuse them or suggest a violation and show them the evidence, and their instinctive response is to kind of point the finger and say, "You, too." If this were not such an instinctive response, we might take some of this a bit more seriously.

We do try to take all of their concerns seriously. We do try to investigate them. I think the Secretary indicated to you that in the human rights area, they are pointing out what they believe to be violations on our part, where we are exposed, where we are not living up to our commitments as much as we would like to. I think we acknowledge it, we explain it, we try to discuss it with them.

In a democratic society, it is more difficult not to comply with obligations assumed because we have a built in system of criticism, inner criticism. I think that is part of our strength. Where the Executive is concerned, it is the Congress that can criticize, the press, the opposing political party. Where the Congress is concerned, the

President can criticize, the press, the opposing political party. Individual citizens are free to do so.

It is unlikely—I hope it will change—but certainly up until now it has been unlikely that we could find a Soviet scientist coming to Pravda and complaining about the fact that the Soviet Union is violating a treaty commitment.

I hope that will come. But it is not unlikely in our society.

I think all of these constraints and influences channel us toward compliance and toward being as best we can rigid about our compliance.

Senator CRANSTON. Have there been occasions where the Soviets have complained about our compliance in some specific way, and where we have altered our approach to that particular matter?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I am not sure that I am equipped to answer that in a historic sense, Senator. So, I had better not try, in the arms control area, to answer that question. I don't know of any such, but that does not mean that there are not any such.

I do know that there are instances where in the human rights area we could do better than we have done. We try, we try to do so. Let me use a specific personal experience that I have had.

During negotiations I have had with the Soviets with respect to other areas, let's say the Helsinki Final Act, the United States was criticized for not having ratified the Genocide Treaty. I can only say to you that I came back and contributed my efforts to those of many here to try to see to it that the United States does indeed ratify the Genocide Treaty. I thought we should do that.

So, those are instances.

I don't know that our action is in response to Soviet criticism, but it certainly is a factor, and the fact that the criticism exists does not dissuade us from trying to do the right thing.

Senator CRANSTON. May I ask Ambassador Glitman if he has any response to that question?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I know of one instance where they complained and we did not change our behavior, and that was when they tried to use the SALT Treaty to complain that our deployments were a circumvention of that treaty. We quite steadfastly said they were not a circumvention of the SALT Treaty and went on with the deployments.

That, in turn, and I look at Senator Lugar, is in part what led us to take such a firm line against admitting language into this treaty which would give them an opportunity to make similar false charges in the future.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would add my congratulations to those of my colleagues on a job extraordinarily well done.

I fear that we will spend most of our hearings over the next several weeks trying to respond to, as my colleague from Delaware said, red herrings that are strewn across the path of these treaty negotiations. We dealt with one of them this morning, which was more than a red herring. I would call it a "crimson whale." [Laughter.]

It's the one of warheads and their destruction.

Lest I overdo it, let me go back to that and describe a corollary in terms that maybe most Americans understand a little better than nuclear weapons, which seem to be pretty esoteric and difficult to understand.

Assume that you had two adversaries facing each other with an arsenal of weapons and those weapons included short-range .45-caliber automatics, which Americans are fairly familiar with, 30–30-caliber rifles, as sort of an intermediate-caliber weapon, and a 20-millimeter automatic machinegun, or a 50-caliber automatic machinegun, either one, and you chose, for whatever reasons, to try to eliminate the dangers that existed to both by taking the rifles out of the picture.

Would it be accurate to say that the rifles themselves are roughly equivalent to a missile launcher, that the bullet, including the shell, is the missile, and that the lead thing that kills you at the end of the bullet in the shell is the warhead?

Now, if you destroy the rifle, which this treaty I presume calls for, if you take the shell off the bullet and pour the powder on the ground, or store it, for that matter, and crush the shell, you are left with a pile of powder and you are left with a bullet, neither of which is going to do you a whole lot of good in engaging an enemy.

Presumably, you could remelt the lead and take enough powder and put it into a .45-caliber bullet and use it on a short range or, conversely, do the same at the other end of the scale.

Is that roughly where we are in what we have negotiated?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I think that is a fine analogy and I am sorry I did not think of it myself. The only part I don't like about it is that I'm in the intermediate-range class in that analogy, and I don't feel like giving up my 30–30. [Laughter.]

Senator EVANS. OK. It just seems to me that much too much has been made of the fact that there will be these weapons waiting out there that could be immediately utilized. I think that that really is fallacious.

Let me turn to another thing that I think is a red herring, and that is the assertion that while you are all fine people, and our negotiating team is fine, but that somehow the State Department is not fine and that evil State Department is carrying the country down the wrong road.

Mr. Kampelman you mentioned very briefly in an aside to your remarks who appoints you. Who does appoint you?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. All of the negotiators here were appointed by the President. We came from different backgrounds, and our appointments were submitted to the Senate for confirmation. We were confirmed by the Senate.

Senator EVANS. Let me refer to a more recent period of time when there was a lot going on in the negotiation leading up to the treaty's successful conclusion.

There were several summits involved. There were news stories talking about last minute changes and that sort of thing.

Is there any element, any at all, of this treaty as it now exists that prior to its approval was not approved by the President?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. None at all, Senator.

Let me make a point here, which I did, as an aside, refer to in my statement, in effect to respond to the implication.

Our delegations are interagency delegations. There are five agencies in the U.S. Government that have an interest in this negotiation, all of whom are represented in the Geneva negotiating team. The Department of State is one of them. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is another. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have independent representation. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the fourth, and the intelligence agencies are represented in our negotiating teams.

All of these agencies play a very important role in contributing their advice to the President as to what our position should be with respect to each of the issues and all of the negotiations that we engage in. If there are differences, the President makes the decision.

I want to say to you that in the main, after discussion, there are not that many differences—not as many as one would surmise from reading about them.

So, the President then makes the ultimate decision.

Now, you referred to some of the meetings besides the meetings of the actual negotiators in Geneva.

Senator EVANS. I was curious about the impact, if any, both positive and negative, of the pressures of the approaching summit meeting or of other things that were happening at the same time on the negotiations.

Were they helpful, harmful, or did they have any impact at all on the way in which you negotiated?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Well, let me begin my answer by saying that even in the meeting of the foreign ministers, Secretary Shultz has been accompanied at his request by representatives of the Defense Department, for example, and of the other agencies. More recently, the National Security Advisor has been present, and certain representatives. Most recently, the Secretary of Defense has been present in those discussions.

Now let's talk for a moment about the question you now have raised.

I understand any concern on the part of a responsible citizen or Member of the U.S. Senate about moving pellmell, hurriedly moving toward decisions. It somehow implies maybe a lack of deliberativeness, acting under pressure, and not with the best of judgment.

Let me remind you with respect to the INF Treaty that this pellmell rush has taken 6 years, a carefully crafted 6 years, a thoroughly researched 6 years. We knew exactly where we wanted to go.

I can say for myself, and I am fairly certain that I speak for all of the negotiators, that none of us felt under pressure to come up with an agreement within a particular time period if that meant coming up with an agreement that was not in our interest.

Speaking personally as a negotiator in private life as well as a negotiator now for a number of years for the United States Government, in Madrid and again in Geneva, I can say to you that I believe having time goals is useful, particularly in dealing with the Soviets.

Why is that? It is because somehow their pattern, as I have observed it, seems to be that they don't make the crucial concessions until they consider the end-game has arrived. It makes sense. Why make the concession earlier if perhaps we will make the concession as a result of the normal democratic pressures that operate on us.

Now, the question is when do you get to the end-game? How do you define it? There is always a possibility of miscalculation.

But when there is a meeting of the heads of state or a meeting of the foreign ministers, there is an assumption somehow implicit in all of this that we are getting close to a period, and if you have concessions to make, Mr. Soviet Union, this is the time to make them, and then we evaluate them.

This, of course, is the task of the negotiator—not to let his government's interests in any way be adversely affected by the date. I think that has been the case with respect to our negotiations in the INF Treaty.

Ambassador GLITMAN. If I might just add to that——

Senator EVANS. Surely.

Ambassador GLITMAN [continuing]. Quite frankly, in looking back at the last period of the negotiations, from this perspective, as opposed to being there at the time, I find the word "end-game" a little hard to use for that period. Why is that? It is because if you look at those basic principles that I outlined in my statement, you will find that we had achieved all of that well before the end of the negotiation, well before that.

There were a lot of details left, and they were very important. But they were not the sort of issues which were, I might say, cosmic, the sort of main, hard issues. We had done those. Those had been achieved during the various meetings that had taken place, either in Geneva with us, at the negotiating table, or with the President earlier at Reykjavik, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Kampelman, others—all had been working. So, it was really more of an evolutionary process.

I also agree with Ambassador Kampelman that in the end you must have a deadline. I think, unfortunately, it is just human nature that without it, you will just take a little more time.

So, had we been told well, you've got another month or another 2 months, it would have ended up the same way and we still would have been working very hard at that last period, because human nature is that way. Whatever is left becomes very, very important in your eyes at that moment because that is what is left.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I just might ask Ambassador Glitman something.

You said the principles were all set at an earlier time. Could you tell me approximately when you felt that the fundamental principles that are most important to the treaty were agreed to and you got into the detail stage?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, certainly by mid-1987, when we were engaging on verification. The rest of them had already, as I outlined in my statement, been achieved. We had a lot more to do on verification at the end. But by the time we got through, then, we could sense that our job was simply to take what they had agreed to in principle and make it work in detail, which took a lot of time and a lot of effort. But I personally felt we were over the hump on the main points at that juncture.

Senator EVANS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to add my congratulations to those of others for the fine work that you have done here.

Looking beyond INF just for a moment, the Secretary expressed yesterday on more than one occasion the belief—and I do not want to misinterpret his observations—but it seemed to me that he was saying, in effect, that we should go next to START because it is more simply accomplished, since we have two countries to deal with rather than many.

I am wondering if that is the best reason that could be stated for going next to START. There are many who feel that the conventional force imbalance is the next big challenge, the most serious threat to the alliance. I am interested in brief observations from each of you, if you can give me a stronger reason than simply it is arguably easier to get to a conclusion on START because there are only two countries. Can you give me a stronger reason for why we ought to go there next, rather than to reduction in conventional force levels?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, many of the questions and exchanges that have taken place yesterday and today at this hearing would seem to indicate—and we have always recognized this—that there is an interrelationship between the systems, the INF and the strategic.

There has been concern expressed, for example, about the possibility of retargeting. Obviously, the extent to which we can address the strategic reductions, it is very important for us to do so.

Furthermore, Senator, it would appear as if our own national security interests would be tremendously enhanced, United States national security would be tremendously enhanced if we could persuade the Soviets—in principle they have agreed—to cut their arsenal by 50 percent. We are concerned, for example, about their SS-18's. It would be noteworthy in our interest if we could put into treaty form the agreement we already have to reduce to no more than 1,540 warheads in that particular area.

So, it is our national security interest which is impelling us in this direction.

Now, we started these strategic reduction negotiations nearly 3 years ago. It will be 3 years in March. So there is a great deal done already in this area.

Ambassador Glitman pointed out how we knew a number of months ago the main areas of INF were already in hand. I can tell you that perhaps the main areas, putting verification aside, of START are already in hand.

For us, therefore, to put that aside when it is in our interest in my opinion is not in our interest.

Now, the complication of the conventional area, which is very important—and I do not disagree with you, Senator, a bit, on the importance of dealing with that subject—the complication is that we have no reason to expect, only to hope, that that negotiation can be completed in a reasonably short period of time.

It is complicated by the very factors that the Secretary highlighted—23 countries negotiating, 2 alliances. It is further complicated by the fact that we still have not agreed on the date we are going to begin those negotiations, and it is not up to us. The Congress could pass a resolution saying let's begin by X date. The President can enthusiastically support it and say I agree, let's begin by X date. But it does not necessarily mean that we would begin by X date because it would require 35 countries to agree, not just the 23, on the X date.

So, it is for that reason, without minimizing the importance of conventional——

Senator **McConnell**. So, in your judgment, since our security is enhanced by such an agreement, assuming we can solve the verification problem, even if we never get anywhere on conventional forces, we are still better off than we were when we started.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. We are.

Ambassador **Glitman**. If I might add a point, I did spend a brief time heading up the MBFR delegation, so I can speak with certain knowledge of the complexity of that negotiation, but also of the importance of dealing with the conventional issue.

I think we should not leave an impression that we are ignoring that question. The fact is that we are at work in Vienna now, as we speak here, trying to come to grips with that conventional arms control problem.

The Secretary, I think quite rightly, was simply trying to point out that in terms of where the prospects are, one is easier to handle than the other because there are only two parties to the one. But I hope no one was left with the impression that we are not going to pursue those conventional negotiations further.

Senator **McConnell**. May I ask you this? Even if there were only two countries involved, would it be safe to say that when Gorbachev begins to deal with his own military people in conventional forces, he has a tougher political problem internally in pulling that off than he might have, say, with a START agreement? Is that an accurate assessment of the internal politics in the U.S.S.R.?

Ambassador **Glitman**. It is very difficult to really speculate on what would motivate the Soviets. The facts are that they have a lot more manpower tied up in conventional forces and costs, as do we. The verification problems are enormous. The ability to find counterpart systems, trading off one against the other, is far more complex. All of those issues add to the difficulty, but not to the requirement to continue to work at it.

Senator **McConnell**. Quickly, Senator Boschwitz and the two of you were discussing the production facilities for the SS–20 and how we would go about verifying the fact that it was not being produced.

How confident are we that this is the only production facility in the U.S.S.R. that could be utilized for this purpose?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Senator, we are as confident as we can be. There is no way that we can be 100-percent certain that there are not covert facilities somewhere hidden in caves. That is the example I always use.

But what we can be sure of is that in a zero environment, where there is no testing and no ability for them to move around freely, they will have a very difficult time sustaining a force, even if they did produce it, and the risk of getting caught is enormously higher in zero than it is when you have other missiles in which you can sort of hide this force.

Senator McCONNELL. On to the question of the destruction of the missiles or the launchers. As I understand it, a hundred of those can be destroyed by launching, as opposed to some kind of static destruction.

I am interested in how this came about and what concerns, if any, are there with monitoring launching? How can we verify that it is a launch for destruction purposes, for example, rather than a test flight?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The Soviets argued that they would have greater difficulty for a number of technical reasons in destroying their missiles than we would by exploding them or by what is called "static firing," sort of chaining them down, strapping them down, and letting them fire out the missile in that way, or the stage of the missile.

During the discussions which involved experts from the United States added on to the delegation, people who build our missiles, as well as people who build their missiles, they got together and met for about 2 weeks. We learned a certain amount from them and vice-versa. One of the things that they kept insisting on was that they had a very real problem, a very real concern, with the manner in which they could destroy their missiles, and concern that since they had so many more to destroy, that they would not meet their timetable unless they were allowed to launch a certain number to destruction.

We discussed this with them, resisted it to some extent, but after a while recognized that there may be (*a*) some validity to their argument, that (*b*) we may want to do some of it, and (*c*) that it had the impact of having them get rid of them faster; also (*d*), we insisted upon and received the right to onsite inspection of these eliminations, so that answers part of your question. We will be there, and it is all spelled out in the elimination protocol. We will be there. We will be able to make sure that the missile that is being launched is indeed one of those covered by the treaty.

There is no telemetry permitted. There is a range safety requirement. You can permit range safety information to be transmitted. We asked for that. Why? Because when we launch from Cape Canaveral, if that missile is going astray, we want to find out so that we can blow it up before it lands on somebody's head. But that is a simple signal that just says here I am. That will be permitted, but nothing else.

So, we will have the right to observe it. We will have the right to ensure that there is no telemetry value coming out of it, and it is only good for 100 launches and only good for 6 months, and they can only launch into an area into which they have traditionally launched. Most of those, almost all, with one exception, have gone on, I think all of them have landed on Soviet territory, and with one exception they have all gone off toward the Soviet Far East.

Senator McCONNELL. With regard to the transit of missiles or launchers for destruction, there is a 25-day period in there, as I understand it. How did you agree on the 25-day period? How does this portion of the destruction work?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The purpose here was to try to keep a limitation on how long it would take for a missile essentially to get from one place to another.

Our effort was to ensure that it did not take so long that the missile or launcher might hide itself somewhere. So, we put limitations on the time.

We would have liked it a little shorter; the Soviets would have liked it a lot longer.

We also insisted that they give us ex post facto notification of where that missile was at any given time. We agreed upon 4 days.

So, if it takes them, say, 25 days to get from point A to point B, they will have to tell us afterward where they were every 4 days during that transit.

Senator McCONNELL. But we do not observe that except through some technical means.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Through technical means we would observe that. Yes. They will have to notify us that the transit took place, notify us after it took place, where it has been, and we will have an opportunity to at least ensure that if we did see another missile at some place that is not covered in the treaty, that is to say, a violation, that that missile was the one that was in transit. It was designed to deal with that.

Senator McCONNELL. Does the treaty specify how it is transported?

Ambassador GLITMAN. No.

There again, we may want to use shipborne traffic for some of ours, which is why, in the end, we extended our time zone. We realized that maybe it would be cheaper for us to ship some back by ship, so, well, we added a couple or 5 days to where we started out ourselves. We did not have any problem with that.

Senator McCONNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Senator McConnell.

Thank you.

The committee will now recess until 2 o'clock, permitting the members to go to their regular caucus luncheons. We will be back with you both at 2.

My understanding is that you can stay until all of the questions have been exhausted.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. We will, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

The committee is in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met at 2:08 p.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Kerry, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, and Pressler.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order. I notice, in the absence of my colleagues, I have a few questions of my own I would like to get out of the way, if I could.

In the first place, I was wondering, Ambassador Kampelman, if you could give us a little bit of the background on article 14. "The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions."

Is this just boilerplate? I do not recall it in other treaties. And I was just curious what its origin was.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Well, Ambassador Glitman will give you the details of the negotiating exchange.

But what I think is relevant in connection with your question is that in SALT II, the SALT II agreement, there was indeed a noncircumvention article, article 12, which you will not find in this treaty, not the way it was in article 12.

And then they had an article 13 of the SALT II Treaty, which is very similar to what we have. And the heading there is prohibition of conflicting obligations. And each party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the treaty, is the way the SALT II Treaty was written.

And in the explanations of it, the article refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future. And existing agreements are therefore not affected. And this in turn was based on article 10 of the ABM Treaty.

So that, and this is really as a followup to what Ambassador Glitman had discussed this morning in this issue, and he may want to add to it.

The CHAIRMAN. But also, what is the reason for it? What caused you to put it in at all?

Ambassador GLITMAN. There was, as Ambassador Kampelman pointed out, a precedent of sorts in the SALT agreement.

What troubled us was that the Soviets had used the noncircumvention article as a club to try to hit us over the head with to argue that our deployments of the Pershing and Cruise missiles were somehow circumventing the SALT II agreement.

They were not, and we told them they were not. But we learned a lesson from that, and that was that the Soviets would use language of that sort, noncircumvention, to try to prevent us from undertaking what we considered to be legitimate activities connected with our own defense and security, including that with our allies.

When we started to negotiate, the Soviets had reproduced that language from the SALT Treaty, and in fact at one point they even added to it more constraints. There could be no transfer of blueprints or components and so on. There was a whole string of things.

Well, you will find none of that in the treaty because we refused to accept that. The Soviets did ask for this other language, which is, as you say, very close to boilerplate. Effectively it says that you will abide by the treaty.

But it is the sort of clause that you will find not infrequently in treaties. And it is there as an additional guarantee of good faith, I suppose. Well, we agreed to that being put in.

At the same time, the Soviets wanted, as you may recall, another clause in the treaty which would have called for follow-on negotiations. And would have had us, in effect, agreeing that there could be further negotiations, even though we had gotten zero.

And their aim was, of course, to try to get U.S. aircraft back in, and possibly British and French nuclear forces. And we did not want that. So, we agreed that this language could be accepted. They agreed to drop the follow-on.

But, I will tell you that during the course of our discussion of this article we made it very clear to them that there is no question that this noncircumvention business is out, there is no question that we had gotten them to agree to take out the details about no blueprints, no components. And this simply said that we would abide by the provisions.

And as I pointed out to Senator Lugar this morning, there is nothing in this language which, for instance, would prevent us from working with our allies to develop new missiles with ranges below 500 kilometers, or from working with our British allies under the agreement, or starting another program with anyone else for that matter, if it met our legal requirements above 5,500 kilometers range.

The CHAIRMAN. I still have not gotten a simple answer for it. What is the reason for it? Who suggested it and what is the reason for it?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The Soviets essentially suggested that language. And their initial effort was to try to get language that would be broad and vague enough so that they might later try to argue we were breaking the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. This is compromise language between our position of no language and their wanting to push it?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes. But remember, as I said, Senator, it is very important to understand that in arriving at this, we made it clear to them that we would not consider this language to prohibit us from maintaining our cooperation with NATO.

That was the issue at stake here, and we did not hide that during the negotiations. And the answer is "yes, we can continue to work with our allies to help with NATO defense." What we cannot do is produce or deploy this class of missiles, classes of missiles that have been eliminated by the treaty. But that is different.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I think Senator Kerry has not had a chance during the first round. So, if you want to do your first round?

Senator KERRY. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This morning, Senator Biden and I keep coming into the same area here a little bit. In your testimony on page 26 you referred to your comments, and I would like to just bring them back for a moment, if I can.

You said that the INF negotiations had a very high-political content. And then you went on and said, "Indeed, without that potential, they would have had little political impact."

But their ability to intimidate, their potential for inciting fear of decoupling the United States from its allies are what gave Soviet INF missiles their real force. They did not have to be used to be effective, and so forth.

Then Senator Biden questioned that question of decoupling, and of other missiles. I would like to come back to it for a minute.

The question is, if the SS-25's, which could be given a trajectory that could, obviously, be aimed at Europe and retarget any target. If they were so targeted, would that not have the same effect in terms of the coupling-decoupling issue?

Ambassador GLITMAN. No, Senator, it would not. The fact is that they could retarget them, or the SS-18's, or what have you. It is possible to do that.

The difference is that with the SS-25's, we do not know what they are targeting us or our allies. We have no idea who those missiles are targeted at.

Senator KERRY. All right, but what I am saying is, if in response all of a sudden it became clear that they are deploying a whole group of SS-25's, and our intelligence says these are not aimed at the United States specifically, but they are targeted at Europe to replace the targets taken away, would that not put us back where we are?

There is nothing to stop them from doing that. Correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. There is nothing to stop them from doing it, but it would not put us back where we are.

Because the value to them of the SS-20 was that it allowed them in effect to hold Europe hostage in a way that the SS-25's would not, because we would not be sure that the SS-25's, nor would the allies, that the SS-25's could not be retargeted against us.

But with the SS-20 you have a weapon which the Soviets in effect can say to the Europeans, this is between you and us, and therefore you and we solve this without the Americans. It is an effort on their part effectively to say that we have a weapon that cannot strike the United States, and therefore the possibility is that the United States might not come to your defense. So, you had better pay attention to it.

That is a misreading, and a very serious misreading of our position or that of our allies. But they could have come to believe that by misreading it that way. And they did try to play on that.

But you cannot do that with the SS-25 because you cannot argue that this weapon is not "aimed at the United States."

Senator KERRY. I understand that.

But in terms of ability to project possible war-fighting scenarios, and in order to make determinations about deterrence you certainly have to factor in that possibility. Do you not?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Again, from a military standpoint, a strategic weapon can reach an intermediate-range target. So militarily, yes, you could do that.

But it is the political impact that is really at play here. And that was, in my view at least, the important issue. And that is what we removed.

Senator KERRY. Well, was the import of your answer, Ambassador Kampelman, to Senator Biden this morning that the United

States and Soviets have a tacit understanding on interim restraint on strategic forces, until there is no such restraint?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Senator, there is none.

Senator **Kerry**. No tacit understanding?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Senator, what I did indicate is the President's expression of restraint, which he did in writing. But we have no reason to believe that the Soviets have accepted this or are going along with it.

We, of course, noted with interest what Senator Biden said he heard in Moscow on the subject.

Senator **Kerry**. Well, do you think we would be well-advised, or that you might be well-advised to negotiate an interim agreement?

I know, and yesterday Secretary Shultz articulated them, the administration's feelings about SALT II adherence but would we not be better off if both sides resolved at this point to hold to those SALT II limits, at least until START is negotiated?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. No. In my opinion, no.

Senator **Kerry**. Why do you say that?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. For a number of reasons, one of which is that we are now negotiating in START very significant reductions. Reductions that are greatly superior to the numbers that would be present in a SALT II Treaty, by a large factor. And that is where our energies in START ought to be directed.

Our objective, if we can do it in our interests, is to try to get it done during the first half of this year. For us to sit down now with the Soviets and attempt to negotiate some other interim kind of figure will take time, will take energy.

I do not know that it would produce any results. It would not have any verification content to it. And under those circumstances, I do not think myself that it is a productive avenue to follow.

I think we would be far better off concentrating our energies now to explore whether we can get a START Treaty.

Senator **Kerry**. With respect to the treaty itself, article 2, section 2 of the treaty defines a ground-launched Cruise missile as a "ground-launched Cruise missile that is a weapon delivery vehicle."

Now, I assume you say weapon delivery vehicle because we can conceive of a ground-launched Cruise missile which could be used for other than weapons delivery purposes. Is that accurate?

Ambassador **Glitman**. That is correct. Drones, for example, reconnaissance drones.

Senator **Kerry**. Now, if the other side wanted to build a ground-launched Cruise missile for surveillance, would that be allowed under the treaty? Because it would not be a weapons delivery vehicle?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Well, they would have to show us that it was not a weapons delivery vehicle. But they would be permitted as long as it falls outside of the range. There is certainly no problem.

Senator **Kerry**. So, they are allowed to build a non-weapons delivery ground-launched Cruise missile?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Yes, a non-weapons delivery vehicle.

Senator **Kerry**. And they are allowed to have that launching capacity. Correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes.

Senator KERRY. And that would not be in the test-launched category of restraint under the treaty?

Ambassador GLITMAN. No.

Senator KERRY. What is to stop them from having ready launch sites and missiles to which they simply attach the warheads and then they have got a subset of so-called surveillance missiles which become Cruise?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, we would be able to keep some eye on what they are doing by the nature of the system itself.

And there is a different type of infrastructure that would go with a reconnaissance drone than would go with a Cruise missile that would be used for nuclear, or for that matter conventional delivery.

There again is an area where we have an interest, of course, in maintaining an ability to have drones.

Senator KERRY. So, you are saying that in the verification protocol you would be able to actually distinguish between whether or not that could be surveillance versus weapons delivery?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The difference is that if it is a weapons delivery vehicle, you have got to test it as a weapons delivery vehicle. It has got to be able to hit a target and they would need to prove that it can hit a target to their own satisfaction.

And if that happens, then that would of course be a sign that it had been used for weapons delivery. If it is a drone, it goes out, turns around, and comes back. But there is a difference between that and being able to have a missile that can really home in on a target the way that our Cruise missile can, for example.

Senator KERRY. Can any argument be made at this time that an SS-20 has that capacity?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The SS-20 does not have that drone capacity. No, sir.

Senator KERRY. Now, article 7, section 11 creates an exception that is created to permit the test of ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles, so long as the launchers are clearly test launchers, which are distinguishable from regular ground-launched ballistic missile or Cruise missile launchers. Correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct.

Senator KERRY. Now, this exception would permit the testing of sea-launched ballistic missiles and sea-launched Cruise missiles in a ground-based mode. Is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct. And let me note that this particular provision was put in here at our request.

We do in fact test both our sea-launched Cruise missiles and our sea-launched ballistic missiles from fixed ground-based facilities. And we need to be able to continue to do that. So, we have insisted on this right.

Senator KERRY. My time is up, so I will wait for my next round.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Kerry.

Senator HELMS. Why do you not let him follow up on that?

Senator KERRY. I just have a quick followup. Could the Soviets use that exception to maintain test launchers which, while not regular launchers, could be quickly substituted to violate the treaty?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Well, they would have to be fixed. And while there is not a particular limit on the number of those that you can have, the restrictions that are in here on the nature of the systems would be readily understandable to us that these were or were not being used intermittently for testing.

But they would no longer be mobile. They would have a fixed system. And again, we ourselves have a similar requirement. And again, that is why that is in there.

Senator **Kerry**. So, it is at our request. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one last question?

I was struck, Ambassador Kampelman, I had two versions of your testimony. Did we get a later version? We did?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I explained this morning when I testified that after listening to yesterday's testimony I felt we did not need to repeat some of the things that were said. I will stand by the first version too.

Senator **Kerry**. I am sure you will. I just could not figure out which was which.

But anyway, in the first version, you recited, as did Secretary Shultz yesterday, some of the current agreements under the START negotiations. And obviously this treaty brings up a lot of issues about the force structure of the future.

The pre-START U.S. force structure features about 6,600 sea-launched ballistic missiles on 37 subs and 2,289 ICBM's on 1,000 land-based missiles. Post-START, based on what you said in your testimony, which is currently obviously under discussion, we and the Soviets would be permitted only 4,900 ICBM's and SLBM warheads in all.

That is down from 8,900 to 4,900. Correct?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. That is correct.

Senator **Kerry**. The Joint Chiefs are suggesting a post-START force of 16 Trident subs. That would carry a total of about 3,200 warheads. That leaves 1,700 warheads available for land-based ICBM's.

We now have 50 MX missiles. The Air Force wants to go up to 100. So, after START, under the current structure you have arrived at, do you envision that force structure needing an additional 50 MX missiles for 100?

Because at 100 MX missiles, 10 warheads each, would you not then create a window of vulnerability for our land-based missiles versus theirs? They would have about 3,300 warheads to our, at that point, it would be a 10-to-1 ratio.

And I am wondering where you envision going with respect to that force structure as a result of that. Is that not a window of vulnerability?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. As you are aware, Senator, within these numbers that you have correctly identified, the 4,900 ballistic missiles would include the ICBM's and the SLBM's. There is room for various combinations and I really think that the question as to which combinations will better serve the military interests is something that I feel more comfortable having the Joint Chiefs respond to than having myself respond to.

What I do know is that this is an area that they have given a great deal of attention and are continuing to give a great deal of study to. That the 4,900 number, which was arrived at in this last December meeting of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, was a number that the Joint Chiefs felt was extremely important in order to carry out the military objectives that they saw being required.

And since you will be having testimony here in that area from those who are better qualified to deal with this mix than I, I would rather now tread on their toes, and let them do that.

Senator KERRY. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler has not had his first round of questions. So, he or any others who have not had an opportunity, will have their opportunity. And then we will start on the next round. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. I have been dodging between committees today, but I did hear your opening statement and I commend you both for your extensive hard work.

As to the onsite inspection, how did we arrive at the areas that are open to the onsite inspectors and the parts of the countries or areas that are not? Could you give us a little background on that?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes. If I understand the question correctly, we believed that first of all in a zero environment that would not have to go as far as we would have to in an environment where the missiles existed.

And that was one point where we would not go as far, because the issue would be made somewhat easier. It is harder to cheat if you cannot have any missiles outside at all, without running the risk of getting caught.

Second, we developed the program essentially to take account of the fact that these missiles are mobile. By the program, I mean the verification regime. And that includes ours.

We also have a requirement to be able to operate our Pershing and Cruise missiles away from their bases so that our troops can practice the various camouflage measures, the ability to move around the country, open country and in the forests that we need to practice in order to keep the missiles in the state of readiness that is required for proving that they can survive, as part of their deterrence.

So, those are the considerations that were behind what we were trying to do, particularly that one about the deployment. And that led us to the idea of working with deployment areas, areas in which the missiles could legitimately operate.

But at the same time, we did not want to allow those missiles to operate everywhere in the country. So, that was the next part. We have deployment areas, we have facilities that are declared support facilities. They are all listed in the MOU, as well as the deployment areas. These are the only places where missiles and their lauchers can be.

And then we have the right to transit between those facilities. But there has to be notice when that happens.

And I might mention, in the shorter range missiles, their movement is limited to going to an elimination facility.

Senator PRESSLER. As I understand it, you did not insist on the right to inspect any so-called suspect sites.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Right. And let me explain that.

Senator **Pressler**. Now, why would that be, including installations in the Soviet Union that are not listed in the memorandum of understanding?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Two reasons, or three. First, the point of zero, which is helpful here, will not be the case in START.

Second, the most likely or the easiest place for cheating to occur in terms of ease of operation would be in a formally declared facility, and so that would be the prime place that you would want to look at.

Third, this is something that I think we—I am glad you raised because it is an important point that has to be made. There are limits on both sides as to just how much we or they are prepared to open up. If you go to an anytime, anyplace approach, you have to be prepared to allow the other side to do that. And as we began to look at the situation, it became clear that we were not prepared to do so.

And I might just say that I recall, Senator Pell, when you and your colleagues were with us in Geneva and we were discussing this very subject, and the question arose about whether we would be prepared to let the Soviets into a certain facility in the United States—I will not mention which one—which would occur under an anytime, anyplace regime. One of the Senators who knew more about these things than I did said "Oh, no, not there. He said I know something that I cannot tell the rest of you about, but we are not going to be able to let them in there, and we should not."

Well, that was an interesting and important point that he made because it brought home the issue here. You cannot expect to go any time, any place in the Soviet Union unless you are prepared to do the same in the United States, and I am happy to say that it turns out we really do have some secrets. Not everything got leaked to the press, and we ought to keep them that way.

Now, that is a limitation that is involved here, but you cannot just look at this treaty's verification regime and say, "Well, there is a problem there." The point is that there is a web of constraints which will be in effect.

Senator **Pressler**. Yes. Well, the argument is used sometimes that the Soviet Union is a less open society and we are a more open society. I am somewhat concerned that the areas in the Soviet Union that are off limits, the sites or whatever, are really off limits to everybody, whereas in the United States we have more of an open society where people can acquire this information more easily.

Would you say that is true?

Ambassador **Glitman**. There is no doubt that we are by far a more open society. We also put some limitations on where Soviets can travel in this country in direct reaction to their doing that to Americans.

But the fact is that even if we are a more open society, it is true that we do have some places and some facilities that we consider very sensitive.

Senator **Pressler**. Sure.

Well, the point I am making, I am sure we do have restrictions on where Soviets can travel, but for example, recently some Czechoslovakian "tourist" with a collapsible airplane and electronically equipped truck went around our country taking pictures and so forth. There are lots of other friends of the Soviets who can go just about anywhere.

Would anytime, anywhere challenge inspections be part of an absolute verification scheme, or would that be impossible?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, I think in the case of START, we will probably have to go into that a little more. Because of the zero, our ability to catch cheating is that much greater in INF. In START we may have to go into this, and the question will then arise whether you need a right of refusal.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, what would be the risks to our security if we had an exchange of giving the Soviet Union free rein to roam around investigating sensitive military facilities, if we had the same free rein in the Soviet Union? It is my feeling that they or their agents currently possess that option.

What would have been the—what I am sorriest about is that the Soviets can pretty well collect all that information from us, but we cannot collect it in their society because they have so many areas that are really off limits to everybody.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, they are not off limits quite to everybody. There are other ways of—and I do not want to get into that in this open hearing, but I do not think it is correct to say that we are totally ignorant of what happens throughout the Soviet Union.

I do think it is a fair point, and I have tried to make that, that we have certain limitations on what we are prepared to accept. But I do think more importantly than that is the fact that the INF verification regime takes place in a zero environment where there is no production and no flight testing which we can monitor which will be giving us good confidence that they cannot cheat in a militarily significant way.

We cannot guarantee 100 percent.

Now, if we found some suspicious activity at some place that was not a formally declared facility, we could go to that Special Verification Commission, call a meeting of that Commission and say "Hey, what about this." And we would get an answer or we would not. But we would certainly start that process going.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Kampelman, let me ask you, yesterday Secretary Shultz said he did not really have very much of a problem with a one-for-one parity on conventional forces in Europe, and I am wondering, what would be your judgment if the Senate were to adopt an amendment to the treaty calling for an agreement with the Soviets for a 1 to 1 parity on conventional weapons in Europe that would go into effect simultaneously? At least the reductions would go into effect, and there would be a plan over a period of time for some parity to be achieved in conventional forces.

I would submit that the MBFR talks have been going on for a long time, and that within a matter of a few weeks the Soviets could probably sign such a protocol, if they are agreeable at all to progress in this area.

What would be your judgment, what would happen if the Senate adopted such an amendment?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I myself think that would be highly unfortunate because it would in effect mean that a treaty which is important to the United States and in the American interest; that is, the INF Treaty, would in effect not be put into practice for quite a period of time, without its having any relevance to what we do or do not do because conventional arms talks are talks that will be taking place—maybe they will begin this year. We hope so—between 23 countries. And it is totally beyond our control.

We could not put into effect a treaty in our interest because it would be necessary for other countries to agree to it since you could not get an agreement in the conventional area without other countries agreeing to it.

And I do not think that is in our interest. I do not think such a condition serves the best interests of the United States. And therefore, I would be unhappy if there were such a condition put in during the course of the ratification of the INF Treaty.

Senator **Pressler**. But I am sure a man of your skill probably could negotiate it fairly quickly.

It is true that there are several countries involved, but the United States is the leader of NATO essentially, and we have gotten our NATO allies on board on this one. I think we could probably move fairly quickly if the Senate did that.

But let's just imagine the Senate did that; what would be the first step? Of course, you would do what you are instructed to do, but what would be the process that we would go through?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Well, the first process is not a new process. That is, it is to look at the existing negotiations that are now taking place in Vienna within the context of the CSCE process, the Helsinki Final Act. Negotiations are now taking place there, and one of the results that we would like to see coming out of that meeting is a result to start a negotiation in the conventional arms area.

We have gone somewhat far in that we have at least agreed that there should be 23 countries dealing with it, the members of the 2 alliances.

On the other hand, it is not—again, you need a unanimous consent of 35 countries for that negotiation to begin because the CSCE process is done by consensus. You would need the unanimous consent of 35 countries for that negotiation to begin.

Now, we have a position at that Vienna meeting. Our position is "Yes, we do want these conventional talks to begin." But let's not do that at the expense of a very important piece of paper from Western point of view; namely, the Helsinki Final Act, which is a balanced document and which includes a very important human rights ingredient to it.

So, we are saying to get a result, we are not satisfied with just the result in the conventional area, we also need a human rights result because that is what was written into the Helsinki Final Act as a package in 1975.

Senator **Pressler**. But you did not insist on this regarding the INF Treaty.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. No, no, absolutely not. That is one of the points. Absolutely not. But the Helsinki Final Act, which was written and signed in 1975 was again the product of 35 countries negotiating, and it took a number of years.

And I am suggesting to you that to get a result coming out of the Vienna meeting since the rule of unanimity was agreed upon in 1975, to get a result coming out of the Vienna meeting, you would need to have 35 countries agreeing to it.

I am giving you that to indicate to you that I think we would be misleading ourselves and misleading others if we conveyed any impression that the conventional talks are likely either to get started, and certainly to be completed, within any brief period of time. It will take years.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, may I submit some additional questions for the record?

Let me just say in closing that I think the warm relationship that seems to exist between the President and Mr. Gorbachev would seem to make it possible to overcome all the roadblocks that have been set up, both on Helsinki and conventional forces. It would seem that these could be dealt with fairly quickly, I think, if the Senate did adopt such an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In light of Senator Pressler's questions regarding violations, and obviously this is an issue that has been raised and will continue to be raised, I wonder what your views would be on a resolution that would require withdrawal from the treaty if the Soviets were found to be in violation.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I would want to think about that a moment, and I would want to say to you that whatever views we express would be personal views and not authoritative views in behalf of the administration. I want to make that distinction because I think the Senate and the Senate committee has got a right to know the distinction between an authorized view and a personal view.

My own personal view is that I believe that there are some violations which, if they take place, should push us to pull out. I am not sure I would want to pull out of an important treaty in our interest if a violation took place that could be dealt with by a less drastic form of action.

I think our responses ought to be commensurate responses, but if it were a serious violation, I would have no problem doing so and no problem supporting such a proposal.

You always get a judgment call when a violation takes place, does it warrant this consequence or that consequence, and I do not know how easy it would be to write that in the form of a reservation or not.

But I do think that we are far better off, myself, to keep a pattern now of flexibility with respect to these kinds of responses.

Ambassador GLITMAN. I would only add that this treaty, in article 15, paragraph 2, does provide for the right of withdrawal when supreme national interests are called into question.

So, it is a standard withdrawal clause, but it is there, and I think what you are really asking is can you make a value judgment in advance of the event, whether you would want to put that clause into effect. You have got the clause, and therefore, I think, as Ambassador Kampelman suggested, it really would depend on the circumstances whether you want to put it into effect or not.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you think that one of the mechanisms that would help us, or either party, determine violations would be the Special Verification Commission?

Do you view this as a forum that is going to be substantive enough and strong enough and objective enough that we are going to have confidence in their decisions?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The forum will only be as effective as the governments make it. That is point 1.

Point 2, we have tried to structure this one in a way that it will not be routinized. The SCC does what it does, but it meets on a regular basis, and it kind of falls into a routine.

This thing is set up so that the meetings can be called when the problem arises, as rapidly or as frequently or as infrequently, and at whatever level we choose. Therefore we will have an opportunity to use this particular commission in a more dramatic way, so to speak, because we are going to have to call a meeting when something happens, and we will determine our level of representation. How we go at it will demonstrate what our concerns were.

I would expect, and I am just speculating, that at the beginning we would probably start at a very technical level, let's try to handle it as if it were just a small problem, and then if it turns out that it is not, we could escalate.

But the Commission itself is really a body in which we will try to work out these differences and try to get a resolution of the problem.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What will be the makeup of the Commission? Has this been determined by the Soviets and ourselves at this point?

Ambassador GLITMAN. No, and by the very nature of what we are trying to achieve here, we do not want it to have a secretariat and a full-time staff. We want it to be seen as a body that gets together when problems arise. It just will not meet for the sake of meeting.

Senator KASSEBAUM. True, but who is going to compose the body?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Whoever we want it to, ma'am.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Oh, so it can change from time to time.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes, Senator, we can. We can change it. We can meet at whatever level we want.

Now, if we want to appoint someone as a commissioner and give him that title, and he can go full time, fine. If we want to choose a technical expert for a particular meeting, we can go in at that level. If we want it higher, we can do that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Are these details that we have worked out fairly closely with the Soviet Union?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, they know what we are proposing to do, and that is how we wrote it. They would have preferred the SCC, frankly, the established forum. So, this is our creature, so to speak. We did it this way, and they have agreed with it, and we have discussed it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well I can see what you are saying, but it certainly is open-ended, is it not?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, it is designed to be in a sense open-ended. That is the whole purpose of allowing it to be called on demand without a right of refusal to come to the meeting, and to in effect choose the level of representation to fit the issue that is before us.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, who makes the decision on when it should be called and who will compose the Commission?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The party that feels it has a reason for complaint would get——

Senator KASSEBAUM. All right, say that we do. Well, then, will the President make this call? Who will——

Ambassador GLITMAN. In the end it would ultimately be under the President's authority, and he would—he would in effect have to say "I want this meeting called, I want it at this level. Find me the right people and send them over there." Then we would get in touch with the Soviets, via diplomatic means, we have the nuclear risk reduction center which we are using in this treaty for notifications, and we would say "We have a problem, we want a meeting such and such a time," and then probably at such and such a place, and then they would have to attend.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Who follows the day-to-day sort of, I suppose, nitty-gritty aspects and implementation?

Ambassador GLITMAN. We will be using the nuclear risk reduction centers, the NRRC's, essentially as the day-to-day exchange of information, and there will be a flood of data going back and forth as long as there are still missiles, but that body will not adjudicate anything. It acts essentially as a channel of communication.

We will be using our own intelligence means, whether national technical means or the inspectors who are onsite. If any problems arise, they can get back to the U.S. Government, and we can then call for a meeting of this Commission to deal with the problem if we cannot handle it in some other way.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, for instance, we may believe there is a problem, and so we, the President will call a group into being, and what if the Soviets respond that they do not see a problem?

Ambassador GLITMAN. They have to come to the meeting and tell us that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is clarified in it.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is what this requires, yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. They are required at that point to participate.

Ambassador GLITMAN. They are required to attend.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And vice-versa.

Ambassador GLITMAN. And vice-versa.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think the Secretary stated that yesterday at some point.

But it seems to me it is terribly important how this operates because if there is enough confidence in the strength of this Commission, it goes a long way in addressing the question of whether there should be a separate reservation, perhaps, giving us the assurance that there is a mechanism at the level and the ability to handle such questions.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, let's hope it does not get too much of a workout.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I am sure we all hope so. But the Standing Consultative Commission—and I think the chairman brought that up this morning—has been something that has, in my view and perhaps others, too, never worked or been utilized to the extent that perhaps it should have been or could have been, and as such has lost something in regard because it has not been utilized.

I think this is an interesting concept. It still seems to me it is a little amorphous, but I was just curious about how you saw the day-to-day aspects of it working, I guess that those questions come through the risk reduction center.

Ambassador GLITMAN. And through our own detection.

So, again, think of it in terms of a forum that is there for us to use at the time and the level of our choosing rather than just sort of a fixed thing.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

There are no others from the first round, so we start a second round, and I have one question I would like to ask, Ambassador Kampelman, and that is that implicit in the exchange with Senator Pressler was a judgment that the INF Treaty terms could exacerbate a problem in the area of conventional forces, in other words, that they are going in different directions.

You did not mean that, did you?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. No. But I do want to assert that I think it would be in our interests, and all of our interests, if we could begin a negotiation on conventional arms. But by no means did I mean to convey that there would be an added incentive for it or an added requirement for it because of any provisions that were incorporated in the INF Treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. If my colleague would yield just briefly, yesterday Secretary Shultz said he did not like the 3-to-2 ratio, and he said he liked the 1-to-1, so I took that as an endorsement of a 1-to-1 parity ratio.

The CHAIRMAN. On perhaps a political level, what were the major compromises the U.S. side made? What were the two or three big compromises you had to make to get this treaty implemented and agreed to by the Soviets?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I think as I review at least the 3 years in which I was actively involved, I am impressed with the fact that I do not think it was necessary for us to give up any of our objectives. And I believe that is an accurate reflection of my feelings as I review these negotiations.

Now there is always give and take with respect to details. And there was that process that took place here. In connection with a question asked a bit earlier, we had one set of verification requirements when we were thinking in terms of having a number, an equal number, but a number to be agreed upon in the INF area that each of us would have.

I myself, when I discussed this with my Soviet counterparts in urging that we go down to zero pointed out that verification would be a great deal simpler with zero than it would be with a number. And when they finally agreed to go down to zero, they obviously turned to Ambassador Glitman and said "OK, which of the verification requirements that were yours given a number, are verification requirements that you do not find now necessary that we are down to zero?" And I think that was a question that could be looked upon as a give and take. Maybe Ambassador Glitman wants to add to that.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct. And one of the things that we agreed at that point not to insist on was the portal monitoring system. But when we found out about the SS-25 we got that back anyway. But I think the other point to note Senator Pell, is that as I said in my statement this morning, if you looked at where we started, then the basic principles that were written into that 1979 NATO decision and that we worked out with our allies, and that we used as a backdrop and a guidepost for results that we wanted, we got every single one of those plus the shorter range.

In fact we started out really only asking for some kind of a constraint on shorter range, basically a freeze.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you notice any increase in the creativity or willingness to negotiate in the Soviets after Mr. Gorbachev came to power as opposed to before?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I think the answer to that is going to be "yes," in looking back on it. Part of that answer may lie in a point, I made in my testimony. Gorbachev made a lot of public statements and he did enter into what we normally call the media game. And he plays it well. But once he did that, he found himself having to play by the rules. By that I mean, it is very difficult, in our free societies to make speeches outside a negotiation saying you want something while you are doing something else inside.

In those instances where that happened and we called them on it, both inside and yes, outside, what changed was not the public line. What changed was the policy inside.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

President Reagan has said many times that the principal goal of his arms control negotiations was to achieve the reduction of nuclear arms. I believe this morning we established fairly clearly that the "nuclear warhead device," and the associated guidance systems are removed before the delivery vehicle and the reentry vehicles are destroyed, is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Now how many nuclear warhead devices are removed on the U.S. side?

Ambassador GLITMAN. All those that we have on our deployed missiles are removed, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Which is, 931?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The MOU number is what we have.

Senator HELMS. I am asking these questions for the record. I already know the answer to them.

How many nuclear warhead devices are removed on the Soviet side? My information is 3,136.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is about it. You can add it up from the figures here.

Senator HELMS. Now that is a ratio of 3.4-to-1 of nuclear war devices preserved and protected by the treaty; that is to say that they are removed and set aside. That is for the Soviets.

Now in terms of kilotons of nuclear explosive power, which are removed from the delivery vehicles, What is the total Soviet kilotonage removed and protected?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I do not have that number, and you will not find it in the MOU, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well if you want to jot it down, it is 1,231,300 kilotons preserved and protected for the Soviets. In terms of the kilotons of nuclear explosive power which the United States removed from NATO delivery vehicles, the total is 129,350 kilotons preserved and protected. And the reason that I wanted these figures in the record Max, is to indicate that there is a 12-to-1 ratio in favor of the Soviets.

If you want to check my figures, I would be glad for you to do that. Leading up to my real question, which part of an SS-20 or a Pershing II is the more expensive, more difficult to produce independent upon higher technology, the nuclear part or the nonnuclear part?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I do not know the answer to that question, Senator, which is more expensive.

Senator HELMS. With all due respect, you know. It is exceedingly more expensive to build the nuclear part. And it is true that our own nuclear processing capability is in fact limited, isn't it?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That indeed is an important point, Senator. It is limited. We do have some shortages, and therefore, we perhaps more than the Soviet side have an interest in retaining this material. And again, the question is, What do you do with it once you take it out?

Senator HELMS. So, it is not infinitely expendable. And that is true, as you say, for the Soviets. So, in fact, the INF Treaty does not reduce in any respect whatsoever, the nuclear stockpile. We established that this morning. It only reduces the number of nuclear vehicles. Is that a fair statement?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is a fair statement. And I think the analogy that Senator Evans drew this morning is a very apt one. I think that you were not here for it. But I think he did a very fine job in pointing out what is at stake here. Namely we are getting rid of the devices or the missiles which bring those weapons.

Senator HELMS. I understand. You use your arithmetic and I will use mine.

Now the SS-20 is related to the SS-25, is it not?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The first stage we are told is similar, but not interchangable.

Senator HELMS. Well, it is almost identical.

Ambassador GLITMAN. The entire missile sir? The first stage they say is outwardly similar.

Senator HELMS. The first stage where the rocket motor is, they are almost identical.

Ambassador GLITMAN. We are told you could not tell the difference if you looked at them.

Senator HELMS. And is not the second stage so similar that the treaty provides for the Soviets to give us special identifying characteristics so that we can tell the difference between the SS-20 and the SS-25?

Ambassador GLITMAN. We insisted on that to make sure that the second stage would not be outwardly similar, so that they can only produce one outwardly similar stage.

Senator HELMS. Now just for the record, what is the range of this SS-25?

Ambassador GLITMAN. It is an intercontinental ballistic missile, above 5,500 kilometers.

Senator HELMS. 45?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Above 5,500 kilometers.

Senator HELMS. So, it is in the ICBM class as you say. And has not the SS-25 also been tested at the 500- to 5,000-kilometer range?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I do not know that for a fact but I can tell you that I would say that the SS-25 could be targeted on targets below 5,500 kilometers. That is possible.

Senator HELMS. As low as 500?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That may be. I am not technically competent to answer that.

Senator HELMS. So, is it not true that the SS-25 has both the capacity of the INF missiles covered by the treaty and the capacity of an ICBM?

Ambassador GLITMAN. It is lacking one important capacity. And that is a political capacity to demonstrate to our allies that it can strike them, but not us. It demonstrates that it can strike us as well, and therefore its ability to decouple, the whole issue which brought us into the negotiations in the first place, is lacking. It is a strategic weapon, not an INF weapon. And therefore, it does not have that capability to create the sense of political hostagetaking that you get with an INF weapon or that they will no longer have when we get this treaty, if we do.

Senator HELMS. Well I am tempted to comment on that political aspect, but I will not.

The definition in the treaty I take it, is quite narrow. It covers only missiles that have an INF capability, is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct—500- to 5,500-kilometers range.

Senator HELMS. But it does not cover missiles that have both an INF capability and an ICBM capability.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Senator, I think the point is that any missile that can go above 5,500 kilometers and therefore qualifies as a strategic weapon can be retargeted and used on an INF intermediate-range-type target. Now there is a cost to that. There is a military cost because you cannot use it on a strategic target.

There is a political point which I maintain is a very important one. It does not serve that same political purpose as the INF missiles have served for the Soviets. So, we have to ask ourselves again if that was their aim, why either bother with an INF missile, why not just build all strategic weapons.

But they did not, they built these for a very good purpose.

Senator HELMS. I could answer that, but I do not want to get into a debate with you. I am just trying to get some facts in the record.

The Soviets under this treaty have in fact have a new missile system, the SS-25, which by the way is a violation of the SALT II Treaty, isn't it?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I would say that we are right to criticize that and bring it up for compliance. Yes sir, I agree with that. But that is not an INF issue. That is an issue out of the other negotiations and out of the SALT negotiations.

Senator HELMS. We have got the SS-25 that can do everything the SS-20 can do. Therefore the nuclear portion of the SS-20's; that is to say the most expensive part and the most difficult to manufacture is preserved and protected by this treaty and there is nothing to prevent the Soviets from putting it on the SS-25.

Ambassador GLITMAN. There is probably one thing, and that is that the SS-25 is a single-warhead weapon and the SS-20 is a three-warhead weapon, and therefore the nuclear warhead devices are probably different.

Senator HELMS. Well they may be, they may be probably, they may be possibly, or it may not be all that different in terms of technology.

Ambassador GLITMAN. We believe they are; a more detailed answer would have to be classified. We note that a nuclear warhead device cannot be simply "put on" a missile. It must be assembled into a reentry vehicle designed to fit on a particular type of missile.

Senator HELMS. In any case, I just do not see how this treaty reduces nuclear stockpiles in any degree whatsoever. Just to be candid about it. And I think that the treaty is deficient in that regard. But I will pick this up on my next round of questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, I would like to make a comment on that if I may. You are obviously concerned and I think correctly so with an element of advantage, one or the other. And are the Soviets gaining any advantage? I gather that from the use of the words "preserved" and "protected." the Soviet thing is preserved and protected which you used a few times. And I think that is a correct way to look at it. But I do not think you can look at it just on the basis of figures as to how much of the fissionable material is saved or is not saved.

Senator HELMS. Or how much it cost to develop. You do not think that we ought to look at that?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Because the fact of the matter is in my opinion the fissionable material that the Soviets have now available in their SS-20's is there, has been paid for, and the very fact that they have to reduce more than we do means by definition that therefore since we are not destroying the fissionable material, they will have more fissionable material left after it is over than we will have.

I think that is by definition.

Senator HELMS. That is my point.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. But it is fissionable material Senator, and not arms. And you have indicated that the President talked that the objective is to reduce nuclear arms, to indicate that it is not reducing fissionable material, I do not think negates the end result that we seek, which is to reduce nuclear arms. And I guess maybe the discussions that we have in the ensuing hearings and in this hearing will focus maybe on that distinction.

Senator HELMS. Well fissionable material Max, is what goes boom and kills you, not what you are reducing.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Only if it is added to by the items that we are destroying. By themselves, they do not go boom on a target. That is the point. You need something to carry them, to project them. That is what we are destroying.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Dodd has not had a chance yet in this first round.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me if I can come back to an issue that was raised I gather earlier today by my colleague from North Carolina. And Jesse, you may want to listen to this answer, because I am going to come back to that article 14 that you raised this morning. I know you brought it up. And apparently last evening on one of the discussion programs, one of our colleagues called article 14 a very troublesome sort of a boobytrap clause.

You recall there was so much discussion of article 12 in the SALT II agreement. It was argued that that was the door that allowed the Soviets to take tremendous advantage from a propaganda standpoint. They argued that everything we did was a violation of SALT II, whether it was modernization or conventional force improvements, whatever, that the language of article 2 gave them an opportunity to be highly critical of the United States on anything we did.

There are those who argue that article 14, while it is more narrowly drawn language, is once again the, a boobytrap if you will, that will allow the Soviets to be critical of the United States if we do anything to modernize our forces.

As I read that clause, it is rather clear on its face. It says that we have to comply with the INF Treaty and that we cannot violate it by contracting or colluding with third parties either. That is what I read it to be.

Let me ask you, is there anything else which you agreed to with the Soviets that is included in article 14 that is not either one, compliance with INF, or two, prohibits colluding or contracting with other countries, for instance to place what would otherwise be prohibited missiles on French, German territory, or the like.

Is there anything else in that clause that we ought to know about?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. No, Senator. Indeed, let me point out to you, and I will have Ambassador Glitman perhaps take a moment to give you a little bit of the negotiating history on that, but let me point out to you that the provision in the SALT II Treaty is not repeated in the INF Treaty.

Senator DODD. I hope I did not confuse you with that. I understand that.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. And indeed the SALT II Treaty has something rather similar to what is in the INF Treaty and that was not criticized at the time. That is the SALT II Treaty had both of these sentences in it. I am referring now to article 13 in the explanation. The executive branch made very clear at the time of SALT II, and I will read from the explanation it gave.

Senator DODD. I meant to mention article 13, 12 and 13, you are right.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. And what we said was that article 13, which is in a sense the equivalent of what you will find in the INF Treaty, the articles refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future and existing agreements are therefore not affected. And I——

Ambassador **Glitman**. I would only add that we did discuss, obviously discuss this article with the Soviets. There was no question both sides knew what was at stake here. That is why we insisted on not having the noncircumvention language in this article. The Soviets began by trying to get us to agree to language which would be quite precise, no exchange of blueprints, no components, et cetera, et cetera. All of that was stricken from the final document as you can see. And we told them at the negotiating table that we would be carrying out programs with our allies not in conflict with this treaty. Obviously we cannot produce these kinds of missiles that are banned by this treaty with our allies, but we can carry out our programs of improvements for NATO and that this would not interfere with that in any way.

I think such things as enhanced Lance for example, if it is below 500 kilometers would not be prohibited by this language.

Senator **Dodd**. In other words, modernization of present systems would not be precluded at all by the language of article 14?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Two things would not be precluded, or more than two. It is easier to say what will be precluded than what will not be. And what will be precluded in effect is our undertaking any obligations which are incompatible with the provisions of the treaty. And therefore modernization of the systems below 500 kilometers, or sea-based systems or air-based systems, none of those are covered by this treaty.

As I said this morning about cooperation with our allies on strategic systems, that is not precluded. We have some existing programs.

Furthermore, the one existing program of cooperation that we have with regard to a system that will be banned by this treaty; namely the program with the Federal Republic of Germany, would not be affected by this clause. Because it is in effect now. This only looks forward, it does not look backward.

Senator **Dodd**. So, let me ask you a couple of related questions for purposes of the record.

Is it your opinion that this article in no way restricts the President's power to conduct foreign policy?

Ambassador **Glitman**. That is my opinion, Senator.

Senator **Dodd**. Are the prohibitions called for in this provision constitutionally binding under U.S. domestic law?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Well the treaty itself will be. I guess I should ask Ambassador Kampelman, who is a lawyer, to answer that.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. No question about it. Once it is ratified, it certainly is part of domestic law.

Senator **Dodd**. Does this provision or article prohibit the President from assisting NATO allies to develop their own missile systems?

Ambassador **Glitman**. It would not prohibit them from developing their own missile systems which are not prohibited by the treaty. And as I said, the issue at the beginning was questions of blueprints and components et cetera. That is out. What this treaty does is it prohibits United States/Soviet production, flight testing, deployment, storage, what have you of a certain class of weapons. That we cannot do.

Senator DODD. That and that only?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is all that the treaty says.

Senator DODD. Since you have raised the issue of the German Pershings, could you tell us what the exact process was involving those missiles in the deal?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well the Soviets tried to arrange, work out an arrangement under which the German Pershings would have had to have been eliminated before we and the Soviets eliminated our own missiles. In other words, they were attempting to bring that German system into the negotiation.

Then after they fell off of that, they modified it and said "Well, fine, the Germans can keep the missiles, you have to take the reentry vehicles off of those, which belong to the United States, and take them off at the beginning."

Our point was that no, there is an established pattern of cooperation, it is in effect and this treaty is not going to interfere with the program of cooperation, no more than it will interfere with British and French systems.

And in the end, that is what we have got. Now, Chancellor Kohl made the decision that with the elimination of United States and Soviet missiles, not before but with it, he would then begin the process of eliminating the German missiles and the program of cooperation would then cease.

When that program of cooperation ceases, those reentry vehicles return to us, so to speak, and then we would have to take them and go through the process that we have been discussing in another context with regard to those.

We did agree with them that 15 days before the—after the written end of the elimination process—it is supposed to go 3 years. We and the Soviets agreed that that process would actually end.

We would do it 15 days before the 3 years are up, but after Soviet and United States missiles are gone and during those remaining 15 days that program of cooperation would end, Chancellor Kohl's statement would take effect, we would then take the reentry vehicles and eliminate them, as we would eliminate any other reentry vehicle.

Senator DODD. But is it outside the agreement?

Ambassador GLITMAN. It is absolutely outside, and therefore the principle that programs of cooperation are excluded from this type of bilateral negotiation is also carried through in the treaty.

Senator DODD. That is an important point, and I appreciate your mentioning that.

Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one more?

The CHAIRMAN. One minute.

Senator DODD. Ambassador Kampelman, obviously the controversy surrounding the interpretation of the ABM Treaty is something that you have more than just a passing familiarity with. What, if any, influence, could you share with this committee, did that controversy have on your work in negotiating this INF Treaty?

Did it cause you to make any efforts to clear up any ambiguity in the language? Did you make a conscious effort to leave a negotiating record that bears out the administration's view of the treaty, what the treaty ought to cover?

How did that impact your negotiating with the Soviets and what record did you establish in light of that?

Ambassador **KAMPELMAN**. Let me say the greatest impact of the debate here was felt and is still being felt within the negotiations in the defense in space area which are now still underway.

Insofar as the impact on the INF Treaty is concerned, I think that the debate plus, frankly, other experiences that we have had with respect to ambiguous language led us to be very careful about doing the best we can—I do not know that we succeeded in all cases—to avoid using ambiguous language, because we have a pattern of the Soviets trying to use ambiguous language as a way of stretching it to suit their own interpretation where the ambiguity permits that.

And that was very much in our mind, and we did that not only with respect to the English-language version of the treaty, but we also paid careful attention to the Russian-language version of the treaty, to make certain that the Russian language was also clear and carried out what we believe to be the intent of the parties.

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That was true in article 14, where they tried to interpret in Russian the word "undertakings" in a very loose way, and that was one of the last things we decided on, agreed upon, was that that word would not be interpreted to mean any kind of actions, but only act in the sense of the Helsinki Final Act or an act of Congress, in other words a document that you could point to and not just some loose kind of activity.

Senator **DODD**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We are now in the second round. I have had my questions. Senator Helms has had his. It is now Senator Biden's turn.

Senator **BIDEN**. Thank you very much.

I wish Senator Helms were here because I would like to compliment him. He is a very worthy opponent. He has now created a stockpile gap, and the logical implications of the stockpile gap are that if we somehow got the United States and the Soviet Union, in this case the Soviet Union, to disarm completely and put all their fissionable material in a warehouse, they would gain an advantage because they would have a larger stockpile than we would have.

I am glad you fellows have to answer his questions now and not me.

I would yield.

Senator **SARBANES**. If you would yield just for a second, I think, frankly, that Senator Helms' questions underscored the incredible success the two of you have had in negotiating this treaty.

By his own questioning, at the moment accepting his figures, the Soviets can deliver 1,231,300 kilotons of explosives. They have them on missiles and they can send them over against European targets, 1,231,300 kilotons.

Senator **BIDEN**. And they will go boom.

Senator **SARBANES**. And they will go boom, that is right.

Whereas the West can send only 129,550 kilotons against the Soviets. And you have succeeded in negotiating a treaty that eliminates the capacity to send these kilotons in either direction to blow up, and you have eliminated a 12-to-1 gap between the West and the Soviet Union in the ability to deliver this tremendous destruction.

I think you have done a terrific job in that regard.

Senator **Biden**. But you have created a stockpile gap.

Ambassador **Glitman**. Probably created a scrap iron gap, too, I suppose.

Senator **Biden**. Let me talk a little bit, Ambassador Kampelman, about START if I may. Senator Dodd asked, What kind of impact SDI has on START? And that reminded me that earlier you said you did not like linkage.

But is it not true, in the beginning we wanted to link START and INF? The Soviets said they would only talk about START if we talked about SDI. We said we were not going to talk and negotiate about SDI, and the only way we could get into a negotiation with the Soviets that might bear fruit was to discuss INF, because SDI would be the complicating factor if we were to do otherwise.

Is that not true?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I do not think it is, Senator. But I would like Ambassador Glitman to correct me to the extent I am wrong about it.

If you recall, we did have two separate negotiations before the Soviets walked out, and then some time in 1984 the Soviets raised the question about space, SDI, and wanting to have some negotiations in that area. And I think they were surprised, at least according to the reports, when the response was, "Fine, but we also want to include the START talks and the INF talks from which you dropped out."

There was then a meeting on January, I think January 5 and 6 or January 7 and 8, in Geneva—that was before I got into government service—between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz, when the agreement was to have all three taken up in these new talks.

As I looked at the negotiating record of that meeting, the Soviets wanted linkage and used the word "linkage."

Senator **Biden**. Linkage of?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. All three really, but certainly SDI to the others.

And our position was "No, we would not accept that." That was Secretary of State Shultz's position. And the communique finally ended up with the word "interrelationship" rather than the word "linkage," and we do recognize the interrelationship.

Senator **Biden**. I would like to, move on to one other area if I may because my time is going to be up. Ambassador Kampelman, do you intend that the START agreement will be comprehensive if we have our way? That is, covering all systems able to strike the United States and Soviet territory. Or will some systems, such as our forward-based systems and sea-launched Cruise missiles, be omitted if you had your way?

Or what is your present posture?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Our present posture is that we find it extremely difficult to come up with how we can include the sea-launched Cruise missiles into the package, primarily because—well, I do not want to even use the word "primarily." Strike that.

I would say among the reasons being the difficulty of verification of that which is to be included. And that subject is now under active negotiation in Geneva.

Senator **Biden**. What about our current position on mobile ICBM's?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Our current position on mobile ICBM's is that they should be banned until such time or unless the Soviets are able to show us a verification system which can work. And we have been ourselves, Senator, doing extensive work in Washington in exploring verification of the mobile system.

Senator **Biden**. My third question on that score is, What do you assess the state of Soviet space-based technology to be? We hear a lot about that. How concerned are you that they are in a race for their own SDI, their own space-based defense system?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. It is a concern. It is a concern, and I think you have to look at the particular areas. We know, for example, that in the laser field they have been in this a long period of time. They have got outstanding experts in the field, people who have won international prizes for their research in the field.

So, it is a matter of some concern to us, and we are trying to deal with it, learn about it. We know a great deal about it.

Senator **Biden**. Would you insist that we maintain the right to withdraw from any START Treaty that you might be able to negotiate if developments in Soviet strategic defense systems seemed to threaten or undermine our stability?

Does it make sense to insist on a provision, stipulating that if in the event of the duration of the START Treaty the Soviets were able to develop a workable space-based defense system before we are, then we would have the right to withdraw from START?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Let me tell you what our position is. It is one that does not want to have linkage between START and space defense. Now, let me elaborate upon that by saying that, if you recall, in 1972—I think Secretary of State Shultz dealt with this yesterday—when we got the ABM Treaty into force, the assumption was—it is in the preamble, and the assumption was that there would be reductions in the strategic offensive arsenals of both sides.

I do not want to go into why there were not those reductions, but those reductions did not take place. Mr. Gerard Smith at the time, in behalf of the United States, said that if those reductions do not take place in 5 years, he would feel the United States would be justified in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

They did not take place. But I want to point out to you, what we are saying to the Soviets is we never had that part of the ABM bargain carried out. And remember, we have said to the Soviets, if what we are talking about, which is 50-percent reductions, is carried out we will still have more after the 50 percent than we had in 1972, when we both agreed we should reduce.

And that is why we do not feel the Soviet Union should do what it is doing, which is trying to tie the START reductions to further restrictions in the defense area.

Senator BIDEN. Well, we never contemplated in 1972 a total space-based shield—the nuclear astrodome the President talks about—did we?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Well, in 1972 the ABM Treaty, as you know, was based obviously on what technology we then knew about. And that was the current technology at the time. What has happened, of course, is that we have injected ourselves by the logic of what happens in the world technology and scientific developments—we now have a completely new world of technology, other physical principles or God knows what.

The fact of the matter is we did not contemplate that, but we still want the reductions that were the promise and the premise of 1972.

Senator BIDEN. I hope without abandoning the notion of eliminating space-based defense systems, but I will get back to that.

Senator DODD. Would you yield on that one second?

But did not the ABM Treaty, though, specifically talk in generic terms about new technologies? And while it did not specifically address the issue of SDI because no one could have contemplated that—in fact this was the Buckley question and one of the reasons why he was the only Senator to vote against it, because it did in fact address the issue of new technologies.

That was the debate, I thought.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. It addressed the issue of new technology, Senator, in Agreed Statement D, and it referred to it as "other physical principles." And what it said is that, with regard to other physical principles, deployment will be prohibited; that steps short of deployment could be contemplated, but if any one of the parties wanted to proceed in the area there should be discussions and negotiations between the two parties, which is exactly the posture in which we are now finding ourselves as far as the United States is concerned.

We are saying, "Let us now under Agreed Statement D talk to each other about what we might do with respect to these other physical principles."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to make a comment or two prior to raising questions. As I have listened to the testimony and questions this afternoon, there needs to be a sorting out—and you gentlemen are helping us a great deal today—of both the language of the treaty as well as the preconceptions people bring to its interpretation.

In the past, on the liberal side of the political spectrum in this country, many people spoke of nuclear stockpiling and conjured up a vision of bombs or missiles literally in a pile. Cartoonists used it and various other ways to illustrate our armed might.

And it still is a vivid mental image for many persons. They see a missile or a bomb as a whole object. And the idea was, at least for many persons to try to limit these, to cap them, freeze the number, or to destroy them. There was to be a feeling of satisfaction if somehow or another you could get rid of a single one.

Now, you gentlemen are presenting a much more sophisticated argument, and I think it is a valid one. You are saying that, in fact, what is practical is to destroy missiles, launchers, the infrastructure, even parts of the reentry vehicle or the front-end sections of the delivery vehicles, but there are elements; namely the nuclear explosive devices, that would be dangerous to destroy out in the field. Therefore, we will bring the latter back to our home base and store them because we do not want our warhead designs inspected.

We have military secrets of our own and there are very good reasons why we want to protect our designs.

This may be a hard thing for all of us in the Senate and the American people to understand, but we will need to do so. It is a sophisticated way of looking after our interests.

It may be tedious for you to keep going back and forth through this explanation, but sometimes treaties fall on the basis of very small things, and we do not want this one to fail on this point.

Now correspondingly, it seems to me that many conservatives have argued the real problem is that the Soviet Union is a closed society, and that true arms control requires intrusive, onsite inspection; we must get inside the Soviet Union and have the ability to monitor developments.

And that in fact may be one of the major values of this treaty. We did not suspect, I think, in our time that that would occur. I remember conversations—in fact, Senator Biden and I had one with Kosygin in which he said, no onsite inspection during SALT II, but maybe during SALT III or IV the Soviet Union would think about it.

Now suddenly we have a vast change in the Soviet position. But we have had to make some changes in our own thinking. You have discretely described what is a very critical problem for the United States, and that is, when confronted in our own defense industry, in our own governmental branches, with the thought that Soviet inspecters might be roaming around the United States at will, traveling and inspecting whatever they wanted to, we drew back.

We never suspected it would come to that, but it has. We agreed to intrude and to have intrusion into our affairs; it works both ways.

So, the illusions or images to which I referred are falling, and this is very difficult for people who think in terms of symbols and cartoons to grasp. But the latter are falling, and we have not yet adjusted psychologically.

Yet even while these adjustments are underway, you are making a very limited claim. This is not the treaty to end all wars or weapons. It is in fact a limited agreement requiring the destruction of certain elements of missile systems of a certain range.

I suppose technically, as you have said, you can retarget or change the range of something that shoots long to shoot shorter. We could do the same with our system if it was of value. We could use old devices on newer delivery vehicles not covered by the treaty if that was of value to us.

But the point you have made is that it probably is not of major value. As a matter of fact, this treaty allows you to put some fissionable material back in the bottle literally while putting a lot of hardware and scrap iron on the sideline.

Now, it has been suggested by my distinguished colleague from North Carolina today that retention of the fissionable material gives the Soviets a 12-to-1 advantage in this area. So be it. As I think the Senator from Maryland has very accurately put it: Thank goodness the advantage exists in that form, rather than in a form of nuclear delivery vehicles that can threaten us in a very direct way.

We have rendered it benign in a ratio of 12-to-1, and clearly that is to our advantage. But it will require careful explanations for us all to understand that advantage.

While we are sorting things out, it seems to me that the question just raised by my colleague from Delaware, gets us into some other areas that are very, very important. The SDI issue is I think clearly one of these.

It is not an easy issue for any of us to discuss rationally because there are very strong feelings on all sides. The President has suggested a comprehensive SDI, which has been pictured as a protective bubble over the entire population. Other people have had less ambitious views, but the President has been adamant about his vision.

There is a strongly held feeling on the part of some liberals that the President, literally, by insisting on strategic defense is aborting any chance to get a START agreement. There is a gut feeling in some circles that the strategic defense initiative will finally sabotage the opportunity to get a 50-percent reduction or some other sizable change in strategic offensive forces.

So, we keep dancing around this problem.

What I would like to ask the two of you is whether there exists on the part of the Soviet Union a fear similar to that often expressed in this country of the so-called accidental shot in error or the irrational shot fired by a madman?

Surely they have this fear. Have the Soviets evidenced any interest formally or informally, and leaving aside the issue of a comprehensive SDI, in defending against such theats, a problem we presumably share?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, the pattern of negotiations in the space and defense area in Geneva has been very interesting because it has been evolving. At the outset there was no interest in discussing these questions with us. The only interest was, if I may quote from one of their slogans, a ban on space strike weapons, whatever that meant.

But that has evolved, and I think we are now talking about these things. And I think that is useful that we talk about these things.

One question they have asked us is, If we are going to reduce, why do you need a defense? Good question. I have said, "Fine." Obviously you need a defense while you have reduced only to 50 percent, but let's assume we reduce further at some point. You need it because you have got the Qadhafis of this world, you have got the Khomeinis, and you have got others, and we both should have an interest in protecting ourselves with respect to that possible development.

So, we are talking about this, and this is not the forum to get into the details on the space and defense negotiations. I am hoping we will come up with something in Geneva that will permit a piece of paper to be brought before you where we can have full discussions in this area.

Senator LUGAR. I take it then that you are suggesting there is a formula that could be worked out with the Soviets if they want a START agreement. In other words, presumably they see a value to themselves in achieving strategic offensive reductions and not doing so to the disadvantage of their position on strategic defense.

But are you pushing for a formula of sorts that allows the strategic defense argument to continue or to resolve part of it? Can you give us any indication?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Only to say this, and I am sure you understand why I do not want to get into the intricacies of where I think we can end up with an agreement between us and the Soviets in this area, other than for me to say I think we can.

Senator LUGAR. Yes, I do.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. And indeed, I have seen some signs from them that make my judgment, perhaps to myself, vindicated, but we will see how it evolves. I do think we have indicated a willingness to provide predictability to both sides in this area of concern.

Senator LUGAR. In the timeframe of the next few months.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. You mean the agreement within the next few months?

Well, certainly it does not take time to deal with a defense in space agreement. It takes time to deal with a START agreement because of the intricacies of the verification provision.

It is interesting, the Soviets gave us a piece of paper, a proposed protocol, it was only three pages long. We put down ours a week later which was no more than three pages long. So, it is not a time element. It is a negotiating element, trying to come to an understanding as to how both of our interests can be met, permits us to do the SDI program we want to do, permits them to have the predictability that I think they are seeking, and permits both of us to go ahead with the START reductions.

I do believe, Senator, that when they say they want the START reductions, I do believe they do. I have seen enough signs of it.

What I cannot answer is why, because that is going into an area that is a mystery to me and to many others.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Glitman, I would like to pursue the issue of the political goals that will be achieved by the elimination of the INF missiles.

First of all, for the record, you ought to define a "strategic weapon." You made reference to that in the context of your discussion with Senator Helms about SS-20's and SS-25's, and I think it would be helpful if you could define that.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Thank you, Senator. It is a ground-launched missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

Senator SARBANES. And therefore, a weapon with the capacity to reach the United States.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, and that range, in effect, was calculated on the basis of a missile which could, from United

States territory, reach Soviet territory, and vice-versa. That is how it was arrived at in the SALT talks.

Senator SARBANES. So, the significance is that a strategic weapon could be used to hit Europe, but it also could be used to hit the United States. It means the United States and Europe are, in effect "in it together," because they are both exposed to a weapon that could hit either one of them; is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, very well put.

Senator SARBANES. Now, on the INF missiles whose ranges are 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers, or 600 to 3,300 miles, those could not reach the United States.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. But they obviously could reach Europe.

Ambassador GLITMAN. YES.

I would make one small exception since we did have some arguments with the Soviets as to whether they could reach Alaska, whether they could reach the Aleutians was the issue, and we did use that point and made that point. But basically they were not capable of reaching.

Senator SARBANES. So, when the Soviets deployed such weapons, they exposed Europe to a threat to which the United States was not exposed.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Exactly.

Senator SARBANES. That then created apprehension among our European allies, since we were no longer in the same box with them; is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, and add to it the fact that there was no arms control agreement that placed any limitation whatsoever on that class of systems, they were absolutely running free.

Senator SARBANES. Now, by negotiating a treaty which eliminates all of these weapons, you have removed the decoupling effect which the Soviets sought to achieve by introducing the weapons.

Is that one of the purposes?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is a very important purpose of this treaty.

Senator SARBANES. And what do you see as the treaty's political effects? What is it we and our allies achieve by removing those weapons?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The political result is that a class of weapons which have that capability, and as I said, in a sense a proven capability to intimidate, shown by the fact that it created the furor that it did, that class of weapons will be eliminated by this treaty. That should relieve for the Europeans the concern that that weapon caused and the capability the Soviets had with that weapon to create a situation where the prospect of decoupling might occur to them as being possible. We do not accept that it was possible, but they could have misled themselves into believing it was possible, with obvious consequences, if they were to try to implement it.

Senator SARBANES. Would you be more apprehensive about a situation in which the Soviets had 3,136 warheads with a yield of 1,231,300 kilotons on missiles targeted against Europe, and the Europeans and the United States together had 931 warheads with

129,550 kilotons targeted against the Soviets, then about a situation in which the missiles had been destroyed and the Soviets had 1,231,300 kilotons of nuclear material available to them in a stockpile, and the West had 129,550 kilotons of nuclear material available in a stockpile?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes, I would, for as we established this morning, the nuclear material, even the nuclear weapon devices, without the delivery systems, cannot reach their targets, and therefore, the political impact of the Soviet systems is missing if there is simply nothing left but the nuclear material that was in the missiles before they were destroyed.

Senator SARBANES. Actually, the more nuclear material they have compared to us after missiles have been destroyed, the more important it was to have eliminated the missiles. When the missiles were operational, the Soviets had the capacity to cause much greater damage than we had; is that not correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Absolutely. They had more missiles.

Senator SARBANES. So, the larger this ratio, as my colleague from Delaware has put it, of this so-called, what did we call it, nuclear materials stockpile——

Senator BIDEN. The stockpile gap.

Senator SARBANES. The larger the nuclear stockpile gap resulting from the destruction of the missiles, the more important it was to have achieved a treaty which eliminated the delivery vehicles.

Is that not correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Exactly, because that stockpile demonstrates the size of the force that we are facing. That is the proof that we are getting rid of a very large force, moreover that stockpile cannot be brought to the target by this class of missiles when they are eliminated

Senator SARBANES. And the stockpile gap represents the end of a process which involved eliminating the real weapon, the missile which could deliver the nuclear material to cause the damage.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Exactly.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am sorry that Senator Helms is not here. Perhaps he is listening because I would like to ask about a statement that he made in his opening statement this morning. He said that in the closing weeks of deliberations, almost 100 unresolved items were concluded. The United States gave up what had been considered fundamentally important issues during this period.

Now, Senator Helms communicates with about as many Kansans as I do, and I would like some help in answering this question, and if you could give us a few details on exactly what was negotiated at the end, what compromises were made, this would be helpful I think in answering a statement here which has gone unchallenged.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Thank you very much for this opportunity, Senator Kassebaum.

First of all, we did prepare a checklist of brackets. What we mean by brackets are areas in the treaty where the sides had not yet reached agreement. And every place that there was such an area we had a bracket, and we made a checklist so as to be certain not to forget anything.

And it turned out to be, I think, about 90 at one point, 97 or so. But bear in mind that many of them were duplicates. The same problem—and I will discuss one in particular in a moment, the question of the stages—created brackets throughout the treaty so that if you stripped away the repetition of the brackets, you came out with a much smaller number.

So, the checklist was simply there so that we would not forget something. Thus when you reached an agreement on one issue, you might end up removing a whole host of brackets with it. So, I hope I am clear on that; you really did not have 100 problems, you just had 100 brackets that we had to deal with.

Second, I think it is vitally important to understand that most of the treaty, a great majority of it was completed before the end. As I pointed out earlier, the basic principles that we had to achieve were achieved. So, what we were dealing with was implementing some of the final points that had been agreed to, some of those, for example, during the meeting with Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze in Geneva in late November. And that meeting in itself, if one looks at it in retrospect, while we believe it was important, and it was a very important meeting to get through some of these problems, and it did so successfully, the kind of issues that were left at that point were not the big questions of whether you include British and French systems or whether we end up with equality or whether it is global or not, all that had been decided.

So, what were we dealing with? Much of the time was taken up with the question of stages, and the problem here was that the Soviets argued that their missiles were constructed and left the factory as a single unit, and that therefore, the sort of things that we should be inspecting for, in the field, was the full missile, whereas in our case, since our Pershing missiles are capable of being shipped by stages, first stage, second stage, front ends, they wanted to inspect for objects the size of the smallest of those stages.

Now, in fact, the way the treaty is written, we are not obliged to look for only SS-20's in SS-20 bases. We can in fact look for a smaller Soviet missile, the smallest one, for that matter, if we want to, a Cruise missile or the SS-23, and objects that are capable of containing a missile of that size.

But we felt that we needed more reciprocity, and in the sort of simple way that I try to look at things, it was a question of who gets to poke around in what. And what we were arguing about up until very near the end was just that point. They were saying, "Well, we want to be able to look for your small second stage of the Pershing," for example, and you can see the dimensions in the memorandum of understanding, and you can only look for the large SS-20.

Now, as I pointed out a moment ago, we could have looked for something smaller than the SS-20, but we felt that as long as they were able to inspect for the stages of our missile, we ought to be able to inspect for something as small as the smallest stage of one of their missiles; whether that missile is capable of being shipped in stages or not was not relevant. The fact is, as we pointed out to them, that in the MOU, they specify that they have stages, and they give their dimensions and their weight. Therefore they must exist.

We spent a long time on this issue. And in the end, it came out the way we wanted it to, and the treaty will now permit us to inspect for an object the size of the smallest stage of a Soviet missile. It is not as small as one of our smallest stages, but it is smaller than their full up round, so to speak, their full up missile.

Now, I give you this very detailed point to show you the type of thing that we were arguing about at the end.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I appreciate that, because I think it is useful.

Ambassador GLITMAN. And see how detailed it is.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. May I add a word there, Senator?

I was in Washington during those last few weeks while Ambassador Glitman was working those issues out, and we would get cables, one, two a day, and I obviously would want to know what is happening in these areas, and I was impressed, frankly, with—each time I would look at the cable I would say, "Well, but that was the way we wanted it, that is the way it came out." And constantly we were winning these points rather than losing these points in the last few weeks. But that is what impressed me during the course of those negotiations.

I would like to add one other comment to build on what Ambassador Glitman said. At the outset of a negotiation, you do keep your eye on the very important issues. They become very important, and you think about other issues as being less important. But obviously, as you solve the important ones, the lesser important ones take on a greater importance. And the more you solve, the greater importance is attached to even issues you originally considered to be quite minor. And I think we should keep that in mind, too.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is exactly what I was trying to say by the illustration. There is human nature at work here, as Ambassador Kampelman pointed out.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, you have done a very thorough job laying out in testimony both today, and Secretary Shultz yesterday, the larger issue. I think, again, when a statement like this is made, as detailed as your description may be, it is useful to know exactly what type of issues you were dealing with.

Ambassador GLITMAN. May I give you another example? I would be happy to.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Please.

Ambassador GLITMAN. One of the issues we ran into was that at the ministerial meeting in November in Geneva, the Soviets agreed to permit us to open the canisters in which the SS-25's are contained when they leave that factory at Votkinsk where we will have this permanent monitoring. When we got further, after the ministers left, of course, some of us were still there in Geneva, and we were there to get this written up in treaty language, and they tried to walk that back. They tried to argue that rather than having a random selection, that only the 30th missile that comes out of the factory could be opened, and we pointed out that was never agreed to during the ministerial meeting. I had personally discussed that issue with Marshal Akhromeyev, who was on the

Soviet side of the table at this point, and I had said to him that "We will need to discuss the quota number."

We had had side discussions of experts on the Soviet side and ours making the same point. But when we started to negotiate after the ministers left, they reopened this issue and tried to argue that it was 1 out of 30 and not a random selection.

Well, we finally agreed on eight. We started with, I think, 12, and then they said, "Well, 4 or 5," and finally we agreed on 8. And from what I understand, it will give us a very good sampling of that.

One more example. At the ministerial meeting, we agreed that there would be two production facilities, one on each side, of missiles, subject to this full time monitoring. The Soviets tried to restrict the number of launcher production facilities to two, one on each side, and we pointed out that the launcher production facilities were in fact subjected to interior onsite inspection already in the treaty. We thought that was agreed.

After the ministers left, the Soviets tried to change that and tried to argue that, no there are only two launcher production facilities—they had mentioned two specific ones at the ministerial—and those were the only two that would be subject to inspection. And here again, we insisted that that was not the correct interpretation, and they eventually agreed with us.

So, you will find that there is onsite inspection of the Soviet launcher production facilities as well as ours. But that was another example of the kind of problem that we had to resolve at the end.

Senator Kassebaum. My time is up. I wonder if I could just add——

Senator Biden [presiding]. Not as far as I am concerned, and I am sure Senator McConnell will not mind. I love doing this when the chairman is not here, run it like the Judiciary Committee.

Keep going, Nancy. You are doing fine.

Senator Kassebaum. Back to the Verification Commission again, because we were talking in the broader scope about verification, but I am still puzzled.

For instance, on implementation, if you have someone, an inspector, one of our people who believes that in their interpretation they should be allowed to get into an inspection facility and the Soviets say "No, that is not how they interpret it," is this something that goes to the risk reduction center first?

How is that handled?

Ambassador Glitman. The risk reduction center would not handle that sort of thing. What it would do would be—it is the place where—for example, let us take that inspection you were just talking about. We would notify the Soviets through the risk reduction center a certain time in advance that we are going to arrive at a point of entry—and there are two of them in the Soviet Union, Moscow and Irkutsk.

And we would tell them that in *x* number of hours we will arrive at Irkutsk. That transmission would be accomplished through the risk reduction center. Those American inspectors would arrive, let us say, at Irkutsk and say that they want to go to the base at Drovenaya, which is the easternmost base, to inspect.

They would not tell the Soviets they were going to Drovenaya until they were ready. They have a certain amount of time, and then they would tell the Soviets, and then they would have to be brought there within a maximum of 9 hours.

So, that is very short notice. Effectively, they have only got 9 hours to get us there. And by the way, we choose which 9 hours and which day. So, all of that is in our hands to do.

Let us say we get there and the inspectors arrive at the gate and somebody says: "We are not going to let you in." Now, that is a violation of the treaty right there, and there would be some sort of discussion, obviously, at the gate. I am just giving you a hypothetical as an example.

That kind of situation would eventually find its way to the Commission if it were not resolved right there on the spot. And the way that would happen is that our inspectors would write out a report, submit it to both sides, which is called for by the treaty, and that report would say that, the Soviets did not permit us to enter into this particular base, or maybe even a part of the base, which according to the treaty they have to let us into certain sections. They barred our way into a particular facility inside the base. That too would be part of the report.

And if we were not satisfied with the arguments that they gave, we would be able to take it up. They would be in violation, and the place that we would discuss that would be in that commission. We would call a meeting of that Commission and say, "What happened, and ask for an explanation."

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. The Soviet SS-12's and SS-23's are types of shorter range missiles that are covered by the treaty; is that correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MCCONNELL. Do they have missiles deployed or in the development stage that are capable of that same range, but are not listed in the treaty?

Ambassador GLITMAN. They should not have any. I do not know the answer to that question. I do not believe so. I am not aware of any new missiles in the shorter range—that is, 500- to 1,000-kilometer range—that the Soviets are working on.

Senator MCCONNELL. Would the discussions have required them to declare those kinds of missiles had they had them?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes. If those missiles had been worked through the testing stage at least, they would have had to tell us that. If they are on the drawing boards, we cannot peer into their factories, but if they have taken them out and tested them, at a minimum we would have to know that.

In any case, they cannot produce or flight test such missiles once the treaty enters into force.

Senator MCCONNELL. In a 1986 unclassified publication on Soviet R&D, and defense procurement, the CIA claims the Soviets always are developing follow-ons to existing systems. It is my understanding there is probaby a follow-on to the SS-23, possibly with a range capability currently under the treaty minimum.

If that is true, would that be cowered by the treaty?

Ambassador GLITMAN. If they do not test that missile beyond 500 kilometers, it would not be covered by the treaty. If they test that missile beyond 500 kilometers—well, they cannot.

The mere fact that they test it beyond 500 kilometers means that that missile is in violation. Now, if they had something that happened to go 500, that is just too bad, even if it was not meant to.

Senator MCCONNELL. You do not have any doubt that if they tested it beyond 500 we would pick that up?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I believe that could be determined.

Senator MCCONNELL. Article 11, section 3, requires inspections to verify initial data be complete within 90 days. Will we be ready within 90 days to carry out those inspections? Is that something we can handle?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is an important point, and indeed we are working now to assure that we will be able to carry out those inspections. We are in the process of identifying people to do this activity, setting up training programs for them, and ensuring that our roster of inspectors will be ready to hand over to the Soviets as quickly as possible.

Senator MCCONNELL. How would that be handled? How many people would be involved? Who would be in charge?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The numbers are set out in the treaty, in the documents. There are 200 on either side, inspectors for short-notice inspections, the baseline inspections, all those sort of things; another 200 inspectors who will be assigned to the monitoring—that is a permanent presence at Votkinsk for us—and then 200 aircrew.

We will be giving them a list of 600 names split into those three categories. I believe that this is being worked largely out of the Defense Department.

Senator MCCONNELL. What happens if the inspection is not carried out or not allowed to be completed?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, the treaty specifies that it has to be allowed to be completed. The only exceptions that are made for even getting there on time is force majeure, and that essentially means if you run into a snowstorm and the airport is closed, you cannot take off.

But then that does not count as an inspection. You have a quota of inspections, and if that sort of situation arises, well, you do not carry out that inspection because there is obviously a safety problem involved here. But it does not count as if you had carried it out.

But basically the treaty requires that there be these inspections. We spoke a little while ago about the any time, any place, and I noted that one of the problems with that is that if you go to that you may have to have a right of refusal, in other words for someone to say you cannot go to this place or that place.

In this treaty there is no right of refusal. We may not have any time, any place, but every place we have got you cannot refuse an inspection. There is no way to say, "Do not come in," without violating the treaty.

Senator MCCONNELL. Would this kind of inspection be applicable to suspect facilities?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, it is applicable to those facilities that have been declared in the MOU. For example, you can go to formerly declared facilities. The one exception is a production facility, missile production facility.

As I pointed out to Senator Kassebaum, we will go into launcher production facilities. Missile production facilities, because both sides have reasons for not wanting them open to inspection, we kept off the list. But there is no right of refusal in this treaty.

Senator MCCONNELL. Does the treaty permit the Soviets to claim bases or facilities have been eliminated prior to entry into the treaty and exempt them in any way from inspection?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The only thing that that would accomplish is that we would only have the baseline inspection and not the closeout inspection. Having said that, let me now explain.

When the treaty enters into force, the sides will have a new exchange of data and, unlike the data in the MOU, this updated data, which will be handled through the NRRC—the nuclear risk reduction center is going to be the channel for providing that data—will be subject to onsite inspection.

We will be able to go to every facility, the exception being inside a missile production facility, and in effect take an inventory count onsite of every Soviet missile and launcher support structure and support equipment, covered by this treaty.

We will be able to go there and look at it and in effect we will get an inventory count. We are going to have to do that, as you pointed out, within a certain timeframe. And we have arrangements within the treaty to permit us to cover them.

That is the baseline inspection. Let us take the example you gave us. Let us say that they took a storage depot and they said it is no longer operational. We could go to that storage facility depot and we would determine then and there that it was no longer operational.

That means that it would not be subject to what we call closeout inspection because it had already been closed out. If they had not declared it as no longer operational, not only would we see it at the baseline, we would also see it when they closed it out.

Finally, even if they were to say, "OK, we have eliminated this facility at this juncture, you do not have to have the closeout inspection." The baseline inspection will serve both purposes. We still would have a right for the entire life of the treaty verification regime to go back to that place on very short notice and inspect it onsite.

Senator MCCONNELL. Ambassador Kampelman said several times that we have the parameters of an agreement on START, but that the big stumbling block remaining is verification.

You may not be able to answer this, but what more would you need to be able to go beyond what you have been outlining in the verification area for the INF Treaty. How far beyond that do you need to go to satisfy the verification requirements that we would certainly want to satisfy for START?

Are all of these principles just as applicable, and what additional principles are there that you can sort of rattle off off the top of your head that are applicable to START, that aren't applicable to INF?

Ambassador GLITMAN. One example is the perimeter portal monitoring. Under the INF Treaty, as I pointed out, we had been prepared to drop it, until this SS-25 issue came up in the light of the zero. But only in the light of zero, were we prepared to drop it.

Under START, where there will be no zero, we are going to have to have perimeter portal monitoring, and not just around production facilities. We may want it around the storage facilities, etc.

So, there is an example of how we will have to do more in the START area.

Senator MCCONNELL. Do you have any idea how many production facilities they have for the long-range missiles?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The Soviets have several production facilities for long-range missiles. We can provide a specific number in a classified form.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McConnell.

Ambassador Kampelman, I mentioned it to the Secretary while he was here yesterday, this request of mine from a couple of months ago when I wrote to the Secretary:

> The committee's consideration of the negotiating record of the treaty will be of central importance. Accordingly, I would ask that you direct the legal advisor to prepare, in consultation and coordination with the legal counselors to the Department of Defense, CIA, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a legal analysis covering the full scope and precise content of all obligations undertaken by each party to the treaty, the protocols on inspection and elimination, and the memorandum of understanding on data exchange.
>
> This analysis should be based on a thorough review of all treaty documents, including instructions, minutes of the negotiations or records kept by the U.S. side, and exchanges of notes with nations affected by the treaty.

The letter goes on to say that:

> It should be understood and explicitly stated that the documents provided for the review constitute a full and comprehensive record of the negotiations and obligations undertaken in the treaty and that documents not provided have no legal relevance to the obligations imposed by the treaty and its related documents.

At this point I would ask unanimous consent that the full letter be inserted in the record, without objection.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. I would ask what progress is being made on giving me a reply. I know that you have been burdened with this task, and it is almost 2 months. November 30 is when I wrote the letter.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. This work has been underway. As a matter of fact, the negotiating record is compiled and we are waiting to turn it all over.

We have provided the negotiating record of the INF Treaty to the Senate pursuant to the requests of several Senators. We have also provided a detailed article-by-article analysis of the legal obligations in the Treaty. We are preparing responses to your requests and the requests of others for additional information on the Treaty's legal effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the intent of the administration to give me a specific reply along these lines?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be forthcoming?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. In fact, most of it is prepared. We did it on a section-by-section basis, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but that is not quite the same thing. What I am talking about is an analysis of the negotiating record, not in a large section-by-section analysis. There is a difference.

I think you are talking about a section-by-section analysis. That is not what is asked for here. It is in addition to, but it should include, the examination of the negotiating record, so that 10 years down the pike another time, another Foreign Relations Committee, another administration, is not faced with the problems which arose with the ABM Treaty.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. You will get, Senator, a response to your letter. I realize the difference that you have pointed out and I understand you want more than a section-by-section analysis, though we have provided a section-by-section analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be great. But to be specific and upfront, this is so we do not have another ABM negotiating record brouhaha 10, 20 years from now, when you and I are no longer on the scene.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I also want to say that in order to meet that problem we are attempting to have our witnesses before you speak authoritatively when they are authorized to do so and when they are not authorized to speak authoritatively to make that clear to the committee, so that there is no ambiguity later as to whether an authoritative witness spoke or somebody spoke on an issue that was not authoritative.

That was one of the reasons why I was not answering specifically some of the military questions that Senator Kerry asked earlier today, because I did not feel that my response could be an authoritative response in that area.

But we do understand your request. We have it. It is being worked on.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you can see the urgency of it and the possible alternative, the necessity for me to go through the negotiating record, which I understand is several truckloads of documents.

Thank you very much indeed. I have no further questions at this time.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I have been very interested in some of the comments of Senators, one or two, not more than that, implying, if not stating directly, that there is something destructive about raising questions about this treaty. You do not think it is destructive, do you?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, I have told you that I feel your questions are well thought out, they are of concern to you, and they deserve a response from us.

Senator HELMS. I thank you, sir.

Then another Senator said something, and I am sure he is just as worthy as he says he is, that he wanted to be positive, he did not want to be negative. Well, I think it is kind of positive to want to be sure that the American people are being protected and that the Soviet Union is not allowed to get more of an advantage than it has now.

In any case, there appears to be a general agreement, both on the committee and by the negotiators, that the Soviets retain the indisputed use of their SS-25 missiles. There appears to be a general recognition that these missiles have both an INF capability as well as the traditional ICBM capability.

You would agree with that, would you not? I think we have covered that.

Ambassador GLITMAN. We have covered that, Senator.

Senator HELMS. So, here is the problem that I have, and it is an honest problem. If I could be proved wrong, fine. Under the terms of the treaty the United States on the one hand does not have even one alternative ground-launched missile of intermediate range capability remaining in Europe under this treaty, correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator HELMS. So, I am just a country boy from North Carolina, but I think I can see a one-way street when I see one, and I think I can know one when I see one. The United States under this treaty would give up all of its intermediate-range missile capability in Europe, but the Soviets get to keep some of theirs.

And by the way, did you bring those charts down?

[The chart referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator HELMS. I want to get back to this fissionable material and guidance system and so forth. Here is what I was talking about a while ago, the ratio of nuclear warheads preserved by the INF Treaty: the Soviets, 3,136; the United States, 931; 3.4-to-1.

And somebody said a while ago that was good. I do not think it is so good, because these components, this fissionable material, can be used and I am sure will be used on the SS-25. It is awfully expensive stuff, and you do not go into a hardware store and buy it.

So, I am saying that this gives the Soviets a great advantage, particularly in light of the question I just asked you about the SS-25 being either, having the short range or the long range.

Now, the explosion power preserved by the INF Treaty: the Soviets, 1,231,300; the United States, 129,550; about a 12-to-1 ratio in the Soviets' favor.

Under the treaty, will there be any U.S. intermediate-range missiles remaining in Europe after the treaty is ratified and after the period of implementation to counter the SS-25's?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Senator, there will be no United States nor any Soviet intermediate-range missiles left. The Soviet Union will have SS-25's in Europe.

Senator HELMS. Which has the capability of a short range?

Ambassador GLITMAN. So does the SS-18 or the SS-17. Any ICBM has the capability of targeting the same target as an intermediate-range.

Senator HELMS. But we have none?

Ambassador GLITMAN. What it lacks—we will not have any intermediate range.

Senator HELMS. See what I mean?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Senator, the point is that we will have strategic weapons. Both sides will retain strategic weapons. The fact that they have weapons in Europe is a geographic reality because they are in Europe. But what they will not have is an INF force capable of threatening our allies with the effort to suggest that it is capable of reaching them but not us, and therefore that it would decouple.

That is what we were aiming at here and that is what we have achieved.

Ambassador **KAMPELMAN**. Senator, I am sure that you understand that just as they can retarget their 25's just as you suggest, so can we retarget our strategic weapons, our strategic forces.

Senator **HELMS**. Where are they?

Ambassador **KAMPELMAN**. We have them on submarines, we have them——

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. What matters is not where they are, but what they can hit. And our strategic weapons can reach the Soviet Union.

Senator **HELMS**. Well the SS-25, I believe you said it was a single warhead vehicle, is that right?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. A single-warhead missile; that is correct, Senator.

Senator **HELMS**. All of them?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. My understanding is that they have tested that. That is again maybe an intelligence point that I am not familiar with. And if that is the case, we can discuss it in closed session.

Senator **HELMS**. I do not want to put you on the spot. Because you have got to carry so much information in your head to be a witness that I do not want to budget you about it. Go ahead.

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. I just wanted to say that among the pieces of information that I did not have when you asked me what was the most expensive part of that front end and I told you I did not know and you said "Yes, you do." In fact I didn't. And if I did know I would have told you Senator. I just did not want to mislead you.

Senator **HELMS**. I will withdraw that comment. I just think that it is obvious.

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That would have been my guess but as Ambassador Kampelman has pointed out, we want to be authoritative. We do not want to take guesses here.

Senator **HELMS**. We might look into it just for the fun of it.

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. Estimating the cost of any item is inherently difficult, even in a benign environment. As a general rule for U.S. INF missiles, we would expect the nuclear component to be the most expensive part of the "front end."

Senator **HELMS**. I meant no offense about it. I think you know that.

Do we know whether the Soviets have developed or are in the process of developing multiple warhead capability for a new and improved SS-25?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. Again, I think that is something that would have to be covered in closed session, Senator.

Senator **HELMS**. I agree with you. So, I will not pursue that. The SS-20 was deployed when, 1977, something like that?

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. We first, as I pointed out became aware of it in 1976. It did not actually get deployed until later.

Senator **HELMS**. Then NATO came up with the dual track strategy.

Ambassador **GLITMAN**. That is correct.

Senator **HELMS**. What are the military capabilities of the SS-20 which made it so threatening to Western Europe?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Basically its range, its mobility, the fact that it was solid fueled all put it in a somewhat different we believe, different category than the existing SS-4's and SS-5's which were liquid fueled, not nearly as accurate, single warheads. The SS-20 had three warheads. The 4's did not have the range of the 20. The 5's did, but there was a much, much smaller force of 5's than there was SS-4's.

Senator **Helms**. It was more accurate than its predecessors too.

Ambassador **Glitman**. I did say that, yes it was more accurate.

Senator **Helms**. Article 6, paragraph 2 of the treaty permits the Soviets to produce a type of missile, and I quote, "which uses a stage outwardly similar to but not interchangeable with" a stage of a missile covered under this treaty. Now this paragraph I believe refers to the SS-25; is that right?

Ambassador **Glitman**. That is correct, Senator.

Senator **Helms**. It is very similar to the SS-20. So clear it up for me. The SS-25 is just an updated version of the SS-20, would that be a fair assessment?

Ambassador **Glitman**. I would not say so, Senator. In the sense that it has an additional stage and it is an ICBM and it has a single warhead. So, it is not really an updated version. But it uses an outwardly similar stage the Soviets admitted to that came out during the negotiations.

As I was pointing out earlier, we had a discussion on stages and we concluded from the way they were arguing that there was a problem here. And we got them to acknowledge it.

Now if you do not mind I will use up my time, I hope not yours, Senator, but one of the problems that we also ran into was that our Cruise missile, ground-launched and our sea-launched Cruise missiles are not only outwardly similar, they for all practical purposes are identical.

We argued long and hard that there was no relationship there, and I do not believe there is between the GLCM and SLCM, because the infrastructure is totally different. But the Soviets argued that in fact, they had a problem there. They wanted to put restrictions on our sea-launched Cruise missiles and we refused to do that.

We did not hide from them that they were identical, the same canister, the same shipping container. But we did not let them stop our Cruise missile SLCM program under this treaty though they tried very hard to do so. So, we did stop that. But what we did find out was that they had this problem with the SS-25. Now the result of that is this clause.

They told us that we could in fact carry out this inspection in monitoring it and we are going to do so. But that missile does have an outwardly similar first stage to the first stage of the 20.

They will not be able to produce another outwardly similar stage, and as a result of that, they will not be able to produce the 20. The treaty is not aimed surreptitiously under this guise, the treaty is not aimed at stopping the 25. You and I may agree in fact on whether the 25 was a violation of the SALT Treaty. But this treaty is not aimed at stopping that. It is aimed at stopping the production of the 20.

So, what we are doing via this paragraph is assuring ourselves that SS-20's are not coming out of that factory at Votkinsk. And to do that we have gotten them to let us look at the SS-25's.

Senator HELMS. So, it is just an unfortunate circumstance that the SS-25 can do the work of the SS-20 short range and also become an ICBM? That is one of the things that bothers me.

The red light has been up and I apologize for going over.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment about this exchange? I would like, Senator, for you to consider the following two points that I would like to make to you for your consideration.

With respect to one of the charts that you put up, the implication of that chart is that the INF Treaty is preserving more warheads than is preserved for us. Whereas as a practical matter, that is not so. People will come to the conclusion that is not warranted by the facts.

What it is preserving is the nuclear device and guidance systems. It is not preserving the total warhead. Every warhead will be partially demolished and destroyed. I just think that for the sake of letting people understand what the realities are that is maybe an oversimplified headline.

And the second point I would like you to consider is that given the disparity, using your figures, Senator, of the 1.2 versus the 129,550, which is let's say 12-to-1, but given the disparity, would not you rather have that fissionable material in a stockpile someplace, because the fissionable material is there, rather than in missiles that can destroy?

This really means that what we have done is come up with an agreement that will in effect remove 1,231,300 kilotons from being able to hit targets, whereas we are only removing 129,550 kilotons from being able to hit the targets. And I would like you to consider that ingredient.

Senator HELMS. He is asking me a question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. I suggest we yield, that we yield as much time as the Senator needs.

Senator HELMS. I do not want to intrude, but he asked a question.

Senator BIDEN. Please go.

Senator HELMS. Max, that depends. You are not destroying the fissionable material. We have all agreed to that. And it is right there for the Soviets to convert along with the guidance systems and all that and plunk it in that SS-25. That is my problem. And we are getting out entirely, see.

Now they have got this huge inventory, I think Joe Biden said it or somebody else, of fissionable material, staff hands me all this information. I cannot read this fast, and I think I will have to wait and digest this.

But the point is that you are really not doing anything, I am afraid, I hope I am wrong, except letting the Soviets advance their technology with the SS-25 and providing them with a tremendous inventory of the things that you kill people with. That is my answer to that.

I hope I am wrong and I hope you are right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think that Senator Helms is, if you will excuse my saying it Senator, is on to a clear concern and potential shortcoming in this treaty. But I think for the wrong reason.

The Senator is worried about the stockpiling of fissionable material that has potential application on other missiles. What I think the Senator is really saying is that unless there is another agreement somewhere along the line, the end result of the INF Treaty will be that the Soviets will have been able to maintain a military capability unencumbered by this agreement and we will have lost a military capability.

Militarily now we have land-based systems that can strike Soviet territory from Europe. We are giving that up.

That is why I think, and I know you are going to shudder when I say this, you are making the strongest argument that can be made for the need to have an agreement that would bind both sides by the SALT II limitations on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Because the SS-25 is a single-warhead missile, the only way the SS-25, which you are understandably preoccupied with, can benefit from this fissionable material that is going to be in the stockpile is if they build new ones. They are not going to add additional warheads on the 25. They will build new SS-25's with this material. They will need a lot of other things to get there, and I admit gentlemen it is a real stretch to get there and it is a big undertaking, but the only reasonable connection between a stockpiling of fissionable material, SS-25's and European vulnerability is in the context of no SALT-like limitations.

Right now, the Soviets have 2,504 to 2,540 strategic nuclear delivery systems depending on whose number you accept. A portion of those are SS-25 single-warhead missiles.

So, that is why ironically you and I are in agreement on the need for something to be done. However, the solution you are suggesting seems very counterproductive to me. You are suggesting that the answer is to let the Soviets keep this destructive power on SS-20's and that we keep our destructive power on our Pershing II's and ground-launched Cruise missiles.

But the Soviets have an overwhelming advantage in ratios in terms of destructive capability in this realm. What I am suggesting is that both sides destroy their medium-range missiles and set a limit in the interim while we are negotiating the START agreement on the very system you are worried about—the SS-25.

For if we had such an agreement, which said you could not add any new missiles to the total inventory, then in fact you would not have anything to worry about with respect to the stockpile of fissionable material. All the Soviets could do unless they were to violate the treaty would be to keep it in a room on their territory, and if it were to blow up, it would kill them.

That is the only thing it could do. So, that is why I think you make such a compelling case for my position. And I know that probably bothers you a great deal and you probably disagree with it.

Senator HELMS. I am just astounded. What is your position?

Senator BIDEN. My position is that INF is a great idea. It is even better if in the meantime, while one of our most capable negotiators in history is negotiating the START agreement, that the administration would see the wisdom of not allowing the Soviets to have anymore SS–25's for example. Not just 25's, but not anymore 19's or anymore anythings. We know now and we can verify now how many of those total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles they have.

They could, under the regime I am suggesting, dismantle an SS–18 or an SS–19, or another missile and build an SS–25. But the point is that the aggregate number could not go up. Practically speaking I cannot imagine them trading an 18 for a 25.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, may I make a comment about that?

Senator BIDEN. Please do.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. You had a good discussion with the Secretary about that and you and I had a good exchange about it this morning. And where did it come to; we came to in a sense a unilateral statement by the President with respect to what the United States would do.

Senator BIDEN. Max, let me stop you right there because I know what you are going to say. What is the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that the United States has?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. What is the number, I want to turn to the experts here. Anybody?

Senator BIDEN. Don't we have slightly over 1,900?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I do not have an exact number.

Senator BIDEN. And the Soviets have slightly over 2,500. Now let me make this point. The President said, and then you can answer because you are so good at this, the United States will in fact be restrained by only building up to the number that the Soviet Union has.

So, under the President's proposal when he rejected SALT, he was saying that the Soviets have 2,504 or 2,544 or 2,540. The number is arguable because of the dispute over bombers. I will not get into that. The United States has 1,950, and for the sake of discussion we will be generous and say the Soviets have 2,550. It is really 2,240.

Now what the President is saying is, if the Soviets maintain their levels at 2,540 the United States will not build up any higher than 2,540. So, the United States reserves the right to increase its nuclear delivery vehicles by roughly 500 to 600. And the Soviets will stay at their current level of 2,550.

What I am saying to you is that the best bargain to come along would be to say we have 1,950 SNDV's and you have 2,500-plus. We just signed an INF agreement, so let's make a deal. While Ambassador Kampelman is negotiating the START agreement, which would be the most significant arms control agreement in the history of man if it is ratified, we want to agree that we will both stay at the existing limits on SNDV's.

No one ever argues that the Soviets violated the aggregate number established in SALT II except possibly what I consider an esoteric argument on bombers.

So, if you do not agree to some sort of interim restraint then the Soviets can do exactly what the Senator from North Carolina is worried about. Now I will stop.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I wanted to point out to you, as I was continuing to develop the point that I was setting down what the President has said about a form of U.S. restraint although you may not agree with the terminology.

Senator **Biden**. Did I accurately describe the President's position?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I think you did, yes, but I also want to point out to you that while that is taking place, without any agreement as the Secretary pointed out yesterday, the Soviets are destroying their 11's each time they deploy the 25's.

Senator **Biden**. Agreed.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. In other words, they are destroying the old launchers as new ones are being introduced.

Senator **Biden**. Agreed. In effect they are abiding by it. What I am worried about Max is that when I was in Moscow the Soviets told me that they planned to continue to abide by it. But what I am worried about is, and I do not understand what the big problem is, if it takes 2 or 6 years instead of 2 months to get a START agreement, if Gorbachev passes away, if policy changes, if the climate changes, then they can without any restraint other than their good will change their mind.

They can go ahead and build up if they want to. It seems to me since they have already agreed in principle to stay at that number, it would be a useful thing and would not require any major new negotiation to say let's have an understanding that you will stay at that number.

Ambassador **Glitman**. If I may, Senator, it does seem to me that this issue should be divorced from INF though. I think you can.

Senator **Biden**. How do you solve the Senator's problem?

Ambassador **Glitman**. I am going to try to. Because it seems to me that what we have to keep our eye on is what the INF Treaty is supposed to accomplish. And it does that. We may dispute a little further and discuss a little further what happens to that nuclear warhead device, the nuclear material, but it will eliminate the missile systems that we are dealing with here.

Why is that significant, there are military reasons, sure. But there were far more, in my view far more important political reasons for that missile.

Senator **Biden**. I do not disagree with that.

Ambassador **Glitman**. And the reason that that missile, the 20 in particular, it applies to the others as well, but specifically the 20, especially the 20, was a problem for us and more so for our allies who by the way, seemed to like getting rid of them, was because it was different in one important respect from the SS-25 or the SS-18 or the rest of the strategic missiles.

Senator **Biden**. But not the SS-4's and SS-5's it was not any different in terms of what it could do. It was more accurate, it was heavier.

Ambassador **Glitman**. But the point is that class of missiles is going. And what distinguished that class of missiles was that it could not, "not reach the United States, but only our allies," and therefore it was decoupling.

The fact that they were to produce more strategic weapons will not impact in that way. We set out to achieve what NATO was concerned about, and it will have been taken care of.

Senator BIDEN. Let me get to the end of my position, which is this. I believe this treaty is worthy of being passed all by itself without any change in any way. I believe it is better if it had this constraint to which I refer, and I was, as you were, around in 1977 when former West German Chanceller Helmet Schmidt went to the International Institute of Strategic Studies and made his famous speech.

I was with President Carter—and you will remember this Max—when in fact the argument was made by our military that we really do not need to deploy in Pershings. We have got it covered. But we better do it for political reasons. A few argued as to the military utility.

But all of that discussion took place in the context of SALT. The dual-track decision was taken at the time that SALT II was presumed by the Europeans to be a fait accompli. And it was signed onto by us at a time when SALT was viewed as an integral part of this mosaic of arms control.

So, we said we have got SALT II here and we are going to pass it, we thought. Little did we know how powerful the Senator from North Carolina was going to be, and others.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Or Afghanistan.

Senator BIDEN. Or a lot of other things.

So, at the same time we are including those in a subcommittee on NATO that I chaired said we must deploy. I was a strong supporter of deployment and continued to be all the way through. Everybody said it.

I agreed that the way to get the Soviets to get those missiles out was for us to say if you do not, remove yours we will display ours. But then all of a sudden we all forgot about SALT II. SALT was the context in which this agreement was made. I do not want to beat it to death. I just want you to consider, trying to get the administration to slide a little letter under the door or over the transom stating that we are not going to go above the limits, which the Soviets say that they are willing to agree to.

I believe it would be a great addition, and, quite frankly. It would clear away what I think is going to be a mild stumbling block. I do not think it is going to block this treaty, and I think it would be of little cost to implement my proposal but that is something you negotiators know better than I.

I have made my point. As a matter of fact, I have overstated my point probably, but I think it is an important one for both substantive reasons and, quite frankly, political reasons in this body.

I appreciate my colleague yielding. I have more questions.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I hope it will not be considered rude. I have been asked to attend a meeting at the White House at 5 to report on these 2 days. How would it be if I left Ambassador Glitman here, who is perfectly equipped to deal—of course, obviously he is more equipped than I—with all of your questions, and he and I will talk about this later.

Senator Dodd, I hope this does not offend you.

Senator DODD. Are you going to be with us tomorrow?

Senator BIDEN. We will call you at home.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. No, but I could return.

Senator **Biden**. If I could ask my colleagues one further indulgence, there was one point I think should be clarified, and it was raised in an exchange between Senator Dodd and Ambassador Kampelman. It related to the whole notion of new technologies, technologies based on other physical principles in the ABM Treaty.

I really think you misrepresented, unintentionally, their effect. Article 3 sets out what you can have under the ABM Treaty. It says land-based defensive systems and sets where they can be. And then the Agreed Statement D, which is an add-on, refers back to article 3, and the new technologies. It says there can be new technologies that can be developed and tested for those land-based systems that we have agreed are allowed.

But even there you cannot deploy them until you sit down with the Soviets or they sit down with us and say "Let us agree whether or not we can deploy this new technology as it relates to article 3, which specifies land-based systems."

So, I guess the only point I want to make is I believe that Agreed Statement D is constraining, not permissive.

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Well, we have, as you know, a difference of opinion on the interpretation of this question. I referred to Agreed Statement D only in response to Senator Dodd's question as to whether there was not a reference in the treaty to other physical principles, and that is where the reference is, and I did give you my own interpretation of Agreed Statement D.

I think we both agree that there is ambiguity, regrettably, as we all found. Regrettably, I think there is ambiguity in this provision and, building on that, we were saying we are trying to avoid the ambiguities in the INF Treaty. But I do understand the other view with respect to Agreed Statement D because I have gone into it carefully.

The **Chairman**. I appreciate very much your being with us, Ambassador Kampelman. I would like to also add here that in connection with the document you are sending me in answer to our request, there should be a direct correlation between the negotiating record and the enlarged statement that you are sending, and that is what I am driving at here.

Senator **Dodd**. Max, I am just going to ask about that article 14. I presume that is something that can be handled by Ambassador Glitman. Thank you.

I actually just have one question, and I will terminate with that. I understand Senator Kassebaum earlier raised the issue of the desirability of attaching a condition or a reservation for the withdrawal from the treaty in case of a Soviet violation. In fact, I think it was you, Ambassador Glitman, if my notes from my staff are correct, who brought up the general withdrawal clause in the treaty, article 14.

My question is, in response to the possibility of such a reservation being offered, Is there not a standing provision of international law with regard to treaties that would allow either party to a treaty to declare a treaty to be null and void should there be a substantial—I do not know what the words are specifically—violation where you could declare that without having to wait 6 months, as article 14 says?

Doesn't international law allow that for one or the other parties? Now, granted, there may be a dispute about it, but nonetheless one or the other party could in fact declare the treaty null and void without waiting for the 6-month period.

Ambassador GLITMAN. I am told that that could be done. If there were a material breach of that sort, you could do so. But, of course, this article does provide the standard way in which such a situation would be taken care of. But you are correct.

Senator DODD. But in the absence of that there is a means by which the United States could withdraw or declare the treaty to be null and void without having to rely upon article 14.

Ambassador GLITMAN. That is my understanding.

Senator DODD. I just want to get it even clearer than that. The best way to do it, maybe, is——

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. As Ambassador Glitman stated at the hearings, under generally recognized principles of international law, a material breach by one of the Parties to a bilateral Treaty entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the Treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.

Senator DODD. And I am not sure of the answer. I am raising it as a question. I presume that will be one of the reservations that may be offered—maybe not a reservation that you would have any objection to—but nonetheless it seems to me that if there is an existing body of international law that would provide for that kind of conditionality it seems to me that ought to be clearly stated as an argument against such a reservation, if it is offered.

Ambassador GLITMAN. To put it in legal language, a state has a right to suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, its performance of treaty obligations in response to a material breach.

Senator DODD. And that certainly would apply in this particular case.

Ambassador GLITMAN. In this sort of situation, I think the important thing to do is, as I said to Senator Kassebaum, to keep the flexibility there for the President and the Senate of the day to determine how to react, not to sort of tie them down to doing this or that sort of thing, but the flexibility that we have now in the treaty, plus international law, should permit that.

Senator DODD. I just wonder if you might go up a bit of a ladder, if you will, with me. We have seen under SALT II, or under the ABM Treaty, allegations of violations on the part of the Soviets. What I would like you to do is to take me through what might be minor irregularities up to substantial violations.

What remedies do we have or do the Soviets have, in the case of minor infractions and moving to more serious ones. Is there a system of remedies available to us short of article 14 and, if so, what are they?

Ambassador GLITMAN. The treaty itself does not provide any remedies per se. In other words, if you do this, that happens. There are in many of the areas what I like to refer to as self-regulating mechanisms—as an example, making life difficult for inspectors. Put simply, I would hope that both sides would start out with good faith, good will, and a real effort to try to make life easy for inspectors. I say that for maybe one sided and American reasons. I would like to see the Soviet inspectors in Utah have an opportunity to look around and see American life, and I think from what I have read in the newspapers the people out there are prepared to do so.

Senator **Dodd**. I think I saw them taking pictures.

Ambassador **Glitman**. That is fine, and I would like to see a reciprocal arrangement happening out in Votkinsk. That would be a good thing. It could happen that something would go wrong. If it were determined that this were deliberate, they would know that we have the ability to create similar sorts of problems. That is a very simple—talk about a remedy, there is it, built in.

So, in that whole category of areas where inspectors might be, to use a street word, "hassled," there is a self-regulating mechanism because they know, each side knows, that if that happens it can find a similar thing happening on its side, and that is very different than some of the other problems we have had in this domain before, because here we do have it in our power to react that way.

I repeat, I do not want that to happen. I do not think it will. I would like to see the opposite happen. I would like to see it work in a reinforcing way, but we do have that type of self-regulating mechanism here, and that will apply to a number of questions that I have seen in documents that deal with that issue, by the way. How do we handle this kind of a problem? the answer is here.

Second, as you work your way up obviously I think the important point is that the punishment has to fit the crime, and it is almost impossible to hypothesize on what type of violation would happen and what would be the response to it. I really do not think it is helpful, probably, for me to say "Well, that part of the treaty is not very important, so we really would not care much about it, whereas if they did this, invoke that part of the treaty; well, by gosh we would really be upset."

The fact is that we expect both parties to abide by everything that is in that treaty, and that includes behaving in a decent way toward inspectors. I just used that as an example where you do not have to worry about remedies per se. Both sides have it in their interest to carry it out. That really applies throughout the treaty, in a sense, because of the point you were just raising.

If there is a material breache, we have it in our power to leave the treaty. We have it in our power, if we are dissatisfied with something very material and after 6 months we do not think that we have achieved the satisfaction that we want, to leave the treaty.

I think we should really leave it at that, because if we try to go beyond that we will probably end up, as I say, working with hypothetical situations which could suggest that some things are more important than others, and I would not want to tie anybody down in the future on how they react to it.

Senator **Dodd**. And it may not be the proper forum here, in a public forum, to go into it. But, Mr. Chairman, you may want to limit on Friday the discussions specifically to verification, but I see an issue relating to verification, and that is what remedies we may find available. Maybe that is a better place to ask than here.

Ambassador **Glitman**. I should have added that the SVC is also available as a forum in which to try to find solutions to whatever problem it is that has arisen. We have that as well.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you very much, Ambassador Glitman. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator **Biden**. Mr. Chairman, I hate like the Devil to trespass more on your time and, more importantly, quite frankly, the time of the witness, who has not had a break. But I have about 15 or 20 minutes more of questions. I do not know if I am the only one that has any further questions but it may be appropriate to give the witness a 5-minute break, and then I promise I will be done within 20 minutes.

What I would like to talk about is modernization and what is able to be done. You have spoken to it some and I would like to clarify a little more. I would like to speak a little bit about the so-called German singularization problem and what we should and should not be doing to try to allay that concern.

And I would like to speak very briefly with you about future interpretations of the treaty. I would like to flesh out a little more, the point that Chairman Pell has been pursuing if that is all right, because we have the most qualified man in the world to speak to this. I am not being solicitous. You are the world's reigning expert on this, and I am not going to get a chance to ask you again. I would need another 20 minutes, if I could.

The **Chairman**. Would you like a break?

Ambassador **Glitman**. It is your call, Senator.

The **Chairman**. I would ask if you would take over. I have just one point I would like to raise, and that is this is the section-by-section analysis. This is not what I am talking about. It is the correlation of this with the negotiating record that we are talking about, and I would hope we could get it.

The other question I have is where is the negotiating record now. Is it on its way to us? Is it still in the State Department?

Ambassador **Glitman**. As far as I am aware, it is still at the Department of State, and that is part of your negotiation or, shall I say, discussions with Ambassador Kampelman. We have completed the memorandums of conversations. They are all complete. What happens to them is what you all work out.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. I would say if you could recess the committee until 10 tomorrow morning.

Senator **Biden** [presiding]. I shall, I promise you, and I should have known, Mr. Ambassador, that having dealt with the Soviets for so long your ability to sit exceeds mine. I tried to finesse this, but I need a break for 3 minutes. Can we recess until 5 minutes after, and if you want to sit there, that is up to you, but I am going to leave for a minute.

Ambassador **Glitman**. I am in favor of reciprocity, Senator.

[Recess.]

Senator **Biden**. The hearing will come to order. Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your indulgence here. I would like to just follow up on some things that have been raised already, and I would like to try to clarify them. Then I would like to turn to a few things that I think have not been raised.

I am sure that you are familiar with the worry among Germans in the Federal Republic and, quite frankly, Germans in the GDR about having been "singularized," a phrase that is gaining some currency in Germany by the INF Treaty.

That is, they believe they are left as the host for and the targets of short-range nuclear forces that the treaty leaves in place, the so-called SNF forces. Those between zero and 500 kilometers.

Of course, this worry is in one sense misconceived, since the United States is the site of and the target for an even greater number of strategic weapons. Germany has hardly been singularized as the world's only nuclear battlefield. Nonetheless, the concern exists, and has political implications, at least in my view.

Indeed, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, arrived in Bonn a couple of days after I left there last week, obviously hoping to play upon this German concern. He expressed empathy with the German predicament, and encouraged them to move quickly toward a "third zero," the elimination of all zero- to 500-kilometer-range nuclear weapons.

And he suggested that the Montebello decision to modernize remaining systems in Europe, particularly the Lance missile and any further modernization of forces in that zero- to 500-kilometer range would circumvent of the spirit of the treaty.

Now, this is extremely important, because the fact is that maintenance, at least in my view, maintenance of some SNF capability will be, for the foreseeable future, a necessary component of NATO's military posture of nuclear deterrence.

My question is, What can the United States best do at this point to allay German concerns about so-called singularization?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, first of all, I think it is important for us to understand those concerns and to recognize that the Federal Republic has been the host to a large number of these weapons, as well as an extremely important part of NATO's entire deterrent force.

But we are dealing here with some factors that are inescapable. And one of them is geography. And the fact is that the Federal Republic, along with Norway and Turkey, have a common border with the Soviet Union among NATO countries. We do as well, of course, but it is separated by about a mile and a half of water.

But basically, those two countries have a common land border, those three countries have a land border with the Warsaw Pact or with the Soviet Union. And there is no escaping that.

So, if we were to eliminate shorter range nuclear weapons, the same problem would arise with long-range conventional artillery. And if we eliminated the artillery, the problem would be there with the machineguns, and so on down the line.

What I am saying simply is, You cannot escape that problem, and we have to be conscious of that and understanding of that.

Second, I think you have really answered the question as well as anyone can, when you pointed out that we as well are under the potential gun of a Soviet attack in terms of strategic weapons.

We have to assume that more of them are aimed at us than anyone else. And that is the answer, because NATO is an alliance based on collective security. So, there really is not any singularity in that sense.

All of us will be involved. We have more Americans living in Germany, for example, than there are Luxembourgers.

Senator BIDEN. Period.

Ambassador **Glitman**. Period. I may be off by a bit, but if it is not more it is about the same. You just look at your numbers. So, we have a very high human stake as well. And we are now back to coupling.

But I think that is really the key answer to this problem. We are in this thing together. Our purpose is to deter war, and there will not be any problems being singularized, as long as that deterrence exists. And as long as the other side understands that there is no profit, either in attack or intimidation. I think that is really the most important point here.

Now, with regard to making that deterrence work, I would agree with you that one of the important things we need to do is to ensure that what was agreed to at Montebello is carried out, and we are in the process of working with our allies to do that.

In addition, we have to strengthen the conventional side, or improve it. We need to strengthen it. We do not need to necessarily only have to spend more money. There is a lot that can be done.

You and I used to talk about this when we were both dealing with NATO—I was, and you still are—how important it is to try to work on rationalization, standardization, a whole host of areas that we have got to continually work at.

We have made a lot of progress. There is a lot more to be done. All of those things, I think, have got to be carried out, and that way we will maintain the deterrence. And that way there will not be any problem of singularization.

Senator **Biden**. What I heard most about in my 10 days or so in Europe, both for and against, was the modernization of the Lance missile so that it could be fired from its roughly present positions and make it into Poland. In other words, so it could do something other than strike West German or East German soil.

And it seems obvious to me that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Soviets are going to try to argue that this is a violation of the spirit of the agreement.

Was there any discussion about modernization with the Soviets at the time of negotiating? None of us, I think, really have any direct feel for how these negotiations take place.

For example, was there ever any exchange where you said, "All right, now we are going to agree to eliminate those missiles between 500 and 1,000,"—the second zero—"and those between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers. But we want you to know, by the way, that we are not forgoing and we are considering or planning on modernizing the Lance missile."

Was that ever bluntly stated? Or is that something you do not talk about?

Ambassador **Glitman**. I will not say that it was stated that bluntly. But they realized as we talked about the problems that would arise with the range criteria, for example, and we agreed to a criteria which says, "tested at 500 kilometers."

And we pointed out to them that in that case we would have preferred something a little more involved in terms of mathematical formulas. It still would have been subjective. They did not agree with that, and we accepted the tested range as being the most objective standard you could come up with.

Senator **Biden**. Say that again, now. You accepted——

Ambassador **Glitman**. The tested range.

Senator **Biden**. Which means what?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Which means that if the missile flies at 500 kilometers or above, it is automatically a violation.

Senator **Biden**. In a test?

Ambassador **Glitman**. In a test. But in the process of discussing that, we made clear to them, and yes, I had the Lance missile in mind, although I did not say the words.

But fine, now you understand that if we test, say 450, or as one of our British colleagues put it, 499 against a stiff wind, that is an exaggeration——

Senator **Biden**. His microphone keeps going out.

Ambassador **Glitman**. It is probably me rather than the mike. I am not used to getting that close.

All I was saying was, they understood from our discussions that we had in mind the possibility of deploying new systems—I would not say that they were pleased with this—that would not go 500 kilometers. Because in this discussion of range, that is the point that we were trying to get across to them.

Senator **Biden**. Now, one other point on modernization. My being impressed with 10 Downing Street was quickly overcome by the attention that Mrs. Thatcher required when she made it clear what she thought we should do next.

And one of the things she spoke at length about to me, and I am sure to others who have spoken to her, (and she was not the only one who raised it. SACEUR talked about it with us and Lord Carrington) was the following.

She said there was a need not only to modernize short-range missiles—that is, the Lance—and artillery, but in particularly Mrs. Thatcher argued that there was a need to have a standoff ALCM capability.

That is a dual-capable aircraft that could have an air-launched Cruise missile that could stand off and go the range of an intermediate-range land-based system.

That is, it could go anywhere from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. She further argued that there was a need for us to have SLCM's, sea-launched Cruise missiles in that range.

Now, is there any question about whether or not modernization of our nuclear forces to include air-launched Cruise missiles from dual-capable aircraft stationed in Europe, with ranges up to 5,500 miles, and sea-launched Cruise missiles, stationed or assigned to NATO that could go up to 5,500 kilometers would be permissible.

Is there any doubt that they are permissible, if the will exists and if the judgment is that NATO should have them, that they could be legally deployed under this INF Treaty?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Not in my mind, Senator. The treaty only prohibits ground-launched missiles. So air-launched or sea-launched are not covered by the treaty.

Senator **Biden**. The reason I asked that is you went into some detail an hour or so ago about that very subject in a different context, when you were making the distinction for Senator Helms about ground-launched in another context.

Can you rehash that for the record at this time a little bit? That is, what discussions were there that would either implicitly or explicitly allow these weapons, beyond the fact that the treaty only prohibits ground-launched, ground-based, land-based missiles?

How other than from that language in the treaty is it reasonable for the Soviets to either know explicitly or implicitly that ALCM's on dual-capable forward-based systems are permissible, if we wish to put them on, and sea-launched Cruise are permissible if we wish to deploy them?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Certainly the discussions we had with the Soviets from the beginning of the negotiations, with regard to SLCM's, which they tried to capture in this treaty, and with regard to aircraft, which they tried to capture in this treaty, should make clear to them that we had no intention of allowing those systems to be covered by the INF Treaty. And the end result is that they are not.

You will find no mention of aircraft, and no mention of any sea based systems, be it sea-based air, which they tried to capture, or SLCM's which at one point they brought up in INF, then they transferred them over to START and so on, back and forth. But you will find no reference to either of those systems in this treaty.

Senator BIDEN. That is my clear understanding. I have something of a concern that we are going to hear the following argument.

That START, by definition, captures strategic systems. Strategic systems are systems that heretofore we have defined, and I believe still define under START, as being able to exceed 5,500 kilometers in range. Am I correct?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes. You have to make a slight exception in that the submarine-launched ballistic missiles may not have had that range, but when combined with their platform, which moved, they did.

So, we did include in the START talks sea-based systems, of which the range of the missiles themselves might not be 5,500.

Senator BIDEN. If we were to modernize our nuclear capability assigned to and/or in Europe, that is with Lance upgraded, air-launched Cruise missiles on forward-based aircraft, and sea-launched Cruise missiles that may have a range less than 5,500 miles, do they automatically get captured in the START debate?

Or are they somehow in limbo? Do you understand the point I am trying to make? Or am trying to get clarified?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I understand. And I think the answer to your question is that ALCM's and SLCM's are both under discussion in START, and how that works out——

Senator BIDEN. Regardless of their range?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Basically. There may be some criteria on the lower end of the ALCM, and I am not familiar with that and the same with the SLCM. There is a big debate between us and the Soviets as to whether there is the lower end to the SLCM. At least, there was when I was watching that, following that issue.

So, in general, those two types of systems are under discussion in START. How they will be handled at the end of the day is another subject. I do not know the answer to that, neither does anyone. But they are there for discussion.

Senator BIDEN. So that you feel that we are on pretty solid ground to argue that SNF modernization and what would in effect be intermediate-range modernization of air-launched or sea-launched Cruise missiles, ALCM's or SLCM's, that if we move forward on all three of those areas, that none of them individually, nor all of them as a whole would constitute a violation of the INF agreement?

Ambassador GLITMAN. They would not be a violation, and again I refer to our discussions about article 14, the fact that we did not have anything in this treaty which spells out or uses the word "non-circumvention."

Article 14 is very explicit about conflicting with the provisions of the treaty. And the provisions of the treaty are very clear. Ground-launched missiles.

Senator BIDEN. I am going to take you into an area where you may not want to go, and just tell me if you do not.

Obviously, you are speaking up to this point in your answers from specific knowledge. You were the negotiator. I am now about to take you into a realm of where do we go from here?

At a minimum I think both you and I would acknowledge that modernization will create a political question in Europe and with the Soviets. I mean, it is at least fodder for debate.

And do you have a sense of whether or not we should be moving expeditiously on modernization prior to an agreement or the clear outlines of an agreement on conventional forces and on START?

Or do you think we, as a practical matter, are going to have to show some real progress on START and conventional force reductions before we will be able to establish the political will in Europe to do what apparently our military commanders and some political leaders think is necessary?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Well, my own sense is that we should carry out the decisions that were reached at Montebello on modernization. I think they were agreed by the alliance and they ought to be carried out.

Senator BIDEN. For clarification, for the record, the Montebello agreement is an agreement that was made among all the NATO allies and defense ministers, that there was a need for us to modernize. And we outlined with some specificity the systems we would like to see upgraded.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Correct. And we also agreed to reduce the number of remaining nuclear material in Europe.

Senator BIDEN. That was my question. General Galvin, the SACEUR made the case that the way in which this should be done is according to the model posed by Montebello. In fact he said if he got modernized weapons of the kind we are talking about, he would prefer a lower number of total nuclear weapons remaining in Europe which after INF would be some 4,000.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Something like that.

Senator BIDEN. He believed he could live with a significantly lower number—he did not say what that would be—if there was modernization. And he argued that is the way that it should be sold.

But my question is this, Does the passage of INF in any way politically alter Montebello, since that decision was taken prior to an INF agreement? Do you understand what I am saying?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Yes. I think what it does is, let us put it this way. I think the decision was a good one. It was taken prior to the INF agreement. But while we were negotiating.

Senator BIDEN. At the time, was there an expectation that we would get a double zero?

Ambassador GLITMAN. I think there was an expectation. At that time we were arguing, negotiating essentially, on the basis of an interim agreement, which would have left us a number in Europe.

Senator BIDEN. What year was Montebello? 1983?

Ambassador GLITMAN. 1983, yes.

Senator BIDEN. I think we are going to have some rough sailing in that area, and I hope that any modernization takes place clearly within the context of significant progress on other fronts.

And maybe we should even unilaterally move to withdraw some additional nuclear weapons, that we do not really need, in order to create the climate to be able to make progress. But that is a political decision I realize I am not going to be able to make, nor are you. Although you may be asked to see to it takes place.

The last area I would like to speak with you about is the so-called reinterpretation issue.

There has been a very serious constitutional controversy about the issue of executive branch reinterpretation of treaties. Obviously it is somewhat pejorative when we say reinterpretation of treaties, which I believe has occurred.

Is this treaty subject to reinterpretation?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Senator, I think the treaty speaks for itself. We have tried to keep any ambiguities out of it. I hope there are not any there. If there are, these hearings will undoubtedly uncover them. But I do not believe there are any serious ambiguities in there.

So, let's just put it this way. If we all do our job, the question and the problem that you have raised, should not occur.

Senator BIDEN. Essentially, I interpret your answer as saying it's not subject to reinterpretation. Yet had the question I suspect been asked of our negotiators, in 1972, I am sure that officials then would have answered—as a matter of fact I know because they came before my committee—the exact same way.

It seems to raise the question of what distinguishes a treaty that is not subject to reinterpretation from a treaty that is. I do not think any such distinction exists. Don't we have to operate on the principle that a treaty will be interpreted in accord with the interpretation which holds at the time of ratification and that any change in the interpretation will require consent of both the parties which for the United States means that the Senate has to be involved?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Senator, one of the things that I was doing while this debate was going on in Washington was negotiating. And I am afraid that if I started to venture forth in this area I would probably run afoul of either you or Judge Sofaer or both.

Senator BIDEN. You are right. One of us, you would. And I guess now that I have asked the question, there may be a more appropriate panel or individual to pose it to. If you can bear with me one more moment. Do you have anything?

Senator DODD. Just one thing. Earlier, inadvertently, I think I implied that Senator Kassebaum might be offering a condition or a restriction regarding the issue of violations? Right of withdrawal. She has no intention of offering such a resolution. She was merely raising the question, and I apologize to her if I implied in any way that I thought she was going to do it. But really she wanted to raise the issue as to how it ought to be dealt with. And obviously you were very forthcoming in your answer to that question. But I do not want to leave the impression that she was contemplating such a move

The only other item I would add, Joe, to our two witnesses, just for the purpose of the record I think you have done a remarkably good job in these things, the hours you put in, the time you put in, to come up with this agreement I think deserves tremendous commendation from all of us. And I just want to be on record in expressing that to you and to Ambassador Kampelman as well. I think you did an excellent job.

Ambassador GLITMAN. Thank you very much, and I will pass that on to Ambassador Kampelman.

Senator BIDEN. We use the phrase fine public servants. You really are one hell of a public servant. I mean you have done a phenomenal job on this whole thing. And I know it must be somewhat frustrating to sit here for those of us who did not sit through those hundreds of hours, God knows, maybe thousands of hours of meetings that you had with your Soviet counterparts. I can think of more enjoyable things. They are fine people, but they are not rollicking, laughing sessions.

Senator DODD. I would say too, Joe, that your questions these past minutes have been fascinating. And you look around, here we are, a major arms control agreement and this is almost an empty room.

Senator BIDEN. Well, there are one, two, three cameras.

Senator DODD. They have been excellent questions and excellent answers. Your mother is watching.

Senator BIDEN. My mother is watching.

Senator DODD. And I think my Aunt Helen is watching.

Senator BIDEN. John Ritch, the Deputy Staff Director of the Foreign Relations Committee just handed you or your staff some questions I believe. I will not trespass anymore on your time, but there are additional questions submitted by Senator Pell and myself and I would appreciate it if you would answer them. And I also want to make one last parting plea.

If you all could talk about whether or not you could get an agreement even if it is simply a letter suggesting that the Soviets might be willing to stay at their present limits on strategic systems. I really think it would have a substantive and political saliency. I ask you to consider that. You have been very, very gracious and we are going to recess the witnesses.

Would you like to make any closing comment, Ambassador?

Ambassador GLITMAN. Only to say thank you for your kind words to both of you. I want to say that I had a marvelous staff, some of whom are here behind me today, throughout these talks.

Senator BIDEN. Would you introduce your staff that was involved?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Well those that are here. Ron Forest, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator **Biden**. We are going to embarrass the heck out of you.

Ambassador **Glitman**. Leo Reddy, from the Department of State, my wife who is not part of my staff, but who had to put up with an awful lot of stuff, Karin Lawson who was our legal counsel, and many others as well.

Senator **Biden**. Well thank all of you for a very good job and for your testimony today. We appreciate it very much. The hearing will be recessed until 10 tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., January 27, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:02 a.m., in SR-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Adams, Moynihan, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Trible, Evans, and McConnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

Secretary Rogers, Secretary Vance, we welcome you here today and appreciate very much your coming.

We had originally arranged to have all of the former Secretaries of State since 1969 appear today. I regret that, in the end, in spite of our invitations, we were not able to get everyone together at once. But I am pleased that we have today the Secretaries of State during whose terms of office some of the most important strides in arms control were made.

William Rogers served as Secretary of State from 1969 to 1973, and during that period, the SALT I agreement and the ABM Treaty were concluded.

Cyrus Vance was Secretary of State from 1977 to 1980, and he oversaw the negotiation of the SALT II Treaty.

It has been a long time since there has been a treaty dealing with strategic nuclear arms. In my view, there is nothing more important than achieving a new agreement and making radical reductions in strategic weapons along the lines of what we discussed in the Reykjavik and Washington summit meetings.

The INF Treaty is a good treaty. But I believe its principal value will be in setting the stage for a strategic arms agreement.

We would appreciate having your comments on the INF Treaty, as well as your views on the contribution that the treaty could make in paving the way for agreements in strategic arms, chemical weapons, and conventional forces.

We are looking forward to hearing from you. How would you like to proceed?

Former Secretary VANCE. I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Secretary Rogers.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Is the microphone causing that buzz?

Senator MOYNIHAN. No, the Soviets have installed a bugging device, that's all.

The CHAIRMAN. It's just an in-house buzz. We are trying to get rid of it. Maybe we can get used to it.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. ROGERS, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Former Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am very pleased to be invited to appear here today in support of a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of the intermediate-range and shorter range nuclear missiles.

The treaty will eliminate an entire category of weapons on an asymmetrical basis, so that the Soviet Union over a 3-year period will be required to eliminate a much larger number of weapons than the United States—on the order of four times as many.

This feature of the treaty must have been a difficult pill for the Soviets to swallow, especially in light of the effort they made a few years ago, in strongly opposing the deployment of our Pershing missiles in Europe.

We all remember what a massive effort that was. The Soviets, joined by their satellites and by many persons here in the United States and in Europe, especially Germany, loudly proclaimed that the deployment of the Pershings would be an act that could lead to war or, at best, would be very destabilizing and would greatly worsen the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This treaty gives the lie to all of those claims.

President Reagan, supported by the Congress and by courageous friends and allies in Europe, pressed forward and successfully deployed Pershings in Europe. In part, at least, this treaty results from that effort.

In 1979, as we remember, the Soviet Union had deployed a large number of SS-20's directed against Western Europe, and this caused great concern. That concern was based on the fear that the weapons might be used against our allies in Europe and, because the United States had no weapons in that category deployed in Europe, the only adequate counterforce would be our ICBM's.

This raised the following question: Was it creditable to believe that the United States, in the defense of Europe, would risk using ICBM's with all the horrors that that would entail?

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. May I interrupt for a moment. Because of the buzz, we need to stop using the amplifier for a moment. If you would be patient, we will recess for just a moment.

I apologize. This is the first time this room has been used; that is, for these hearings. There are not "bugs" to work out, but buzzes to work out.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we could back up for a moment and have the ranking minority member make his statement now that he has arrived.

Senator HELMS. I just told the Secretary that this is not a defect, but it is an air raid alert. [Laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to see two distinguished Americans and two good friends of mine here this morning to bring to us not only their experienced judgment, but also their historical experience in arms control.

I thank you for coming.

In the first 2 days of hearings, some important points have been established. They may be in dispute, but we can settle that dispute a little later on, I hope.

The first is that it is clear that no nuclear warheads will be removed from the arsenals of either country by this treaty. Thus, it does not support President Reagan's key criterion for arms control; namely, that our goal was reductions.

Second, the testimony has made it unambiguous, absolutely, that the nuclear warhead devices and associated guidance will be removed from the reentry vehicle before the delivery vehicle is destroyed.

Now, we are not talking about some vague "fissionable materials." We are talking about, in the treaty language, "a nuclear warhead device." We are talking about in treaty language a lot of things.

It is a complete electromechanical nuclear assembly. The Soviets do not have to break it up or reprocess it to use it again. So, it is a device on the shelf. It is fully operational, and it is deliverable as soon as it is bolted on another reentry vehicle.

Third, the treaty permits the Soviets to preserve and protect 12 times as much nuclear megatonnage as the United States. We must not forget that the nuclear warhead device and its guidance are the heart of the missile. It is the most expensive part of the missile. It requires the most sophisticated technology to produce, and its components are in the shortest supply. The Soviets, therefore, gain a much greater advantage than the United States.

Fourth, this treaty eliminates only NATO's INF capacity. The Soviets retain full INF capacity by transferring the warheads to the SS-25, not covered by the treaty. NATO gives up its INF capacity totally, but the Soviets get to keep their capacity on European soil.

Fifth, by setting up this unequal situation, the United States is placed in the position where we are left only with the option of starting a full-scale nuclear war if we are to respond to Soviet aggression in Europe. Essentially, this puts the American people on the frontline.

So, Mr. Chairman, in short, the testimony so far has revealed that this treaty, in the judgment of this Senator, is unequal, unfair, and a trigger for a nuclear holocaust. It is clear to this Senator that the Soviets have a plan to cheat and, in fact, are cheating.

We are fortunate to have the experience of the two distinguished Americans here this morning. Secretary Rogers was Secretary of State in the period leading up to the conclusion of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT I ABM Treaty.

Secretary Vance was Secretary of State during the period leading up to the conclusion of the SALT II Draft Treaty.

Now, when Ambassador Kampelman was before us yesterday, he noted that, and I quote him, "We have a pattern of the Soviets trying to stretch ambiguous language whenever the opportunity suits them. That is not Jesse Helms talking. That is Max Kampelman.

Secretary Kissinger reported to Congress on June 15, 1972, and I quote:

> The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow SALT I agreement as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to respond * * *. If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field * * *. The two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move into an entirely different relationship of building additional trust.

Then Mr. Kissinger continued:

> If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the agreement or through failing to specify numbers about which we have left absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation . . . if it should turn out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship.

End of quote from Henry Kissinger.

Moreover, President Reagan in one of his latest reports on the violation of SALT II restrictions noted, and I quote the President: "A number of [Soviet] activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core or central provisions of the treaty frequently cited by proponents of SALT II as the primary reasons for supporting the agreement."

Today we are dealing with the INF Treaty and Ambassador Glitman noted here this week, and I quote him, that "it is a practical recognition of the problems created by Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and the need to ensure that compliance problems do not create a situation in which an agreement becomes a source of misunderstanding and tension rather than a force for improved relations."

Mr. Chairman, the problem of Soviet cheating is, indeed, a major issue in all of our treaty relationships with the Soviet Union. Official Senate documents have recorded at least 30 major violations of treaty agreements by the Soviet Union, going back as far as 1920. About the only treaty they did not violate was the agreement with Hitler to divide up Poland.

Since January 23, 1984, President Reagan has reported to the Congress seven times on Soviet violations of arms control agreements. These may be tabulated, I guess, as follows:

One, SALT I ABM Treaty—now 10 confirmed violations;

Two, SALT I Interim Agreement—5 confirmed violations;

Three, SALT II Treaty—now 25 confirmed violations;

Four, Limited Test Ban Treaty—more than 20 confirmed violations;

Five, Threshold Test Ban Treaty—over 24 probable violations;

Six, Biological Warfare Convention—multiple confirmed violations;

Seven, The Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons—multiple confirmed violations; and

Eight, The Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement—multiple confirmed violations.

So, that is the point that I have been trying to make here, among others, this week. Senators may agree or disagree. But I think they ought to look at the facts, because the record is a pattern of highly conscious practice. As President Reagan himself noted, it is a pattern of violation of the core provisions, not peripheral or unimportant issues. It may be summarized by saying that the Soviets do not violate all the provisions of arms control treaties; they violate only those provisions that are not to their advantage.

The Soviets not only cheat, they plan to cheat. It can be demonstrated that many of the violations were already in the planning and developmental stage at the time the treaty in question was signed.

That is why I am convinced that the Soviets are cheating now.

The historical experience of our witnesses today therefore will help us judge what the Soviets are planning to do to cheat on this INF Treaty.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to present an opening statement, and I thank you gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Rogers, you had already started, but maybe you would like to back up and start again.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I appear here today in support of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter range nuclear missiles.

The treaty will eliminate an entire category of weapons, of missiles, on an asymmetrical basis, so that the Soviet Union, over a 3 year period, will be required to eliminate a much larger number of missiles than the United States—on the order of four times as many.

This feature of the treaty must have been a difficult one for the Soviets to accept, especially in light of the effort they made a few years ago in strongly opposing the deployment of our Pershing missiles in Europe. We all remember what a massive effort that was.

The Soviets, joined by their satellites and by many persons here in the United States and in Europe, especially Germany, loudly proclaimed that the deployment of the Pershings would be an act that could well lead to war or, at the very least, be very destabilizing and would greatly worsen the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This treaty gives the lie to all of those claims.

President Reagan, supported by the Congress, and by courageous friends and allies in Europe, pressed forward and successfully deployed Pershings in Europe. In part, at least, this treaty results from that effort.

You will remember that in 1979, the Soviet Union had deployed a large number of SS-20's directed against Western Europe, and this caused great concern. It was based on the fear that the weapons might be used against our allies in Europe, and because the United States had no weapons in that category deployed in Europe, the only adequate counterforce would be to use our ICBM's.

This raised the following question: Was it creditable to believe that the United States in the defense of Europe would risk using the ICBM's with all the horrors that that would entail?

Thus, the SS-20's became successful weapons of intimidation, and had the potential of weakening NATO or even possibly causing it to disintegrate. So, the Pershings were deployed by the United States to allay that fear, and in our own self-interest to signal to the Soviet Union our deep commitment to our NATO allies.

Now that deployment has been successful and the Soviets have agreed to eliminate all of the SS-20's and similar missiles in exchange for our eliminating the Pershings. That fear has been allayed and we have started a process that may result in the further reduction of both nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

It should be noted here that the Soviets also dropped their insistence that weapons from other countries be included in the negotiations. This, of course, was an important and necessary concession.

I might say, members of the committee, the fact that the Russians agreed to asymmetrical reductions I think is extremely significant because in further discussions in arms reduction, that could be a very valuable precedent. It also is important that they dropped their insistence that missiles from other countries be included.

So, I think on the numbers alone this treaty is a good one.

However, to my mind, possibly the most significant feature of the treaty may be the provision for onsite inspection.

I remember hearing President Eisenhower once say that he doubted that the United States could ever have a meaningful arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union because the Soviets would never agree to onsite inspection. And he believed we could never agree to arms reductions with the Soviet Union without onsite inspection.

Now that the Soviets and the United States have agreed to onsite inspection, I believe that a precedent has been established that holds out great promise for mankind.

In all likelihood, future treaties between the nations will include similar or improved provisions. With adequate onsite inspections and full use of the latest technical methods, adequate and reliable verification should be possible. Thus, the prospects for further progress in arms reductions seem to be good if the Soviets are prepared to make mutual and balanced reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons.

If the climate between the United States and the Soviet Union continues to improve, we should encourage it, and at the same time make certain that our overall strength remains great and that we maintain the strength and cohesion of our alliance.

We have one significant advantage—communism does not work. It is not working in Russia or North Korea, or Cuba or in any of the Eastern bloc countries.

Gorbachev's new book attempts to chart a course for the Soviet Union which would make it possible for the Soviets to benefit from the advantages of a free society, a free marketplace for goods and services, and at the same time maintain a controlled society for individuals and for ideas. Of course it won't work.

In the long run, either Gorbachev will be removed from his office, as Khrushchev was, or Russia will become a much different society.

If he remains in office and the society becomes more open—depending on the degree of openness—a new challenge will face the United States. We will have to constantly remind ourselves in that event that a system which has openly and consistently espoused world domination does not easily change its spots; or if it does, in all likelihood it will be a temporary change.

So, our emerging policy, I believe, should be one of wary flexibility. We should attempt to resolve, by mutuality, some of the sources of conflict in the world between the superpowers; but we should always require money in the bank. Let's not rely on "checks in the mail."

Certainly we all have to keep in mind the points that Senator Helms has made. I don't think that we can negotiate any agreement with the Soviet Union based on trust. I think the thing about this treaty that is so important and that appeals to me is that I think it is about as hard a bargain as we possibly could have expected from the Soviet Union.

Finally, then, this INF Treaty is a modest step on a path toward further arms reduction. It could be a precursor of much larger steps.

We must be willing to accept the possibility of what appears to be a major foreign policy change in the Soviet Union and welcome it.

It is true, as Senator Helms says, that we can argue the Russians have cheated, and we certainly can assume that they may attempt to cheat in connection with this treaty. But if you follow that logic to its conclusion, it would be that we should never make an agreement with the Soviet Union about arms reduction.

I think the attractive feature of this agreement is that it is verifiable. The elimination of the weapons will be observed. The Soviets will have to eliminate four times as many weapons as we do. It will be over a 3-year period, so we can observe them.

All in all, it is a very well negotiated treaty.

So, let's continue to negotiate in a businesslike way. If we can make a good deal, make it. If we can't, don't.

If we can negotiate a satisfactory START Treaty this year, that is in our best interest, and fine. If not, wait until we can.

Let's not be under any pressure because it is an election year or for any other such reason. Success depends on the effect of a treaty, not on who makes it or when it is made.

There have been those who would argue that the treaty should have been more comprehensive, or that it should have dealt with strategic arms in the first instance, or that conventional weapons and troop strength should have been included. Who can be sure?

What I feel certain about is that no all encompassing arms reduction treaty would have been possible, and I'm convinced that this treaty, which has the support of our military leaders and our allies is a good one. The fact is that this is a good treaty, on its own terms, and should be ratified on its own terms.

If crippling amendments are attached or if it dies in its crib from inordinate delay, the chances for arms reductions in this century may have been lost, and the chances for what appears to be a window of opportunity for peace may be closed.

So, I strongly support the treaty and respectfully urge the Senate, after full and careful consideration, to ratify it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

The Chairman. Thank you very much indeed, Secretary Rogers.

And now, Secretary Vance, we will be happy to hear from you.

I apologize again for the buzzing. We are trying to do our best to eliminate it. But if we do not succeed, we can always move to another room.

Senator **Helms**. Maybe it would be good if you pulled the microphones a little closer.

STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Former Secretary **Vance**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, I am very pleased to be here today, along with my respected colleague, Bill Rogers, to testify on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

These hearings and the discussion and the debate that will follow provide a rare and valuable opportunity not only to carefully examine the treaty before you, but also to illuminate the road ahead, as we strive to build a safer world into the next century.

Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly endorse the INF Treaty, as signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

In my considered judgment, it advances America's security interests. It is militarily sound. It is the fruit of a decade of sharply tested allied resolve and unity. And it provides fresh impetus to the process of arms control that can lead to broader agreements that enhance our security.

Let me begin with some historical perspective because this treaty represents the successful culmination of a decade's effort to deal with the problems posed by the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe.

A clear picture of the rationale for the deployment of our ground-launched Cruise missiles and Pershing II's is critical to understanding how this treaty manifestly serves our security objectives.

Soviet introduction of highly accurate, multiple warhead missiles in Europe during the mid-1970's created a new challenge to the balance of power in Europe and to the effectiveness of NATO's deterrence strategy.

In the context of the strategic parity the Soviets already had achieved, this new element in the defense equation was deeply troubling to our allies and to us. It became clear that we needed to counter this incipient Soviet advantage, by negotiations if possible, but by arms deployments if necessary.

This was the heart of the dual-track decision taken by NATO in December 1979.

In this decision, the alliance resolved to develop its own offsetting nuclear force, while at the same time seeking to neutralize the threat of the SS-20's through negotiations.

That decision and the subsequent deployments created painful political problems for some of our allies and brought efforts by the Soviets to exploit those difficulties. But the alliance held its course through two American administrations. That steadfastness has now been vindicated with an agreement that achieves NATO's essential strategic objective: Elimination of a class of missiles which, because of their accuracy and short warning time, make crisis more dangerous.

Seen in this light, the INF Treaty is a victory for allied cohesion and resolve. It would be ironic indeed if we now snatch defeat from the jaws of victory and unilaterally deny what the allies have achieved together.

Mr. Chairman, this agreement is important for its own sake. But it also represents a positive reaffirmation of the arms control process, a process that now is deservedly high on the agenda of both superpowers.

The treaty provides valuable new building blocks, blocks that can be used by this and by future administrations to construct, through the painstaking process of negotiation, more comprehensive agreements that serve our mutual interests.

In particular, the verification provisions that have been achieved in this treaty break significant new ground that can enhance the mutual confidence essential to progress in other arms control arenas.

Let me make a final point.

Senate ratification of this treaty, the product of a decade-long effort, pursued by two administrations of different parties, can send a powerful message to the world that the United States is a consistent, reliable negotiating partner, capable of speaking with an enduring voice. To approve this treaty in an election year will vividly demonstrate that on vital issues of national security, the United States can act with bipartisan unity.

In this context, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that the Senate will not burden this treaty with reservations or amendments that would require renegotiation with the Soviets, jeopardizing what this treaty embodies.

What we must now do to strengthen conventional deterrence in Europe and to deal with the Soviets on other issues are vital concerns. They require practical, creative, and level-headed discussion and debate. But this agreement should and does stand on its own merits. It serves our national interest. And to demand progress on every front as a precondition for progress on any front is a prescription for paralysis.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee and I urge the Senate to provide this agreement with enthusiastic support, as I believe it merits.

I would be very happy to answer any questions the committee may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen, very much indeed.

As a matter of general information, I would like to wind up the testimony of the Secretaries if we could this morning, because this afternoon it is our plan that General Rowny and Mr. Abshire will be witnesses.

I would also add that if we do not get rid of the buzz, we will move into our regular committee room this afternoon.

Mr. Rogers, I was very struck with your reference to Gorbachev's book. I also read it and was struck by the pragmatism of it. His solution to Russia's problems is to leapfrog backward, to the time of the NEP, with a pragmatic approach to the new economic policy.

I think we can learn a lot from reading that book and can get more of a feeling of his own view on things.

Former Secretary ROGERS. It is a very interesting book.

The CHAIRMAN. Right, and I am afraid that it has not received the currency that it should. I think, when we are dealing with world figures, just like "Mein Kampf" gave us a feeling of where Hitler was trying to go, I think this book gives us feeling of where Gorbachev is trying to go. I think it is really mandatory reading for all of us in this field, even though it is written in a very poor style and a sort of stream of consciousness technique. But you feel that is the way he probably talks, too.

I am curious. In connection with the dual-track decision, which was brought into effect, as my recollection is, during your tenure, Secretary Vance——

Former Secretary VANCE. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Do you see that this treaty in any way reverses that proceeding or carries out some of the thoughts you had at that time?

Former Secretary VANCE. Not at all. It demonstrates that the dual-track approach was correct and we have achieved the objective which we set before us, "we" being the alliance, when in December 1979, we took the fateful decision of going forward with the dual-track approach.

The CHAIRMAN. I rather like the boldness that the two chiefs of government entered into at Reykjavik, and I have often felt that if they had had a couple of more days there removed from the observers, we would be further down the road of arms control than we are today, even further.

But would the Carter administration have sought a zero/zero outcome?

Former Secretary VANCE. What we said at the time that we took the decision was that we wanted to reduce intermediate nuclear forces to the lowest possible figure, and it was understood that included a reduction to zero.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you see as the key factors which have led to the achievement of this treaty, which puts us a little further down the road than we were before?

Former Secretary VANCE. I think what has been achieved in the verification field is a major step forward.

I think to move to a position where we have the acceptance of onsite inspection, and a very substantial number of onsite inspections during the years provided for in the treaty, is really a very important step. It sets a precedent for the future on which I think we can build, and build importantly, as we attempt to negotiate further agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I would like to add to that.

I think it is remarkable that so little has been said and written about that feature of the treaty, because in our administration, in the Eisenhower administration or the Nixon administration, if we had been able to achieve this kind of onsite inspection, we would have thought that we had achieved a miracle. In those days, and until more recently, even taking pictures of military installations in Russia has been "verboten." And now, we are going to have

Americans going around in Russia, at their request, making onsite inspections of their production facilities, asking them to open the roofs of these military facilities so that we can take satellite pictures—a very, very comprehensive plan of onsite inspection, which obviously will be a precedent which they will have to live with in future discussions.

The fact that we are able to do that to me is quite remarkable. Somehow it is so contrary to everything the Russians have stood for for the last, what, 40 years. To have them all of a sudden change I think is remarkable.

In talking to Ambassador Glitman about it and in listening to his testimony yesterday, I was interested in how all of a sudden the negotiators apparently found out that this was Gorbachev's view—from the newspaper account. In other words, the decision about onsite inspection was not made by the negotiators. They first learned about it from a TASS report.

So, it is possible that Gorbachev is somewhat changing the policy of the Soviet Union. I think that we, as Americans, have to realize that that is a possibility—not that we accept it, but we have to realize that it is a possibility, and take advantage of it.

Former Secretary VANCE. Mr. Chairman, could I add a point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but I just want to make one comment. Once we go down this path of intrusive verification, it is not going to back up. It is going to open up more and more as the years go by.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Vance.

Former Secretary VANCE. Perhaps the most important substantive effect of the treaty is the elimination of the decoupling effect that existed when we faced the SS-20s. That was really a problem of perceptions which was very deep and could have been very divisive within the alliance.

By the elimination of this entire class of weapons, we have removed the problem of decoupling, which is at the heart of what the alliance was trying to do when it came forward with the dual track.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I will desist my questioning now and will turn to the ranking member.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am going to be merciful. I have to go down to Pennsylvania Avenue.

I don't know whether I am going to get spanked, Joe, or not, but I think we are going to talk about aid to the Contras.

Senator BIDEN. I'll bet on you, Jesse. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. Don't bet much. [Laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, Bill, if I may, Article 2 of SALT I provided that, and let me quote it, "The parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBM's or ICBM's of older types deployed prior to 1964 into land-based launchers for heavy ICBM's of types deployed after that time."

I know you must recall the many assurances which were duly reported by the news media, the assurances that Mr. Brezhnev and other top Soviet negotiators made during the SALT I talks to the effect that the Soviet Union did not—did not—intend to replace light ICBM's with heavy ICBM's.

Did you at that time have any reason to doubt all of these assurances that proliferated among the Soviets?

Former Secretary **Rogers**. Well, I never accepted any of their assurances on face value. I mean, I always expected that they might try to cheat.

I think we have to expect that in the future. It may be that their policies will change to the point where they are totally reliable and we can deal in confidence with treaty provisions. But I don't think we have reached that stage yet.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I think the point is look at the consequences of this cheating by the Soviets with respect to the heavy ICBM's as a consequence of SALT I.

Anyway, on May 26, 1972, just before SALT I was signed, our intelligence services intercepted private conversations of Soviet leader Brezhnev, indicating that the Soviets fully intended to deploy heavy SS-19 ICBM's to replace the light SS-11 ICBM's, despite the limitations of Article 2 of SALT I.

I am sure you remember that, but just to refresh your memory, I recall that in March of last year, Richard Perle, the Assistant Secretary, appeared before this committee, and he made this statement, which I think is important to remember at this time when we are saying well, it will work out all right anyhow. Richard Perle said, "We also know through what was then an extremely sensitive communications intercept that after General Secretary Brezhnev agreed on the issue of the extent to which silos could be enlarged, he became concerned that he might thereby have inhibited the substitution of this heavy"—meaning the SS-19—"missile for a light missile, and he got into communications with Soviet Defense Minister Grechko, and we acquired that conversation."

Then he quoted the conversation.

Brezhnev said to Grechko, "Can we fit the new missile in? I have just agreed to a 15-percent rule?" And Grechko said, "I'll have to get back to you." And he did get back to him, and he said, "We can fit it in," and Brezhnev said "Thank you. No. Thank God."

That's an unusual thing for a Soviet to say, isn't it?

It was only at that point that that particular arrangement was consummated.

There is no doubt in my mind that had Marshal Grechko instructed General Secretary Brezhnev that this new missile, one that surely would have been considered heavy, would not have fit into that silo, he would have retracted the position he then had on the table.

Now, this is continuing what Richard Perle testified to.

Now this intercept indicates clearly, it seems to me, that the Soviets signed SALT I fully intending to violate it. That is an opinion commonly held around this town among intelligence people and diplomatic people.

Now, were you aware of these interceptions at the time?

Former Secretary **Rogers**. I do not remember that particular one, Senator. No, I do not.

Senator **Helms**. Well, you were a distinguished Secretary of State. I don't know why you should have been kept in the dark about these interceptions.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. Well, as I say, I have no recollection of this one. I have no doubt that the Soviets do two things when treaties are signed. One is they try to go right up to the line, on the one hand, to be sure that they cannot necessarily violate it, but take every advantage of the language of the treaty, to get as much out of it as they can on the one hand. And I have never doubted that they would attempt to violate it if they thought they could get away with it.

I think we have to proceed on that theory as far as the INF Treaty is concerned.

The advantage of this treaty is it is over a 3-year period, and we are going to be able to observe the elimination of these 1,600 missile sites, and we will do it by personal observation. If they don't do it, why we'll know it. And we do not have to eliminate ours until we are satisfied that they are eliminating theirs.

So, that is one of the features of this treaty, that it eliminates, it seems to me, the possibility of cheating, to a great degree.

Senator **Helms**. Now, you know, I hope that all of you are right and that I am wrong. But we have been a long way down the road with Soviet duplicity. And I know one thing about Bill Rogers: If you had been told about this interception at the time, you would have been up here to the Senate telling us about it. I believe that.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. Well, I think so, too.

Senator **Helms**. But the impact of it, the deployment of the SS-19, in circumvention of SALT I that we have just been talking about, represented a sixfold increase in the number of Soviet warheads targeted at the United States.

When SALT I was negotiated, did you ever dream, Mr. Secretary, that the Soviet assurances as to their intentions regarding heavy ICBM's would prove false?

Former Secretary **Rogers**. Well, I don't know about "dreaming." I thought there was certainly a possibility of it.

Senator **Helms**. Well, did you ever dream that they would result, as a consequence of the circumventions, in the nuclear threat to the United States, an increase of sixfold?

No, you did not. I can answer that question for you. You did not anticipate that. You did not trust the Soviets, and we don't trust them now.

But I think that we ought to consider line by line in this treaty the consequences of duplicity. Using Hawaii back last fall as target practice, you know, that was just rubbing our noses in it, that sort of thing.

But, as I say, I'm doing the best I can to analyze, and the Lord did not make me impossible of error. I am worried about a lot of things in this treaty.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. Senator, I don't think you and I disagree at all. I think we ought to be very wary, after we ratify this treaty, to be sure that it is carried out.

The point is I think in this instance that we have a treaty that is verifiable, and it is in our best interest. They are going to destroy four times as many missile sites as we will, and we will be able to observe them.

Just on the surface, I cannot imagine a better treaty than this one. I mean, we have onsite inspection, it is asymmetrical, it does not include our allies, and it does not affect just Europe, it also affects Asia.

So, all of the things that we would have liked to begin with I think we have achieved.

I would say this. If I had been Secretary of State and had a hand in negotiating this treaty, I'd be very proud of myself. I think this is an excellent treaty.

Senator HELMS. Well, I'm proud of you anyhow. Thank you very much.

Former Secretary ROGERS. It's mutual, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Very good.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, in the committee's first 2 days of the hearings, much attention has been focused on my distinguished colleague from North Carolina's concern about the fact that the treaty does not provide for the elimination of warheads as well as delivery systems.

I am compelled to say that I think part of the reason that this issue, which yesterday I called a "red herring," and which my friend from Washington more appropriately named a "crimson whale," has gotten so much attention that the administration's witnesses have not given as full and effective a response to the question as I believe they should have.

Let me, therefore, be presumptuous enough to try to summarize why this treaty does not provide for warhead destruction and why the fact should not be of any concern.

First, the United States did not wish the treaty to provide for warhead destruction because arrangements that allowed for verification of warhead destruction would have allowed Soviet inspectors to learn details of advanced American technology, which we did not wish to provide to the Soviets free of charge.

I believe Senator Helms can sympathize with that concern. I doubt whether he would want the Soviets to have that ability.

Second, it would have been nonsensical for the two sides to destroy fissionable material at a time when both sides are manufacturing fissionable material. This would have been particularly counterproductive for the United States, which is in shorter supply of such material than the Soviet Union.

I trust again that Senator Helms would be sympathetic to that point also. It benefits us more than it does the Soviets to maintain the fissionable material.

Third, it bears emphasis that the purpose of this treaty is not to eliminate nuclear weapons. That is a much longer term goal. It is to eliminate certain kinds of politically significant nuclear weapons, as well as militarily significant nuclear weapons—but politically significant. This is a point that was made by both former Secretaries and particularly by Secretary Vance in his comments earlier. This is that accurate land-based missiles, with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers would be eliminated.

The treaty eliminates such missiles in their entirety. Thus, the treaty, as Secretary Rogers has said, completely fulfills its purpose.

As we have discussed and as Senator Helms well understands, a Soviet warhead which is undelivered is a Soviet warhead that is still where it belongs, which is in the Soviet Union, not on our allies or us.

Finally, it is simply a caricature to describe the weapons dismantlement process under the treaty as allowing Soviets to "unbolt a warhead" from one missile and bolt it on top of another. The only usable material that will be left will be fissionable material and the reusable engines, which we are going to take off our Cruise missiles.

Indeed, in this regard, the treaty is to the United States and not to the Soviet advantage. We got the better of the dismantlement arrangements because we will have the ability to salvage much more than they.

All of the deployed Soviet missiles are ballistic missiles. They have Cruise missiles that are not deployed, but all of the deployed missiles are ballistic missiles. So they, as we, get to keep these fissionable materials and their guidance systems. Because a high percentage of our missiles are Cruise missiles, and because their engines will be transferable to our permitted weapon systems, this is significant.

Another thing, we can do is attach them to ALCM's and/or SLCM's—that is sea launched or air launched Cruise missiles. Again, this is a position I would hope that Senator Helms is very sympathetic to.

Certainly in my mind, these and other arguments—that my colleague from Maryland made in such an articulate fashion yesterday—all add up to clear and resounding testimony as to why the United States has gained all the advantages it sought and why in the short and long term our advantages exceed any that the Soviet Union has gained from signing this treaty.

Now, Mr. Chairman, with my remaining time, I would like to ask a question of our distinguished witnesses. I will refrain, by the way, from going back to the issue of Soviet cheating, to which I am sure you and others are prepared to respond, but if time permits, we will be able to respond to.

I thought Senator Helms' example of the Perle testimony was interesting. Quite frankly, I still thought the "intercept" he talked about was classified. The interesting feature of the testimony that the Senator read is that it indicates the Soviets were not in violation. Under SALT I, they were allowed to deviate by up to 15 percent in making changes in certain features of their missiles. In my view the intercepted conversation referred to earlier indicates that the Soviet General Secretary called his chief military adviser to ask if his plans were within the 15 percent range and to see if he could move ahead. The adviser called back and said "yes, you can do it within 15 percent." And the General Secretary said "good," "great," or "thank God," or whatever. The United States may have preferred that the Soviets not be able to do this, but that is not what we negotiated.

The whole point of that is that they did not violate.

Former Secretary Rogers. Yes. He was trying to live within the treaty.

Senator Biden. That's right. That is the whole point of it.

It is so fascinating to me that Senator Helms is able to make such strong arguments in behalf of the treaty. I mean, why would you pick that as an argument to prove the Soviets cheated when, by definition, they did not cheat.

Now, maybe Senator Helms is better than the rest of us in going into the Soviet mind. I guess the implication was, had the Soviet leader's military people said, "no, you need a 19-percent deviation," then the General Secretary would have said, "well, let's lie and pretend it is only 15," or whatever. But the fact of the matter is—it was not a violation, even what Senator Helms just read.

But let me get to my question because I am running out of time.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to know this from our witnesses.

In our first two days of hearings it has been clearly established that this treaty does not really deprive the Soviet Union of any category of military capability. It deprives them of a category of military weaponry, but not of capability, in that they can retarget their existing ICBM's on Europe and can also, since there is no existing limit on the total number of strategic systems, build additional strategic missiles that have ranges below 500 and above 5,500 kilometers.

Now we spent 7 years negotiating, (and much of that you did, Secretary Vance) the SALT II Treaty, from 1972 to 1979. Then we spent another 7 years honoring its terms, with minor discrepancies (which are a matter of dispute and that I won't go into now) even though the treaty was never ratified.

There was much value, I think, achieved in SALT II, particularly in the area of definition and agreed procedures, not to mention the fact that the treaty set caps that required the two sides to dismantle some weapons when they deployed others.

Indeed, I know it must be rather frustrating for you, Secretary Vance, to hear that the INF Treaty is the first agreement to require dismantlement of nuclear weapons, because the SALT II Treaty, even though unratified, required the dismantlement of hundreds of Soviet launchers.

But looking to the future, we now face uncertainty with regard to the negotiation of a new strategic treaty, a START Treaty. We hope for success within months. The practical reality is, though, that we may very well have to wait years.

So my question is this.

Would it not be wise for the two sides in connection with ratifying the INF Treaty to also agree to limit their strategic systems, that is, systems above ranges of 5,500 kilometers, pending the achievement of a new accord?

More specifically, would it not be reasonable for the two sides, using already agreed to counting rules, to honor the current Soviet level of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles of about 2,500, or perhaps the agreed SALT levels of 2,400 SNDV's. In addition, would it not be reasonable for Mr. Reagan to state as U.S. policy that, pending agreement on the SALT Treaty, the United States, which now has 9,000 strategic warheads, will not exceed the strategic level of the Soviet Union, which is now 9,800.

This entails an acknowledgment that the United States can count Soviet warheads. So we acknowledge that we can count them. Perhaps an interim warhead limit could also be included.

So my question is, does it not make sense for us, since we can verify and since we have existing counting rules, to agree to limits on the total number of SNDV's, strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, at about the 2,500 level for the Soviets, and possibly agree to a limitation on the total number of strategic warheads, in our case about 9,000 and in their case about 9,800?

Former Secretary **VANCE**. I'd be happy to answer that, if you would like me to.

Senator **BIDEN**. Please, Mr. Secretary.

Former Secretary **VANCE**. I believe that the limitations agreed to in SALT II——

Senator **BIDEN**. I hate to do this, Mr. Secretary. There is a roll call vote and we only have nine minutes left. At least for me, I think your answer is very important and I would like to hear it in its entirety.

Mr. Chairman, would it be appropriate for us to recess and to go and vote now and for the Secretary to answer the question in full when we come back?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Absolutely.

Why don't we recess right now and come right back.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The **CHAIRMAN**. The committee will come to order.

Secretary Vance was about to give his response to Senator Biden's question, and then we will move on to the next questioner.

Secretary Vance.

Former Secretary **VANCE**. Senator Biden, as I had started to say, I believe that the limitations which were contained in the SALT II Treaty were an important part of that treaty and were very much in the national interest of the United States.

I therefore feel that we made a great mistake when we said we were no longer going to abide by those limitations, and that there are no ceilings any longer.

Therefore, I would welcome an understanding between the parties, as they negotiate the 50 percent cut in intercontinental weapons, to have in place by agreement between the parties, an oral agreement, that they would abide by the SALT I limitations.

On the other hand, I think it would be a grave mistake to make that a condition of this treaty.

This treaty should go forward in my judgment without any reservations or amendments. But the basic idea I very much support.

Senator **BIDEN**. Secretary Rogers.

Former Secretary **ROGERS**. I think I agree with that. In fact, I do agree with that.

In the first place, I should say, and I am sure the committee knows, I am not what they called yesterday an "authoritative" witness. So what I say is just my own view.

I think of course if both sides could agree, could sort of have a gentlemen's agreement, that they were not going to build any more ICBM's for a while, until they negotiated on START, that it would be nice, but I don't think it is probably a viable suggestion, although it is an interesting one.

I would like to say that I think the negotiators that we have who appeared here before this committee yesterday—Kampelman and Glitman—are outstanding negotiators, representing America's best interests in the finest possible way. I have every confidence in them that they will do all they can to move ahead in the START talks.

So I would hesitate to recommend anything by way of trying to give them direction, because I think they are moving in the right direction. I think that we all, all Americans who believe in arms reduction—and I think most Americans do—as long as it is equal and verifiable, it is a good thing. If the Senate, after full consideration of all aspects of this treaty, ratifies it, then I think we should proceed at once with these negotiators, with the idea of having a successful START negotiation.

In the connection with those negotiations, certainly the suggestion Senator Biden has made is one that they will consider. I am sure Max Kampelman will do that in the days ahead.

I agree with Cy. I don't think we should have any conditions. We should not tie that aspect of it to the ratification of INF.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, a simple and straight-forward question which is easy enough to answer is would you recommend that the Senate ratify this treaty as it now sits——

Former Secretary VANCE. Absolutely.

Senator EVANS [continuing]. With no reservations, conditions——

Former Secretary ROGERS. Absolutely.

Senator EVANS [continuing]. Or any understandings?

Former Secretary ROGERS. Absolutely.

Former Secretary VANCE. Absolutely.

Senator EVANS. Secretary Rogers, you were involved in the early stages of SALT I negotiations. Secretary Vance was the Secretary when the decision was made to deploy the Pershing II's and GLCM's.

Can you give me some history? Why did we choose to put these INF systems on land, even though we had sea based and other based capacities to strike the same targets?

Was it military, political, or a bit of both?

Former Secretary VANCE. Partly both.

Many of us will remember the problems we had with the multilateral force which for years we tried to put together, that was basically a sea-based force. It was such a complicated mess, however, it failed. We did not want to do that again.

Therefore, we thought the way was to put the Western missiles on the ground, and if we could get agreement on the ground alternative among a number of nations, it would also demonstrate resolve on the part of the alliance, which was very important for the Soviets to see.

So, those were the two principal reasons we decided to put the missiles on the ground rather than to go to sea.

Senator EVANS. In light of what has happened and your knowledge of the history subsequent to that decision, do you believe that that decision, in itself, was primarily, or at least in large part, responsible for the Soviet willingness to come back to the bargaining table——

Former Secretary VANCE. Yes, I do.

Senator EVANS [continuing]. And to conclude the agreement?

Former Secretary VANCE. I do.

I think that if we had not done that, you would still see the SS-20's sitting right where they were before, and there might be even more of them.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I think that is the reason, certainly to me, that it is so remarkable they went ahead with this INF Treaty.

As I said in my statement, it gave the lie to everything they said before. They had opposed it. They developed a whole political opposition in Europe. They supported the Greens in Germany, and at one time it looked very doubtful about whether we were going to be able to get our allies to support it, there was so much opposition.

So by now acceding to our request and by eliminating the SS-20's, in effect they give a lie to all the arguments that they made.

It must have been a difficult decision for them.

Senator EVANS. From the decision and your knowledge of the history that went into this, how would you judge the current attitudes and the rationale from the Soviet side? Do you feel that there really is a difference in the direction of their foreign policy? Is this merely a tactical setback from which they will, once again, move toward their more traditional goals?

Former Secretary ROGERS. Let me take a shot at that.

I remember when Khrushchev was here and our attitudes about Khrushchev, which were that he was going to be more forthcoming and maybe easier to get along with. That did not work out. Then we thought so again from time to time subsequently.

I think the attitude should be as follows.

It appears that a change has been made in Soviet policy. Certainly it has been made in some ways. Certainly in economic terms it has been made and certainly in terms of some further free expression in the Soviet Union it has been made. I think this treaty itself is an indication that some change was made.

It was interesting. The negotiators did not think that the chance of onsite inspection was very good. In fact, they doubted that we would be able to achieve it until Gorbachev came along. Then, all of a sudden, there was a quick, major change, which even surprised the negotiators, apparently. And I am speaking about the Russian negotiators.

They saw for the first time in the newspapers that Gorbachev had changed his position.

So I think yes, we have to accept that there has been a change.

Now, how significant that is, how lasting it is going to be, I think we have to wait and see.

Let's assume that maybe it is possible that they are changing their policy. We should encourage it. I don't see why we have to continue to call them names. We don't have to buy it, either. We don't have to accept it as a fact.

If they are changing their policy, and it is quite possible for economic reasons and for political reasons, because the satellite nations are having a good deal of trouble—and I am speaking about Cuba and Mozambique, Ethiopia and maybe to a lesser extent North Vietnam, Poland, and even Hungary—they have a lot of problems, both economic and political. It is very possible that they are saying to themselves we've got to be a little bit more forthcoming, we have to become a little more up to date on things, and maybe that is what they are doing.

Certainly there are a lot of indications to that effect.

So I think we should be willing to assume that there is that possibility.

At the same time, I don't think we should do anything on faith. I don't think we should say oh, now it is all changed and let's take a lot of chances.

I must say that what I am saying I think is the current policy of the administration. I think the negotiators that we have would say the same thing. I think they are excellent people. I don't think they are going to be taken in. We have had too many sad experiences with the Russians to be fooled, and I think that our policy is a very good one.

It is encouraging. I think it is the most encouraging period that I can remember in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Former Secretary VANCE. Senator, let me express my views on this question.

Senator EVANS. Yes, please go ahead.

Former Secretary VANCE. Let me say first that I agree with much of what Bill has said. Let me be more concrete, however.

I think that Gorbachev has recognized that the correlation of forces has been running against the Soviet Union and are continuing to run against the Soviet Union.

One of the principal causes of this is the perilous shape of their economy and the economic problems that they face, as well as some of the social problems which they face in terms of a loss in productivity, alcoholism, and many other similar kinds of problems.

Therefore, he concluded that he had to address head-on these domestic problems if he was going to turn the situation around. That is a tremendous job that he is facing, because he has to take on the bureaucracy. He has to deal with reallocation of all kinds of elements, both in terms of people and in terms of resources.

If he is to do that, he needs time, or a breathing space, as I think the Soviets call it. And if that is the case, that means that we are going to have more flexibility in their dealings in external affairs than they had before, because they have to devote time, effort, resources and money to dealing with these domestic problems.

As a consequence, I think that his position with respect to arms control is affected by this need for a breathing space, and I think it will have some effect—how much I don't know—as we increase the pace in the START negotiation.

There is also one other aspect that I cannot evaluate yet.

The Soviet Union appear to be in the process of changing its foreign policy strategy by shifting to the concept of natural or common security.

Whether time will prove this is something they will to stick to I don't know. But that is what they are saying at this point.

As Bill has said, these are possibilities, and we would be making a grave mistake if we did not explore these possibilities, in a hard-headed, non-starry-eyed way, to see if we can reach agreements which are in our national interest and which are verifiable.

Senator **Evans**. Thank you.

I cannot think of a time when Teddy Roosevelt's old adage is as appropriate as right now, and that is to speak softly, in terms of our relationships, and still carry a big stick.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. I think there is one other thing that I would like to add.

The Russians still are having serious problems with the Chinese. They still have a large concentration of forces on the Chinese border.

So far it does not seem that they have had any success in improving their relations with the Chinese, and that is an additional problem of some magnitude that they have to deal with.

Senator **Sarbanes** [presiding]. Secretary Rogers, you earlier, by way of a disclaimer for your testimony, stated that you were not a so-called "authoritative" witness. I simply want to make the observation that some of the best testimony has come from other than so-called "authoritative" witnesses.

So we appreciate both of you being here today and welcome your testimony.

I want to put this question to you:

You both made the point that it demonstrated great resolve and unity on the part of the allied countries to have deployed the INF force. Not all of those weapons have been deployed, incidentally.

What do you think the impact would be if the Senate failed to ratify the treaty, or to draw it even further, suppose a clear majority of the Senate wished to ratify it, but it was not the extraordinary two-thirds majority that is required under our Constitution? What if, for example, three-fifths of the Senate thought this was a very good treaty. Witnesses testified that it clearly would serve our interests and those of our allies, and absolutely should be ratified. It was an excellent proposition: here are the Soviets, as you pointed out, eliminating these weapons on an asymmetrical basis—at roughly a four to one ratio, as a matter of fact. They have dropped their insistence that independent European forces be included, so that the French and the British are free to continue their nuclear programs, as they choose. There is extensive intrusion in terms of verification.

Let me phrase the question in this way. Do you think we would be able to deploy the balance of our intermediate range force if, under these circumstances, the treaty were rejected?

Former Secretary **Vance**. I would like to try to answer that question.

First, I think it would be unlikely under those circumstances that we could deploy the rest of our INF force.

Senator **Sarbanes**. We might not even be able to retain the forces that are there now.

Former Secretary **Vance**. That is correct.

But the political effects within the alliance of our being unable to go forward at this time would be absolutely disastrous. Having seen that we were unable to be constant enough to continue with SALT II and then to see, after 10 years of negotiations, a failure of our resolve to ratify the INF treaty would have dire political effects within the alliance.

In addition, I think it would have grave consequences for any arms control negotiations in the future. For me, that would be a very sad, indeed a disastrous, consequence.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. I agree with that, and I would go further.

I think it would have those consequences as far as our allies are concerned, but it would have even possibly greater consequences throughout the world.

A lot of people in the world think we are war-mongers, that we are equally as guilty as the Russians in terms of wanting to dominate the world, and if we were unable to ratify this treaty when it has the unanimous support of our military people, all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it has the overwhelming support of the American people, it has the unanimous support of our NATO allies and all the military commanders in NATO, if a few people in the Senate are able to block the ratification of this treaty, I think it would be devastating—devastating not only to our NATO alliance, but all over the world.

I cannot think of a more serious setback to American foreign policy and to American interests throughout the world than to have this treaty fail, either fail by vote or die in the crib from being smothered because it never gets to a vote.

So I feel just the way Cy does. I think it would be a calamity to have that happen.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I appreciate those responses.

Secretary Vance, I particularly noted something in your statement that Secretary Rogers also made reference to. Let me just quote it again: "Senate ratification of this treaty, the product of a decade-long effort, pursued by two administrations of different parties, can send a powerful message to the world that the United States is a consistent, reliable negotiating partner, capable of speaking with an enduring voice. To approve this treaty in an election year will vividly demonstrate that on vital issues of national security, the United States can act with bipartisan unity."

It seems to me that, aside from the benefits that flow from the treaty itself and its terms, this sense of an America that can close ranks across partisan lines on vital issues of national security, when we perceive that an agreement that clearly serves our national interests, and when both our allies and also our adversaries, for that matter, can understand that, is a very important consideration.

Let me pursue another line of questioning.

The question was put to you earlier about whether the Soviets are changing their policy. I think you both indicated that there was the possibility that such changes may, in fact, be taking place. You were both then very careful about how we should respond to that.

The question I would ask is this:

What is wrong with skillfully trying to find out whether, in fact, the Soviets are changing their policy, while all the time maintaining our guard in case it should turn out that they are not changing their policy?

In other words, some seem to see an inconsistency between, on the one hand, exploring to see if there is a change in policy and adjusting to that, while at the same time being on the ready if, in fact, your exploration should prove that such a change is not happening.

Do you find any inconsistency in carrying, as it were, this double attitude? How would you approach it?

Former Secretary VANCE. I think there is no inconsistency. Indeed, it is just simple, good common sense to proceed in that way.

Senator SARBANES. Secretary Rogers.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I agree. There is no inconsistency. That should be, and I think is, our policy.

Senator SARBANES. I think it has in fact been the policy of every administration in dealing with the Soviets.

Former Secretary VANCE. It has.

Senator SARBANES. I think, Secretary Vance, you were the one who said "tough-minded, but not starry-eyed." I think that was the expression you used.

Former Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much for your testimony. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I enjoyed very much the testimony of both of you and I appreciate your being here today.

I think that it is pretty clear to all of us that the INF Treaty, as we say down in Kentucky, "is a done deal." I think it is going to be ratified rather overwhelmingly and without any crippling amendments.

Consequently, I would like to talk for a minute and ask you questions about the post-INF environment in Europe.

There was an interesting article in today's New York Times, the headline of which is "Summit Treaty Spurs Bonn to Play Field for Détente and Disarmament."

Reading from the article a couple of paragraphs, "The treaty signed in Washington played to the yearning for détente and disarmament of a divided nation straddling the front line of the East-West conflict, and it fanned the suspicion that the United States will not stand sentinel over West Europe forever. The West Germans are probably ranked among the most enthusiastic Western boosters of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his domestic and foreign policies. Polls have found that the West Germans view the Soviet leader as having greater credibility than Mr. Reagan. Probably more significantly, they have shown that only 24 percent consider the Soviet Union as a threat today, compared with 55 percent 5 years ago."

Further on, "In Bonn last week, Mr. Shevardnadze continued the courtship by professing ardent interest in eliminating the weapons that worry Germans most—short range nuclear rockets and chemical weapons * * *".

Before you gentlemen came on board a good deal has been said in the last couple of days about our conventional situation vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact and the post-INF environment and the need to seriously address that, I am wondering how each of you sees the West Germans fitting into this.

In your judgment will they respond to Soviet calls for triple zero? Can we safely go in that direction without putting our conventional forces in an even worse position than they are in today?

I know Senator Levin has made some arguments to the contrary, but it seems to me that a majority of the experts looking at the conventional force balance in Europe feel that we are at a disadvantage.

I am interested in your observation, since both of you have dealt with West Germans over the years, in various treaty contexts.

How do you see this situation now? Where do we go from here?

Former Secretary ROGERS. Of course, the problem of our dealings with Germany is really one of the major problems in the field of foreign policy that we have.

It is a complex problem because of World War I and World War II. We have been able to maintain good relations with the Germans under different political regimes, and at times it has been difficult. Certainly it was difficult at one time to deploy the Pershings, because the Green political movement was a very substantial movement.

I do think that the leadership in Germany realizes the value of NATO, and I think they will be determined to maintain the strength of NATO.

So, I think our policy has to be sure that that continues.

I think one of the good things about the INF Treaty is it does not decouple of us. In a very major way, it makes us much closer to the Germans.

The Germans have always been nervous about whether we really, in the final analysis, meant what we said, whether we would come to their defense if they were under attack, particularly by nuclear weapons.

I think this is going to do a lot to eliminate that fear.

So I feel that we will be able to manage our relations with Germany on a satisfactory basis, and I think we will have to do that.

Of course, there are a lot of fears in Europe. One of the fears that the Russians have is the possibility that East Germany and West Germany will get together again. One of the concerns they have, you will notice every time the East Germans make a move toward getting closer to the West Germans, the Russians get very nervous.

I think there has always been a feeling in the back of the minds of some Germans that the unification of the two Germanys would be a good thing.

So I think anyone who is Secretary of State or in the field of foreign policy—and certainly this committee—has to realize it is a complex problem. It is a day-to-day problem. But because of the success of NATO, because in a very major way it has contributed to peace for the last 45 years, I think it will continue to be strong.

We have to be careful to support it, and we will have defections from time to time. Look at what happened in Spain.

But those political defections, we can correct those. I don't think the one in Spain is going to be that serious.

So I guess, to summarize a rather long answer, we have to develop and continue our strong alliances with West Germany. I think we can do it. I think this treaty, ratification of this treaty, will help in that regard.

Senator McCONNELL. Let me make just one observation before we go to Secretary Vance.

I find the German position somewhat curious. I understand full well that their view is that tactical nuclear weapons fall on German soil. I understand that.

On the other hand, if you take away that remaining deterrent, in all likelihood the conventional war is going to be fought in Germany, too. Therefore, as I said earlier, I find it somewhat curious that there would be support for further weakening our ability to deter a conventional attack by going to triple zero.

Former Secretary ROGERS. When you speak about "triple zero," I am sort of out of the loop these days. What is that?

Senator McCONNELL. I am talking about the elimination of nuclear battlefield weapons below the threshold of the INF Treaty, with a range under the 500 kilometer cutoff.

There are some who feel that we ought to be improving our capability along those lines to compensate for the numerical imbalance that we have with regard to the Warsaw Pact and the other conventional forces.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I think that is right.

I think we will have to modernize. I am not sure, when we speak about the Germans' thinking, that it is all that monolithic. I think you will find all kinds of German opinions. But when they get down to making decisions, they must say to themselves, if we eliminate all other defensive weapons and we have to rely on old fashioned war with troops and artillery and so forth, we are going to be the ones that suffer, just as in other wars that have been fought on our soil.

So I don't believe that will be a problem. I think the German leadership is too smart for that.

Senator McCONNELL. Secretary Vance.

Former Secretary VANCE. I think it would be a mistake to go to triple zero until we are much further down the road and have seen what happens with respect to the START and what comes out of those negotiations.

It is not going to be easy to negotiate a 50 percent cut in intercontinental weapons. There are lots of problems—subceilings, whether or not there will be a clear tie required in with SDI, and a number of other very complex problems.

So I think that we would be making a mistake if we, at this point, rushed into a triple zero situation.

However, I do think that we ought to get at the problem of conventional forces and start serious negotiations on that issue.

In the meantime, I think that we have to modernize our conventional forces, and this is going to take money. I believe we will have problems with the real problem that lies ahead.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I agree with that.

Senator McCONNELL. Yes, it seems to me that it is on the verge of being a very significant problem.

I gather that both of you do not subscribe to the view that there should be any linkage between the START discussions and progress on conventional reductions, is that correct?

Former Secretary VANCE. As far as I am concerned, there should be no linkage between the two.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I agree with that.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome both of you to this hearing. We are delighted to have your thoughts and advice based upon your great experience in the realm that we are exploring.

Let me say, first, before I go to some questions, that I thought the fallacious argument that Senator Helms raised earlier this week about fissionable material had been put to rest and given a decent burial. But today there he went again.

Let's be clear that in order to satisfy the Senator from North Carolina's demand that all fissionable material be destroyed and policed, we would have to allow Soviet inspectors inside all our energy companies' nuclear reactors, Soviet inspectors inside all our uranium enrichment and plutonium processing plants, Soviet inspectors inside all our nuclear bomb design and assembly plants.

I am not sure Senator Helms has thought this through with care.

His demand would mean that Soviet Communist inspectors would have a free run inside those Duke Power Company and Carolina Power and Light reactors in his State of North Carolina.

President Reagan and his U.S. negotiators opposed this exact suggestion when it was publicly made by the Soviet Union. But, enough about these protestations from those who have never supported an arms control agreement, who now take the position that this treaty should be opposed because it does not go far enough.

The American people are not dumb. They are not about to believe that Ronald Reagan, our most virulently anti-Communist president, has been snookered by the Soviets.

Let me go on now to some questions that relate to a few major concerns, like linkage, compliance, verification, and strategic doctrine.

If we ratify this modest INF Treaty—and I expect we will—it will be the first time the United States has ever ratified a treaty with the Soviets to destroy any offensive nuclear missiles.

I would like to elicit your views, whoever chooses to respond, on a few of these central issues.

First, on linkage, do you believe it would be wise or unwise for the United States to condition achievement of one national security goal, specifically ratifying the INF Treaty, upon the achievement of other desirable goals, like Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, compliance with Helsinki, or compliance with other arms agreements?

Former Secretary ROGERS. I think it would be very unwise indeed to link it in any formal way. So I would strongly oppose that.

Obviously, in our discussions with the Soviets, we have been discussing some of these other issues, and we can discuss them at the same time. That's fine—but certainly not by way of linkage.

Senator CRANSTON. On the matter of compliance, to what extent are questions about Soviet compliance with arms agreements clear, demonstrated violations, or disputes about ambiguous interpretations or ambiguous conduct?

Former Secretary VANCE. Could I come back before that to the question that Bill just answered?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Former Secretary VANCE. I agree with what Bill said. I think it would be a bad mistake to try to link. Indeed, it would be a devastating mistake if we were to try to link this with our issue of alleged violations.

I would point out, however, that it is not quite accurate to say that this is the first time that nuclear weapons have been destroyed.

Pursuant to SALT II, weapons were destroyed, however, it is a fact this is the first time that we have had a whole weapon system in total being eliminated and banned for the future.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I don't think we ever mutually agreed, did we?

Former Secretary VANCE. Yes, we did. In SALT II we agreed you could not exceed specified ceilings, and as a result of that, Polaris boats were taken out of operation and other weapons, were destroyed.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. I did say this would be the first time we have ratified a treaty that would do that.

Former Secretary VANCE. Excuse me. I missed "ratified."

Senator DODD. A minor obstacle. [Laughter.]

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, a minor obstacle, as Chris Dodd suggests.

I did ask then about compliance and whether Soviet compliance has involved demonstrated and clear violations, or whether there are ambiguities about interpretations or conduct.

Former Secretary VANCE. I think in a few cases there have been violations.

Senator CRANSTON. In a few cases?

Former Secretary VANCE. Yes.

In most of the cases, there have been ambiguities. There have been ambiguities on both sides as to whether or not actions that each took did or did not violate the treaty. That is why you have the Consultative Commission, to deal with those kind of issues.

I do not agree with the long list that Senator Helms referred to. I think that a lot of the items are not listed "violations," as he described them. Far from it; most of them are ambiguous situations.

Senator CRANSTON. He included in his list, as I understood it, alleged Soviet violations of SALT II, never ratified, and we, too, have "violated" SALT II, have we not, an unratified treaty?

Former Secretary VANCE. We have abandoned the treaty at this point.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. And we have done things——

Former Secretary VANCE. Since then.

Senator **Cranston** [continuing]. That would have been prohibited had we ratified it?

Former Secretary **Vance**. Yes, that is my understanding.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. Of course, it is difficult to talk about "violating" an unratified treaty.

Senator **Cranston**. Yes. Absolutely. It does not belong in that list.

Then I take it from your response, Cy, that we cannot claim that our record has been 100 percent unambiguous and 100 percent perfect in living up to treaties on arms matters that we have signed?

Former Secretary **Vance**. No, we cannot.

Senator **Cranston**. On verification, since there is no such thing as perfect verification, how much is really enough?

Should we approve INF even if we know we might not be able to detect all violations?

Former Secretary **Vance**. We are never going to have 100 percent certainty on verification. It simply is impossible.

So, in terms of verification, it must be sufficient verification so that if there is any cheating, we will pick it up soon enough so that we can counter it and not put ourselves in peril.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. But having said that, this is a very, very tough treaty in terms of verification.

Former Secretary **Vance**. I agree with that.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. We are going to be able to witness the elimination of their missile sites, and we are going to be doing it at the same time. So this is observation. We are going to look at it and see it.

Now there are two areas of possible violation. One is do we know for sure that they don't have other missiles which have not been accounted for under whatever it is called, an instrument of understanding, the IOU, or something like that. Anyway, they have to list all of the missiles they have, and I suppose an argument can be made that maybe they have not listed some, or maybe they tried to secret them away.

It is hard for me to understand the logic of why they would do that. I mean, if they are going to destroy 1,600, and we are watching and we can see them destroy them, why would they want to hide one or two?

Furthermore, they have plenty of other ICBM's, other missiles that they can use. So why would they want to cheat on this?

So you have for the first 3 years, it seems to me, an almost foolproof system. After 3 years you can say to yourself they might cheat, they might try to build some more. But you can say why would they do that? Why would they try to build some more?

First, they probably will get caught because we have a lot of technical means. Second, they have plenty of weapons. Third, hopefully, by that time we will have a START Treaty of some sort. So why would they want to go back to building INF's?

You know, from my standpoint, it seems as if this is a damn good treaty and verifiable.

It is true that people say is it possible for the Russians to cheat and I guess the answer to that is anything is possible. But it is going to be very difficult for them, and I feel very comfortable with the verification procedures.

Senator CRANSTON. I see that my time is up.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I'm sorry, I took too much time.

Senator CRANSTON. No. I thank you for that full and very helpful answer.

I do have some further questions, but I will have time later, and so will you, I trust.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to both of you here this morning. You have covered an awful lot of the questions that I had.

I would like to address one which comes back to the question that has been raised now by numerous individuals in articles, editorials, and the like, and that concerns the whole relationship, what some have called a "crisis" in the NATO relationship as a result of the INF agreement.

Secretary Vance, you, of course, are a unique and particularly special witness because you were there at the creation of the INF "problem." You were Secretary of State in 1977 when Helmut Schmidt gave his speech in London, identifying the SS-20 as a serious problem, and then in 1979 you co-authored the dual-track decision as a way of dealing with this issue.

The argument by some is that the Euro-missile decision was made not only in order to deal with the SS-20 problem, but also trying to fill some gaps that already existed between ourselves and the Soviets. Now, having reached an INF agreement, the Euro-missiles are gone and the SS-20's are gone, and we have gone back and we have sanctioned, the gap that existed prior to the SS-20's going in.

So, in fact, we have not really gained anything, but merely have moved us back to the status quo that existed prior to 1977.

How do you address that particular concern, and could you maybe enlighten us as to the precise reasons why the Euro-missile decision was made?

Former Secretary VANCE. Yes.

The reason that we had a Euro-missile problem was the fact that the Soviets had begun to introduce the SS-20's, which were intermediate range weapons, with great accuracy, rapid response time, and mobility.

This created a concern on the part of our NATO allies as to whether there was decoupling taking place, or that would take place, and that somehow our allies would be left in the lurch.

That was the principal reason that we decided to move forward with the dual track strategy. That led to a year long study, out of which came agreement that the way to deal with the problem was the two-track approach, whereby we would make the decision to deploy and deploy not only in one country, Germany, but also in several other countries as well, coupled with the decision that we would seek to negotiate the reduction or elimination of all intermediate weapon systems to a figure as "low as possible." In our talks with the Germans, it was agreed that that meant as low as zero.

When we showed resolve within the Alliance to go ahead and deploy, this gave to the Alliance and to the Soviets a very clear signal that we had the courage in the Alliance and the steadfastness to go forward and pursue this strategy, at the same time, if they were willing to sit down and negotiate for reductions or total elimination we were prepared to do that.

This steadfastness has been very important for the alliance. It gave a clear signal to the Soviets that we would not just sit by and let them build up their intermediate forces while we did nothing.

Now that we are eliminating the whole intermediate system, we have addressed the basic problem—the problem of a perception—that we were going to decouple or at least lead the Soviets to think that we were going to decouple.

Senator **DODD**. So the argument that, in fact, we were trying to take care of a shortfall in tactical nuclear forces, that that was the reason for the deployment of the Euro-missiles, is unfounded?

Former Secretary **VANCE**. Yes.

Senator **DODD**. Secretary Kissinger, in an article that I believe—was in "Newsweek," but it may have been one of the other magazines, I am told by staff that it was "Newsweek."

Let me read a summation, Secretary Rogers I ask both you and Secretary Vance to comment on this.

First of all, there is an assumption in this article that there is now a crisis in NATO as a result of the INF agreement, that new, creative decisions will have to be reached in order to bridge the gap created by this decision.

He makes four points.

One, he says that there is an apparent change in military doctrine pursued by the past five administrations, and this now places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea.

Two, he says that many Europeans are convinced a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, "the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic will be decoupled."

By the way, I should mention in the first point he adds that, given our budgetary difficulties, coming up with modernization or new defense systems will be that much more difficult.

Third, he says his fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced, and because of that imbalance, the administration invocations of its horror of nuclear war sent a shudder through the Europeans, who worry that America may recoil before its nuclear commitments—going back to the old de Gaulle concern, that we would not sacrifice New York to save Paris—with all due respect to my colleague from New York here.

He never said Hartford or New Haven at all. He was always talking about New York.

Senator **MOYNIHAN**. Yes, I recall.

Senator **DODD**. Last, he says that all this makes it probable—and this is the important point, it seems to me—all of this makes it probable that Europe will seek new directions in the years ahead. Some countries will be tempted to maneuver between East and West and to extend the administration's denuclearization rhetoric to the battlefield weapons. Others will go in the opposite direction and seek to build up their own nuclear forces.

You mentioned earlier, I think, Secretary Rogers, that under this agreement the French and the Germans can go ahead with their own programs.

Why is Secretary Kissinger wrong in that assessment?

Former Secretary ROGERS. Well, let's divide the points. He made four points.

Senator DODD. I can go back and cover them again, if you would like.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Let's talk about a crisis in NATO. I suppose that word has been used over the years some 25 times and in various ways.

There is always a problem in NATO. Anytime you have an alliance of that type, there are problems. But I do not agree that there is a crisis in NATO.

I think there would be a crisis in NATO if this treaty were not ratified. Then you would have a crisis in NATO.

But I think this treaty, if ratified, shows that we are not going to be decoupled. It shows that we are deeply, even more deeply involved, in the alliance. And when we talk about elimination of weapons and so forth, after this treaty is ratified there will still be, what, 4,000 nuclear weapons on our side?

Former Secretary VANCE. Over 4,000.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Over 4,000.

So we are not talking about zero weapons. We are talking about zero INF weapons.

I think that instead of being a crisis and being weakened, this is going to strengthen NATO.

Now, I keep hearing people who oppose this treaty talk about how they have been in touch with the leaders of Europe.

Senator DODD. That was going to be my next question, so you can address that, too.

Former Secretary ROGERS. They have had all of these "private discussions" with the leaders of Europe and the leaders tell them in very melodramatic fashion how upset they are.

Well, frankly, I don't believe that. Just outright, I don't believe it.

Senator DODD. Have you had conversations with former colleagues in the European Community?

Former Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sort of.

Senator DODD. Has anyone expressed any concern like that to you?

Former Secretary ROGERS. Well, they say it, but it is all very general.

I mean, obviously any time there is a treaty, national leaders talk about this problem and that problem with the treaty. But the fact of the matter is all of the leaders of the NATO nations strongly support this treaty, and they have said so. And the military leaders in those countries do, too.

I don't know what cocktail parties our colleagues have been attending and who has been telling them this, but I just think it is baloney.

If there is any truth to it, why don't the leaders say so? I think it is a disservice to the nation to keep going around having anonymous reports about national leaders in other countries opposed to

INF. Obviously, on the issue of whether there is going to be difficulty getting money for modernization, I think the answer is yes. I think there is difficulty in getting money for any program these days. But I think it is essential and I think we will get it done.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Kerry.

Senator DODD. Excuse me, but I think Secretary Vance has a response.

Former Secretary VANCE. I agree with what Bill has said.

I have not talked to any heads of government recently about this issue, but I have talked——

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me for interrupting, if I may.

There is a roll call vote going on at this time, so I will run over and vote, and then will come back. Then I would hope we could wind up with our witnesses before this afternoon because we will have new witnesses.

Senator Dodd, would you preside?

Senator DODD. I will stay until you come back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and I am sorry.

Please continue, Mr. Secretary.

Former Secretary VANCE. Although I have not talked with any heads of government recently, I have talked recently with a number of senior officials in Europe about this issue.

They support what Bill has just said. There are obviously in each country some people who disagree, as there are in this country. But I think the record speaks for itself, as Bill has pointed out, when you see each one of the heads of government saying they are all for this and they feel very strongly that it is critically important that we ratify and ratify promptly without reservations or amendments.

So I simply am not hearing the alleged voices that say we have a great crisis in NATO at this time.

Now, with respect to the specifics, if you want me to deal with a couple of them. First, the elimination of the intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles has not changed the conventional balance but we are a lot better off than before in that the Soviets will have to destroy four times as many weapons, as we will. This is obviously a real plus for us.

Second, of course, we have to move more rapidly in coming to grips with the conventional problem of conventional weapons. It should be, and as I understand it, it is a priority of this administration in the months that remain to try to construct a framework for conventional arms reductions negotiation.

With respect to the suggestion that it is probable that Europe will take new divergent directions, I do not see the situation that way at this point. I believe the fact that this treaty has been signed, and if ratified will go into effect, will not push them in the direction of taking new routes and changing our relationship. Indeed, as Bill says, I think it will tend to strengthen the relationship and would make the alliance proud of the fact that it has demonstrated the will and steadfastness to pursue our course through to a final conclusion.

Senator DODD [presiding]. Do either of you see that there is a danger of individual nations within the alliance going off unilaterally on their own, since they are not bound by this agreement, to have their own intermediate nuclear force structure, if you will?

Former Secretary VANCE. I believe modernization will continue with respect to the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France, as they are already embarked upon that course. I don't see other nations in NATO developing nuclear weapons.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I agree.

I think that if I were sitting in the Kremlin and representing the Soviet Union, I would be more concerned about my allies moving in the other direction. I think there is much greater likelihood, in view of the economic difficulties that the Russians are having and the difficulties that the satellite nations are having economically, that there would be more of a tendency for them to move in the direction of the West than vice versa.

Senator DODD. I am going to declare a five minute recess here because I am about to miss a vote.

I presume that one of my colleagues will be returning immediately to continue the questioning. I know that Senator Kerry, Senator Moynihan, and Senator Adams have questions as well.

I personally want to thank both of you. Your testimony is extremely helpful. It addresses some of the issues that you know have been raised by others dealing with the broader questions, and particularly the NATO alliance. It is extremely important.

Thank you both very much.

Former Secretary VANCE. Thank you.

Former Secretary ROGERS. It has been a pleasure to see you again, sir.

Senator DODD. The committee will stand in recess for 5 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of our panelists very much for their interesting testimony and for being here with us.

I thought we might deal with a couple of the criticisms of the treaty that are out there. To those who have been criticizing it, among other reasons, there have been two principal reasons for having the Pershings deployed in Europe. One was, obviously, as a counter to the SS-20's.

Since the SS-20's are being removed, there is now a fallback position. They are saying that the Pershings, the INF missiles generally, are an important escalatory ingredient in the flexible response doctrine, that they are part of an important ability, if you ever were in a conflict or were war-fighting, that they would be one of the choice weapons you would want to go to, and their elimination means that you now have to go to larger or you have taken this out of our arsenal.

I wonder if you would comment as to whether or not there is any reality to that, or how you would respond to that particular criticism.

Former Secretary ROGERS. I think we have to deal with it because some people have raised the question. But I just don't see it.

In the first place, I have difficulty, Senator, with the whole discussion about how you fight a nuclear war. I mean, the idea is sort of they'll use one of theirs and we'll use two of ours, and then we may try some others, and maybe that isn't enough.

Somehow that is unworldly. I cannot imagine either side using nuclear weapons with any confidence that it is not going to destroy the world.

I mean, once you start down the road of using nuclear weapons, no one knows what is going to happen. Look at Chernobyl, just a little thing like that.

So the idea of sort of playing nuclear war games, sitting around a table, is so unrealistic to me.

The nuclear weapons that we have, and SS-20's are a good example, are for the purpose of intimidation. We have to try to be sure that our allies are not intimidated. You know, when you talk about having a conventional war, the minute you use nuclear weapons, it is not conventional anymore. It is a nuclear war.

We will have 4,000, as Cy and I pointed out earlier, nuclear weapons in Europe. So I do not believe there is anything to that argument.

I cannot believe that the Russians are thinking along that line. I cannot believe that they are thinking about actually starting a nuclear war. They have had a great advantage over us in terms of numbers for a long time, and they had a tremendous advantage over Europe when they had their SS-20's and we did not have our Pershings.

So sort of the idea that they are right on the verge of starting a nuclear war and if we are not careful it is going to be another Pearl Harbor—I have trouble believing that. And I think they must be coming to that conclusion, too.

We have enough to destroy the world many times over. Whether they have 10 percent more ICBM's than we do does not seem to me to make much difference. It is an interesting debating point, but I don't think in the real world it makes any difference.

I cannot ever remember—and I am sure Cy will say the same thing—that we ever had a war game where we said now here is what we will do, we will sneak up on the Russians and we will drop two nuclear weapons, and then they will retaliate, and so forth. I don't believe any government, certainly neither the Soviets nor we, is thinking that way.

So I guess I have trouble even with that concept. It does not seem realistic.

I mean we have sea launched missiles, we have missiles on artillery weapons, and we have missiles on planes and all sorts of things that we could use. So if we started down that road—you know, I think I feel strongly about this because not so long ago, 3 or 4 years ago, I played the role of the President in a major war game that was reported in the "Wall Street Journal," so I guess I can talk about it a little bit.

Part of it was along this line.

The minute you start talking about trying to respond to one nuclear attack, it is a whole different ballgame. Nobody knows what will happen.

Senator **Kerry**. I have always thought, Mr. Secretary, that we would be better off if we changed the names from "war games" to "war exercises," or something like that.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. I agree.

In answer to the point you are making—and I guess the reason I took so long is I feel strongly about it—I don't think that makes any sense at all.

Senator **Kerry**. I appreciate your answer. I wanted it because it is raised by those who criticize the treaty, and I think it ought to be addressed.

Former Secretary **Vance**. Let me just say that I think Bill has hit the nail on the head.

First, talking about a carefully calibrated escalation after you have crossed the nuclear threshold is madness. You cannot realistically think of that kind of scenario.

Once you cross the nuclear threshold, I don't see how you can control escalation; and anyone who thinks that somehow you can in a very neatly calibrated way is day-dreaming.

Second, Bill was dead right when he pointed out that the principal problem on the use of the SS-20's was the psychological use of those weapons for the purpose of political intimidation.

That is why it was so important from the standpoint of our allies, to see that this whole range of weapons was not only eliminated, but banned for the future.

Senator **Kerry**. I'd like to ask you another question, if I can.

Henry Kissinger, in the articles referred to by Senator Dodd, has said we should ratify the treaty because to not do so would be what all of you have said with respect to the Alliance; but at the same time he has criticized it as pushing us toward a "decoupling."

Earlier, I think, Secretary Rogers, that you said you thought it couples us. I happen to agree with you.

But for the record, would you articulate further why it does not decouple, and in what ways you feel it couples us.

Former Secretary **Vance**. I think that it does not decouple because once you eliminate this group of weapons, you have eliminated the fear of our NATO allies that we would stand aside if these weapons were used in Europe against our allies.

Therefore, I believe strongly that what had been agreed to in the treaty strengthens the relationship between ourselves and our allies and clarifies our steadfastness.

Former Secretary **Rogers**. And, of course, we all have to remember that we have 350,000 Americans in Europe, and I don't know of any better way to couple our interest than to have that number of Americans in Europe.

In any conventional war, there would be a major attack on our forces. So we not only have those Americans on European soil in defense of the alliance, but we also have submarines, Cruise missiles, and other kinds of short-range nuclear weapons, and I don't know how we could be coupled much more.

Over the years, our resolve has been very great and it will continue.

I think there has been some suggestion here that maybe the Europeans will try to decouple, but that does not make any sense either. I mean, they have been worried that we might decouple.

And now that worry seems to be passed, and I think they will be reassured.

I think they would worry very much if this was not ratified.

Senator KERRY. My time has expired.

I thank you for that answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Adams.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and Mr. Secretary, I am so very pleased that you are here today. I agree completely with your position. I am hopeful that we will ratify this treaty without anything that would send it back to the Soviets.

My concern is that a new generation starts into power in the Soviet Union and a new generation here, and that our goal is to produce stability in the relationship.

I happen to agree with you. I don't know how you cross the nuclear threshold. How do we answer the question? I am very hopeful that this is the beginning of a bipartisan foreign policy that will carry into a lot of other areas.

How do you best suggest that we produce this stability utilizing this treaty as a first step? The question that is going to be put to us is aren't you really changing the relationship with the Soviet Union by agreeing to pull these out and using defensive strategies rather than offensive strategies in Europe? In other words, we all know that the reason for the Russian offensive strategy and the SS-20's was that we do not want to fight on Russian soil, we want to fight on somebody else's soil.

That, to me, is a basic thing that a number of us must state in this debate, that as we move to a new generation in this country and in the Soviet Union, we will maintain stability and this treaty moves toward it.

So, as I said to Secretary Shultz, tell me how you feel we can best state this, because some of us are going to be in a position of wanting to do that.

Either one of you or both of you may respond, because you represent to me a movement in the United States that has gone on now for several decades, and the best of it.

So how do we answer that question of will this improve the stability between the two superpowers so that we can get on with our other business in the world?

Former Secretary VANCE. Let me make four points, if I might.

First, on the question of reservations and amendments, I think the Congress will make a terrible mistake if it permits any reservations or amendments. Once you let one get in, then it is almost inevitable that you are going to get others, and then you get a Christmas tree and you end up with a "killer amendment" and you have killed the treaty.

So I, from sad experience, would urge you not to let any amendments be put on this agreement because I think you may end up killing the treaty if you do.

Second, with respect to the specific question that you put, I think the fact that we have had this treaty—it has been agreed to and if ratified without qualifications—is going to give confidence to the alliance that we can stick together, that we can speak with an enduring voice, and that we can speak with a bipartisan standpoint in doing what is best for NATO and for the alliance. I think that is a very, very important message to convey.

There are two problems, however, that I think we ought to address ourselves to.

One is that we ought to pay more attention to real consultations with our allies and not go with our minds made up, listen to what they have to say, and let it go in one ear and out the other. I think often that is what we do.

On the other hand, they should pay more attention to burden-sharing. We are carrying too much of the load, and they have to realize that if we are going to have a successful, continuing alliance, that is something they have to address.

We cannot be expected to carry the bulk of the load. They have to do more.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary?

Former Secretary ROGERS. I think, in addition to what Cy said, you are speaking about stability in terms of the superpowers, and what about young people? How are they going to think?

Well, one of the problems that we have had with the young people in the Soviet Union is they have not been exposed to very many ideas from outside, and there is no doubt that they are fearful of the United States. They do not trust the United States.

They remember the war, their fathers remember the war and all the things that went with it, so they are worried about us.

Now, as they become somewhat more open a society, they will have better opportunities to know more about us. We, in turn, will, if Gorbachev means at all what he says—I am not talking about every word, but if he means anything along the lines that he is talking about—that will change the attitude of some young people in this country to some extent.

Suppose he gets out of Afghanistan in a year, as he said he would like to? Suppose in the interest of good relations between the two countries he decides to quit supporting the Nicaraguans and he tells them we'd like to have good relations with the United States, so we are not going to continue to send arms to you, we are not going to support you to the same extent? Suppose that should happen. And we continue on START talks and they proceed successfully, and we get a treaty in the next year or two.

Those things—I don't mean all of them necessarily, at one time—things like that can give added confidence to young people throughout the world that it is possible for the two superpowers to develop relations that may result in a more stable, more peaceful climate in the world.

That is what we all hope for. That is what we are here talking about today. This is a step in that direction.

I think if we can, we should take further steps in that direction.

As we have said, it makes no sense for the two superpowers to talk about war. They know full well and we certainly do that we can't have an exchange of nuclear weapons.

So I think it is a process of education, a process of learning a little more about each other and trying to get along with each other.

They don't trust us and we certainly do not trust them.

Now, as time goes on, we can remove a little of that mistrust, I hope. But that is going to be a long process, and it is quite possible for us—look how we have gotten along over the years with the Chinese. Who would have thought in 1972 that we were going to get along as well? We have differences, but we get along with them quite well.

I don't believe any American says to himself that we have to worry about the Chinese using a nuclear bomb against the United States or any of our territories. I think we are confident that we get along with them pretty well.

And it is possible as time goes on that we can develop that same confidence with the Soviet Union. Keep in mind that we have not had a world conflict in—what is it—forty-some years. In the first half of this century we had two major world wars. But since then we have not, and I attribute that to the nuclear deterrent.

You know, people talk about getting rid of all nuclear weapons. I think the fact that we have had nuclear weapons is the principal reason we have not had World War III.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Adams.

Senator Moynihan.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, this has been an extraordinary morning for the committee, and I am aware of how much longer it has gone on than it ought to have done. But to have two such exceptional American public servants makes one proud.

The CHAIRMAN. And both New Yorkers, too.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes, both New Yorkers, but one who can also make a considerable claim to West Virginia, however. They span this whole age.

Secretary Rogers was a member of the Cabinet, I believe, in the year the Soviets exploded their first hydrogen bomb—was that not the case?

Former Secretary ROGERS. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator MOYNIHAN. And you both have been through that whole time, present at that creation.

Can I just offer one remark. Both of you have spoken so eloquently about what you mean when talking about nuclear war.

I was one of the INF observers. We have had a group going back and forth for the purpose of being able to speak about how INF questions were negotiated. We did not do any of the negotiating, but we watched.

One rather remarkable occasion happened one evening. We would normally meet with the Soviet delegation, and on one evening about a year ago, we were talking about prospects for the treaty negotiations, and the wife of one of the chief Soviet negotiators spoke to several of us. We asked why are you suddenly loosening up, and she said, "You have not had your Chernobyl yet."

I do offer the thought that it made an impression on them.

Sir, I would like to ask you this.

The Declaration of Independence speaks of a decent respect for the opinion of mankind, and with respect to the role of the Senate it is true that our Constitutional arrangements are unique. There is no country in the world, save ours, where that signing ceremony in the East Room in the White House just before Christmas would not have been the end of the matter. The treaty was signed.

The Soviets are actually announcing that they are going to put this before their Supreme Soviet.

But if we were to turn this treaty down, would it not be a blow to the confidence the world has in the straight-forwardness of Americans? We have never meant to be a devious people, but would we not commence to look devious? Would we not present ourselves as people who are not good negotiators, trustworthy partners, as the Secretary said.

Former Secretary VANCE. My answer, Senator Moynihan, is yes, I think we would run a grave risk if we did that, particularly in light of recent history, where we negotiated for years on the SALT I and SALT II negotiations—

Senator MOYNIHAN. And the Test Ban Treaty.

Former Secretary VANCE [continuing]. And after years of negotiations with two administrations on SALT II we were not able to carry through, and it failed.

Senator MOYNIHAN. And the Test Ban Treaty, too.

Former Secretary VANCE. And the Test Ban Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These are all lying, gathering dust at this point, in the records of the Senate.

To then have another, after ten years of negotiations, another treaty, which fails because it cannot get the approval of the Senate, is going to raise very grave questions about our ability to govern ourselves and our ability to carry through on agreements reached by our officials negotiating in good faith on behalf of our nation.

Now, obviously, if there are matters discovered which really make for a bad treaty, you would have to deal with those. That is not the case in the treaty before you. It is a good treaty.

This is a very carefully negotiated treaty. I have looked at it very carefully and I have some experience in this. I think this is one of the better treaties that has been negotiated.

No treaty is perfect, but this is one which certainly deserves the support and approval, of the Senate.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Senator, you always come up with an unusual and valid idea. I had not thought of what you had said.

That is exactly what will be thought of us. We will be considered devious. It will be headlined as "CIA Scuttles Treaty; Makes Pleas Behind Backs," or something of that kind. You can imagine it. What would they say? What reason could be given if you have most of the people in Congress, the public, all our military heads, all the NATO allies, all the military people who are now in charge of the defense of the West, if you have everybody on one side and we do not ratify? It will be considered a devious act: "CIA Deviously Scuttles Treaty."

Senator MOYNIHAN. And the very quality of openness, which we prize in our government, will be discredited. It will be said that something goes on that nobody knows, that there is, in fact, a secret government.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Absolutely. Absolutely. Some great power, Wall Street and the CIA, scuttle it. You can see it now.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes.

Mr. Secretaries, we do thank you. I thank you so very deeply. You are New Yorkers and we are immensely proud of you. It has been a special moment for this committee, if I may say so, as a very junior Member.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Senator.

Former Secretary VANCE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I share Senator Moynihan's admiration for each of you. We wish you well, and thank you very much for being with us this morning.

The committee is now recessed until 2 p.m., when General Rowny and Mr. Abshire will testify.

Former Secretary ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Former Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met at 2 p.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Helms, Pressler, Trible, Evans, and McConnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

This afternoon, we are pleased to have before us Gen. Edward Rowny, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters and Ambassador David Abshire, formerly the U.S. Permanent Representative to the NATO North Atlantic Council.

General Rowny has a long association with arms control issues. Between 1973 and 1979, he was the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SALT negotiations. Following his retirement in 1979, he was a highly visible critic of SALT II. In 1982 and 1983, he served as head of the administration's START delegation. Now, General Rowny is a strong supporter of the new INF agreement. Given his strong credentials as an arms control skeptic, it will be valuable to the committee to hear General Rowny's views of the merits of the treaty and its implications for the alliance.

Ambassador Abshire has a longstanding and deep interest in alliance issues. He brings to us an excellent knowledge of the unique perspectives of the NATO partners. I look forward very much to receiving his judgments.

General Rowny, would you begin.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR EDWARD L. ROWNY, LTG. (RET.), SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

General ROWNY. I will be happy to, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, the last time I appeared before this committee for an arms control treaty ratification hearing I was not a witness for but against ratification of the SALT II agreement, which, as you know, I thought was fatally flawed.

Now, however, after a great deal of careful consideration, I appear as a witness for ratification of the INF Treaty. I support the INF Treaty and welcome this opportunity to present my views on why it should be ratified. This accord is sound and serves our nation's security interests.

It is a success that truly has many fathers. It could not have been completed and signed without bipartisan congressional support and the support of allies and friends. But most of the credit, I believe, is due to Ronald Reagan and his administration, for his fortitude and patience.

You have all heard the history of the negotiations in considerable detail, and I will not review these details again. Rather, I would like to relate to you why I personally feel this is an agreement worthy of ratification.

I support this treaty because it achieves the objectives that we set out, we and our allies, when we entered negotiations with the Soviets in 1981: one, that there be equality of rights and limits; that the negotiations must deal with United States and Soviet systems only; that limit must be global with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, or vice versa; that there must be no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability; and finally, and very importantly, the agreement must be effectively verifiable.

This treaty, as I am sure you have heard several times now, is the first ever to reduce nuclear-armed missile arsenals rather than simply set limits on their growth. Not only will there be equality of INF missiles at the zero level, but zero shorter range missiles as well, those with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. We will be eliminating an entire class of United States and Soviet missiles. Moreover, we will arrive at global zero by asymmetric reductions. The Soviets will need to eliminate deployed missiles capable of carrying more than 1,600 nuclear warheads, approximately four times as many as on the missiles of the United States.

Invoking this principle of unequal reductions to equal levels will be critical to the success of a number of other areas of reduction efforts involving conventional forces, chemical weapons, and START.

This treaty also calls for the elimination of these missiles on a global basis. At the President's request I have undertaken about 300,000 miles of cumulative travel in the last 4 years to allied and friendly capitals, both Europe and in Asia. In the last 2 years I have been to Asia nine times for consultations. From my many trips to Asian capitals, it was clear that they most strongly supported global zero over any interim solution that would not eliminate the SS-20 threat to this region. I related their concerns to the President and pressed for a global zero outcome. In the end, the Soviets agreed to eliminate their INF missiles, and I might say parenthetically that the Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, and Australians all helped put pressure on the Soviets in this regard. They eliminate all of these missiles which could threaten our allies and friends in Asia.

As a consequence, I can assure you that this treaty rightly enjoys global support.

This treaty is bilateral and covers only the INF missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. This outcome was obtained in spite of Soviet attempts over the years to retain unjustified offsets for systems of third parties. We saw this Soviet attempt to get something for nothing as a tactical ploy and remained patient until the Soviets backed down.

This treaty also satisfies our requirement to maintain deterrence and coupling while not undermining our conventional forces. Imbalances in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces exist today and will continue to exist after the missiles are eliminated, but deterrence is assured by the fact that NATO will retain those nuclear weapons required to prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of their superior conventional power.

Flexible response will continue to be a viable NATO strategy, employing a mix of nuclear weapons, of shorter range Lance missiles, artillery-fired artillery projectiles, and aircraft capable of striking the Soviet homeland. In addition, some sea-launched ballistic missiles remain committed to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In fact, once all our INF missiles are removed, we will still retain in Europe about 4,000 nuclear warheads on a variety of allied and U.S. systems. Our strategic nuclear systems, the ultimate guarantor of deterrence, is unaffected by this treaty.

Thus, the coupling of the United States to Europe will remain after INF missiles are eliminated. Our commitment to Europe is not based only on nuclear weapons. Indeed, the most potent sign of U.S. commitment to Europe remains the presence of over 300,000 combat-ready U.S. troops on the ground. Moreover, NATO will receive a bonus benefit from the elimination of the shorter range Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. These systems are capable of delivering not only nuclear warheads, but also conventional and chemical warheads on key NATO targets, including depots and airfields vital to our conventional reinforcement capabilities.

But in the final analysis, Mr. Chairman, the INF Treaty must be followed by a strong effort to redress the existing conventional imbalance, something I am sure that our Friend Ambassador Abshire will point out as well. The hard facts are that without a concerted NATO effort to strengthen its conventional capabilities, the Soviets lack a strong incentive to reduce the offensive threat posed by their conventional forces in Europe. They are also gambling that NATO will not rise to the occasion and reduce the imbalance.

I make this statement with a little trepidation because most people, and I think rightfully so, do not like to speculate on Soviet intentions, but I have had a number of occasions to talk with the Soviets over the last 8 to 10 years in this process, and I know that they do not give us this treaty for nothing. They are gambling that NATO and the United States will not have the political will to redress the conventional imbalance.

Looked at objectively, there is no reason why European NATO with more population and larger total gross product than the Soviet Union cannot do its part to meet this challenge. With American help, it can and must be met. And on this point, I would call to the committee's attention that much valuable thinking on how to address this problem is contained in the Secretary of Defense's recently submitted report entitled "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's."

Of course, in addition to the INF Treaty, we are seeking strategic reductions, and here again, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, over the last year I have worked very hard to keep START in the forefront of our thinking and not let it be put into the back room because we were concentrating so much on INF because I think START is very important. And here again, the Soviets are gambling that we are so eager to enter into an agreement on 50-percent reduction of strategic forces that we will compromise our ability to conduct the research necessary for strategic defenses.

A START Treaty, as proposed by the United States, would benefit both the United States and the Soviet Union. It should stand on its own merits and not be linked, as the Soviets continue to demand, to crippling limits on our Strategic Defense Initiative. Under no circumstances should we allow a START agreement, much as we want one, to become hostage to such limits on our ability to defend ourselves and our allies from a ballistic missile attack.

The last objective I want to address is one very close to my heart, that is, verification. I agree with the President that we trust but verify. Not withstanding the General Secretary's complaint that this was said too frequently, I believe the President's maxim cannot be repeated too often.

It must be recognized, in my opinion, that no airtight verification regime in arms control agreements is possible with so secretive a society as the Soviet Union. The INF verification package, however, is so extensive that it satisfies reasonable criteria of effectiveness. The verification elements of the treaty combine in such a fashion as to raise the cost and difficulty of cheating and the risk of getting caught.

For the first time in a United States-Soviet arms control agreement, each side will send onsite inspection teams to help verify the data provided by the other, and thus provide greater confidence in the agreement's data base.

Inspectors from each side also will be permitted to observe the elimination of the missile and related equipment throughout a 3-year period.

Even after all the missiles have been eliminated, U.S. inspectors will remain for up to 10 more years at the Votkinsk factory where the final assembly facilities exist to assure that SS-20 production has ceased. Since the SS-20 first stage is outwardly similar to that of the long-range SS-25, our inspectors at Votkinsk will be permitted to measure, weigh, and image all SS-25 canisters leaving the facility. In addition, as a further safeguard against Soviet cheating, we are permitted eight inspections a year, randomly, in order to open and inspect the contents of an SS-25 canister as it leaves the portal.

Each side will be permitted so-called short notice inspections at present and former INF facilities during the entire 13 years of the onsite monitoring. Thus, for 10 years after the missiles have been destroyed we can inspect to ensure that no INF missiles are illegally located at these locations.

Perhaps most important of all, the treaty also provides for a ban on flight testing of INF missiles. Without flight tests, the Soviets cannot remain confident of the safety and reliability of any illicit missiles for more than a few years.

I might say that the complex and comprehensive INF verification regime, as good as it is, in my opinion would not meet satisfactory criteria without two requirements: one, the global zero aspect, and the other, this aspect of no flight testing of INF missiles. With these two, I think we have a much greater assurance that the Soviets cannot cheat.

Since so many verification details of the INF Treaty are without precedent, the accord will provide a test of verification procedures applicable to future agreements. This is especially critical to START which will pose many more complex verification problems than INF. It will be harder to verify a 50-percent reduction which will permit continuing production, testing, and deployment, than the outright ban with a reduction to zero as is contained in the INF Treaty.

But even when President Reagan expressed his greatest satisfaction with this INF agreement, he took pains to remind us that the INF agreement is but a single step forward in arms reduction. More importantly, President Reagan has reminded us that arms reductions are but one element in the full context of our relationship with the Soviet Union. In order to secure a broad improvement in United States-Soviet relations, significant changes in Soviet behavior must occur in other important areas such as human rights, bilateral issues, and regional issues.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I support the treaty. I welcome the opportunity that these hearings affords to advance a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms and a correction of the imbalance of conventional forces. To me, the greatest benefit that can come from these discussions and this deliberation about the INF are in these two points, that we can now move ahead in these two very important areas of 50-percent reduction of strategic arms and conventional forces.

At the same time, I urge that the INF Treaty before you be ratified without crippling conditions or amendments.

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Rowny.

Ambassador Abshire.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy indeed to follow General Rowny's excellent testimony.

I am privileged to testify before this committee in support of the ratification of the INF Treaty. I want to do so in the context of what I believe must be done to enhance deterrence and improve flexible response.

By the time this committee concludes its hearings, you will have heard a wide range of views on the INF Treaty. What are we to make of some of the contradictory testimonies and ideas you will hear from experts? How can you best understand the reasons behind the different conclusions and their implications?

Let me suggest that the fundamental question at issue in this debate is deterrence, and that the basic reason why the testimony of experts will differ is that they bring to their analyses fundamentally different views of how deterrence is enhanced and maintained. Some will testify as if they believe deterrence is a purely military phenomenon. Some, whose views are more narrow still, will imply that deterrence resides in a particular weapon system or a category of weapons. Others will stress the political nature of deterrence in making their assessments. All, I believe, need to take a broader view.

Deterrence must be viewed in a broad framework, one which encompasses politics, strategy and military capabilities. It needs to look to the future, not to the past. For NATO, the question is how we continue to maintain both politically and militarily the viability of its strategy of deterrence based on flexible response and forward defense. The question is how can we maintain the cohesion and strength of the alliance as the fundamental framework within which we seek to provide stable deterrence. The question is how can we maintain deterrence today and tomorrow?

It takes discipline to look ahead, to see that where we are going is more important than where we have been. But too many times when we profess to look forward, we are really looking through the rearview mirror, analyzing events as they have been, not as they are, and as they might be. I would suggest that you ask of those who testify before you to look ahead and not through rearview mirrors.

Let me give you a concrete example. Many critics of the INF accord, and this is true of many in Europe, are dissatisfied precisely because they are looking through the rearview mirror at the forever lost strategic nuclear conditions of the 1960s. They believe that the INF Treaty upsets a particular system of nuclear deterrence that they believed was here to stay indefinitely.

Critics suggest that the double zero outcome removes two rungs of a precise escalation ladder over which we have complete control. This image of rungs in a ladder of escalation emerged in the 1960's when the United States enjoyed superiority at each rung of the ladder, so to speak, at each level of escalation. The plain fact today is that the West no longer enjoys escalation dominance as it did then.

The Pershing II is a tremendously able weapon in terms of military capabilities, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it was deployed primarily for political purposes. Other nuclear weapons, including those that will remain in Europe, will be able to hold the Soviet Union at risk, to deny the Soviets the solace that the Soviet homeland will become a sanctuary should they attack. In face of the military and political implications of the Soviet deployment of SS-20's in the late 1970's, the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles did restore needed political and military flexibility to the West. But to continue to believe that these weapons remain an essential condition for maintaining deterrence, even if the SS-20's are removed, is another example of rearview mirror thinking.

I have suggested that we need to broaden our horizon, to accept that reality has changed, to understand that loss of nuclear superiority has important implications. Does this mean that NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response is outmoded? Not at all. What it does mean is that we need to look to the future, not to the past, in undertaking policies to maintain the credibility of NATO's deterrent.

In maintaining deterrence in Europe, the problem is unequal conditions, both nuclear and conventional. With this treaty, especially its codification of major unequal reductions, we have taken a major step toward dealing with nuclear inequality. What remains is a serious imbalance at the conventional level, and NATO's priority must now be to come to grips with this imbalance through a combination of force improvements and arms control. Arms control alone is not the answer. Indeed, we may never achieve the arms control objectives we have unless we undertake conventional force improvements.

Improving NATO conventional forces is now the way to retain the flexibility of flexible response. It is imperative that we do so, for it is at the conventional level, the level where war would actually start, that NATO's inferiorities are most glaring and potentially most dangerous. It should be stressed that the INF Treaty did not create this problem, and the requirement to take action faces the alliance regardless of how the Senate votes on this treaty. Improving conventional forces is the way, and this may seem paradoxical, to lengthen the life of nuclear deterrence, so that any decision to deliberately escalate to nuclear weapons could be made much later than it would have to be made if the conventional imbalance persists.

Whenever I mention the word "improvements," critics shake their heads and say it cannot be done, there is no money. I say think smarter, not richer, and it can be done.

So the INF Treaty must be seen as just part of a more comprehensive alliance strategy for the way ahead. The first step in that journey will be the NATO heads of government summit in March. NATO heads of government must take the lead in forging a comprehensive strategy to confront the difficult issues facing the alliance: nuclear arms control and modernization, conventional improvements, the Atlantic to the Urals conventional negotiations, chemical weapons, and armaments cooperation.

In March, alliance leaders need to give urgent authorization to ministers for several months of intensive study using all the elements of the NATO machinery. I need not remind you that the NATO defense ministers mandated such a study in 1984 when I was Ambassador to NATO, and it resulted in an action plan that moved the alliance forward with the adoption of a conceptual military framework, a new emphasis on armaments cooperation, and the conventional defense improvements effort. The March summit can give rise to another round of forward thinking in NATO.

Leaders should now also agree to a second heads of government summit a year from now in order to review negotiations and also to review progress on implementing their action plan and chart the way ahead.

These summit meetings should build upon the principles enunciated in the 1967 Harmel Report of strength and negotiations. At their 1984 meeting in Washington, NATO foreign ministers reaffirmed the so-called Harmel doctrine which added the emphasis that strength and cohesion come first and must be the foundation for effective negotiations. Finally, a summit meeting in March, followed by a second a year from now, will give our allies a sense of continuity through our election period and transition of government.

I am here to tell you that conventional force improvements are possible even in times of limited resources, and that small steps taken now will pay big dividends in the future.

At the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, I lead a project on a defense investment strategy for the United States and its allies. Our first report identifies a wide range of low cost and no cost improvements in NATO's force planning and decisionmaking process, in alliance force structure and armaments cooperation which could provide a basis for a NATO action plan which meets the challenges of the post-INF environment in Europe.

Let me briefly mention only six measures NATO could pursue at no cost. These can be mandated at a NATO summit, but bilateral discussions should start immediately.

First, NATO must undertake a net appraisal of the dynamic balance of forces for consideration at political level. The NATO appraisal must show strengths, weaknesses, and trends on both sides and emphasize their meaning for conventional improvements in arms control. We have recently completed such an unclassified net assessment at CSIS. In fact, Phil Karber and I briefed the highlights of our conclusions to the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning. I believe it would be of great interest to members of this committee, and we would be pleased to present it to any of you individually or in groups.

Second, a thorough review of NATO's crisis management machinery is critical. The threat of a Warsaw Pact reduced warning attack in Central Europe imposes enormous new pressures on NATO's less-than-streamlined crisis management machinery.

Third, a special study should be mandated on now NATO would face up to the potentially precarious maldeployment and readiness problems in the Northern Army Group area. Both the Supreme Allied Commander and Defense Planning Committee need to identify how the danger of Soviet armored breakout in the North, which would invalidate all of the NATO countries' investments in NATO, can be met more collectively.

Fourth, the administration should engage Congress in finding new tradeoffs with allies such as transferring less-preferred ammunition to a war reserve stock for NATO military commanders in return for rationalization of national logistical infrastructure.

Fifth, NATO needs a second effort on armaments cooperation to obtain better return on defense investment. A cooperative effort under the Balanced Technology Initiative that the Senate authorized in addition to the ongoing Nunn-Roth-Warner programs on armaments cooperation, would emphasize to Europeans our determination to target our technology investment to correct precise conventional imbalances.

Sixth, we need a mandate for longer term discussions involving both government and industry for better use of defense resources. This could include emphasis on more off-the-shelf purchases as well as a search for more tradeoffs like Roland/Patriot deal with Germany.

Having seen NATO make real progress in recent years, I am not prepared to throw up my hands and say that nothing can be done to improve conventional forces or better the use of our collective resources. The six steps I have mentioned, and those six steps are from some 30 that our group has recommended, these are short-term, no-cost, remedial measures with potentially great returns on improved conventional capability. The challenge of the 1990's is to think smarter, not richer, as we look at the emerging security environment in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces remains the essential element of instability in Europe. In the 1990's, NATO must come to grips with the Warsaw Pact's emerging capability to execute a shorter warning, Blitzkrieg-like attack with its forward deployed troops.

Let me make it clear, I do not think the Soviet Union is planning such an attack. I think they gain enormous political leverage from such a capability, greater political leverage, by the way, than they gain from the threats of their SS-20's.

Now, while there are differing opinions on the implications of the Soviet conventional force buildup in Central Europe, an unclassified military appraisal that we have produced points to an alarming Soviet capability to threaten NATO's weakest sectors with a heavily armored attack with little warning. This is not to say that the Soviets are planning a war. Capability and use are not the same. But capability combined with instability can lead under certain circumstances to miscalculation and war, and we saw that in 1914.

Conventional improvements and arms control must therefore go hand in hand to eliminate this destabilizing Warsaw Pact capability. The NATO foreign ministers, and this was a huge step forward, recognized this in their December 1986 Declaration on Conventional Arms Control by urging priority attention to the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large scale offensive action.

The lesson of the INF Treaty for our conventional arms control negotiations is clear. Force improvements and modernization at the conventional level are necessary as leverage for meaningful negotiations The kinds of conventional improvements I have mentioned today are key to the success of NATO's negotiating strategy.

The second pillar to NATO strategy must be a conceptual framework for conventional arms control. The aim must be stability. At CSIS, we are working with many of the experts in and out of government to develop a framework for evaluating arms control proposals, whether they come from the East or from the West.

Further, I believe it will be necessary to resist negotiations on short-range nuclear systems, the third zero, until we have achieved substantial conventional reductions. Maintaining and modernizing

NATO's nuclear arsenal, agreed upon at Montebello by NATO defense ministers in 1983, complement conventional improvements efforts and provide the West with increased leverage for conventional negotiations with the pact.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I regard the INF Treaty now before the Senate as the fruit of difficult labor within the alliance and believe it should be ratified. There is, however, no cause for complacency within our alliance. Neither is there reason to doubt NATO's ability to deal with the many challenges of the 1990's. As we shift our focus to conventional reductions, we must remember the lessons of the Harmel doctrine and seek to deal from strength. Conventional improvements and nuclear modernization must go hand in hand with development of a coherent approach to arms control. If we are to realize the promise of the negotiations in Vienna.

The treaty before us is historic not because it is the end of the old process but because it is the beginning of a new one. We have moved from SALT I, which was characterized by Senator Henry Jackson as an agreement based on sub-parity for our side, to a very different kind of agreement based upon unequal reductions and parity. Even so, there are dangers on the horizon if we do not move forward with a comprehensive strategy to enhance deterrence and flexible response. To simply depend upon Gorbachev's good will would defy every lesson we have learned from the application of the Harmel doctrine and would undo the success that we have achieved. If we do move forward with a comprehensive strategy, there is great promise of repeating at the conventional level what we achieved with the INF agreement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Abshire.

I was very struck with both your statements.

General Rowny mentioned correctly, there is no reason why European countries in NATO with more population and larger total gross product than the Soviet Union, cannot do its part to meet this challenge.

Now, the interesting point here is what he is saying is that NATO, not including the United States, has more population and a larger total gross product than the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. So obviously the problem rests with the NATO countries, why they will not pull up their socks and make a contribution more akin to what we do as a percentage of our GNP.

Maybe their assessment of the risk is less intense than our assessment of the risk. But for some reason, they are spending about half as much of their GNP as do we.

Does that mean they consider the Soviets about half as dangerous as we do? I am not sure. I would be very interested, Mr. Abshire, in your thoughts as to what could be done to persuade the NATO allies to pull up their socks.

Is it a question of making sure they have the same assessment of the risk as do we? Is there some other method?

To my mind, it is a disgrace that they have not done more. I have said this to individual chiefs of state over there. They really are not carrying their load, and we should get together with our allies on this.

Is our assessment of the risk too high? Maybe we are spending too much over there.

I would be very interested in your thoughts.

Ambassador Abshire. Well, let me say, Mr. Chairman, we have done an unclassified net appraisal that which goes beyond number crunching, to show how a war, short-warning attack would go. We took this appraisal to Europe and gave it to the NATO council and to the military committee, and I had a chance to discuss it some with Margaret Thatcher and other people at the top level. I think the value of that appraisal was that it showed the unevennesses in NATO. NATO is not universally weak. It is not universally strong. It is uneven.

France's problem in May 1940 was not that it was universally weak. The Maginot line was strong and it was a good development. There was no reserve, however, and the Germans broke through on a mile and a half front on the Meuse. France fell within a week.

Now, if you had told the French President in 1938 that he had a defense problem, he would have probably gone out and strengthened the Maginot line rather than develop an investment strategy to put their money precisely where it was needed. And if NATO develops what I call an investment strategy or resources strategy—and we have started along this path—to correct specific vulnerabilities as compared to throwing money and technology at the problem, I think these rectifications can be accomplished.

And I would like, if I may, just to make one more comparison with May 1940.

The German Blitzkrieg tactics aimed at a rapid breakthrough, going deep without protecting the flanks, with the assumption that they would not meet strong resistance. The operational maneuver groups of the Soviets are patterned along that same doctrine. It would have been easy with a different application of resources to have changed France's situation in 1940. If we take a different approach in NATO, I think we can start real alterations, which should begin at this heads of government summit because we have already made progress along this line.

A coalition approach would provide leverage, a better return on investment, multiplier effects, not just each country doing more on its own, which has been the problem. It is a collective approach, synergies, strategy and better use of our investment resources.

The Chairman. You say, you are talking about synergy where the total is more than the sum of the parts, but nevertheless, the fact that the non-United States, the NATO nations not including the United States, spend about half as much of their GNP as do we, would indicate to me that their assessment is different from ours.

Does it not indicate that to you?

Ambassador Abshire. I think part of the reason that their assessment is different from ours is that the allies have too long been hiding behind, unduly behind, nuclear deterrence. I think that deterrence and defense can never be disconnected, and the allies did not want to look at real conventional defense, which is a part of flexible response.

We began to sense their change in attitude 3 years ago. Senator Nunn changed his support from troop withdrawals to his codevelopment amendment when he recognized the change, and I think in this post-INF environment now, we have a new opportunity to get the allies to face up to defense on the basic level, the conventional level at which a war would start.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess maybe I am speaking in political terms or American terms, I still think it is a disgrace that we spend double what they do, virtually, and where in fact they are just not carrying their load, and I think we have been very tactful in the way we have let our message be known, and I think some way has to be found to increase their contribution, whether it is the carrying out of the Mansfield amendment which I remember, I think I supported about 20 years ago, or the former Nunn amendment, I do not know. But the European nations should be on notice. This feeling certainly is one I intensely have and I think is shared by a good many people.

Now, I would like to ask General Rowny if he is speaking for the administration. The reason I say this is because in the controversy over the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty, it was alleged that some statements of some Nixon administration officials were irrelevant because they were not speaking for the then administration.

General Rowny?

General ROWNY. I think the only way that I can approach that, Mr. Chairman, is to say that the administration testimony that you are hearing from me and I think from others has the blessing of the administration, and if that is the thrust of the question, I think that you can naturally assume that this is an authoritative statement which does have the blessing of the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. You can see the point here in connection with the ABM Treaty where five of the six negotiators say the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty is wrong.

Some critics of the INF Treaty contend that the treaty creates, exacerbates, problems relating to conventional forces and nuclear deterrence. They further argue that since the treaty causes problems, it should be approved only in conjunction with measures to compensate for the damage done by the treaty in the areas of conventional forces and residual theater nuclear forces.

Do you think this treaty presents those problems, and does something have to be done to compensate for the problems caused?

General ROWNY. No, sir, I do not think this treaty per se presents any problems of that type. I do think, though, that it gives us all an excellent opportunity to look at the East-West balance and to see just what is at issue here. And as a number of my counterparts have told me quite candidly, you Americans and other Westerners are mesmerized with this nuclear problem. We, they say, do not want a nuclear war either, but conventional forces are the cutting edge of political objectives.

So they are looking at the conventional problem, and therefore, I could not agree more that we should redouble, treble our efforts to redress the conventional imbalance, get us the wherewithal in order to negotiate a treaty on the conventional field.

The CHAIRMAN. My time has expired.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a matter of personal privilege, I ask the Chair's indulgence for just a brief moment or so before I go to the questions, and the time not be charged.

I want to make a commitment to all Senators on this committee and all Senators in the Senate that I have never and will never impugn their motives when they disagree with me on something. I will not make sarcastic remarks. I will not misrepresent what they have said or what they have intended.

Now, I think it goes without saying that comity demands that at all times we respect each other, even when we differ strongly, and I want to say that my questions about this treaty spring purely from a concern about the past and what may be the future.

Now, the Chairman will remember that I explained to him that I had to leave this morning to go to a meeting with the President at the White House which took something over an hour, and by the time I got back there was a vote on. As a matter of fact, I missed one vote while I was down there. And I do not know for sure what was said, but if the implications that were reported to me—and I stress that they were reported to me—if the implications are correct, then I think perhaps there has been an overstepping of propriety.

As I understand it from several who were here, including one Senator, and I hope their inference was mistaken, my good friend from Delaware, whom I respect highly—I do not agree with him on occasion—he implied that the information that I read this morning with regard to Soviet leader Brezhnev and Marshal Grechko, was somehow classified or confidential information that I should not have used.

Now, if he did not intend that, and I am sorry he is not here, but on the other hand, he spoke about me when I was not here.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. I do not recall that, and the written record, the stenographer's record would be able to show what was said.

Senator HELMS. Well, in any case——

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I recall that precisely. Senator Biden simply said "I thought that was classified." But he then continued on. He did not state that it was classified.

Senator HELMS. Well, just to clear up any question about it, I quoted exclusively, entirely from public testimony delivered by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle before this committee. Indeed, that testimony was delivered on March 26 of last year before a joint session, a joint hearing of this committee and Senator Biden's committee, and it was a public response at a public hearing.

The hearing has been printed, I have a copy of it here in my hand, including everything that I recited this morning, and it was also reprinted in the Congressional Record of April 8, 1987, and I can furnish the page number if anybody is interested.

Now, the exchange last year before this committee meeting jointly with the Judiciary Committee began when I asked Mr. Perle a question, and this was the question. "Does the SALT I interim agreement negotiating record indicate that the Soviet SALT negotiators deceived the United States on the issue of whether heavy ICBM's were prohibited from replacing light ICBM's? '

And Mr. Perle responded, "Yes, Senator Helms, I believe this is not only the most dramatic instance of Soviet deception but the one that carried the gravest consequences."

Then he went on to say, "It was one of the more important provisions of the interim agreement that launchers for light missiles could not be converted into launchers for heavy missiles." We were unable in the negotiations to get the Soviets to agree to a definition of the terms 'heavy' and 'light.' There were limitations in the treaty on the extent to which the silos in which missiles were based could be enlarged.

"At the time, the Soviets had a new missile, vastly more effective and substantially larger than the light missiles, the launchers for which could not be converted to launchers for heavy missiles, and I believe they concealed the testing of that missile until after the interim agreement was signed." And we subsequently, to our dismay, discovered that the light SS-11's were replaced by SS-19 missiles, that by the understanding conveyed to the Senate of the United States, would surely have constituted heavy ICBM's.

"I know that this was a particular"—I am continuing to quote Perle. "I know that this was a particular concern because that conversation," the one I read into the record this morning, "I know that this was a particular concern because that conversation and that conversion meant a six-fold increase in the number of Soviet warheads and a very substantial increase in the throw weight of that ballistic missile force."

And in the paragraphs that followed Mr. Perle cited the information with regard to the Brezhnev-Grechko conversation which I cited and read verbatim this morning.

And I would remind anybody who wants to say even passingly, "Oh, I thought this was classified," leaving the implication that another Senator had deliberately or otherwise violated classification, I would remind anybody that the SS-19 replacement of the SS-11 is a confirmed violation by a presidential commission.

Now, Senators may not agree, but the fact is that that was confirmed as a violation to the Senate, and it was done by a presidential commission.

The reason I cited this conversation this morning was precisely to illustrate the point that the Soviets plan to cheat from the very inception of any arms control agreement, and we certainly have the hard evidence on that.

So ends, Mr. Chairman, my point of privilege.

Now, I have a question or so which I would like to ask.

Senator **Cranston**. May I make one comment on this point?

Since Senator Helms had to leave this morning to go to the White House, it is understandable, but from time to time he has made fairly long statements, then left before there has been a chance to comment. He has not always been here, therefore, when we have commented.

Upon this occasion, Senator Biden is not present to make any statements he might wish in regard to this matter, but what may well have led Senator Biden to state I thought that was still classified, which is exactly what he said, was that following that testimony by Richard Perle, upon the occasion it was given, Bob Gates of the CIA wrote a letter expressing grave concern about the fact that

that testimony was given because it was borderline. Apparently it was desired that it be given publicly, and I presume that is what gave Joe Biden the sense that perhaps it was still a classified matter.

But he did not make any charge that Senator Helms had released classified matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, that does not let anybody off the hook because everybody has got staff. Before I had said, "Oh, I thought that was classified," I would have turned to somebody associated with me and said check on that. Was that not classified? No. I thought it was classified.

Well, let me say for the record, I have never broken classification on anything since I have been in the Senate, and I am in my sixteenth year, and I never shall. I take pains about that. And I think we ought to be very careful. It makes me wonder why it irritates Senators or frustrates them, as seems to be evident, that just one Senator or two—Senator Pressler has raised some questions—dares to ask questions about this treaty.

Now, I know the news media have said that so and so is the point man and so and so is going to do this and that and the other, but I started out from the beginning saying that I wanted to know what was in the treaty.

Now, there were 52 Senators by actual count who said they were for the treaty before they even got a copy of it, and I suggest to you that maybe, maybe all of us ought to read treaties before we endorse them.

The CHAIRMAN. One question here.

Is there any feeling that these hearings are not being conducted fairly so far, because as far as I know——

Senator HELMS. No, oh, absolutely not. You know, you and I do not see how you could even get that inference. You and I work together fine, and we are going to have some witnesses supposedly down the line—thus far we have had none—who are not for the treaty or who have questions about the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. We did our best to get General Haig, for example, and he could not come.

Senator HELMS. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. You realize that.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no debate with you.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I thought a special effort was made to address the very point that the Senator from North Carolina now raises. The fact that someone opposed to the treaty is not here is not the fault of the committee, but resulted because the witness would not or could not come, is that not correct?

Senator HELMS. Well, that is irrelevant to the point I was making.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it is relevant to the point of the fairness of the hearing, and which the Chairman raised——

Senator HELMS. I did not say anything about the hearings being unfair.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you felt that you had not had your opportunity to ask questions.

Senator HELMS. Oh, mercy, no. I have asked questions, and that has frustrated some other Senators.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let's go on with the questions.

Senator HELMS. But let the record show that the Chairman and I work together amicably, and we will continue to do so. I have got no question about the Chairman or the conduct of these hearings, and I think if you want to read back the record, there is no suggestion by me that that is the case.

All right. Now you can turn on the green light.

The CHAIRMAN. It is on.

Senator HELMS. I have already used ten seconds waiting, have I not?

President Reagan, General Rowny, reported to Congress that a number of, and I am quoting him, "a number of Soviet activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core or central provisions of the treaty frequently cited by proponents of SALT II as the primary reasons for supporting the agreement. In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation did they take corrective action," quote, unquote from the President of the United States.

Now, Article 5 of SALT II prohibited no more than one "new type" of ICBM. The first of the Soviets' new type was the SS-24. If I am wrong at any point along the line, please correct me.

The second new type, violating SALT II, was the SS-25, and the President has confirmed this violation seven times. And Ambassador Kampelman reaffirmed this during the hearings yesterday.

My question, General Rowny, is do you know when the Soviets began the development of the SS-25?

General ROWNY. May I check just a second?

[Pause.]

Senator HELMS. I think it was 1975.

General ROWNY. It was not flown until about 1983. It would have been in development for several years earlier.

Senator HELMS. About 1975, then.

General ROWNY. Possible. The specifics of what we knew before the system was test flown are not a subject for this open session.

Senator HELMS. When we signed SALT II in June of 1979, we being the then President, did we know of the Soviets' continuing development of the SS-25?

General ROWNY. We probably knew that in keeping with normal Soviet development practice they were developing a missile which would lead to something like the SS-25, yes. However, it had not been tested.

Senator HELMS. So you were aware of it.

General ROWNY. Again, without getting into classified matter, we probably had reason to suspect they were developing something.

Senator HELMS. And the President signed the treaty nonetheless.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. But in 1978-79 it had not been test flown, this did not occur until almost 3 years later.

Senator HELMS. If the Soviets did not expect to violate SALT II when they signed this treaty, why do you suppose there was so much secrecy about the development of the SS-25?

I am correct, it was prohibited by the treaty, was it not, the SS-25?

General Rowny. SALT II permitted one new type of ICBM. So, the SS-25 was not specifically prohibited. And in 1979, years before the SS-25 had been tested we had no way to determine if a system possibly under development violated the treaty.

Senator Helms. And you say that this government knew at that time that the Soviets were in the process of developing the SS-25, and in violation, and yet went ahead and signed it, is that correct?

General Rowny. I do not think we called it the SS-25 or knew what it was going to be. It had not been tested when the treaty was signed and was not tested for several more years.

Senator Helms. I understand.

General Rowny. It is what came out to be the SS-25, yes, sir.

Senator Helms. Now, am I correct that SALT II also banned deployment, production and testing of mobile SS-16's or any of its stages?

General Rowny. That is true, yes, sir.

Senator Helms. In 1984, President Reagan reported to Congress that the Soviets had covertly deployed 50 to 200 SS-16 missiles, which were banned, at the time of the signing of SALT II back in 1979.

Did we know about the SS-16 deployment at that time?

General Rowny. Sir, we knew about this problem, and we took steps to be sure that it was not—that it would not continue.

Now, let me say in partial answer to the Chairman's question earlier, when I have testified—and I have worked for four Presidents—I have supported the President for whom I was then working. As you know, I broke with SALT II, believing that it was not in our interests.

Senator Helms. I know you did.

General Rowny. And testified—I was doing that as a private individual. And I testified at that time as an individual.

We knew about it but we took steps in that instance to negate the effect of the SS-16, sir.

Senator Helms. I mentioned all this, General Rowny and Mr. Abshire and Mr. Chairman and my fellow Senators, because we have been led down the road of duplicity with all sorts of positive exhortations time and time again.

Now, I do not think I need to present any credentials about my support of Ronald Reagan. He and I were friends prior to the time that he and I lost our respective minds and ran for public office in the first place. I like him. He is a conscientious, dedicated American.

But as I told him as civilly as I could, I have never been a yes man, and neither has he. And he was talking about wanting this treaty to be rushed through, with no amendment, no reservation, no nothing, and I said, Mr. President, I am not through studying it. This was back in December before we went home. I want to know what is in the treaty. And I took an awful lot of time that I otherwise would have spent with my five grandchildren studying the treaty, raising questions. I had a yellow pad with three pages of questions that I stayed on the telephone asking for people to check things on because I do not want us to be duped again.

Now, I do not doubt anybody's good faith or anybody's positive attitude, but the truth of the matter is that we are dealing with a crowd that has engaged time and time again in utter duplicity. Now, maybe they have changed and they are Sunday school boys and all the rest of it now. I hope I am wrong, and I hope that the parade of witnesses, beginning with the Secretary of State, are right when they say we have taken care of everything, everything is hunky dory.

But I just feel that my responsibility as a Senator, and only one Senator, is to know as best I can what I am voting on when I exercise my advise and consent responsibility.

Now, the newspaper editors may not agree with it. That is fine. They seldom agree with me anyhow. I heard the same sort of claptrap from them when I stayed on the Senate floor warning about a treaty giving away the Panama Canal. They said, "Oh, Helms is the most obstructionist. He sees something under the bed all the time."

Well, look what is going on in Panama today. And I happen to believe that the distress in Central America really began to take shape when we passed that treaty.

Now, Senators may disagree with me on that, and that is fine, but I just believe that we ought to restrain ourselves from just assuming that everything is okay until we think about it and look at the implications of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence, and I thank you, General Rowny and Mr. Abshire.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **SARBANES**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to note that the committee has scheduled very extensive hearings on the INF treaty through the month of February, in many instances not only in the mornings but in the afternoons, as is the case here today. I think this reflects the Chairman's commitment to conducting very careful and thorough hearings, in which there is an opportunity to look into all aspects of the treaty and to hear from a wide range of witnesses and subject them to questioning.

So I think any implication that somehow the committee has been unfair in its review of this treaty is simply inaccurate.

Senator **HELMS**. If the Senator will yield, I have made no such implication, and I do not now.

Senator **SARBANES**. Well, I am just making this point for the record. I assume I will start being timed when I finish my statement. I gather that is our new procedure.

General Rowny and Ambassador Abshire, I would like to ask you some questions about your own testimony.

General, you made reference to your visits to the Asian countries in the course of working out the terms of this treaty. We have not had much focus on that aspect so far in the hearings, and I think it might be helpful if you took a moment or two to develop a bit the importance of the global zero option and its implications for the Asian countries and the U.S. relationship with them.

General **ROWNY**. I would be glad to, Senator.

First, to go from the general to the particular, if we did not have global reductions in this treaty, I may not be here testifying in its behalf today. I think that that was so essential to the problem. I mentioned one other aspect, and that is the testing, but this global aspect, global zero was very important.

Early in the game of INF, after the—let's put it at January 15, 1986 when Mr. Gorbachev first made some remarks about INF, we understood that he wanted to reduce weapons in Europe to some lower number but was adamantly opposed to reducing any in Asia at all. He told us that.

We then took a stand in the administration that we would reduce by about 70 percent in Asia by 1988 and to zero in Asia by 1989. On my first round of consultative visits to Tokyo and Korea and Beijing and Australia, the Asian allies did not like this and said, look, we do not want to be treated as second class citizens. I pointed out that we are not treating them as second class citizens, but that we did not have much leverage. We did not have any INF missiles to give up in Asia. If we could reduce the threat by about 70 percent in Asia that was progress. The Asians pointed out that they did not like any solution that permitted SS-20's to remain in Asia.

So I brought that back and I told, reported to the President and the Secretary of State. And so the President and the Secretary of State from that time on began talking about the global application of these limits.

Now, later on the Soviets persisted, and up through Reykjavik said that they would not reduce any in Asia, and at Reykjavik the President said, that's not good enough. They finally said, well, all right, we will reduce to 100 warheads on our Asian soil, but the U.S. 100 warheads must be located in the continental United States.

I took that back then and discussed that with the foreign ministers in Japan and Korea, Australia and China. They reluctantly agreed. They said that, all right, if you go to zero in Europe but 100 remain, so long as 100 in the United States, and so long as that is interim only, we will support such a treaty, but we would prefer global zero.

I brought that back and reported it to the President and the Secretary of State. And together with the President's efforts and pressures that I know existed from diplomatic channels in Japan, Korea, and China, and some in Australia, the Soviets then came to the global zero solution.

The Asians pointed out not only that they were being targeted, but that these missiles could be moved to Europe, and therefore said that there was a threat there to Europe anyway, and they also made the very important point of verification, and they helped us present the point of verification.

So I consider the fact that we spent a lot of time with the Asian allies and the fact that they made demarches to the Soviet Union to be very helpful, and we probably would not have the global zero without the very great effort on the part of our Asian allies.

So I think they benefited and I think we benefited.

Does that answer your question somewhat?

Senator **Sarbanes**. Yes, and I think it was a very significant outcome. There has been a tendency as we have examined on the treaty, because it is seen primarily in a European context, to overlook the importance of what was achieved in the Asian context.

Ambassador?

Ambassador **Abshire**. May I comment, Senator? I was in Japan, in Tokyo in June as a private citizen, and I visited with Nakasone, Tokeshita, Misao, and Abe. This was, I guess, about a month before this breakthrough, and there was enormous concern, particularly since I had recently been NATO ambassador, that they had been forgotten, that they had been neglected. They could reflect back to the Williamsburg summit where Nakasone had joined in the statement about the indivisibility of global security, and this agreement did not seem to follow that pattern.

I think we had a great deal at stake. So I think the following month this breakthrough was an enormous breakthrough because we would have had a very, very uneasy situation if you were moving toward ratification of an agreement which did not include Asia.

Senator **Sarbanes**. General Rowny, you outline right at the top of page 2 of your prepared statement the objectives we set out for the treaty when the negotiations first began.

At the time, did you ever expect to achieve all of those objectives?

General **Rowny**. Frankly, no, sir. I think that the events of the last 18 months have exceeded my expectations.

On the other hand, I must say that it kind of vindicated the philosophy that President Reagan had adopted that if he stayed by his guns, if he stayed strong and continued to make the point, that we had a chance of getting an agreement, or else, as he has often said, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.

But I am pleasantly surprised that we did achieve these five objectives.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Ambassador Abshire, what is your view?

Ambassador **Abshire**. There was little expectation in Europe that we could have obtained this. Although it is a fantastic tribute to the alliance, I think NATO ought to do more to bear the burden, but I think it is very important to keep in mind the enormous burden that the allies bore during deployment, their coalition governments put under enormous strain. I think it was the best consultation that the United States ever carried out because we had five basing countries, so we had to fine tune that consultation, and we learned a great deal from it.

Eugene Rostow calls this victory equivalent to the 1914 victory of the Battle of the Marne that saved Paris. The Kremlin was stunned because they were convinced that they could break the alliance within itself and break Europe from America, which was their political objective.

And Gorbachev, a very brilliant grand strategist, now has totally reversed his course because he recognized, unlike some of his predecessors, that this strategy failed.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, now, let me ask you this question. Given what had to be drawn out of the alliance in order to hold to our position, and given your view that in the end we achieved far more than anyone could have expected, and given that it is clearly in our interests and in the interests of our allies, both in Europe and in Asia, what would be the impact on the alliance in Europe—and indeed, one Asia—if the Senate were now *not* to ratify this treaty?

General ROWNY. As an old NATO hand, and I served there over 20 years, after these consultations in Europe, I would say that, to put a very restrained word on it, it would be most unfortunate.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Devastating would be my word because, you know, the same people who were very concerned about Reykjavik, the suddenness of the Reykjavik meeting and some of the things that were talked about at Reykjavik and who were unnerved by it, but now have rallied round, would see such a zigzag as the final sign that you simply cannot depend upon any kind of continuity from the United States. There is already great concern about that.

So it would be devastating even at this point to the critics that have worried about some of the implications.

Senator SARBANES. General Rowny, would you extend that reaction to the Asian countries as well?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. The Asian countries have made it clear to me from the time that I first started going there as a representative of a President, that they were favor of arms control agreements. They put a lot of attention on conventional arms and START, and they are also interested in INF. They became particularly interested in INF when they heard that the Soviets were going to reduce in Europe but not in Asia, and that heightened their attention.

So I think that it would not be good. It would be a bad thing, and I would say most unfortunate, if this treaty were not ratified.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Welcome to the committee.

I understand that former Secretary of State Kissinger—I cannot speak for him—but apparently he has decided to support this treaty in general because he feels at this point nonratification would create bigger problems than ratification. That is the same sort of reaction we probably would hear with any treaty that the President might negotiate on longer-range missiles in a START agreement. However, the Constitution provides that our Senate is supposed to look at this very carefully, making amendments or reservations it feels are advisable.

One of the areas that I have been very concerned about is the fact that the Soviets are going to keep a four-to-one superiority ratio in ground forces and tanks and so forth, and probably a 15-to-1 or 20-to-1 or greater superiority in chemical weapons in Europe at the same time we are going forward with this INF treaty.

I recall so well when I was in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1970's two Secretaries of Defense coming to me, and one President, saying vote for the monies for the installation of the INF missiles because they will protect the lives of our soldiers in Europe. I was told they are essential to protect the lives of United States servicemen serving in Europe from a surprise attack.

Why has this changed?

General ROWNY. Well, I think that the historical development of this was that the SS-20 became such a huge threat, and the double-track decision called for us to both negotiate and to put in missiles in order to get the Soviets to reduce that threat.

So I do not think that anything has fundamentally changed from the status quo ante. The Soviets had a conventional superiority then and are going to continue to have it. I do not think that this INF Treaty solves that problem, and I take great pains to point out that we should and must get after the conventional imbalances because this treaty does not solve that problem.

Senator PRESSLER. But I remember so well, I think it was Gerald Ford and I think Secretary Rumsfeld and maybe Harold Brown saying that deployment of those missiles is essential to protect the lives of United States servicemen serving in West Germany. Now we are taking them out.

What has changed that—and that is a matter of record back there. I remember going to breakfasts over at the White House when Jerry Ford was there, and this was the big argument. We are going to protect the lives of the servicemen, of U.S. servicemen in West Germany. That is the reason we funded it. That is the reason I was urged to vote for it. That is the reason they were deployed.

What has changed that protects the lives of the servicemen from the four-to-one Russian majority in East Germany?

General ROWNY. I will take a quick cut at it, and then maybe Dave can.

The fact that we put our missiles in was a step to negate this new, large threat that the Soviets put in, and therefore, in that context they were protecting, these missiles were helping protect our troops in Europe from this large force of not only conventional force superiority but this large nuclear force.

Now that the nuclear threat will be neutralized on both sides in this particular range——

Senator PRESSLER. But what protects the lives——

General ROWNY. The Soviets still have the conventional advantage.

Senator PRESSLER. But what protects them against the conventional forces?

General ROWNY. That must be addressed.

Now, what protects them in the interim is——

Senator PRESSLER. What protects the lives now? The argument was used to get my vote and others' votes to fund them and continue the funding——

General ROWNY. I see. Let me take a quick answer.

Senator PRESSLER. The threat was the Soviet conventional forces rushing across and killing our servicemen in West Germany, so to protect their lives we needed these missiles. That is, I believe, Don Rumsfeld talking to me in 1974 or 1975.

General ROWNY. Sir, we have other systems, the air-launched, that is, airborne systems, dual-capable aircraft. We have seaborne systems, and we have the shorter range ground-launched nuclear weapons of up to 500 kilometers.

And once this larger threat of the SS-20's is removed, we still have the ability to augment the conventional inferior forces in

Europe with this nuclear residual which is quite considerable. It is some 4,000 weapons.

Dave.

Ambassador **Abshire**. Well, I was going to add my predilection or my bias or whatever you want to call it because this is something that I felt strongly about at NATO. I have spoken out on it, I have written articles on it. There has been a false sense of security at the nuclear level, and that occurred when we lost escalation dominance, which fundamentally changed the equation. And I do not mean it threw nuclear deterrence out of the window, the first use of the other guy. But it meant that to have flexible response you had to vastly increase your conventional capability, and if that conventional capability was going to collapse in 4 or 5 days, you do not have flexible response.

So we have already pretty much lost flexible response if you mean something that is really flexible.

Now, what is the guarantee? It means that we now for the first time can get the Europeans to consider seriously conventional defense, and if they do that there are ways out of this dilemma. We have got a report on this that I will send you.

If people are going to hide behind a nuclear magic and continue to think they are living in the early 1960's when we had superiority, then they are never going to come to grips with those things that need to be done. In the 1990's, had you left the Pershing and Cruise missiles in there, the short-warning armored Blitzkrieg-type attack that the Soviets would be able to launch, with the nuclear capability comparable to the Maginot line were they to go under it, it would be a fait accompli, they could blackmail us far more than with the SS-20's.

So this is the thing we have got to come to grips with and get corrected.

Senator **Pressler**. So, in other words, what you are saying is that the various Secretaries of Defense who used the argument for funding of these missiles to protect the lives of U.S. servicemen from direct attack by the Soviet troops, those arguments were not very intellectually honest then.

Ambassador **Abshire**. I am saying that even then, I would have put, and I think they tried to but it was hopeless, far more emphasis on the conventional and sounded a greater alarm on the conventional. We bold have a far worse situation on the conventional due to the forward deployment of the Soviet forces. Despite sounding alarmist I believe the situation can be corrected if we approach it intelligently, and I will send you our program.

Senator **Pressler**. All right, thank you.

Yesterday I asked why a conventional force agreement could not be attached to this, and I was told because it involved so many nations.

I should point out that if just the United States and Soviet Union reached an agreement to lower their number of troops in that area or to reach parity, that would basically solve the problem, and certainly this nuclear agreement has involved many nations. We were talking about the Asian nations, we are talking about the European nations and so forth.

I would also like to follow up on some of the fine questions that have been asked on the differences between the SS-20's and the SS-25's, and I think we have covered what some of the differences are in the missiles, and maybe this is not a proper question for this panel, but for example, are the re-entry vehicles different? Have any of our people had a chance to compare these?

This is the front end or the top of the missiles. I think the questions yesterday were about the motor and the carriage parts of them.

General ROWNY. Without going into a classified information, I will just keep it general, Senator, they are two entirely different systems. The SS-20 is a mobile system which has a relatively short range, that is, it can hit Europe but not the United States. It has three weapons on it, independently targetable. The SS-25 is also a mobile missile that has a long range, can hit the continental United States, but only carries one weapon.

Senator PRESSLER. But it could carry three if they changed the range, could it not?

General ROWNY. If they changed the range, it could possibly carry three, or if they changed the booster or did other things to it, yes, sir, it could carry three, or lightened the particular re-entry vehicle. So there are a number of ways to change it.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, but that would be a violation of the INF Treaty if the new range covered the European theater, which they could perhaps do. They could certainly get that done with the warheads, could they not? I mean, do we have scientists who could do that?

General ROWNY. Yes, I am sure.

Senator PRESSLER. I'm sure they do. I am sure we do.

General ROWNY. If they significantly redesigned the -25, sir, so that it was tested to a maximum range of between 500 and less than 5,500 kilometers, and we had evidence, collaborative evidence that they redesigned it, yes, it would be a violation of the INF Treaty, because it would be then a treaty-limited item.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, let me just say in conclusion that as a Congressman and Senator who has tried to vote conscientiously on defense issues, different Secretaries of Defense have told me different things about these missiles over the years, and it keeps changing, I guess. I guess we are in a changing world, apparently.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join the other members of the committee in welcoming you and thanking you both for your very helpful testimony today based upon your long experience in this field.

A major impediment to past efforts to negotiate or ratify arms agreements has been a series of concerns like linkage, compliance, verification and strategic doctrine.

I would therefore like to elicit your views on a few of these very central issues.

On the matter of linkage, General Rowny stated very firmly, "I urge that the INF Treaty before you be ratified without crippling conditions of amendments." So he has made plain that we should not have amendments that would cripple or kill this treaty.

I would like to ask your viewpoint on the same matter, Mr. Abshire. Do you take the same position?

Ambassador Abshire. I would agree with that. This does not mean that in all agreements I reject linkage, but in this case it is not the time for linkage; and second, the leverage at the conventional level has got to be gained through conventional improvements. That was the theme of my testimony.

Senator Cranston. I would like to address the next few questions to you, General Rowny, and Mr. Abshire, if you have any expansions or any differences, please express them.

On the matter of compliance, to what extent are questions about Soviet compliance with arms agreements demonstrated, clear violations or disputes about ambiguous interpretations or ambiguous conduct? I gather there is a feeling that witnesses have thus far said that there is a mix of both.

General Rowny. Well, Senator, the Soviets have violated and are violating existing agreements, and we report annually on that to the President, and the President makes those known. For example, today we have a series of four or five of the ABM Treaty. You are familiar with the largest ones, I am sure, and maybe the others, too. The Krasnoyarsk radar is a definite violation. The Gomel activities are a clear violation. The fact that they had mobile, were testing mobile systems, the fact that they were testing ABM's concurrently with missiles in a surface-to-air mode, the fact they may have been giving ABM capability to SAM's, surface-to-air missile systems, all those are potential or probable violations of the ABM Treaty or items of real concern.

Also, clearly, they have violated the Geneva Chemical Weapons Convention of 1925. They have clearly violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. They also violated the Helsinki Accords.

So they have been violating existing agreements, and we have made that known.

Now, in this particular treaty, the INF Treaty, we have tried to build in so many different safeguards so that we will know earlier and without so much ambiguity on a number of these cases about their violations. But if your question was do they violate treaties, yes, they do.

Senator Cranston. Many of these changes that are on record, are not necessarily 100 percent. In some cases, it is at least ambiguous, we know that in some cases the Soviets have questioned things that we have done and we have modified our behavior as a result.

I would like to ask you about the Thule and Fylingdales matter. Probably the most significant area of U.S. action that some consider dubious under treaties is our building new, large phased-array radars at Thule and Fylingdales, which the Soviet Union and some responsible Americans—including U.S. negotiators of the ABM Treaty—believe are prohibited by Article 6 of the ABM Treaty. The Air Force Chief of Staff testified to Congress that the Thule radar poses "a potential conflict with the ABM Treaty."

Do you have any comment on that example? We look at many Soviet actions and think they are violations. They look at some of our actions and have questions.

General ROWNY. I would say first as sort of a general and I hope not a flippant comment, and then a particular. In general, the Soviets feel that they must respond, every time we say something, they feel that they have to respond. For example, when the KAL airliner was shot down, you know, they said, well, it was probably a result of U.S. action. They have sort of a kneejerk reaction to a number of these.

But on a more substantive level, I have looked at the Soviet allegations about Thule and Fylingdales and I find them not supported, and the U.S. official position is that these were not supported, testimony by other people notwithstanding. The Soviets did violate and are violating the ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar and Gomel. We are not violating with respect to Fylingdales or Thule.

Senator CRANSTON. On conventional forces, General Rowny, do you believe that full and final implementation of INF, and by that I mean dismantling of the final missiles and the final stages, should be contingent upon progress toward or actual achievement by then of adjustment of the size and nature of U.S. and U.S.S.R. conventional forces. Or is that an issue to consider separately?

General ROWNY. Sir, I would like to see our efforts to reducing conventional weapons very much increased. I would like to see more attention placed on that, and I agree with the Senator who spoke earlier that it is not simply a matter of more nations that are involved. That is not the problem. There are also other problems here which make this a difficult issue. But that is no reason why we should not tackle it.

On the other hand, I think that the INF Treaty can stand on its own and we should go ahead and complete that, and if we can get reductions in the Soviet forces during the same period, all the better. I think that that would be desirable. If we cannot, I do not think we should hold up implementation of INF until that conventional imbalance is redressed.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Could I comment?

I think the mistake in any kind of linkage in such a final phase is that it leaves the implication that INF is to the disadvantage of our security and to the Soviet advantage. I think it makes far more sense to take the third zero and make the elimination of the battlefield and shorter range weapons related to the conventional. But by the same token, conventional improvements must develop a robust momentum of its own now to produce the balance.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

General Rowny, you have made a strong statement about the importance of the START Treaty, and expressing the hope this will lead on to that. You said we should not link START to SDI, as the Soviets have been suggesting.

In the same sense, should there be a formal linkage between completing the START Treaty and approving the conventional balance? Should progress in one area there be contingent upon progress in the other?

General ROWNY. Well, the first part of that question, Senator, I think that START is also a freestanding treaty which would be in the U.S. interest and the Soviets' interest, and a number of my counterparts, when I was negotiating with them, told me that there is a lot in the START treaty for them as well as for us in the United States.

In other words, if they would have to come down in their ICBM forces, we would have to give up our submarine forces, which they find of some concern, and also our air-launched Cruise missiles. So I think that the START agreement should stand on its own. There should not be this artificial linkage that the Soviets imposed first on INF and START with SDI and now still have it with START. I think this is a political ploy, and I hope that that is dropped.

Having said that, that therefore leads me to also say that I do not think that linkage of conventional and START or INF and START is justified.

Senator CRANSTON. You said earlier that it would be disrupting and disconcerting for our alliance and would lead to questions about continuity and steadfastness in policy if the INF Treaty was rejected by the Senate. Would it be equally disrupting and disconcerting if a START Treaty was negotiated and then rejected by the Senate?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think so. I think that while some of the allies naturally think of INF forces as something that is closer to home, they also very much have in mind strategic forces. And I think that this also would fall in the same category.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston. Senator Evans?

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My gratitude to the patient witnesses. They have lasted a long time.

General Rowny, you were opposed to SALT II, as you said in your statement, because you believed it was a fatally-flawed agreement.

What were some of the basic reasons for your opposition? And to what degree was your concern over our inability to really watch over Soviet cheating? And how much of a factor was that in your decision?

General ROWNY. Verification was a very big factor in SALT II and my unhappiness with SALT II, Senator. The fatal flaws had to do with the fact that we permitted the Soviets heavy missiles, and we had no such right, that they did not want to include the Backfire bomber which we determined had intercontinental range.

And also that there were a large number of unverifiable, or marginally-verifiable provisions. And verifying the wrong thing. In other words, in SALT II we were looking at the launchers and not the warheads. We were looking at the rifle tube and not the bullets. And it is the bullets that kill.

So when President Reagan came in and asked me to come aboard, some of my advice fortunately he took, and there have been principles which have been followed. And those are that any treaty we enter into should measure the right things, like warheads.

And this new treaty, START, would measure warheads, and also the INF Treaty, while we are now reducing missiles, we also took into account the fact that it does have the warheads on them.

A second principle was that it needed to be equitable. In other words, this asymmetry, if necessary, had to be accomplished, because equal reductions would still leave the Soviets ahead. And this has been a principle.

And third, it has to be effectively verifiable. And this INF Treaty, while it is not airtight, and I do not think any treaty can be airtight, has such a large number of verification provisions built into it that it raises the cost of Soviet cheating.

But also, the two things that we got into this treaty at the end that makes it a verifiable treaty, in my opinion, are the globality, that is the fact that the Soviets are going to reduce to zero. And also the second element that goes along with that, and that is the fact that they cannot test any systems.

I think that these two elements of the INF Treaty are very important to the future. Now, we can, of course, hope for a START Treaty to reach global zero. We certainly have to insist that they have global equality. And so we are agreeing to that so far in the numbers we have.

I would also hope that we could get very much more stringent restrictions on Soviet testing, because the Soviets will be allowed to test missiles as long as they have them, but we should be able to assure that they test them, for example, without encrypting, which is one of the things we wanted in SALT II but did not get.

Senator EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I think we could shorten this set of hearings very substantially if as a committee we would just stipulate that we believe, given the chance, the Soviets would cheat under any treaty that we sign.

Then we would not spend so much time worrying about whether or not the Soviets cheated under previous treaties or under alternative treaties or under anything else we might do in the future, but rather we could focus on precisely what we are dealing with now which is an INF Treaty with its specific kinds of verification.

Verification is necessary only because you are afraid the other side will step outside the treaty, given the chance. Otherwise, we would need no verification.

I suggest that too much attention to past treaties and whether or not and under what circumstances the Soviets cheated is largely irrelevant to this Treaty, where we have to deal with what we have got and what we have negotiated.

With that in mind, and considering the other elements of the treaty, would you recommend to a Senator that he or she vote for ratification of this Treaty as it is without further amendments, understandings, or anything of the kind, just as it sits?

General ROWNY. In my view, Senator, the treaty can stand on its own.

Senator EVANS. As it is?

General ROWNY. Yes.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I would support that.

Senator EVANS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, do you mean can or should stand on its own?

General ROWNY. I think it does. It does stand on its own. Now, I must add to that that I am not saying that the Soviets may not cheat. I think that we have to watch them and monitor them.

I am saying we have a better web of constraints to catch them if they are cheating. If they do, we have to do something about it.

And so I do not think that anything here has proved that the Soviets will not cheat.

But the way the President says, trust them but verify. I think there is still the principle even if the Soviets do not like to hear it.

Senator EVANS. Do you suspect the Soviets believe that, given the opportunity, we might cheat too?

General ROWNY. Not really, sir. I think that they might say that for propaganda purposes.

But the Soviets have studied, those we deal with that have studied our system, they know that it would be extremely difficult for a democracy, with a free press, legislature for hearings, type we have, open literature, I think they realize that we——

Senator EVANS. Dan Rather would be right on top of us.

General ROWNY. That we would not be able to cheat, and I think they recognize that fact.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. May I add a comment? I think by far the greatest thing to fear in the post-INF environment is not the cheating in this particular case, because I think Gorbachev has got his own very different strategy, and his own set of motivations, and his own direction.

The danger is Europe letting its guard down, coasting along, and not getting its act together to follow the Harmel doctrine of strength with negotiations.

Gorbachev is counting on this response. We, NATO, must prove his expectations to be wrong.

Senator EVANS. I was going to turn to that, even though we are not dealing directly with conventional weapons or what comes after INF.

I think that what comes after INF is important because if we believe that it is dangerous to ratify an INF Treaty because of the position it puts us in, then we ought to think twice about ratifying it.

You have both said that you believe it stands on its own, that it is worth ratifying, and that we would be at least as well off, and maybe better off than we are today.

General ROWNY. Having said that, though, Senator, that does not solve the problem of conventional.

Senator EVANS. I understand that.

General ROWNY. If we can draw attention to that, I think we should.

Senator EVANS. Ambassador Abshire, you talked about the six points that NATO could pursue at no cost. We hear a lot in this body about things that can happen at no cost. That is almost never the case.

It seems to me that in looking at those six points that, while the analysis or the approach of the policies that you are talking about might be of little or no cost, to carry them out might, in fact, entail a very substantial cost.

For instance, where you say, third, a special study should be mandated on how NATO should face up to the potentially precarious maldeployment and readiness problems in the northern army group area.

Presumably, readiness, or the improvement of readiness, might require a fairly substantial investment. The study might not cost much, and we would have a better understanding of where we are. But I suspect that probably improving readiness might cost some money.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. May I comment, Senator?

Senator EVANS. Yes.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Absolutely. Many of these recommendations resulted from a tour of European capitals and from our unclassified net assessment of the balance of forces. We think NATO should do a classified appraisal along these lines.

I have mentioned things needed to break the mindset that this is an unmanageable problem, and to alter the attitude of what I call throwing money and technology at the problem, and instead to look at the specific vulnerabilities and to develop a specific investment strategy, get us moving, so that we can find coalition solutions.

Now, some of the things that I have mentioned do not cost anything. To do that net assessment might mean the military committee working Saturday afternoons. They have the documents. They have not put them together.

Another recommendation for the Secretary General and the major NATO commanders to take that assessment to capitals and to sit down with the cabinet ministers and the finance ministers to look at the specifics. Well, that costs the gasoline for the military planes that would take them.

But some of those things can get us moving and can get us serious about conventional defense at no cost. The reason we picked those first is to get them moving immediately in that direction, rather than a period of malaise in the next six to nine months.

Senator EVANS. Well, I realize that. And I could not agree more that we ought to work smarter and not necessarily just throw money at things.

But we ought not be lulled into the feeling that we can handle all of the conventional imbalance between the West and the East with no new investment.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is correct. But you know, it depends on where you place your priorities. In our own Government are we going to put some priorities in this direction? Or other directions?

For instance, we could create a covering force for the North AG area, the danger point, through a joint fund. You could do that in place of some other things in your defense budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator McConnell?

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following right along, Dan was pursuing the line that I wanted to pursue in any event.

Most of my questions the last three days have related to the post-INF environment. I mentioned to Secretary Vance and Secretary Rogers this morning, an article in today's New York Times about how the West Germans would like to get rid of our nuclear forces below the 500 kilometer threshold.

It seems to me we may have a problem sustaining our existing deterrence posture, much less improving or expanding our forces. I apologize I was not here during your testimony and therefore did not hear the six recommendations that you made that you argued did not cost much.

There seems to me some indication that we may have a hard time maintaining our alliance's current level of deterrence, or for that matter sustaining at existing levels our own. The Soviets are obviously shopping this idea with the Germans once again, knowing their vulnerability to arguments that any kind of nuclear deterrence is a bad idea.

Frankly, it seems to me that the Germans would be interested in an adequate nuclear shield, since they would be the first victims of a conventional assault.

My concern is that this is going to be an enormously difficult task, to improve our collective conventional response capability within NATO, and I wanted to hear some of your further observations about that.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, I think you have outlined a very definite danger. The feeling in the Federal Republic of Germany, is something they call, I believe wrongly, "singularity." They feel that they have been left out there holding the nuclear bag at the lowest level.

They have not been left alone. We have nuclear capable planes and weapons in other alliance countries, but they have more. It is for this very reason of centrifugal forces, however, that I think it is so important that we have not just one but two summits.

I wanted a heads of government summit a year ago at this time. I think we are about a year late. But my recommendation is that we have a summit, which is now planned in March, and another summit after our new President comes in, and that we have a work program that produces a comprehensive strategy to keep our allies together.

During this period Gorbachev, who is a brilliant grand strategist, is going to attempt to splinter that alliance apart, by inviting prime ministers and foreign ministers and so forth to his capital.

So, whether it is on conventional improvements or conventional negotiations, whether it is on the chemical level or whether it is on the third zero option, it is important to rally the alliance around as we did brilliantly during deployment, to keep this unity, to make better use of our resources, and to have a strategy in all of these interrelated areas.

Senator MCCONNELL. If I may interrupt you, given the euphoria at the moment in Europe over the INF Treaty, what is your realistic assessment of what we might be able to accomplish with our NATO allies in the area of buildups of any type?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It depends upon our collective leadership, and I think waiting too long on this heads of government summit can be a mistake.

We have a window of opportunity that we are going to lose, because Gorbachev, within the next year, is going to attempt to eliminate the perception of any threat while he still has the conventional capability. Therefore it is most important to get this comprehensive effort going.

I had a good talk with Manfred Woerner, who will take over the Secretary Generalship in June, and he is very strong on these conventional improvements. He understands thinking smarter, if not a lot richer through better use of resources, tradeoffs, and multiplier effects.

In other words, he has a strategic mind. So, we should get moving on this course. After all, it was through deployment that we won the great INF negotiating victory. Now it must be through conventional improvements that we can win this final victory to eliminate the danger of short warning Blitzkrieg-type attack.

Senator McConnell. But you know what we are up against. I read this this morning, a Times article from today, which had a Bonn dateline. It pointed out that only 24 percent of the Germans now consider the Soviet Union a threat, as compared with 55 percent 5 years ago. And, my guess is that figure would probably be similar throughout Europe on that kind of question.

Thus my observation that I wonder if these democracies have the will in the face of a euphoria of the INF Treaty, and the feeling that the Soviets are no longer much of a threat. Do they have the will to do the kind of things that are needed in the post-INF environment?

This is going to be a very, very tough thing for us to pull off. Is it not?

Ambassador Abshire. I agree. But in our swing around Europe with my team in October, we visited with SPD and Labor leaders, and we discussed the problems up in this Northern Army Group that I have been talking about. We were able to get them to say with certainty that the problems must be rectified.

But these people need to be shown a coherent way to do this, without every country blindly doing more, but through collective solutions, as we are capable of doing when we really get that machinery moving.

And let me say that a great part of the leverage is in our smart weapons, and in the funds that have been set up by the Senate Armed Services Committee, that first Nunn fund, and now the balanced technology initiative.

The Pentagon is doing good work on what is called the competitive strategies initiative, shaping technologies at points of the opponent's weakness.

This work gives great leverage and helps us in what we call the second echelon attack, whereas our recommendations, including sustainability and this ready force, are aimed at eliminating the most vulnerable areas of the first echelon attack.

Senator McConnell. That is American funding though, right?

Ambassador Abshire. Everybody's collectively.

Senator McConnell. In your visit in October, how willing did you find these leaders to spend some money?

Senator Evans was talking about the things you recommended that did not cost anything. How willing did you find them to spend some money on conventional forces?

Ambassador Abshire. It is much easier to get them engaged, if you are thinking smarter and not richer because there is the possibility of getting to the money later.

In 1985 we started a conventional defense improvements program based on no new money, but we accomplished tremendous things.

For example, we developed a conceptual military framework for NATO looking 20 years ahead instead of 5 years ahead. We were able to pull together a range of resources for better use.

And as I say, that is the reason that Senator Nunn switched from his troop withdrawal stance and a year later said that since so much has been accomplished, he wanted to be a part of it by creating a positive amendment.

Senator McCONNELL. I gather both of you agree that the START agreement should not be linked to the conventional discussions.

Is that the position of both of you? That the treaty, standing alone, assuming the verification problem can be taken care of, is worthy of ratification?

General ROWNY. Yes. Except I do not want to imply by that that we should not move on conventional forces and move out smartly.

In other words, the reverse of that is not true. On conventional imbalances, we should move ahead. And I think that the more important aspect here, the technical and the psychological that you mention, is the psychological.

I think as important and as good as this INF Treaty is, it should not be oversold as the millenium or the answer to all these other problems. As I tried to point out in my statement, it is only a step, and the President has said that. It is only a step.

So we have got to guard against Gorby fever or euphoria or these other things that you have mentioned, because that could very well unhinge us in trying to get START and conventional reductions.

Senator McCONNELL. As you all can tell by the tone of my voice, I probably will support the INF Treaty and may well support the START Treaty.

But the irony of all this is that we complete INF, we complete START, and then we are looking at a fairly significant military buildup. Are we not? Because for a conventional agreement to come about, everyone has testified, you have got enormously complicated problems.

First, a huge number of countries involved in such discussions. Second, I would assume, correct me if I am wrong, that for Gorbachev to do something in the conventional area he has got to confront his military complex.

An awful lot of Soviet soldiers presumably might be doing something else, if there were a significant reduction in the level of their conventional forces in the Soviet Union. So this third step—this third treaty—that we are putting last and not linking to anything else is going to be complicated to achieve.

Arguably, assuming that the decision to deploy INF ultimately got rid of medium and short-range missiles, is this agreement going to cost us a lot of money in the conventional area? Do you not think?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes. But you know, what has been the great driving lever on negotiations? It has been SDI. And why? Because the Soviets view that as an information revolution.

In my judgment, it is not so much a given configuration of SDI, but the Soviets' realization that they cannot compete. We know that throughout, the Soviets have been concerned that we would have the imagination to take the basic SDI investment and look at the conventional applications, whether it is in robotics or rail guns or sensor technology, to conventional balance. They have been so worried that we might get our act together and be able to shift the conventional balance, because clearly on this level, they know they cannot compete.

And by the way, we have made progress. We have 12 memorandums of understanding on some of these smart technologies. So there is leverage. There are resources that are available, and a lot of these are not necessarily new monies. They are carrying through on certain priorities.

The Chairman. Thank you very much indeed. And I am like the janitor, I have to stay till the end. And so I will pass my opportunity here and pass to Senator Cranston.

Senator Cranston. Thank you very much. General Rowny, I wanted to explore to what degree, if any, force asymmetries are in and of themselves an impediment to arms agreements.

Arms negotiations have often foundered, as you know, because of different force configurations. For example, the Soviets have more heavy land-based ICBM's, our SLBM's are superior. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact has more tanks, NATO has more anti-tank weapons, and so on.

Do you believe that the United States can reach arms agreements, even where such asymmetries cannot be eliminated?

General Rowny. Yes, sir. I think that there can be balances of things that they have against things which we have.

When I talked about asymmetries earlier I was talking in terms of things which are comparable, such as the warheads on the SS-20's and the warheads, say, on the Pershings. In other words, in like fields.

Up until recently, the Soviets have always said that we must have equal reductions. And I am pointing out that one of the things we should build on from the INF Treaty is the fact that they have now agreed that they can reduce more of similar things than we, down to equal levels. And I think that that principle is a good one, and we should capitalize on it, and build it.

Now, on the other side, I do agree that the Soviets would find a 50-percent START agreement in their interest, as they have told me, many of them, privately, because what is of concern to them are these powerful submarine forces which can roam not only around the Atlantic but now around the Pacific with very accurate weapons. And also, our air-launched Cruise missiles.

And so in this case we have something to give up, and they have something to give up. We are concerned about their ICBM warheads. So those would complement, or at least balance off each other. And in that case, yes.

When I was talking about the asymmetries earlier, I was talking about the fact that the Soviets, up until recently, have said that they can only reduce things equally of a like nature. And now they have agreed that that may not necessarily be so.

They have come to our principle that it is the end result which is important. That is, that the end must be equal and not that along the line there should be equal cuts.

Senator Cranston. Do you concur with that?

Ambassador Abshire. I do concur.

Senator Cranston. On the INF-START relationship, can you conceive of any valid reason why it might be wise to attach to INF any provisions which would bind our negotiators as to the manner in which they should approach the START Treaty?

General ROWNY. Let me say in general, having been a negotiator for a number of years, that I do not like the idea of binding instructions.

I think that instructions that the Administration gives people are good and sufficient. I think they can use their judgment. So in general I am against any types of inhibitions or conditions placed on negotiators.

Senator CRANSTON. I gather you concur with that?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I would agree with that. I think in retrospect the Jackson amendment on SALT I was good because there we did have conditions of inequality. And we wanted to set a different direction.

But now we are operating on an entirely different set of principles, which have been demonstrated. We have had unequal reductions and equality in the INF agreement.

Senator CRANSTON. On the matter of verification, General Rowny stated in testimony there can be no airtight verification regime.

But he stated his view that the INF verification package is so extensive that it satisfies reasonable criteria for effectiveness. I would like to ask if you concur in that view, Mr. Abshire?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. If General Rowny puts his seal of approval on it, I absolutely concur.

Senator CRANSTON. Second, I would like to ask General Rowny, what about the fact that has been brought up in the course of these hearings that we cannot inspect wherever we choose to make sure that there are no SS-20's somewhere.

General ROWNY. I think that given the other elements of our inspection regime, that that particular aspect of it can fit in place.

Let me say that I do not think we could have the same type of, set of provisions of the same regime, say, for a START agreement, which does not reduce to zero. Here, in the INF Treaty, we said we could go to places where INF missiles were formerly deployed.

And the fact that we are going to see that all the launchers and the transport erectors are reduced, as well as the deployed missiles, the fact that, and also the fact that we can monitor what is happening for a number of years and see what is assembled and what comes out.

I think that all put together, this has some reasonable satisfiable criteria built into it. I would not make those same statements about START. I think START has to be much more comprehensive and complex.

Senator CRANSTON. On START, you did say in your testimony START will pose more complex verification problems than INF. It will be harder to verify 50 percent reduction, which will permit continuing production, testing, and deployment than an outright ban with a reduction to zero.

But is it your view that we should be able to work out procedures and agreements so that START can be adequately verified?

General ROWNY. Given enough will on the part of the Soviet Union, if they tackle this problem, yes, it can be resolved.

I am simply pointing out that INF is more easily satisfied criteria, because certain things happen which would be impossible in START. Such as global zero. We are not saying that. We are saying 50 percent automatically. That allows them to produce, to test, and to train.

And also the fact that they will be able to test these missiles makes the START regime more difficult. But given enough effort and attention and will, yes. It can be worked out.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston. Senator Pressler?

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, listening to the testimony, I have gotten some good notes for a speech on the Senate floor in support of an amendment to the treaty for parity in conventional forces in Europe.

And let me say that I think that is an amendment that I would like to see the administration support. I think we can work very hard on that, if we do not get 51 votes on it, to amend this treaty.

If we get a good vote it will send a signal to the administration in terms of what they should be doing on the START Treaty.

But Mr. Abshire, I heard you say that now we have a window of opportunity to get the conventional forces down. We will not have that in 2 or 3 years, because as the polls cited, the Germans no longer consider the Soviets a threat.

In fact, I say the window of opportunity is even greater now if we were to attach an appropriate amendment to the Treaty, because the treaty gives up our trump card in the Treaty while the Russians keep their trump card, which is superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons in Europe.

George Shultz said here on Monday that he could live with a parity amendment—not necessarily an amendment but the concept of parity. I asked him about an amendment that would let the Soviets keep a 3-2 superiority.

And he said if we are going to do it we should do it right and get 1 to 1. Well, I would agree. Now, it is 4-1 in their favor. But why not utilize this window of opportunity, so to speak, that you speak of, instead of waiting to negotiate a better conventional military balance later?

I do not think the Russians are going to do the conventional treaty right after this. As soon as they get this INF Treaty, they will have what they want. They are not going to agree to a conventional force reduction. It is too ingrained in them. That is their style of war.

Land area, combat-ready troops, tanks, chemical weapons. That is what they like.

This would not have to hold up changing the INF agreement more than a few weeks. The Senate could adopt an amendment, it could become a protocol, then go back to the Russians. Only two countries really are involved in terms of large ground forces. The other countries are just as involved as they are in the nuclear balance or imbalance.

We have talked about how the Asians and everybody are involved in this. Why would you not want to see the Senate adopt an amendment for parity in Europe? We are right in the middle of that window of opportunity. We are going to lose it the day this is signed. Are we not?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, the foreign ministers have, in their communiques, talked about this objective of eliminating the disparities.

This summit provides the window of opportunity to get an effective round of robust conventional improvements. The six things I have listed are just a beginning. And this technology gives us the ultimate leverage to eliminate many of the disparities.

It is not so much a question of force ratios as the Soviet capability for short-warning attack. I think the leverage will result not through rhetoric, but through momentum. That was our experience with the Cruise and Pershing missile deployments, where we certainly achieved something.

We have to get moving on the conventional side. Ultimately it means more money, but we are principally talking about improved cooperation with our allies and better use of resources. And if the Soviets see the new technologies going into that, that is real leverage.

That is where the real leverage is and not in an amendment, in my judgment. I am all for the objective of eliminating the disparities. But I do think it would be bad to have any kind of delay on this Treaty, because I think our allies performed so magnificently during deployment under fire, under real difficulty. And for us to appear to zig-zag now would be unnerving.

What we need is steadiness and leadership to get moving on these conventional enhancements.

Senator PRESSLER. Would you both give me your assessment of the European leaders' endorsement this Treaty? Their endorsement seems to run counter to what a lot of them said previously.

Someone suggested that the Europeans have endorsed this treaty because of pressure from the United States. Some have said domestic election concerns, and some have said convictions. Maybe a combination of all these factors.

Yesterday I had a letter here from former Ambassador Galbraith saying that most French leaders say privately that they are opposed to it. Now, I do not know who those French leaders are.

When Galbraith appears, I will certainly ask him who they are. Because of their previous public statements, I have been surprised at Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher and everybody else endorsing it.

Yet, in my own discussions with Europeans, the ones I have talked to have said it is just going to be a bad deal in the long run. And people keep saying that. For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal written by three leading Europeans illustrates the arguments against it.

But where do the European leaders really come out on this? Is this politics we are hearing? Or is this real strategic defense?

General ROWNY. If I could give a generalized answer, and then Dave has been there more recently and has worked with the allies.

Let me say first of all, Senator, that if you and other Senators would give a ringing endorsement to the Secretary of Defense's report that he put in on Monday, the support of NATO strategy in the 1990's——

Senator **PRESSLER**. Which really means an increase in defense spending, does it not?

General **ROWNY**. Some.

Senator **PRESSLER**. Is it not a substantial increase?

General **ROWNY**. It could also mean some reordering of priorities.

Senator **PRESSLER**. But President Reagan has even said to the European allies that after the treaty we are committed to spending more in Europe. I do not know where the money is going to come from, looking at the size of our deficit.

General **ROWNY**. There is no free lunch. You are right. And that is a problem. But either support that or debate what is better, or which part of those could be put forth. I think that would be very helpful.

To get more to your other question, which I think Dave ought to answer in more particular, the officials of the governments of Europe have all been behind and endorsed this treaty.

When I travel around, I do hear from a number of military leaders and intellectuals and others misgivings, largely because they are looking down the road and wonder about what is going to happen later.

So that is the reason I put a lot of emphasis during this ratification process, not only talking about INF, but what are its consequences? What are things that need to be done in the longer range aspect, so that the East-West balance is improved over a period of years? And that the overall situation is bettered as a result of having had this debate and talked about it?

Senator **PRESSLER**. Well, certainly I am not arguing with you. But I think you put your finger on it.

I think the European leaders have been told informally and formally by our government that we plan to increase spending in conventional forces and chemical forces in Europe, that we plan to modernize other nuclear weapons, such as making the Lance missiles fly further.

I think they expect us to do this, and I think we have told them you support this treaty and we will do this. Not in precisely those words. But I do not think Congress has been told that, and the American people have not been told that.

The cost of defense spending will go up dramatically to American taxpayers after this treaty goes into effect, if the Secretary of Defense report is implemented. And if our other nuclear weapons in Europe are modernized, and if we increase the spending on our conventional forces.

And that is what the European leaders have been told, and that is what they are telling their people.

I questioned putting in the INF missiles in the first place and asked a lot of questions, and was told by Secretaries of Defenses going way back to 1975 that must have them to protect the lives of our troops and to reduce defense costs.

It was either put more troops in or put the missiles in. So I finally went along with it. And it probably would not have made much difference if I had approved or not. But I did.

Now we have this Treaty, and we are telling our European allies that we are going to increase our defense spending in Europe. This was in the New York Times on December 14—that President Reagan made a pledge to that.

We in Congress will still be here, some of us, until 1990 at least. And we will be called upon to vote on some of these things. And if we do not vote for it, the Secretary of Defense probably will come to my office and tell me I am not really supporting our defense, that I am endangering the lives of American troops, et cetera, et cetera.

That is why I am asking some of these questions, because I find in your statements, the way they strike me, that they are very good material for a strong speech in support of an amendment for parity now, to act now on conventional forces and chemical weapons.

I hope we are not making too many commitments to our European allies that we may have trouble meeting.

I think the Europeans take those commitments seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator PRESSLER. I hope to get Mr. Abshire's response.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to get back under the 10-minute rule. But go ahead, Mr. Abshire.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, I was just going to say that we were committed to what we call the Montebello decision, modernization of Lance and those weapons anyway.

On the conventional, we do not need to strengthen the 5th or the 7th corps, because that is not where the problem lies. But what we do need to do in the Pentagon is give a priority to RPV's, and standoff weapons which are going to contribute to the follow-on force's attack.

And by the way, the Ikle-Wohlstetter report supports these actions in their competitive strategies as a way forward on that. In the reevaluation of our defense budget on the issue that you are talking about, the key issue is deciding where our priorities lie. And I think this is the first priority.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Evans?

Senator EVANS. Thank you. First, I think we should correct the record. The Senator from South Dakota talked about his 3/2 amendment.

I think the answer of the Secretary of State was if we were going to have that kind of amendment we ought to do it right, and have parity. But he would not like to do it at all, in this agreement. I think that is an accurate and complete response from the Secretary.

Senator PRESSLER. I did not represent that as anything else than what you just said.

Senator EVANS. Is it not far too simplistic, however, to call for parity in numbers or a ratio of 3 to 2 or anything else?

The conventional weapon formula is an extraordinarily complex formula. I think there are some, at least, who would suggest that there is not the huge disparity that others suggest today.

If you take into account qualitative differences and abilities, we may have misplacement of forces or we may need certain elements, but that pure numbers is far too simplistic a way to try to measure conventional forces. Is that an accurate description, General Rowny?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think any time you do the bean-counting, as some people say, or just look at numbers only that you get a very simplistic answer.

My point of view comes from two sources. One is from listening to a number of allied military leaders and seeing their threat assessment. And on net balance, all these things considered, they feel we have a problem. That is one.

Second, the Soviet military and others that I deal with have given me the impression that that is so. That once they reduce their INF forces in Europe, the correlation of forces is going to be in their favor.

Therefore, any of these improvements, if we can get them no cost, great. If we have to pay for them, let us do that also. Let us simply not do what we have to, because they are very difficult physical problems. But these two go hand in hand.

And if the NATO commanders were satisfied that there was no problem, then I think that we would not have to worry about any feeling of euphoria or comfort on the part of the Soviets.

But since the NATO commanders feel that the conventional imbalance is against them, and this is echoed by the Soviets who believe that the correlation of forces is in their favor, I think that steps need to be taken to correct one or the other. And whichever one comes first, the other opinion, I think, will follow.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Your point on numbers is correct. The real problem is not so much the numbers. The real problem is that you have the maximum forward concentration of Soviet armor in East Germany poised against the weakest point of the central front, where the Belgian, the Dutch, and a German corps are positioned, and where we have no deployments.

So we have to negotiate away their forward deployment that gives them that short warning capability. Meanwhile, regardless of our progress on that, we ought to clean up our own maldeployments, which are not American.

Senator EVANS. I think that was one of your six points and not necessarily an extraordinarily costly thing to do.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. If you were king and could go to NATO and could forget these national problems and take what you have to work out a good defense, we would be twice as well off as we are today.

Now that we have a different climate and a new realism in facing these issues, we ought to try to move in that direction.

Senator EVANS. Is it not also true that there is probably some of that same concern with Eastern European forces as well?

They may be under some greater concentration of leadership. But I suppose there is always the question of until what degree, under a real warfare situation, to what degree and how hard and under what circumstances some of those European nations will fight.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is true. But again I return to the shorter warning lightning attack, because the Europeans would most probably be most cooperative in that kind of a situation where as in a protracted situation they might react very differently.

Senator EVANS. This line of questioning is just to suggest, that we would be foolish to try to delay this Treaty's ratification on some perceived desire to reach a certain numerical relationship on conventional forces. I believe you have already testified to that.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes.

Senator EVANS. Just one other question. We have had many in Congress and outside, and I think the Chairman referred to it earlier, the concern that we spend between 6 and 7 percent of our gross national product for defense, the Europeans spend something less than that, and the Japanese are barely over 1 percent, amidst great furor of getting it over 1 percent.

But is it a rational expectation that all members of an alliance, the Western alliance, contribute the same amount to defense? Or is it more accurate to say that each has a different role to play?

That Europeans are interested in European defense and we are a superpower with different responsibilities? That the percentage we spend on the Pacific or in other parts of the world just simply put us in a different circumstance than other allies and that we should not really expect everyone to spend the same percentage of gross national product?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, let me just say the burden should be measured broadly.

For example, the continental countries have conscription, which also means they do not pay their troops what we pay ours. That is an additional burden for us and for the United Kingdom which also does not have conscription.

The Federal Republic of Germany experiences a very different form of burden, with maneuvers and the constant overflights of military aircraft, a burden that is very difficult for some of those politicians in the Bundestag to carry.

So you put your finger right on the problem. We ought to get countries contributing where we can get the most out of that particular contribution, and then make more of the sum of the parts.

Senator EVANS. But perhaps we should be more. Maybe it is important that we be more explicit along those lines, just for our own education, to try to show that the burden-sharing is not as disparate as we may think that it is when we only measure it in dollars spent as a share of gross national product.

I suspect not only the political fallout, but all of the other fallout that would occur if we tried to reinstitute conscription in this country, would far exceed the differential in cost between what some other nations spend and what we spend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General ROWNY. If I could just add, Senator, while we spend a larger portion of our gross national product because we are one of the few superpowers, I think that that does not say that others can have a free lunch.

Senator EVANS. Of course.

General ROWNY. I do not think you are implying that, and I recall when General Rogers was in command of SAC/EUR he said, if all of these countries put forth, say, 4 percent of their gross national product over a 10-year period, this would redress the conventional imbalances.

It is that kind of thing that I think we are talking about. That still leaves quite a bit of disparity between ourselves and these other countries. It also leaves some possible give and take for political commitments, versus money.

But you come down to the bottom line, there is no free lunch.

Senator EVANS. That is right. And it also comes down to the bottom line that it is always going to be involved with a lot of political pushing and hauling both ways. And to the degree we have open communication and a reasonable degree of trust between ourselves and our allies, that pushing and hauling will eventually work itself out to probably a pretty reasonable sharing.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Could I make my last comment this one, because I like your emphasis on specifics?

I think the way we get more money, more investment, is for NATO to have an effective investment strategy, I would call it a resources strategy, so that the public is convinced that they are really getting that additional security out of the investment as opposed to it being wasted.

That is why I start with thinking smarter, not richer. If we show we can think smarter, that we are stewards, we may to get the additional money.

Senator EVANS. I think that is a very important point and one that was brought out very, very well, I think, in this afternoon's testimony. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Before leaving that subject, I would just reemphasize my own interest as one Senator, and my own feeling that they are not only getting a free lunch, but they are getting a great deal of, a larger contribution from us proportionately to them.

And I think the interesting thing is how the risk is measured in each of these two areas. But I will not beat that dead horse again because we have covered that in my last round.

General Rowny, I would just like to clarify one point. In response to a question from Senator Pressler, I think it was, did you say that if the Soviets tested an SS-25 missile at a range under 5,500 kilometers, it would be a violation?

I do not think that is what you meant, if you did say it.

General ROWNY. Let me get advice of counsel here, if I may, for just a second.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. My point is that the SS-25 has a range capability in excess of 5,500 kilometers, and therefore would not be covered by the Treaty.

General ROWNY. That is true. But if there were a series of tests of a missile, which were restricted to the 500 to 5,500 kilometer class, I think we would have reason to suspect they were violating the treaty.

So I think it would give a rise to a lot of questions. Launching the SS-25 to a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers is not a violation of the treaty, but if they began testing a weapons system that now exists consistently at a shorter range, and had sustained tests, we could have some reason to believe that they are producing a banned system.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be grounds for suspicion and cause for concern, but not a violation.

General ROWNY. If it were clearly the SS-25 launched to an INF range, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now, critics have charged that removal of the American missiles covered by the treaty would open a gap in the so-called continuum of deterrence.

General Rogers has said the INF agreement would eliminate a crucial escalatory option. The result would be a reduction in the credibility of NATO's deterrence. Would you agree with that line of argumentation?

General ROWNY. I would agree to the extent that the way forces are now structured, there is another weapons system which we have, and I think he is talking about the Pershings specifically, which could be used along this escalatory ladder.

Now, if you ask another question, though, would you rather have that step available or would you rather have the larger SS-20 threat eliminated, I for one say I would rather have the SS-20 threat eliminated and therefore would take that particular weapons system out.

So I do not think you can deny that this weapon would be a step, if it were in the present regime. But we are asking a different question, and that is, on balance, is it better for them to take out the SS-20's and us to take out the Pershings and the ground-launched cruise missiles, I believe it is.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I think he stated that very well. I will adopt your statement.

General ROWNY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Scowcroft was quoted as saying the INF Treaty will "leave us the choice of a conventional defeat or using strategic weapons to defend Europe."

What would be your reaction, General Rowny, to that statement?

General ROWNY. My reaction is that is not a complete statement.

If the INF Treaty, let us say, 13 years from now we are convinced that the three-year reduction has been verified and we are in a position where the INF forces are gone, that if the Soviets moved in the conventional forces, we would have dual-capable aircraft, aircraft which could also carry nuclear weapons, we have sea-launched missiles, and we have nuclear weapons of under 500 kilometers. We also have the strategic weapons.

So we are not restricted to the strategic retaliatory step alone. Although that would be part of it. But these other forces exist, and would not be taken out under this treaty.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Could I add that in my testimony I note that we have moved forward with deployment, that the Pershing II's and the Cruise were political weapons.

They were needed to assure Europeans after Helmut Schmidt's 1977 IISS speech that we were not overlooking them in the SALT negotiations. And it was the SS-20 threat, which had led to the need for that reassurance.

And when you say political weapons, weapons that would tend to bind the President in his decision of a nuclear response, but the President makes that decision regardless of the weapons. So we got the Pershing II's out. And they were not needed for deterrence before the deployment of the SS-20 missiles.

And I just reiterate the other point of my testimony. Flexible response has got to be regained at the conventional level, because at these nuclear levels we are at parity, or inferiority.

Anyway, it is not as if the Pershings and the Cruise gave us superiority in those areas, a superior rung in the nuclear ladder. We are equal or inferior.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I must say, speaking of those terms, equal, inferior, and superior, the term I like the best is the one that Mr. Kosygin used to Albert Gore when he was Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee, we were together in Moscow, the father of the present Albert Gore, and he said we should use the word sufficiency, that each side has sufficient weapons to destroy the other.

And I would say that probably when it comes to that, that there is sufficiency on both sides in nuclear weapons in Europe. Would you not agree?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. The Soviets have resurrected that term recently.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Would you concur though?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. It is sufficient.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Nodding your head meant you would agree, I take it?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you. Mr. Nixon and Henry Kissinger wrote that if we eliminate American medium and short-range forces in Europe without redressing the conventional imbalance, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe will remain, and the gap in deterrence of conventional attack will be reopened.

I would imagine the administration would not agree with this statement, and I was wondering if you could give me the reasons.

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. Well, I will say before General Rowny speaks that I think the gap or the danger of this lightning-like conventional capability in the 1990's is there regardless of the Pershing and Cruise missiles.

It is there irrespective of whether they come out or not. This is why I say we ought to concentrate on the practical problem rather than certain more imaginary problems.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you. General Rowny?

General **ROWNY**. Yes. I think that Ambassador Abshire put his finger on it. It is not that this INF Treaty is going to suddenly make this great conventional imbalance.

The conventional imbalance was there, and the conventional imbalance will remain. It all points to the need to get on with reducing the conventional imbalance.

But this removal of the SS-20's on their side, and the moving of the Pershing and GLCM's on our side, does not mean that the Soviets have greatly increased their conventional superiority. That has been there and it is still there.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much indeed. And I would add here that if there are any points that should be corrected in the record, we would be glad to do so.

I thank you both for appearing, and tomorrow at 10 a.m., this committee will resume its hearings, with Ambassador Paul Nitze as our witness. The committee is in recess.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., January 28, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 28, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Adams, Moynihan, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Trible, Evans, and McConnell.

The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

As we move into these hearings, it becomes increasingly important that we get to the witnesses right away. For that reason, I will forego, for the time being, my opening statement, and would ask Mr. Nitze, who has played such a great role in developing this treaty, if he would care to move ahead with his prepared statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. NITZE, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

Ambassador Nitze. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to testify in support of the INF Treaty.

In my prepared remarks, I would like to describe the verification regime mandated by the treaty and to explain why I believe that regime will allow us effectively to verify Soviet compliance with the obligations established by the treaty.

Since this administration began arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have insisted that any agreement must be effectively verifiable if it is to improve stability and to make a lasting contribution to peace and security.

President Reagan has made it clear that he would settle for nothing less.

What do we mean by "effective verification?" We mean that we want to be sure that, if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively, and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation. Of course, our ability to detect and respond to violations helps to deter the other side from committing them in the first place.

In order to achieve an effective INF verification regime, the administration set the following negotiating goals:

—establishment of obligations that are defined as precisely as possible;

—negotiation of cooperative measures, such as on-site inspection, locational restrictions on treaty-limited items and enhancements of national technical means, and provisions providing for unimpeded use of unilateral measures, such as satellite imagery and other national technical means, that will significantly enhance our ability to monitor treaty-related activities; and

—negotiations of provisions that, combined with the aforementioned measures, will increase the cost, complexity, and probability of detection, of Soviet cheating, and thus help to deter it.

We also wanted to establish reliable procedures and channels for pursuing resolution of any treaty compliance problems.

Finally, we recognized the need to demonstrate our determination to adopt appropriate countermeasures in the face of uncorrected Soviet violations, should any occur.

The INF Treaty satisfies the first four requirements by establishing precise, unambiguous obligations, by creating a network of interrelated constraints and measures that allow careful monitoring and reinforce one another in such a fashion as to raise the cost and difficulty of cheating and the risk of getting caught, and by creating a mechanism for addressing compliance concerns.

The final goal is served by the U.S. Government's compliance policy.

The primary obligation of the INF Treaty is clear and unambiguous precisely because of its sweeping nature: the parties are required to eliminate within 18 months all of their shorter range—500 to 1,000 kilometer—missiles and launchers, and within 3 years all of their intermediate range—1,000 to 5,500 kilometer—missiles and launchers. These missiles and launchers are to be eliminated according to detailed, specifically agreed upon procedures.

At the end of three years, the entire class of United States and Soviet INF missile systems, whether deployed or non-deployed, must be totally eliminated. Thus, if even a single Soviet INF missile or launcher is observed after the elimination period, that will constitute clear, unequivocal evidence of a violation of the treaty.

The treaty also requires the parties to eliminate elements of the INF infrastructure, including certain structures, support equipment, and missile-related activity at facilities, that make the INF missile systems a viable military force. It clearly identifies each of these elements and establishes precise procedures for either destroying it or, in the case of certain INF facilities, converting it to non-INF use.

Finally, the treaty bans upon entry into force any further production of INF launchers or missiles and any further flight testing of INF missiles, either present types or new types.

To enhance significantly our ability to monitor treaty-related activities, we negotiated an extensive set of rigorous measures enabling us to verify Soviet declared numbers of INF missiles, launchers and support equipment, to account for them while they await elimination, to insure that they are eliminated, and to strengthen our ability to detect any other such items that might be clandestinely maintained in the future.

To establish a reliable baseline count of the declared treaty-limited items on the other side, we incorporated the following measures:

—an initial exchange of data, recorded in a memorandum of understanding—an MOU—on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of INF missiles, launchers, support structures and equipment, and related facilities. This exchange has occurred, with data current as of November 1, 1987, and the data provided by the Soviet side is, on the whole, within the bounds of our intelligence estimates.

—an update of this data, to occur 30 days after the treaty enters into force.

—a series of baseline, onsite inspections during the period from 30 to 90 days after entry into force to confirm the validity of the updated data. These inspections will occur at key missile support facilities, other than production facilities, and bases listed in the MOU; in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, they are located in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia.

The process of eliminating declared treaty-limited items will extend over three years from entry into force. During this period, we will account for these items through the following measures:

—continuous updates of the data exchanged between the sides, to reflect, among other things, the net effect of elimination activities. This will include a complete update every 6 months.

—restrictions on the location of missiles and launchers to agreed facilities and deployment areas declared in the data exchanges.

—restrictions on the movement of missiles and launchers. Such movements will be permitted only between or among declared support facilities and deployment areas or to elimination sites, and a side must notify the other of such transits within 48 hours after their completion. These notifications must include the numbers of missiles and launchers moved, the mode of transport, the points, dates and times of departure and arrival, and the locations and time at those locations of transported items at least every four days during transit.

—short-notice, on-site inspections to confirm the number of treaty-limited items at declared sites. During the three year elimination period, each side will be allotted 20 inspections per year for this purpose, and also to inspect declared sites at which INF activity already has ceased.

We and the Soviets have agreed on standardized procedures for such inspections, to include the size and makeup of inspecting teams, means of facilitating their movement and operation, permitted inspection equipment, boundaries of the inspection sites, and the rights of the inspectors at the sites. Most importantly, we have agreed on provisions designed to insure that these inspections are truly short-notice.

The Soviets will not know where such an inspection will take place until after the inspection team has arrived in the U.S.S.R. Once the location is revealed to the Soviets, they must prohibit movement of treaty-limited items from the site within one hour and they must insure that the inspection team can arrive at the site in question within 9 hours.

The measures for verifying the elimination of the treaty-limited items are as follows:

—advance notification each time elimination is to occur, including the date and location of the elimination and, for missile systems, the number and types to be eliminated.

—elimination of missiles, launchers and support equipment only at specified elimination facilities.

—mandatory onsite inspection to observe the elimination of missiles and launchers. As I indicated earlier, detailed procedures for the destruction of missile systems have been established; inspectors will observe these procedures, and the inspecting party must confirm in writing that the systems have been eliminated.

—onsite inspection to confirm the elimination of INF support structures and equipment by agreed procedures for destruction or conversion.

—onsite closeout inspections to verify the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities by the removal or destruction of all treaty-limited items and the cessation of all INF-related activities.

Even after all INF missiles, launchers, and related support equipment and facilities declared in the MOU have been eliminated, we must still be concerned lest there be any Soviet attempt clandestinely to maintain an INF force.

Were the Soviets to make such an effort, they might try to take advantage of the assets remaining at their former INF facilities or to exploit their SS-25 ICBM force, which uses a missile stage similar to an SS-20 stage, and is deployed at some former SS-20 bases. As means of detecting such eventualities or other attempts to maintain a clandestine force, the treaty includes the following measures:

—short-notice inspection of sites previously declared to be INF sites and subsequently eliminated, i.e., formerly declared sites. These inspections would help insure that treaty-limited items had not been returned to the inspected sites. During the three year elimination period, these sites will be included in the quota of 20 short notice inspections per year that applies also to still-existing facilities.

After the elimination period, these inspections will continue for 10 years, with an annual quota of 15 per year for the first 5 years and 10 per year for the final 5 years. The procedures for these inspections will be as I outlined earlier.

—inspection by means of continuous portal monitoring, for up to 13 years after the treaty enters into force, of any ground-launched ballistic missile final assembly facility at which missiles with stages outwardly similar to stages of a treaty-limited missile are assembled. Under this provision, the United States is permitted to monitor the Soviet SS-25 final assembly plant at Votkinsk. Our inspectors will monitor all SS-25 ICBM's that exit at the Votkinsk facility and will have the right to use various types of sensors to confirm that no INF missiles or missile stages are leaving the plant disguised as SS-25's.

If a side has no facility that meets the definition in this provision, the other side is permitted to monitor one agreed former missile production facility. Accordingly, the Soviets will monitor a missile production plant at Magna, UT, where rocket motors for U.S. Pershing missiles were formerly produced.

—agreed procedures for enhancing the capability of national technical means to monitor SS-25 bases that are not former INF bases and, therefore, not subject to short-notice on-site inspections as formerly declared facilities. These procedures include the right to request six times a year on short notice an open display of SS-25's at their bases for 6 hours. Combined with short-notice, onsite inspections of SS-25 bases that are former SS-20 bases, these procedures will increase our confidence that the Soviets are not attempting to use an SS-25 base to maintain SS-20's.

—a prohibition on interference with verification by national technical means. This provision enhances our likelihood of detecting illegal activity at locations other than SS-25 bases or former INF facilities.

As I stated earlier, our third goal for the INF verification regime was to negotiate provisions that, combined with the monitoring measures, will increase the cost, complexity, and probability of detection of Soviet cheating, and thus help deter it.

The INF Treaty does this by eliminating elements of the INF infrastructure and banning the activities that are necessary to support a militarily significant INF force.

Structures identified as crucial to supporting INF missiles and launchers will be eliminated by agreed procedures so they cannot be used for INF systems.

Activities associated with INF facilities will cease. Repair, storage and deployment of INF missiles will not be permitted once all missile systems are eliminated. Production and flight testing will be banned.

These restrictions will be monitored according to the procedures I have outlined.

This does not, of course, guarantee that some INF missiles cannot be hidden away somewhere within the great expanses of the Soviet Union. No verification regime could provide such assurance.

It does, however, insure that the Soviets could maintain a clandestine, militarily significant force only at great cost and risk and with steadily decreasing reliability.

One of the most difficult problems for the Soviets would be the requirement to flight-test the missiles to avoid a degradation in their reliability, which would increase over time. Such testing would involve great risk, since the treaty's ban on flight testing is readily verifiable by national technical means. Without the ability to flight-test the missiles, the Soviets would question the effectiveness of these forces and their military value, especially over time.

Faced with this and other obstacles, the Soviets should conclude that the costs and risks of detection are too high compared to any benefits. This, in turn, should help to deter them from violating the treaty.

Should treaty compliance problems arise in the future, we wanted to have in place reliable procedures and channels for pursuing resolution of these issues. This goal is satisfied by Article 13 of the treaty.

Article 13 establishes the Special Verification Commission, and specifies that the commission will meet whenever either side requests a meeting. It further specifies that the purposes for such a meeting will be to resolve questions relating to treaty compliance and to agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty.

Under this provision, if the United States detects suspicious activity on the part of the Soviet Union at any place or at any time, we can request a meeting of the Special Verification Commission to address our concerns, and the Soviets will be obligated to attend. At the meeting, we can indicate our concerns and request an explanation and, if appropriate, corrective action. If we deem it necessary, we can also propose new measures to supplement or clarify the treaty's provision.

We cannot, of course, force the Soviet Union adequately to explain or to correct instances of suspicious activity. But both sides recognize their obligation to respond to concerns of the other side, and they realize that there are consequences for a failure to do so. These consequences reflect the final aspect of our verification policy, our approach to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance.

Our final goal for INF verification was to demonstrate our determination to adopt appropriate measures to protect United States and allied security in the face of uncorrected Soviet violations, should any occur.

As I have explained, treaty provisions that make violations complex and costly, and monitoring rights that create a significant risk that they will be detected, help to deter potential Soviet violations.

But the encouragement of compliant Soviet behavior goes beyond treaty language; it rests as well on Soviet knowledge that the United States has the will to take firm action in response to violations.

We have demonstrated such determination in several ways. We have reacted vigorously to questionable Soviet activities in the bilateral compliance forum, through diplomatic channels, in our reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, and in our extensive consultations with our allies. Where we have determined that a violation has been committed, we have demanded corrective action. And where we have concluded that our efforts to elicit corrective actions have failed, as with Soviet violations of SALT II, we have taken appropriate and proportionate responses.

We are still faced, unfortunately, with Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, most notably in the instance of the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets have halted further construction on that radar, but the violation will continue to exist until the radar is effectively dismantled.

We will continue to insist that the Soviets deal with that violation satisfactorily. However, because the INF Treaty provides us essential security benefits in its own right, and because INF systems are not directly related to strategic ballistic missile defenses, it is our judgment that immediate implementation of the treaty would be in the net security interest of the United States and its allies.

As a result of our approach to questionable Soviet activities in the past, the Soviets should understand well that noncompliance with the INF Treaty will produce a determined United States response.

Beyond the value of the treaty's verification provisions for enabling us effectively to verify Soviet compliance with treaty obligations are certain other benefits that should not be overlooked.

One such benefit is the precedential value for other arms control negotiations. The United States is currently seeking Soviet agreement to onsite inspection and other cooperative and intrusive measures in a number of areas, including strategic arms reduction, nuclear testing, and conventional arms control. Having established a regime employing such measures in the INF Treaty, we should find it easier to negotiate similar measures in these other areas.

An example of the precedential value of the INF regime was provided during the recent summit, when the Soviet side agreed readily to a partial list of verification measures for START that was derived in part from those established for INF. These measures, incorporated into the summit joint statement, include data exchanges, baseline and elimination inspections, continuous onsite monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities, short-notice onsite inspections, prohibitions on interference with verification by national technical means, and measures to enhance verification by national technical means.

Of course, specific limits in the START Treaty, as well as in other treaties, will require their own verification provisions. In START, because weapons systems would be limited, not banned, because infrastructures would not be removed, and because continued testing would be allowed, the challenge to design truly effective verification will be much more difficult and the verification requirements even more stringent.

The administration is continuing to study this problem as it works to flesh out the full regime that will be necessary for effective verification of a START Treaty. Nevertheless, the INF Treaty provides an excellent base on which to build.

Another benefit of the INF regime is the experience we will gain from implementing it. This experience will be valuable in designing verification packages for other agreements.

The United States and the Soviet Union will receive their first technical and political experience in using the systematic application of onsite measures to supplement national technical means of verification. This experience should guide us well in devising the best possible verification regimes in the future.

Finally, there is the more general benefit deriving from the increased openness created by the verification provisions. In the data exchange alone, the Soviets are providing us with information about their military programs far more extensive than anything they have previously disclosed. Coupled with the wide range of inspections mandated by the treaty, this promises to produce a more open environment in which the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation is significantly reduced.

Conclusion: Mr. Chairman, in establishing its requirements for an acceptable arms control agreement at the beginning of its term, this administration set a high standard for verification. We insisted that any treaty would require verification measures going beyond anything that had been negotiated before.

In response to resistance from the Soviets and skepticism about negotiability from other quarters, we held to our views. Now we have achieved our goal; we have the most comprehensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control agreement in history. If the INF Treaty is ratified and implemented, we will be able effectively to verify Soviet compliance with its provisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Nitze, for a good, full, and complete statement.

We would like to move directly into questions, but first, the Ranking Member has said he would like to give his opening statement. I would hope we could be limited to 5, maximum 10, minutes, and I will, naturally, retain the right of reply, either by me or by somebody I designate.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. By all means. I think an open and frank discussion by both sides of every issue is not only desirable, it is imperative.

Good morning, sir, and you can relax for about 6 or 7 minutes here.

Ambassador NITZE. Good morning.

Senator HELMS. Maybe not too much, but you can relax some.

Mr. Chairman, over the past 3 days, we have discovered some very troublesome loopholes in this treaty.

Now, Senators and other may pooh-pooh them at their own risk and as they wish, but the fact is that they are loopholes nonetheless.

We have found, for example, that the nuclear warhead device and the associated guidance may be removed from the SS-20, and, as Admiral Crowe testified before the Armed Services Committee, used on the SS-25.

I have a transcript of what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said when he was asked what warheads can be used on what weapons, and Admiral Crowe said well, you can use the guidance package or the physics package or the material for other weapons.

Now we had an attempt here to say, "Oh, well, you know, we're just talking about fissionable materials." Well, we're not talking about just fissionable materials.

We have found that the nuclear warhead device and its guidance system are the most expensive and the most difficult components to produce, so it is an enormous advantage to both sides to protect them under the treaty. However, we have had it confirmed that this treaty preserves and protects Soviet and United States warheads at a ratio of 3.4 for the Soviets to 1 for the United States, and that it protects Soviet kilotonnage at a ratio of 12 to 1.

To this Senator, the treaty does not seem to be the beautiful instrument that it is being portrayed as being by the administration, my administration, and some Senators. I think it is unequal in its impact.

Another loophole is the upgrade capacity to SS-25 forces. It has also been confirmed that the SS-25 system has every bit the same INF capacity as the SS-20, and that the SS-25 is not covered by this treaty, because it combines both an INF capacity and an ICBM capacity.

Therefore, even under the terms of the treaty, the Soviets can shift the terrorizing capability of the SS-20 to their SS-25 forces.

I think this should not be called the "United States-Soviet Treaty for the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles." It should be called the "Treaty for the Elimination of NATO INF Forces and the Modernization of the Soviet INF Forces."

Now, let me turn, once again, to the question of Soviet cheating, which is a subject which bothers me tremendously. Anybody who looks at the history of the Soviet Union with respect to the treaties it has signed is bound to be concerned about that.

I believe that every witness has said, "Oh, yes, we are concerned about that," and they say we have verification and we can do this and we can do that. But I will get into that with my friend, Mr. Nitze, in just a moment.

Yesterday, we reviewed the fact that the Soviets signed SALT I and SALT II with the intention to cheat and a plan to cheat. Our intelligence information showed that the Soviets were planning to upgrade their light ICBM to a heavy ICBM, the SS-19, at the very time they were negotiating that treaty. They knew what they were going to do, and I am sure in the Kremlin they were nudging each other and saying, "We got 'em again over there."

The classified intercept showed that Khrushchev and Grechko were planning to use the 15-percent increase in silo size as a way to deploy the forbidden SS-19. In other words, they built in a loophole which would allow them to deploy secretly a missile forbidden by the treaty.

Now that is not opinion; that is fact.

Senators may think it is irrelevant, if they wish, and the media may pooh-pooh it if they wish. But I don't think the American people are.

There is a chart back here somewhere that demonstrates the wide range of estimates of Soviet production of SS-20's. The first group shows the declared Soviet number of 650 SS-20's; the second group shows the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, estimates of approximately 1,000. The third group, 2,250, is a maximum threat estimate produced by competent intelligence analysis.

[The chart referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator HELMS. In 1976, William Beecher revealed that the Soviets had a 5-year plan to deploy SS-20 launchers in a ratio of five missiles to one launcher. This fits with actual Soviet practice of producing multiple reloads for each mobile missile launcher.

Key elements of the Beecher analysis—and, as far as I know, nobody has disputed this analysis—the key elements were fulfilled in the first 5-year plan and continue to be deployed in the second 5-year plan, and when Soviet skill at camouflage, concealment, and deception is taken into account, the maximum threat analysis cannot be dismissed out of hand and should not be.

Moreover, right at that table (indicating), yesterday, Secretary Rogers indicated that this important intelligence intercept had been kept from him. At least Secretary Rogers said that he did not remember anything about that when he was questioned. He was not aware of the specific Soviet plan to cheat.

Now, he was the Secretary of State, and I think, Mr. Chairman, that it is self-evident that had Mr. Rogers been told about this telephone conversation which I read into the record yesterday, I think he would have remembered it.

Apparently, obviously, it had been kept from him by the intelligence community, just as it was kept from the Congress. The Congress did not know one thing in the world about it at the time it voted on the treaty.

There was also testimony by Admiral Zumwalt that it was kept from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, this was a clear politicization of intelligence data to cover up a major deficiency in the SALT I agreement, which is what I am talking about. It never would have been agreed to by Congress if this had been known. And SALT I, by the way, was not a treaty. It was an agreement approved by congressional resolution. That distinction ought to be made.

This is why some of us are so concerned about verification.

Two days ago, Admiral Crowe testified before the Armed Services Committee that DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency—estimates showed that there were 165 to 300 more SS-20's than the Soviets had declared in their memorandum of understanding. In other words, the DIA is pretty certain that the Soviets have a covert force of up to 300 SS-20's—and that is 900 warheads, by the way—and each one of these warheads is over seven times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, in case you want to establish some relativity on that.

That is quite a force that the Soviets are hiding out there somewhere.

I am very disappointed, even though I understand the process, Mr. Chairman, that the hearing, the closed hearing by this Committee tomorrow, with the Intelligence Committee, was postponed, because I think we need to clear up this covert force problem immediately. I think we need to ask and get an answer to why is the Defense Intelligence Agency sticking by its estimates when the State Department and the CIA are sticking by the Soviet declarations.

Is DIA going to be forced to change its professional judgment? If so, why? Would there be political reasons? Would it be the zeal to get this treaty rushed through?

I have been told that the intelligence community is in a turmoil right now over the political pressure that is being exerted, as some have put it, to "cook the books."

Now, we don't need any "book cooking" around here. We need to examine the facts, and whoever is right and whoever is wrong is irrelevant. But we need to know all there is to know.

I have sent a letter to every Senator, Mr. Chairman, urging them to go up to the Senate Intelligence Office to read the excerpt from the National Intelligence Estimate Number 11488. Sure there are some bureaucratic caveats sprinkled here and there in the estimate, but the stark facts are there and the Nation and the Western Alliance I think are potentially in grave difficulty.

We have a roll call vote on. What is the Chairman's wish about that?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms. There is a roll call vote going on.

Senator Cranston is a representative from the Intelligence Committee, and he might care to comment for about a minute or two. Then we will recess for the vote.

Senator CRANSTON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just came back from the Intelligence Committee.

I have read that study that the Senator from North Carolina refers to, the excerpts that are available, and I do not think they make a case against our capacity to verify this treaty, and that is the judgment of Mr. Webster of the CIA.

I would like to add that I am delighted to welcome you, Jesse, to the environmental movement. Your recycling arguments day after day—and that is characteristic of the environmental movement in our country—your recycling arguments have already been presented and, already, I think for 3 days running, knocked down and referred to by one of your colleagues on your side of the aisle, who is present, Senator Evans, as not red herrings but "crimson whales."

The Senator from North Carolina is advocating a position that was publicly advanced by the Soviets and was rejected by the American military and rejected by the American negotiators.

The chart that was held up a moment ago is a 1976 chart that appeared in the press at that time, accompanying an article by a man named "Beecher."

We have come a long way in developing verification capacities since those days.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston. We will recess now and when we return, we will start our questioning. I intend to ask Ambassador Nitze to comment as well.

The meeting will recess for a few moments.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

We are very pleased, indeed, that Mr. Nitze is here and we are starting our rounds of questioning, to be limited to 10 minutes.

I would be very interested in hearing Ambassador Nitze's comments and reactions to the points made by our Ranking Minority Member, Senator Helms.

Ambassador NITZE. Mr. Chairman, the first point, as I got it from Senator Helms——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Would you use the microphone, please.

Ambassador NITZE. The first one of Senator Helms' points had to do with the removal of the explosive package and the guidance package from the SS-20 prior to the destruction of the remainder of the RV, and the question suggested that those packages could be used on the SS-25.

I would like to make a number of points.

The first point is that this treaty relates to the elimination of the INF missiles and the things that go with them. It does not relate to a limitation on ICBM's or SLBM's.

The second point is that there is nothing in the treaty and there was not intended to be anything in the treaty which would limit ICBM's or SLBM's. They are intercontinental systems and they are the subject of START.

The third point is that, therefore, there is nothing in the treaty which specifically would prohibit the use of the nuclear material or the explosive package or the guidance package in the SS-25. However, the SS-25 is quite a different missile than the SS-20. The SS-20 is a MIRVed missile; it has three RV's. The SS-25 is a larger missile with a longer range. It is a single RV ICBM. To my mind, it would be wholly unlikely that one could use the explosive package of an SS-20 in an SS-25. I am sure that it would be impossible to use the same guidance system in a single RV missile that is an appropriate guidance system for a MIRVed system, such as the SS-20.

So practically I doubt whether it would be feasible for them to do so, although just in principle, there is nothing in the treaty which limits ICBM's, how you make them, or what is to be in them. There is nothing in the treaty which prohibits the use of the guidance package or the nuclear explosive package in any way either side wants to use it.

The second point that I jotted down was that Senator Helms was emphasizing the fact that the SS-25 combines an ICBM range with the range of an INF missile—in other words, that it can be targeted on the same targets that the SS-20's were targeted on. That is quite right, but I think that is generally true of all ICBM's and SLBM's, that they can be fired against targets closer in than what they were originally designed to hit.

But, even though one can use intercontinental range systems against targets that are closer in, it generally is a waste of assets to so do. To build an intercontinental system is a more expensive and demanding job than to build a shorter range system. I think one loses something here and it is not an intelligent thing to do.

As a case in point, the SS-20 I am sure is a less expensive device than the SS-25. The SS-25 has only one RV, while the SS-20 has three. That is not the way one would do it.

The next point had to do with the 1972 intercept, which I think in part deals with matters of methods, intelligence methods, and, therefore, I am reluctant to discuss it in any detail. But I am certain that this related to what was—during the negotiations of the SALT I agreement, we tried hard to get the Soviet Union to agree to a definition of what constituted a "heavy missile." They would not do so. And so, because of our inability to get them to agree to a definition of a heavy missile, we made a unilateral statement, saying that in our view, any missile with a volume greater than 70 cubic meters we would consider to be a heavy missile. They made it crystal clear that they did not agree with that statement, and I think the full record that was available to the Senate made it clear that this unilateral statement of ours was not agreed to by the Soviet Union.

So I do not believe that one could say that the Soviet action was a violation of the treaty. It was contrary to the unilateral interpretation of our side.

But I think that ought to be discussed more fully in classified sessions.

Then, the final point that I noted down was that the Senator commented upon the fact that there is a difference amongst the intelligence agencies as to their estimates of the number of nondeployed SS-20's that they estimate the Soviet Union might have.

The basis on which these estimates were created and the reason for the differences between them I believe does involve sensitive considerations, and, therefore, I think that is a subject which also should be handled in a different forum than this. I believe that Director Webster is going to be before you, and it would seem to me that that would be the appropriate time for an explanation to be given as to why there are these differences in estimates.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, indeed, for your comments.

I guess what we are saying here, really, is that there is nothing in life without risk. This treaty has risk, but there is more risk if we do not go ahead on this road. It is a question of balancing the relative risks.

In this regard, I gather you believe that this treaty is effectively verifiable. We would be very interested in your definition of the word "effectively."

Ambassador **Nitze**. In my prepared remarks, I described what it is we meant by "effectively verifiable," and, as I recollect it, what I said in that section of my prepared remarks was that we would consider the standard to be whether or not the Soviet Union could covertly deploy a force which would be militarily significant and whether we could find that out, the fact that they had such a force, in a timely fashion, so that we could take offsetting actions ourselves in a timely manner.

I have not given you the exact wording, but I think that is the sense of it.

And so, when one says "effectively verifiable," I think that is what one is referring to: could the Soviet Union clandestinely have and maintain, keep in the kind of operating order that one would wish if one wanted to use it, a force of significant size, a force that would be significant in affecting the military outcome in case these weapons were used?

There I believe Admiral Crowe is prepared to testify to this subject and what procedures he thinks one should go through in the event it were necessary to determine whether or not a given violation were militarily significant.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Senator Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

If I may respond to my good friend from California, Mr. Cranston, I beg to differ with his interpretation of events.

I might say, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that I wish that the public could go and read the classified information to which I have alluded. I am going to see if we can declassify it because I think the public is entitled to know, and let the public make up their respective minds about it.

It is all very well and good for a Senator to pooh-pooh it and say I've read it and it's got caveats in it. Of course. Any intelligence does because intelligence is not an exact science like arithmetic. You have to consider probabilities; you have to consider facts that you have; you have to consider the combination of facts and that sort of thing.

I am not going to get snippy in response to the Senator or any other Senator. But I will say that they are not levelling with the American people when they say that the intelligence material does not mean anything. It is simply not so.

The Senator cannot deny—and I don't think he will—that no nuclear warhead devices will be destroyed under this treaty. They are removed. They can be, and I am sure they will be, reused. The Soviets can keep and reuse 12 times as much kilotonnage as the United States can. We have to reprocess it on our side, but the Soviets can use the nuclear warhead device, sometimes called the "physics package," without reprocessing it.

Obviously they probably will have to make some minor alterations to fit it on another missile—the SS-25, for example—but the basic fact is that it can be used intact, again.

It will save them a lot of money, and it will save them a lot of trouble.

I think it is a question that is not a frivolous one. I think we ought to examine that in terms of this treaty, and I think the American people ought to examine it.

Furthermore, I might note that the chart that was shown, contrary to what Senator Cranston said, was not published with Beecher's article in 1976. It was drawn last week.

I think I explained in my opening remarks that what Beecher reported in 1976 was the Soviet plan to deploy SS-20's at a rate of five missiles—five reload missiles—for every launcher.

Now, Senator Cranston was careful not to declare that Mr. Beecher's ratio was inaccurate because he cannot say that it is not accurate. We do have important intelligence saying that it is accurate, and that includes the Soviet pattern and the practice on other mobile missiles.

Now, based on deployments over two 5-year plans, Mr. Beecher's ratio would result in 2,250 SS-20's deployed. That counts the reloads.

What I am saying for the consideration of Senators and others is that we ought to question whether this is true arms control when the nuclear warheads on either side are not destroyed. We won't be eliminating a whole class of missile if, as Admiral Crowe has estimated, they do get to keep between 165 and 300 of theirs.

Now, then, Mr. Chairman, I welcome Mr. Nitze to the Committee this morning. I read along with him his speech.

On page 4, he said, "Thus, if even a single Soviet INF missile or launcher is observed after the elimination period, that will constitute clear, unequivocal evidence of a violation of the treaty."

That's right. But the trouble with that is that at that point, ours will have been destroyed. What will be our recourse beyond what Mr. Nitze said, say, on page 13, when we find that the Soviets have all of these remaining missiles and we have none? He says, on page 13, I think it is, he is talking about the Special Verification Commission to address our concerns, "and the Soviets will be obligated to attend," et cetera, and et cetera, and "At the meeting, we can indicate our concerns and request an explanation and, if appropriate, corrective action." "Request." "If we deem it necessary, we can also propose new measures to supplement or clarify the treaty's provisions."

It says the United States takes firm action in response to violations.

Well, sure. We'll write a letter, just as we have written countless letters before. It is the "wet noodle punishment" of the Soviets for having engaged in gross violations.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Nitze.

How many SS–20 missiles has the Soviet Union produced?

Ambassador NITZE. I would not be able to give you that at the moment. I would make a few points, though, with respect to the points that you have made so far.

Senator HELMS. Well, I would rather, if you don't mind, we have limited time and I have a line of questioning. Then, when I finish that, you can make any points you wish.

Do you know how many SS–20 missiles they have now?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes. I know exactly what the number is they declared in the MOU on November 1, 1987, and that number of the deployed missiles is 405.

Senator HELMS. It's 405?

Ambassador NITZE. That's right.

Senator HELMS. How many are deployed in launchers?

Ambassador NITZE. I think they have launchers for all 405.

Senator HELMS. They have launchers for all 405?

Ambassador NITZE. That is my understanding.

Senator HELMS. So that leaves the difference between the missiles they declared and the additional missiles that even Admiral Crowe talked about sitting around somewhere.

Ambassador NITZE. Well, no. They have undeployed missiles in addition to that.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Ambassador NITZE. They have undeployed missiles in addition to that.

Senator HELMS. How many?

Ambassador NITZE. Let me just get that figure.

[Pause.]

Ambassador NITZE. It's 306, the declared number of nondeployed missiles.

Senator HELMS. All right.

Ambassador NITZE. All of this should be read in the context of the treaty provisions as to what ones you count as being deployed and which ones you count as being nondeployed.

Senator HELMS. Do your answers—and I had a purpose in asking you these questions. I am not trying to have a fire drill on this thing. But I do want to know if your answers differ in any way from the related material in the draft volume of the National Intelligence Estimate of November 4, 1988.

Ambassador NITZE. I don't know the answer to that, because that is still in draft.

Senator HELMS. Now you are going to appear before the Intelligence Committee, or have you?

Ambassador NITZE. I have not, but I expect that I will.

Senator HELMS. Well, Senator Boren will ask you about that, and you won't be in public.

Could there be differences as large as 300 to 400 SS-20 missiles extra, as has been suggested?

Ambassador NITZE. There is a difference, as I said, between the DIA estimate with respect to the number of undeployed missiles, and the estimate by the CIA and the State Department.

Senator HELMS. Was the DIA wrong?

Ambassador NITZE. I don't know that. The methods of evaluation were different in each case, and I referred to that earlier.

One point I would like to make——

Senator HELMS. OK. Go ahead.

Ambassador NITZE [continuing]. Is that none of these would support the idea that they ever were producing five missiles per launcher. Even the DIA estimate is way off from that.

Senator HELMS. What was the DIA estimate?

Ambassador NITZE. Let me get that figure for you.

[Pause.]

Ambassador NITZE. I'm afraid I cannot give that in an unclassified session.

Senator HELMS. You see, all of this is what the American people don't know and what the Senators, most of them, do not yet know.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield for a moment to Senator Cranston.

I would simply like to make one observation before I do that, though. There are materials that have to be classified.

The assertion by Senator Helms that classified material supports one position is contradicted by the assertions of others who have seen it.

Now, if this material can be classified without raising security concerns, I am all for doing so because it will allow people to evaluate it and reach their own judgments. But the fact that something is classified ought not to be used to suggest that somehow we are being deceived, because the reasons for classification are often very valid ones and this is something we have to be sensitive to and take into account.

I am going to yield a minute to Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I thank my colleague.

I simply would like again to point out that this chart, which the Senator from North Carolina displayed and which has been handed out to each of us, states on it in regard to that estimate of total SS-

20's that this is "based on William Beecher, September 1976 and various press;" and "Source: William Beecher 'Soviet Mobile Missile Worries United States,' Boston Globe, September 5, 1967, various press."

I would like to add that this matter, headed "U.S. intelligence estimate," is not totally accepted within the intelligence community.

I have read the documents in the Intelligence Committee's secure room and there is a difference of opinion in the intelligence community about this figure.

Finally, I would like to note that Senator Helms has complained that material of an explosive nature used on SS–20's targeted at Europe could be used in some way, after some work and adjustments, on SS–25's that are targeted against the United States.

Ambassador Nitze said well, we don't cover intercontinental ballistic missiles, we don't cover SS–25's, and, therefore, that is not prohibited under the treaty.

Well, the logical conclusion of all this is that Senator Helms would like us to write a treaty that would require that the Soviet Union would have only to target SS–25's against us in the United States and would prohibit them from firing against targets elsewhere. I don't see how that serves the interests of the United States.

Thank you, Paul.

Senator SARBANES. Ambassador Nitze, isn't it true that the more nuclear material that is stockpiled as a consequence of this treaty, the more weapons have been eliminated that could have been used to cause destruction?

In other words, the very thing that Senator Helms keeps pointing to is, in fact, the tremendous accomplishment of this treaty. When he points to the fact that the Soviets will have a bigger stockpile of nuclear material left over than we will after these weapons have been destroyed, all it means is that the Soviets have had to give up far more missiles and far more kilotonnage.

Ambassador NITZE. Yes.

I would emphasize that the amount of nuclear material in the warhead is roughly proportionate to the yield of those weapons, and, therefore, to the megatonnage of the weapons. The statistics that Senator Helms gives us would suggest that the megatonnage of the weapons that the Soviet Union would be eliminating would be some 12 times that of the weapons that the United States would be eliminating.

We wanted to state this thing in a more conservative way, and, therefore, we have only emphasized the number of reentry vehicles on both sides which would be eliminated.

We have not emphasized the megatonnage which would produce these higher ratios.

Senator SARBANES. I would like to ask you about the process of eliminating missiles under this treaty, because it seems to be another area where the negotiators have minimized the risk to the United States very significantly.

Under the treaty there are 18 months to destroy the shorter-range missiles and 3 years to destroy the intermediate-range ones. But, as I understand it, the sequence of proceeding is heavily front-loaded, in the sense that it requires the Soviets to move at a pace significantly quicker than ours.

I wonder if you could elaborate on those treaty arrangements.

Ambassador NITZE. With respect to the short-range missiles, those with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers, there the Soviets have a significant number of those—900 to 1,000 warheads. Those will all be eliminated within 18 months.

We do not have any such short-range missiles deployed. We have a few Pershing Ia missile bodies in storage someplace or other. They will be destroyed. But we do not have any deployed.

Therefore, during the first 18 months, the reductions will be entirely on the Soviet side. This is really a significant reduction. The SS–23's and the SS–22's do constitute a significant threat, not only a nuclear threat, but they also have warheads with conventional weapons and with chemical warheads.

So, with this reduction in the first 18 months, where we are not reducing these at all, I think that is, as you say, front-loaded in our benefit.

Also, with respect to the INF missiles, because of the fact that they have more INF missiles than we have, the rate at which they destroy theirs is higher than ours. The treaty provides that both sides shall come down to equal levels of warheads after 29 months.

So, that means that during the first 29 months, the rate of decline by the Soviet side is higher than it is on the U.S. side. So, in the last few months, it will be even.

So, at the last part of this, we will have the same number of INF warheads deployed as they do.

So you move from a very unequal situation to one where the difference becomes less and less month by month, and then, finally, at 29 months, it is even. Thereafter we go to total elimination together.

But it seems to me that that is exactly what you described as being front-loaded in our favor.

Senator SARBANES. Well, one of the things this means is that these very extensive measures for verification, including the onsite provisions, will be initially tested out over a period of time when most of the destruction of missiles will be taking place on the part of the Soviet Union rather than on the part of the United States.

In other words, we won't be giving up much of our arsenal until we are well into the application of the treaty and, therefore, in a better position to judge how fully it is being complied with.

Ambassador NITZE. That's correct.

I would rephrase it a little bit to say that the rate of reduction on the Soviet side will be greater than that on the U.S. side. We will start right away, also, to have some reductions. But our rate will be less, and even a lesser percentage of ours than will be the Soviets.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Nitze, I just want to express at the outset my appreciation and I am certain that of all of our observer group for your unfailing ability to brief us week in and week out during this 3-year search for this treaty. I have profound respect for the continuity you have provided in the history of arms control negotiations involving our country, and especially the INF components, really, which spans more than one administration.

Let me ask this question. From your most recent experience, how would you describe the process by which the United States consulted with and secured the consent of the five basing countries in NATO with respect to Soviet inspection of American sites and systems covered by the treaty, but located on the territory of those allied countries?

What were the allied concerns with respect to these inspections, and what role will personnel from the NATO countries play in monitoring the Soviet inspectors?

Ambassador NITZE. This has been an extended negotiation. The moment it became probable that we would be able to get an agreement along these lines, we began negotiations with our basing country partners, the five basing countries. Those include the Germans, the British, the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Italians.

We have had consultations with them, a particularly close consultation with them since the beginning of the negotiations, since it is on their territory that these INF missiles were based.

They are supportive of the treaty and were from the beginning supportive and wanted to help make the thing work. When it became clear that there would be onsite inspection of facilities for an extended period of time, not just until the missiles were removed, but thereafter for a period of time, it became necessary that there be permission for Soviet inspectors to look at these facilities in the same way that we were looking at the facilities, not only in the U.S.S.R. but also in Czechoslovakia and in the German Democratic Republic.

They wanted to be sure that the permission for the Soviets to enter their country was pursuant to their sovereign decision and that, therefore, there should be an agreement between them and the U.S.S.R.—not that they didn't want to rely solely upon an agreement with us. And so then we negotiated out with them the terms of an agreement, and that was then negotiated out with the Soviet Union. So this resulted in an exchange of notes between all those basing countries on our side, the five NATO countries, and the two Warsaw Pact countries, and all those agreements were signed together. So those regulate the obligations of the sides, they regulate the immunities of the inspectors in these countries and the duties of those inspectors.

Senator LUGAR. Consequently, the Soviets now have specific agreements with each of the five NATO countries, and we have agreements with Czechoslovakia and East Germany?

Ambassador NITZE. That's correct.

Senator LUGAR. Getting back to the German question for a moment, the Soviet Union raised the P–Ia issue very late in the negotiations. In your judgment, why did the Soviets raise that issue late last summer and what was the American position on the issue? And, finally, to wrap it up, was the German statement necessary in order for us to have a treaty? Might the whole thing have become unstuck without the unilateral German statement?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Well, the Soviets did not want to see the Germans continue to have P–Ia missiles, which were their missiles—they had bought those missiles; they belonged to the Germans—and warheads being made available for those missiles by the United States. We had agreed in an agreement of allied cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany that we would make those warheads available for those missiles.

The Soviets thought here if the United States were to eliminate all of its and the U.S.S.R. were to eliminate all their INF missiles and then the Germans were the only ones left with such, that would be an intolerable situation from their standpoint.

On the other side of the argument, we were determined not to upset an agreement or a pattern of allied cooperation which had been established. We have never questioned such patterns in the past and we did not want to do so then.

So we said we were unprepared to ask the Germans to change the pattern of cooperation. And we refused to do that.

But then, finally, Mr. Kohl decided himself—and this was an independent judgment by Mr. Kohl, supported by and approved of by the German Bundestag—if and when the U.S.S.R. and the United States had removed the last one of their INF missiles and eliminated it, then they would declare the pattern of cooperation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. terminated and that, therefore, their missiles would be destroyed, or eliminated, and we would then be free to eliminate the warheads which we were reserving for those missiles in the same manner that we were eliminating the other warheads, which were associated with our Pershings and ground-launched Cruise missiles.

Senator **Lugar**. In your judgment, if that issue had not been resolved by Chancellor Kohl, could have led to the end of the negotiations?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I believe it would have, yes.

We were determined not to upset a pattern of allied cooperation unless the other side had first, in its own sovereign judgment, decided that it wished to terminate it.

Senator **Lugar**. And Chancellor Kohl made that judgment?

Ambassador **Nitze**. He made that judgment, and we did not urge him to make it.

Senator **Lugar**. Sometimes Members of the Senate seek, through conditions to one treaty, to set guidelines or parameters for negotiations and outcomes of another treaty.

What, in your view, would be the impact on the American negotiating position, on our allies, the Soviets, and this administration, of any effort by the Senate to condition its acceptance of the INF Treaty on U.S. adherence to the numerical limits set forth in the unratified SALT II treaty?

Ambassador Nitze. I believe that would be very unwise, and for several reasons.

In general, I think it would be a mistake to link ratification of this treaty to other conditions. I think this treaty stands on its own bottom, but I don't believe it should be asked to carry all kinds of other things as well.

But then, specifically with respect to the limits in the SALT II an unratified, and expired agreement, you know, you look at what those limits are and you compare them with the provisions that we already have gotten agreement with the Soviets on with respect to START. Look at the number of delivery vehicles which both sides are restricted to under the SALT II agreement. That is 2,504, I think, the Soviet level. The Soviet Union has agreed with us in the START agreement that the number of delivery vehicles would be reduced to 1,600, which is an enormous difference.

Look at the number of warheads which are permitted under the SALT II Treaty. There is not really a direct limitation in the unratified SALT II Treaty on the number of warheads. There are indirect restraints. In other words, the treaty says that you cannot have more than a given number of warheads on a given class of missile. But there is not any aggregate ceiling on the number of warheads.

It is quite feasible under the SALT II agreement for each side to have as many as 16,000 to 20,000 warheads. The ceiling that has been agreed between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and us, in the draft START agreement, is 6,000, a vastly lower number.

Look at the limits on throw-weight. There are not any effective limits on throw-weight in the START agreement. We have an agreement with respect to that from the Soviet Union within the START agreement. They would cut their throw-weight from where it is now by 50 percent; in other words, from around 5 million kilograms of throw-weight to something around 2,500,000.

Look at the relationship of heavy missiles. Today the Soviets have 308 heavy missiles and the SALT II agreement would limit them to just that figure of 308 heavy missiles. But the number of reentry vehicles on those heavy missiles is indeterminate. We believe that they have the capacity for not just ten, but 14. They have 14 stations on the SS-18's.

So the number of heavy RV's is quite indeterminate under the SALT agreement.

Look at what we have gotten the Soviets to agree to in the START agreement with respect to limits on the warheads on heavy missiles. They have agreed to 1,540, which is less than half of what they could have under the SALT agreement.

Also, they have agreed to a limit of 4,900 on the number of ballistic missile RV's, and that, I think, is much less; it is half of what they have today and much less than what they could have under the SALT agreement.

It would seem to me that to go back and kind of make a big thing to trying to get the Soviets to agree to these limits, which are so high and so unproductive, would be to limit the wrong things and would just seem to me to be the wrong way to go.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator Cranston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to pay tribute to Paul Nitze's extraordinary public service, and the INF achievement and so much else that he has accomplished in a long life dedicated to public service.

I note that we have strongly disagreed, Paul, sometimes, but you never disagree disagreeably, and when someone disagrees with

Paul Nitze on an arms control agreement, he never challenges the patriotism of the person differing with him.

Paul Nitze has met often in my Whip Office with SALT II supporters when he was a critic of that treaty. He has met with INF supporters in my office when he was a negotiator of the INF agreement, and met with the Arms Control Study Group on all sorts of arms control issues.

It is a pleasure to have you now before this committee.

My first question is this.

Is the fact that the information is classified the reason you declined to respond to Senator Helms' assertion that the DIA estimates five reloads per SS-20?

Ambassador NITZE. I did reply to that. I said that I thought even the DIA estimate, the specific number of which I did not believe I was authorized to mention—I think I am authorized to mention the general magnitude of the difference. I think the DIA says there are between 165 and 300 more nondeployed missiles than the Soviets certified to in their MOU.

But, clearly, even the highest number there, 300, bears no relationship to what they would have had if they had been producing five missiles, per launcher, or five warheads per launcher, even.

So I think there is no support at all for the thesis that the Russians have been pursuing the Beecher thesis of 1976.

Senator CRANSTON. I gather that you are reluctant to get into precise numbers because of classified aspects of this matter.

Ambassador NITZE. That's right.

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Helms' allegation of what DIA's estimate is constitutes the entire basis of his I think unfounded claim that the Soviets have cheated by stockpiling thousands of SS-20s. But it turns out that we can counter these selective references to intelligence data—and I am not suggesting that the Senator from North Carolina has committed any infraction by using classified material in an unclassified way—but we can counter these selected references to intelligence data by Senator Helms from what is now an open source.

On Monday, Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Armed Services Committee. He stated that the DIA estimates that the SS-20's have one reload, not five reloads, as Senator Helms has asserted.

Senator Helms' assertion was based, as far as any open revelation of source, on this chart that he has been relying upon, that goes all the way back to 1976 and published press reports.

Let me read briefly from the transcript of the Armed Services Committee session of Monday.

Senator Humphrey asked the following question: "What has been the DIA estimate of the number of missiles for reload per launcher?"

"Admiral CROWE. One reload." That is DIA.

"Senator HUMPHREY. DIA has been estimating one reload. That would imply 180 missiles," and I would here interpolate not five times that number.

My question then to you, based upon that information that is now open, is, Ambassador, would not Admiral Crowe's testimony suggest that the Soviet SS-20's do not exceed the U.S. estimates that basically we have been relying upon?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes.

I would suggest that he is supporting the estimates that have been produced by our intelligence agencies. And, as I have said, there is a difference between the intelligence agencies, at least between the DIA, the CIA, and the State Department on one figure, and that is the number of nondeployed SS-20's. I think his testimony was fully in support of that fact.

Senator CRANSTON. On another matter, one of our colleagues, the Senator from South Dakota, who is present at this hearing, has suggested that we amend the resolution of INF ratification to prevent fulfillment of the terms of the treaty until we have a one-on-one symmetry in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

I would like to ask you three questions about that. I will rattle them off at once and then go back to each one.

Senator PRESSLER. If my colleague would yield——

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Senator PRESSLER [continuing]. That is not quite my proposal. It is until we have an agreement.

Senator CRANSTON. Until we have an agreement. Fine. That has the same general effect, I think.

I have three questions.

Is that necessary?

Do we have to have conventional symmetry before we can have an INF Treaty or a START Treaty?

And, is it realistic that we would get one-on-one parity any time in the near future? Would not, therefore, that constitute a "killer amendment?"

To go back to the first question, is that necessary?

Ambassador NITZE. I believe not.

I believe the treaty is beneficial to the military security of NATO, both the European part of NATO and to us. Therefore, it would be a mistake not to ratify this treaty because some other desirable end is not accomplished.

I think we are better off, even with the continuing imbalance in conventional forces, to have the INF results, where you get rid of these INF missiles, than the reverse.

So I do not believe it is necessary—in fact, I think it would be a mistake—to do this.

Your second question?

Senator CRANSTON. Do we have to have conventional symmetry before we can have either an INF Treaty or a START Treaty?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not think one does. I do not think it would be wise to insist upon that.

Senator CRANSTON. Is it realistic that we could get one-on-one parity in the near future, or really anytime, or are we not going to have to have some asymmetry at all times?

Ambassador NITZE. We have been working hard for a long period of time, for many, many years, to get closer balance in the conventional field. In fact, that goes back all the way to my personal experience in 1949, when we began this effort to improve the conventional balance and reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons. We tried and tried and tried. But this has two aspects. One is what we can do ourselves in collaboration with our allies. And our allies have really done quite a lot in recent years, and so have we. But the Soviet Union has been doing more. They have put much more into it than we have. And so, one cannot say that the balance has itself been improving as much as we would have hoped.

So I think the balance is negative and has been negative for a long period of time.

One of the main items in the balance, however, is not just the number of men or the amount of equipment. But it has to do with the geographic situation.

The Warsaw Pact, including the U.S.S.R. is an enormous land mass, right there in the center, and the lines of access and the lines of communication between Siberia and the European part of the Soviet Union are really more secure than the lines of communication between the United States and Canada to NATO Europe.

The difficulties of an effective counter-attack into the Soviet Union really are immense. After all, Mr. Hitler demonstrated that and Napoleon demonstrated that. The Soviet Union is in a position as its geographic position is such that it is very hard to achieve one-on-one.

Certainly you are not going to change the geography of the situation.

So that is not the standard that NATO has had. NATO's standard has been one whereby you could deter an attack. It is not necessary to have one-on-one in order to deter an attack. One has to make it doubtful that they can really achieve a success, a worthwhile success, from their standpoint, and that we have been able to do through a combination of conventional and nuclear deployments.

We certainly ought to continue to do that.

We also ought to continue to negotiate to see whether negotiations on conventional arms could not help to mitigate the imbalances which exist.

Mr. Gorbachev has said yes, he was not against the idea of eliminating disparities between the two sides, but he thought there were disparities which favored NATO as well as disparities which favored the Warsaw Pact, and that we ought to get at talking about those. But before we can get at that business of talking about them, we have to decide on the forum in which these discussions are to take place.

I think all of us who have been working on this problem are in agreement that the forum which is under discussion in Vienna, which would expand the area of negotiation to all of Europe, from the Urals to the sea, is a better geographic area; and (b) one ought not restrict this to manpower, but one ought to expand it to including such things as tanks and artillery. That is also correct.

I might also point out that the disparity in manpower is not great between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The disparity is really in equipment and in geography. Those are the things that hurt us.

So we are working at this and we should continue to work at it. But the idea that one could get a quick agreement on this I think is fantastic. It just cannot be done.

Senator CRANSTON. Would the Senator from Washington permit me to elicit the answer to the final question I asked, which would be very brief, I am sure? I have already asked the question.

Senator EVANS. I'm not next in line.

Senator CRANSTON. Whoever is next.

Nancy?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Certainly.

Senator CRANSTON. The final question was, in effect, what would be the effect on the fate of the INF Treaty if an amendment along the lines of that suggested by the Senator from South Dakota were adopted, requiring progress on conventional arms reductions toward a one-on-one parity?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, if that were adopted, we would try to get the Soviets to agree to one-on-one. But I think the chances of their agreeing to that would be zero.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Ambassador Nitze, I would like to ask about a statement that Senator Helms made. I just do not understand it and have not been able to get any answer from staff, either.

He mentioned the need for us to reprocess fissionable material that would be removed, whereas the Soviets would not need to do this. They could use it immediately in any other fashion.

Why would that be the case?

Ambassador NITZE. I don't think it is necessarily the case.

I think it is the case, however, that we have no nuclear weapons which we are now building in which the explosive package, in Pershing II's and ground-launched cruise missiles, would be the appropriate package.

It is not clear that there may not be some design in the future in which this explosive package might be the right one. So I think it is wrong to say that it is absolutely certain that this would have to be reprocessed before it could be used again.

But I think Admiral Crowe could testify better as to the particular probabilities with respect to weapons in which these explosive packages could be used.

Senator KASSEBAUM. As you are very aware, there are some thoughtful critics of this treaty that have expressed a concern about the removal of all of the INF systems and that this undermines deterrence and creates an imbalance.

Perhaps you don't want to go back to the "Walk in the Woods," but in 1982, it is my understanding that during those discussions that you had with your counterpart, you had suggested that some of the systems be maintained—the ground-launched cruise missile, it is my understanding—and that the Pershing II's would be removed.

I wonder if you could help us understand what your thinking is on the Pershing II's and if you do feel that they can be removed—and I would assume that you do—without any difficulty.

I just would like to hear your thoughts on that.

Ambassador NITZE. At that time, in trying to work out something then, in 1982, I guess it was, which would be mutually acceptable to us and to them, I did work out with Kvitsinskiy a package under which we would have been limited to 75 launchers in Europe and they to 75 launchers in Europe.

This would have given us, if we had only the ground-launched cruise missiles on those launchers, we would have four missiles on each launcher. That would have given us four times 75, or, in other words, 300 missiles and warheads. They would have had 75 SS-20's, each with three warheads, which would have given three times 75, which is 225.

So we would have had more warheads in Europe than the Soviet Union, and they would have been limited to the same number in Asia and we would have been limited to the same number in the United States, as I remember it.

But, when you look at the verification problems, these would have limits on numbers of launchers and RVs per launcher, or missiles per launcher. That would have been a much more difficult thing to verify than this treaty. So there are both advantages and disadvantages.

I think there are certain advantages for NATO continuing to have an INF component provided the Soviet INF component is not greater than that.

But it is rather offset by the verification difficulties. So it is a little bit different.

In any case, our problem was that the Soviets would not agree to this package that Kvitsinskiy and I had negotiated and some of our people were reluctant to agree to it, too. I think, by and large, there was much more difficulty on the Soviet side than there was on ours.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So you feel basically that the zero approach is more significant?

Ambassador NITZE. I think it is not only more significant, but it is more do-able.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You mentioned from a verification standpoint.

Ambassador NITZE. That's right.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But earlier this morning I think you also said from a military standpoint.

Ambassador NITZE. From a military-political standpoint—and if you could really have made it verifiable—I would say it was about a stand-off between the two.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to ask this. Because you were a negotiator for the SALT I Treaty and on the verification, the procedure set up now is the Special Verification Commission for violations or inspection questions.

I am a little concerned. I think you were here the other day when I asked some of these questions about exactly how this would be implemented. In SALT I, you really nailed down the Standing Consultative Commission, and you set up in a Common Understanding the procedures by which you would work out with the Soviets the details for setting up the SCC.

It seems to me that the INF Treaty makes reference to the framework for the Verification Commission. But I am wondering how we and the Soviets will determine what this framework is.

There is nothing that I can find that indicates anything beyond just this sort of saying that it will be.

Ambassador NITZE. But it does also say that it will meet at the request of either side and meet promptly at the request of either side, as I remember it. Isn't it Article 13?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes, it is in Article 13—that if either party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission. But what I am asking you is what is that framework?

I am drawing on your expertise from SALT I. I guess if it does not bother you, it should not bother me. But it seemed to me that with those understandings in SALT I, this was actually established far more succinctly in an understanding between the Soviets and ourselves what that framework is.

This just, you know, says within the framework.

Ambassador NITZE. I think the difference between the SCC, as it now exists, and what we have in mind with respect to the Special Verification Commission, is that the SCC is a body which meets from time to time. It has a session for a number of weeks and then it goes into recess for a number of weeks, and then we set a new meeting for it. So I guess it is about once a quarter that it meets.

What was thought about here was that you want to get together fast, and that, therefore, any time either side requests a meeting—you can request one—you create it ad hoc when there is a request, and you would change the people who would go to it, depending upon the nature of the question which was to come before it.

So if you had a particular issue, for instance, with respect to nuclear material, you would have nuclear materials experts there. If you had a question with respect to a particular design of a missile or something like that, you would have different experts there.

But the idea was to give you more flexibility both as to time and composition than has been the practice in the past with respect to the SCC.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Having set up the SCC, are you comfortable with this difference?

Ambassador NITZE. I believe there is full agreement between the Soviets and ourselves as to what is intended here, and I would not anticipate there would be difficulty getting this framework settled.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much and welcome to the committee. I join in congratulating you on a distinguished career of public service.

Let me say that I very much believe in the arms control process. I have some very serious questions about this treaty, and I was intrigued with the line of questioning from the Senator from California, my good friend, Senator Cranston.

Senator Cranston asked you whether we could have parity before this INF Treaty went into effect in terms of conventional forces in Europe. It certainly seems to me that we could, in a matter of a few weeks, reach an agreement with the Soviet Union based upon the concept of one-on-one parity for conventional forces in Europe.

I am also very concerned about chemical weapon parity in Europe.

Some say that this would take a long time to negotiate. It really would not, because the MBFR talks have been going on for years and the two sides have agreed on definitions, and all those things that normally occur in arms control talks have been done. But it would not even have to be a complete agreement. It could be an agreement to move in the direction of parity, one-to-one, within a certain number of years.

The problem is that once we have signed this treaty, we will have given up our trump card. Many people who come to the table say, as you have said, that we can negotiate the conventional treaty later. But we won't have bargaining power later, after this is signed, because we are giving up our INF trump card and the Soviets are keeping their conventional superiority trump card.

I remember so well Secretary Rumsfeld coming to my office when I was a Congressman. He said that the purpose of the INF in part was to protect U.S. lives because, whether they are U.S. servicemen or NATO troops, they would be seriously endangered if it were not for these missiles. That situation was the result of the four to one superiority that the Russians have in conventional forces in that part of the world.

So, I appreciate very much what you are saying, that we want to get this treaty finished and over with.

On the other hand, the Senate does have a constitutional role here, but I get a feeling that people are saying the Senate should just roll over and play dead, that we are not really part of the team if we try to offer an amendment.

I think that some form of conventional force amendment will become a major issue in this treaty debate before it is over. It may not be my amendment, but I think someone will offer an amendment of some type regarding the matter. I will certainly offer the one-on-one amendment. I have one printed that would even leave the Russians with a three-to-two superior ratio. But the Secretary of State said he would rather go for the one-on-one if we went for anything, although he would be opposed to doing that on this treaty.

My concern with this easy answer, that we will do the conventional later, is that once this is signed, we don't have bargaining power to deal with the conventional forces problem.

Just to conclude my question here, I have also noted that President Reagan, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have said publicly to the European allies that we are going to increase our spending on conventional weapons in Europe after this treaty. I think that is how the European allies got on board. I think that is how they were brought on board, with a pledge to increase our defense spending.

I don't know if Congress will agree with that. I don't know whether there is enough money there, whether the budgetary deficit would allow that. I don't know if most Americans want to increase our conventional forces in Europe more than 40 years after the war. As one who voted for the Nunn Amendment, which essentially moves in the direction of reducing our commitment there, I find those kinds of promises are the sorts of things that put our Congress in an awkward position after a president leaves office. I really don't know if we can increase spending on conventional forces in Europe with some of the domestic problems and military needs that we have elsewhere.

I attended a briefing recently in which many top military people said that they would seek an increase in spending to lengthen the range of the Lance missiles to ensure the safety of our troops in Western Europe, which will result in an increase in spending in Europe. I would suspect that our European allies have been told that we will do this as part of the price for their support of this treaty.

I would like you to take a look at that one-to-one amendment. My question is, How do you view the Senate's role in this whole thing, in terms of amendments?

Number two, Why is there such a strong feeling in the administration against an amendment regarding conventional forces, when many treaties that have come through here have had amendments on them?

Ambassador NITZE. There are a number of points.

First, first one is you mention that in your opinion the Soviets had a four-to-one superiority in Europe in conventional forces. I would wonder about the basis on which any such analysis is made. It is very difficult to assess the relative power of things as complex as the conventional forces on both sides, and I certainly do not believe the elements are there for a judgment of four-to-one.

Senator PRESSLER. There was a publication by the group you were formerly associated with in 1979 which suggested a four-to-one ratio or a three-to-one ratio.

Ambassador NITZE. Yes. But I would suggest that that was an arbitrary assessment, even if I had been part of the group, though I do not remember that.

Senator PRESSLER. You've changed your mind on that?

Ambassador NITZE. No. I don't know that I ever said any such thing.

Senator PRESSLER. That's all right. There was a publication, however. Anyway, three-to-one, four-to-one.

Ambassador NITZE. I am sure there are differences of judgment with respect to that. You can see it every day, people coming out with differences of judgment as to the relative capability of the two sides.

My own view is that there is not any doubt about the fact that the Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, rather, does have a superiority in conventional forces. All I am saying is the degree of superiority I think is not very clear.

The second point is I don't see how one could have any confidence that one could verify this agreement that you are suggesting.

The main difficulty with the MBFR negotiations—after all, we negotiated for 13 years on MBFR—was we never could get agreement with the Soviets on the data that they were supplying; and, (b), we never could get agreement with them as to how to verify what the force levels were, even after we waived that question of the prior data submission.

So, it would seem to me this would be a wilderness.

Second, when you say one-on-one, where is the one-on-one? Are you going to do this by theater, by individual location? Certainly one has to look not only at the balance at the central front, but also on the northern flank, the southern flank and various other places in order to have a real judgment as to where the one-on-one is.

Third, there is the question of how do you measure one-on-one? Do you do it by air, relative air strength, by mortar strength, by tank strength, and so forth and so on? Are you suggesting equality in each one of those measures, in each individual area?

It seems to me that it is a vastly complex idea that is suggested by the simple formula of one-on-one. Before you get through with it, you are in infinite complexities?

Senator PRESSLER. So if the formula were different, you would support it?

Ambassador NITZE. I just think that this is a thing that you would have to go at with some degree of care, and be sure that there is understanding, that you have all of the various requirements for a deal that is understood, operable, and verifiable.

I do not think a simple formula, like one-to-one, is going to do you much good.

Now, the next point was you said that somehow or other we were not going to have any bargaining capacity. That rather suggests that somehow or other we, in the INF field, have significant superiority over the Soviets in INF. That just is not so.

It is the other way around. The Soviets have a superiority in INF and in the shorter range systems, those to 1,000. We have been able to negotiate this agreement not because we had a superiority, not because we had bargaining power in the sense of superior forces. This is quite a different kind of thing. It has been that we have been stubborn and the Soviets, I think, would like to have a deal on this, to get forward on the process. But it isn't that we had particular bargaining power on INF that somehow or other we are losing.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, may I have just one minute?

Ambassador NITZE. Let me just complete my answer, please, if I may.

Then you asked me with respect to the role of the Senate.

Certainly the Senate does have the role of determining the will of the Congress with respect to recommending to the President that the treaty be ratified. So clearly it is within the power of the Senate to suggest amendments, if that is what it wants to do. And if you do suggest amendments, we do our best to implement those amendments.

But you are asking me to testify on what I think is wise. I do not believe that the type of amendment you are suggesting would be wise.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let's get back to the question of whether or not these weapons can be hidden.

First, I believe I understand correctly that these are weapon systems. They consist of launchers and missiles. A missile without a launcher won't work, isn't that correct?

Ambassador NITZE. That's correct.

Senator EVANS. A launcher without a missile is not worth very much, isn't that correct?

Ambassador NITZE. That's also correct.

Senator EVANS. The estimates of the number of missiles is somewhat different than the estimate of number of launchers. If they talk about reload capacity and it is two, three, four, or five missiles to one launcher and as I understand the treaty, we observe the destruction of launchers, of what value are the remaining missiles?

Ambassador NITZE. They would only have value if they could produce or hide some launchers. And so, you have to verify both the status of the launchers and of the missiles to be sure that they don't have these systems.

Senator EVANS. So it is somewhat simplistic just to talk about reload capacity because the very nature of reload capacity estimates a certain number of launchers for which there will be one, two, three, or four reloads.

Is that not right?

Ambassador NITZE. I think it does have a bearing upon the estimates that the various intelligence agencies have made on how many nondeployed missiles they estimate the Soviets might now have, because the Soviets now have plenty of launchers. Therefore, the crucial factor is how many missiles per launcher do they estimate they might have.

Senator EVANS. Sure.

But under the treaty, if we effectively destroy the launchers, the nondeployed missiles have no way to be launched.

Isn't that correct?

Ambassador NITZE. That is correct.

Senator EVANS. Even if there were hidden missiles and hidden launchers, how effectively do you believe we can detect testing, continued testing, of these intermediate range missiles? And, if there is no testing, what happens to the reliability of the systems after a period of time?

Ambassador NITZE. I think there is no doubt about the fact that we can verify the testing of these missiles. They go up high into the atmosphere, and we monitor those things very carefully, indeed. So I think we can positively identify whether or not they are testing the SS-20's in the future.

So that I think is unambiguous.

As to the question of what would happen if they did not test, I think it is the opinion of those who have gone into this in detail that the Soviets, (a) have been sticklers for continuous testing of systems that they rely on. They test I think the SS-20's I forget how many times a year, but I think it is 10 or 20 times a year today. We can find that out.

So, if they do not test them, their confidence in the reliability of the system I think would decrease.

Now, that decrease in confidence is something that would go with time. So, if they did not test for 5 years, I think their confidence would be significantly less than it would be if they had not tested for a year.

So this is a growing asset, I think, the longer they go without testing.

Senator EVANS. But there is no question in your mind as to our ability to detect testing if it occurs.

Ambassador NITZE. None.

One further point is that it is not just a question of having launchers and missiles and testing, but you also have to have the forces to operate these systems. That is not small.

We know quite a lot about that because we have ourselves deployed. We have deployed the Pershing II's, and we have deployed the ground launched cruise missiles, and we know what it takes to keep them deployed.

You have to house these people, and you have to train them, and you have to have facilities for all of that.

So the tail for an operational system is really quite a substantial tail, and the people who follow this I think would be surprised if it would be possible for the Soviet Union to have the missiles, to have the launchers, to have the tail, and someone or other keep those systems reliable and in operational form.

Senator EVANS. Let me read a compilation—I think it is an accurate one—of the testimony of former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger before the Armed Services Committee to see if you generally agree with his points in talking about the incentives for cheating under INF.

He said that first, it represented a small percentage of the total nuclear force of the Soviets. There is not much to gain from covert deployments. Cheating is, therefore, of limited military value. Second, the detection of covert deployment could undermine Soviet political gains in Europe due to Gorbachev initiatives. Third, that SS-25's, SLBM's and other missiles could, if necessary, be retargeted, as we could retarget missiles as well. And the detection of cheating, regarding the INF Treaty, is significantly easier than with START because you are eliminating a whole class of systems.

In other words, if you detect one, you have prima facie evidence of violation.

Would you generally agree with those comments?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes, I do.

Senator EVANS. Thank you.

This may be more of a technical question, but it seems to me that the term used by the Senator from North Carolina of "reprocessing" is a technical term in the nuclear industry which has a very specific meaning. I believe that he probably was referring to, more accurately, repackaging or retooling or something of that nature, because "reprocessing" talks about a very complex and very costly process in the nuclear business. I believe I am accurate on that.

Perhaps you can answer it, or if not, someone in the technical field could.

Ambassador NITZE. Your proposition is correct.

Senator EVANS. I thought so.

With all of that, it seems to me that the chart that was shown with great fanfare this morning when, incidentally, there were scores of photographers present, is, well, it is a corollary to what happened a couple of days ago, only instead of a "crimson whale," it is a whole pod of crimson whales.

If these missiles and their warheads did not have launchers because the launchers had been destroyed, and if there were no great benefit to the Soviet Union politically or militarily to cheat in this specific instance, then I think the fundamental question is regardless of which of these estimates are correct, are we better off with all of these missiles on the sheet (indicating), or are we better off if we take that many away from this estimate (indicating) and that many away from this estimate (indicating) which is the admitted number of Soviet weapons?

It seems to me that there is very clear evidence from these two big holes, regardless of whether it is zero over here (indicating), a small number under the DIA estimate (indicating) or even some additional numbers of missiles which cannot be launched, or if tested could be detected, and if utilized would be of limited military and quite certainly a detriment to the Soviet Union in terms of their political affairs in Europe.

That is why I believe that this chart, while interesting and dramatic, is a whole pod of crimson whales.

Let me turn to something that does concern me, however, and that is the requirement that once we get into this treaty, there will be significant requirements for our inspectors, people who presumably must have a large number of abilities—technical abilities, Russian language abilities, other elements.

How good are we? How able are we now and how well will we do as we go into this treaty with the necessary technical personnel with those desired abilities?

Ambassador NITZE. A special agency associated with the Defense Department is being set up to train, to select and train, these men. It will have a deputy. My recollection is that one of the deputies will be suggested by the Director of ACDA. All these people will be approved by the President, and there will be another deputy, and the agency will have its home with one of the Pentagon agencies. But the people that they are recruiting do have these various qualifications that you talk about. Some are Russian speaking; some are technical experts. But they are developing a balanced team of people who will be able to do this job. They are confident that they will be able to have the right number of people at the right time in order to carry it out.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Evans.

I would interrupt here to say that President Mubarak is on his way up to the Hill to have lunch with us. So what I would propose is that Senator McConnell have his round of questions and then recess or adjourn the committee. I don't think anybody wants a second round this afternoon.

So, after that, you can recess the committee, and the committee will meet again tomorrow morning for nomination hearings in the normal meeting room in the Dirksen Building.

I thank the witness, Ambassador Nitze for being here. I have known him for so many years. I have always admired him tremendously and wish him success.

Ambassador NITZE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McConnell.

Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will join you shortly.

Mr. Ambassador, on the assumption that the INF Treaty is going to be ratified without crippling amendments—and I think that is a fairly safe assumption—I would like to look beyond that and ask you if you are among those who reject the notion of linkage, as it might be applied to the START agreement coming up. The parameters of that agreement appear to be more or less in place, and several witnesses have said that there is a possibility that that agreement would be signed sometime this year.

Assuming the current understandings about what that treaty may contain, could that treaty stand alone without addressing any of the conventional imbalance problems that concern you?

Ambassador Nitze. I believe I did outline in response to a question by one of the other Senators earlier in this hearing the points that we have already gotten agreement on between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves with respect to a START deal, and I think those are very impressive.

I should point out, however, there is a great deal of work still to be done before one has a START agreement which would be acceptable to us, and also much work before one would be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

Senator McConnell. I understand that.

Ambassador Nitze. In particular, we do not have the verification measures worked out, which would be appropriate for not only these START systems, but also and more difficultly for START mobile systems, and the Soviets have two mobile systems in their INF deployments—the 24's and the 25's. We are concerned about how one can reliably verify them.

So there is work to be done on START.

I do not believe it is something that one can hasten beyond a certain degree of speed. We want to do it as fast as we can.

You were asking whether the START agreement could stand by itself without the necessity for a concurrent agreement on conventional arms, and I believe that to be the case. Yes, I am quite certain of that.

I am sure that the benefits of getting these big reductions in the most destabilizing weapons, the Soviet heavy weapons—they are big, and this would cut the Soviet throw-weight, which is the most revealing indicator of the power of a missile force, this would cut it in half. So these would be really enormous benefits that we would get from the START agreement, and I think those would be benefits regardless of what happens in the conventional field, even though one tries to make progress in the conventional field.

Senator McConnell. Unquestionably, the success of INF and the possibility of a START agreement have begun to focus attention on the conventional side.

I am sure you noticed yesterday the report in the "New York Times" that Shevardnadze was in the Federal Republic of Germany recently and obviously beginning psychological warfare, if you will, leading toward a triple zero option.

Is that the next thrust that we will see the Soviets undertaking? Will we see an effort to denuclearize the FRG? How do you think they feel about triple zero?

What are your assessments of that particular idea?

Ambassador NITZE. So far, the principal pressure from the Soviet Union is to have tactical nuclear weapons as a whole included, and that goes beyond just the elimination of the ballistic missiles with a range of zero to 500 kilometers, but would also include nuclear artillery in the whole panoply and nuclear capable aircraft.

So they are making propaganda moves, serious moves, in that direction.

Senator MCCONNELL. How concerned are you about that? That sort of thing, to the voting publics in the democracies in Western Europe, always has a certain amount of appeal, does it not?

Ambassador NITZE. I am concerned about it, because I think it would be a mistake to go to the complete denuclearization of Europe at this point, with these there.

I think this is important. It does have a relationship to the continuing imbalance in conventional forces.

So, before one goes down that road of the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, which includes the going to zero on the zero to 500 kilometer ballistic missiles, before one goes down that road, I would want to see some improvement in the arrangements with respect to the conventional balance.

Senator MCCONNELL. I could not agree with you more.

I just wonder how you would assess the political will in NATO these days for the kind of courageous steps to build up similar to the steps that were required with regard to deployment of medium and short-range missiles, which clearly brought about the INF Treaty.

It may require some kind of buildup, I am sure you would agree, to get a conventional treaty at some point down the road.

Is there the political will there for that kind of buildup, either in tactical nuclear forces or in some other area? Is the will there, either for us or for our allies?

Ambassador NITZE. I would like to divide my answer into two parts, the first part dealing with policy.

I think that there is not any policy disagreement within the NATO Alliance. We discussed this range of issues at great length at the time of the second Reykjavik meeting, which was a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers.

At that meeting, we issued a communique, which was agreed to by all the members of the NATO Alliance, which did list the targets in this field of arms control negotiation, which the Alliance foresaw.

At the head of the list was the 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons. Then, as I remember it, the second item on the list was an agreement with respect to chemical weapons. The third element on the list was an agreement with respect to eliminating, to the degree one could, the disparities in the conventional field.

Then the last item was an item which dealt with trying to achieve some greater balance in systems, in ballistic missiles, with a range of between zero and 500 kilometers. But there it specifically said we ought to seek lower, but equal, limits with respect to these systems. But it was at the end of the list rather than being ahead of the other items.

Now it is true that the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, said that in his view, the order in which these objectives were listed should not be considered as being controlling. But he agreed that all of them were important, but he wanted to leave some flexibility as to how one dealt with them, how their interrelationships should be handled.

Senator McConnell. I guess Senator Cranston is in charge. I am going to join the luncheon.

I want to thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for coming and congratulate you for your excellent work in this field over the years.

Ambassador Nitze. Thank you, Senator McConnell.

Senator Cranston [presiding]. Paul, thank you very, very much. It has been a very helpful session, and this does conclude it.

We wish you well and we'll be seeing you again, I am sure, in the course of this exercise.

Ambassador Nitze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Cranston. Thank you very much. The hearing now stands adjourned.

Ambassador Nitze. May I add a few points in my testimony that I left out in my questions, inadvertently?

Senator Cranston. Of course.

Do you want to do it now, verbally?

Ambassador Nitze. Well, one point particularly comes to my mind and that was a suggestion was made that we have said that we had promised the Europeans an increase in our expenditures in Europe in connection with conventional forces. I believe that to be an error. I don't think anybody has made any such suggestion to the Europeans.

We and the Europeans both have difficulties with our budgets, and I don't know that anybody can guarantee in advance what the legislative bodies of the various countries will do in the future.

What I said about policy I think is correct. But what one can say about implementation, there one has to be more cautious.

Senator Cranston. Fine.

Thank you very much.

Ambassador Nitze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Cranston. We now stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROCK ADAMS

During the twenty years I have spent in public service I have had the opportunity to help shape public policies on many issues. But none has been as important as the one we are beginning to consider here today.

The proposed I.N.F. treaty is important for the specifics it contains; but it is also significant because of the path it can blaze, a path that can move us toward additional bipartisan arms control initiatives which can ultimately make the world a safer, more productive place to live.

I believe that the treaty before us is a good one. Its provisions are sound. For the first time in history, an international agreement has been reached to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons. These missiles will be eliminated under strict and unprecedented verification procedures that are capable of safeguarding against any effort to undercut the terms of the treaty on either side of the Atlantic.

The data exchanges required are detailed and comprehensive. The monitoring procedures include extensive on-site inspection options. The treaty requires the Soviets to give up more missiles than the United States -- 859 to 293 -- which I am convinced in the final analysis will enhance the security of Western Europe.

While these provisions are sound and significant, the INF Treaty represents a beginning rather than an end in and of itself. After all, it is important to remember that ever after ratification of this treaty, the United States and Soviet Union will continue to have enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over --- some 25,000 nuclear warheads aimed at each other.

My point is simply that while we have to determine if this Treaty protects our interests and the interests of our allies, it isn't enough to do just that. We also have to view this Treaty as the first step into a new future -- a future which is both unknown and uncertain.

The provisions of this treaty raise a host of questions about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. Examining the implications of this agreement for the post-I.N.F. world is at least as essential as examining the specific terms of this Treaty.

The shape of the post-I.N.F world is still to be determined. In that context, I take seriously the claim of critics that this Treaty and its aftermath may weaken the security and stability of our European alliance. I do not believe that is inevitable or even probable. But it can happen unless we take steps to enhance our collective security. As part of this process, the United States must underscore our commitment and investment in allied security. But at the same time, we must press our allies to invest in their own future security. Within the last two weeks, we have seen a new commitment to the formation of a joint French-West German 3,000 man battalion. This kind of cooperation must be expanded to modernization of allied defense forces and to defense cooperation between allied governments. Both the political and military dimensions of allied security must be considered as part of action on this treaty.

I believe that we can take steps to make a more secure Europe. I have long believed that the notion that intermediate nuclear weapons can substitute for political and conventional military cooperation in Europe is an ill-advised proposition. The corellary concept, that the world could sustain a limited nuclear war without it escalating to an all out holocaust, is more than ill-advised; it is unrealistic and dangerous. What we really must face is the fact that we cannot achieve arms reduction between the superpowers until we have addressed the role of nuclear weapons and conventional forces in European security. To pretend that we can is just an illusion.

With this in mind, as we discuss this treaty, we also must look forward toward the START negotiations and talk about the U.S. agenda in these talks. You can be certain that Gorbachev will have a well prepared agenda. We must have the same. As we proceed with ratification of the INF treaty what will be the impact on our agenda in those talks? In addition, we must think about the forthcoming European conventional force reductions talks and think about what the agenda should be to insure enhanced European security and thus world stability. These and other issues -- including our response to regional conflicts, the effects of President Reagan's Star Wars agenda and the U.S. commitment to a given level of defense spending -- all need to be discussed and debated if the INF Treaty is to become a part of a coherent process rather than an isolated document.

The answers to these questions are not readily apparent. We have not spent the time and the creative effort to visualize the post-I.N.F. world. If we are to create a new reality, we cannot be afraid to challenge old theories and develop new perspectives. We not only have to understand the full meaning of the Gorbachev era, but we must also seek to reach beyond to try to get a sense for what a post-Gorbachev era might bring forth.

One innovation heaped upon another is what brought us to this point in the nuclear arms race. I have no doubt that it will take many more innovations to get us out of it. Only this time, they will not just be scientific innovations, but rather innovative diplomatic actions. In the days and weeks ahead we ought to view this hearing room as a place for new ideas. We need to probe and experiment with our ideas. Granted, many of us have as a goal the ratification of this Treaty; but to make ratification meaningful, this INF Treaty must become a part of a long-term strategy which recognizes both the challenges and the opportunities which surround us. As we look at our vision for the future, tremendous progress is possible. If we fail, we will have missed an opportunity for constructive change that may not come again for a long, long time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL J. EVANS

I believe this will be viewed as an historic occasion. This statement is often overused in the political arena but there is no question that we begin today the process of Senate advice and consent to the first treaty since World War II which will truly reduce the horror of nuclear weapons.

In a very real sense President Reagan brought us here. His insistence, for a strong military budget, sometimes in the face of strong opposition and his determination to continue research on the SDI program gave both the appearance and reality of strength to the Soviet Union and to our NATO allies. He has at the same time consistently offered a reduction in the nuclear arsenal and first proposed the zero-zero INF option in 1981.

All those who aided in negotiating this treaty deserve the gratitude not only of the American public but of the world at large. We may be prepared to take the first small step back from the precipice of nuclear war.

Mr. Secretary, let me reaffirm my support for this agreement. I assure you that I will do everything I can to see that the Senate consents to a resolution of ratification without any amendments that would require renegotiation.

As we begin our deliberations on the details of the treaty, we should also reflect on what the treaty itself represents. In essence, it is a tribute to diplomacy. It says to all, that governments - even governments as ideologically opposed as ours and the Soviet Union's - can settle differences, can improve relations through negotiation and agreement.

Such diplomatic success seems sadly absent from our world these days. We seem incapable of finding peaceful solutions to the world's conflicts. We must not lose the opportunity to hold up this agreement as an example of what can be done if we are willing to undertake the slow, painstaking work successful diplomacy requires. To show governments what can happen if we put aside ideological feuds and ignore those demanding instant results and carefully and deliberately pursue agreement.

I thoroughly disagree with those who squawk loudly about Soviet duplicity and who believe that no verification procedure will keep the Soviets from cheating. They are among the small and unrelenting band who believe that no agreement with the Soviet Union short of their capitulation is worth signing. I disagree wholeheartedly with this narrow perspective. It is not in the long tradition of successful American diplomatic and security policy.

This treaty required six tedious years of diligent effort and work. Patience, persistence asnd a belief in the absolute necessity of resolving the matter at hand produced this treaty. Accomplishments such as this elude the impatient and the less determined.

Any negotiation, any agreement between parties requires a willingness to make sacrifices and to take risks. Clearly, we cannot and must not carelessly or causually give in. Nor can we rely on trust alone. Sacrifices must be balanaced against gains. Risks must be tempered by safeguards.

Many questions about the wisdom of the treaty and its provisions have been raised. Some of thise questions are legitimate; some seem to be mere smokescreens. A litany of concerns have been raised:

--What is the good of eliminating the missiles if we keep the warheads?

--Are the verification provisions adequate and do we have the ability and capacity to effectively carry them out?

--What are the military implications of this treaty?

--Are there such loopholes in the treaty as to make it ineffective or are the treaty's limits so emcompassing that we may be restricting our ability to conduct research in space?

Some have noted that there are so many loopholes in the treaty that compliance to its specific provisions is assured. Others maintain the Soviets have yet to consistently comply with any arms control agreements and doubt they will comply with this one.

All are valid questions and concerns. Given the number of hearings the Chairman and Ranking Member have scheduled and the range of proposed witnesses, I am confident all will be thoroughly explored.

One of the concerns most often raised about this treaty is its military implications and the continuing imbalance of conventional forces in Europe. Western forces, both men and machines, are outnumbered by their counterparts stationed in the countries of the Soviet bloc. This is indeed a serious problem, one with potentially devastating effects.

Yet this is not the only imbalance that should concern us. We must also consider the increasing imbalance in our respective diplomatic corps and the conditions under which they operate. I need not remind my colleagues that we barely managed to avoid disaster with this year's appropriations for the Department of State. But the threat to the very mission of that Department remains. And, as we cut back on funding for the employee and services of the State Department, the Soviets are increasing their diplomatic presence. The determined efforts on the part of some Members of Congress to emasculate the State Department may ultimately be as threatening to our security as any military weakness.

We all realize there are potentially high costs to this treaty. It will cost dearly to assure that the forces remaining in Europe can respond to and deter threats to our security and that of our European allies. I am willing to bear those costs. I am also willilng to bear the costs of maintaining a dedicated and professional diplomatic corps, whose job it is to keep talking, to keep trying to find mutually agreeable solutions. Once the talking stops, the fighting usually begins.

Perhaps this treaty is not all we have been led to believe. It does not do all that we might wish. But it is a beginning. A beginning upon which agreements that go one or two steps further can be built.

It is our repsonsibility as members of this Committee and the Senate as a whole to examine the details of this treaty and then to weigh its merits against its faults. If, upon finding this treaty is, on balance, sound and in our best interests - as I believe we will - we must accept some risks and some uncertainties, then so be it. Let us accept those risks and uncertainties, take the necessary precautions and consent to ratification of this treaty without alteration.

I believe it is appropriate to end this century as we began it with Teddy Roosevelt's wise adage: "Speak softly but carry a big stick".

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR EVAN G. GALBRAITH

1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

January 21, 1988

The Honorable Larry Pressler
SR-411 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-4101

Dear Senator Pressler:

I write urging you to vote against the ratification of the INF Treaty. My primary concern is the loss of the Pershing II, and I ask you to reflect on why the Pershing II is the key to the defense of Western Europe.

The Pershing II was developed because of a pressing need for a credible nuclear deterrent based in Germany. After World War II, American strategic nuclear weapons effectively deterred the Soviet Union in Europe and were the backbone to NATO's conventional forces. In the 1950's the West German Federal Republic produced a new army that made a substantial contribution to NATO, but Germany had no nuclear weapons of its own and its security was ultimately dependent upon the American nuclear umbrella. The Soviets, however, had begun to catch up with the the United States and as Soviet missiles became more accurate and massive, Europeans began to question whether or not the United States would use its massive retaliation solely in the defense of Europe, knowing that to do so would bring Soviet retaliation against the American people. The doubts grew and fear of a Soviet nuclear attack were acutely intensified when the Soviets announced the SS-20 missiles, designed specifically to destroy European cities.

The loss of belief in the American umbrella caused a loss in the will of the German people to defend themselves. The forces of appeasement -- the Greens, and the left wing of the Socialist Democratic Party -- began to flourish and bipartisan support for German national security diminished.

The Pershing II was called upon to meet this deterioration in the morale of the Germans. The resistance to its deployment was vigorous, but because of the high level of prosperity in Germany, the Christian Democrats won the election and the Pershing II was deployed. Men of good will were relieved.

The Pershing II can destroy targets in Eastern Europe and Western Russia in a few minutes. The Germans believe the Soviets are deterred by the Pershing because the Soviets must assume that the United States would fire the Pershing II, if only to prevent U.S. troops from being slaughtered. Moreover, the hope is that the launching of a Pershing against a Soviet conventional break-through need not necessarily trigger a strategic nuclear exchange; the Soviets seeing their bases destroyed might choose to withdraw rather than see their cities destroyed. That the Pershing II is an effective deterrent is clear, but what is not so apparent is that it also immunizes the German people against the Soviet threat to destroy Germany in a nuclear holocaust. With the Pershing II in place, Soviet intimidation is much less credible and the Germans can believe that it is still possible to resist, that they do not ultimately have to bend to Soviet pressure.

And yet we propose to give away this keystone deterrent, primarily in exchange for the SS-20. We are back to the F-111 which the Libyans have since shot down. The purpose of the SS-20 was not to launch them but to use them to terrorize Europeans. The SS-20 and the other missiles in the INF Treaty are not needed for an attack on European military bases. In giving up the SS-20 et al, the Soviets give up very little militarily and the SS-20's original terroristic mission will be carried on by the more sophisticated SS-24 and SS-25. These newer weapons are in the strategic category, but they too can be targeted for Europe. After the elimination of the SS-20, the Soviet nuclear intimidation of Europe will not miss a beat.

Without the Pershing II in place in Germany, appeasement and unilateral disarmament will spread. The will to resist will erode and Germany will slide down the slope toward neutralization and demilitarization. Without Germany NATO shall disintegrate. American troops must either come home or retreat to France. The Soviets may even accelerate the German demilitarization process by offering up East Germany -- unification in exchange for neutrality. The Soviets will soon thereafter dominate Europe and their domination will not remain static. It will quickly extend to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Israel will be subjugated and Arab oil prices and production will be controlled by the Soviets, the world's largest producer of oil and gas. This adverse economic scenario alone -- Europe working for the benefit of the Soviet Union and the Soviets shutting off Persian Gulf oil thus driving the price to $100 per barrel -- is an horrendous prospect.

It is possible that this grizzly series of events will not happen. Maybe the French and the British nuclear weapons will be sufficient to shore up the will of the Germans to remain a fighting force. Maybe not. The point is that the risk/reward ratio is absurd. The loss of the Pershing II may cause the collapse of Europe and the loss of the Middle East, including Israel, while the limitation of the Soviet INF will barely cause a ripple in Soviet military or psychological warfare capability.

Lastly, let us look at verification. It is a fact that we do not know how many SS-20's have been produced. These missiles and their launchers are mobile and can be stored, in easily assembled sections, in SS-25 canisters or in regular commercial containers of the type that are shipped about by the thousands all over the Soviet Union. To verify the absence of something so highly mobile is impossible -- not just difficult -- unless you know how many were produced in the first place. One need not be a scientist or an arms control expert to understand this. A modicum of logic will do.

We are told by the Administration that they have good estimates on the number of SS-20's that have been manufactured. However, these estimates are based only in part on hard intelligence; they are largely based on probabilities (the launchers are rechargeable, the need for spares, training, site diversity, optional deployment, previous Soviet practice, etc.) We simply do not know and in fact the number to be eliminated under the Treaty was finally established by the Soviet Union, not us. It is possible they have several hundred SS-20's stored at sites not included in the inspection procedure.

In reply to this logic the Administration has said that any cheating would not be militarily significant. This strange justification for a lack of verification sounds like a backhanded confession that the SS-20's are not militarily important. This is probably true, given the SS-24, SS-25 and the plethora of other Soviet nuclear weapons, but the Pershing II is about the most militarily significant weapon there is today and we are giving that up in exchange for something we are told has no military significance.

Recently, to compensate for the fact that verification is impossible, the Administration makes what they regard as practical points: SS-20's stored in violation of the Treaty could not be tested; operational crews and launch sites for the SS-20's cannot be clandestinely maintained; and the Pershing was deployed under NATO arrangements which require its elimination once the SS-20 is withdrawn. To this I have replied: The SS-20 has been thoroughly flight tested over ten years and only routine maintenance would be required to maintain its present capability; the crews operating the SS-25 could also maintain proficiency with the SS-20 operating manuals and procedures, working under cover at SS-25 launch sites with SS-20 training models; and the SS-24 and SS-25 did not exist when the original "dual track decision" was made in 1979 and Europe remains as threatened by these new weapons as by the SS-20 and the intention at the time included any successor missiles which threatened Europe.

Most French leaders privately oppose the Treaty, but are reluctant to embarrass Kohl, fearing to do so could bring the SPD to power. In my view this defeatist attitude means the likely end to effective nuclear deterrence in Germany. It is better to meet this issue head-on; the truth and common sense can still prevail.

I think the American people will soon understand why verification is impossible and they will resent having been told that it can be done. Moreover, the fundamental truth as to why it is dangerous to give away the Pershing II will also become understood, and the specter of Europe and the Middle East dominated by the Soviet Union will outweigh any political inconvenience caused by rejecting the Treaty.

Those who lead in achieving this understanding will be honored.

Sincerely,

Evan Galbraith

Thanks for seeing me

Evan G. Galbraith
Former U.S. Ambassador
to France

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR KERRY

Mr. Chairman: I expect to vote to approve this Treaty. I have little doubt the Senate will do the same and thereby rid Europe of a category of weapons which put the world on a 10 minute nuclear hair trigger.

But it is fair to say that many in the Senate have legitimate concerns about the Treaty's net effect on national security as well as about the fate of past Treaties negotiated between the US and Soviet Union.

In addition, there are concerns about the conventional balance. Some fear that removing our Pershing II's and cruise missiles might allow the Soviet Union to use its numerical advantage in tanks and artillery to conduct a Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg west in a time of crisis.

Others are concerned about past Soviet cheating and believe no Treaty with the Soviet Union can be a good one.

Still others recognize that both the Soviet Union and US have stretched the meaning of Treaties in the past. We have opposed this Administration's bizarre reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty, for example, even as we have decried the Soviet's construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Needless to say, this time we want to prevent what happened in those cases from happening with INF. We want no surprises from the Soviets. And we want to make sure that the INF Treaty cannot be "reinterpreted" in the future by either side to mean something different from what the Administration tells us it means now.

It is important to underscore another area of concern. This Treaty permits both sides to freely substitute strategic nuclear missiles to target the locations previously targeted by the INF missiles. This is in fact a potential giant loophole, one which could swallow up the Treaty itself. Previously, people criticized SALT II for limiting weapons instead of eliminating them. INF does the reverse. It eliminates intermediate and shorter range land-based missiles. But it limits neither side in its ability to replace them with other categories of nuclear weapons. As a result, the INF Treaty could become a Treaty without military meaning if it is not swiftly followed by a strategic arms reduction treaty.

It seems to me that if we are concerned that the Soviets will build new missiles to circumvent this Treaty, as the Treaty entitles them to do with their SS-25s, our negotiators should seek at least a joint interim commitment by both sides to stay within the numerical limits of the SALT II Treaty until a START agreement is negotiated.

This loophole in the Treaty requires us to underscore also that a START Treaty is readily within our grasp but for the obstacle of the President's desire to pursue "Star Wars" space-based strategic weaponry. As Secretary of State Shultz has suggested, "our national security cannot depend on wishful thinking." We must not sacrifice real reductions in nuclear weapons on the altar of the fantasy of a perfect shield against them. We should agree upon the START formula for cutting strategic nuclear weapons in half already largely agreed upon. We can deal best with the problem of weapons in space by agreeing to limits on Star Wars testing consistent with the traditional, historic and legally correct understanding of the ABM Treaty.

Finally, Secretary of State Shultz has called on us to ratify the INF Treaty without any reservations or amendments. Yet the Administration's own past rhetoric continues to cast a shadow over the Treaty, as witnessed in the refusal to support the Treaty by four of the six Republican candidates for President.

It is up to the Administration witnesses here, beginning with Secretary Shultz, to leave the nation and the Senate without doubt that this Treaty should be supported as it is -- without language that would prevent the INF weapons of both sides from being removed promptly and completely. To do this, the Administration must clarify fundamental questions:

First, will the Treaty increase stability on the East-West border in Europe, reducing the risk of a crisis turning into a war?

Second, will the INF Treaty improve the overall military balance on the East-West border, making it less likely that if such a war took place, the West would lose?

Third, will the INF Treaty meaningfully improve U.S. national security, making sure that after the Soviets remove their INF weapons, they can't simply substitute other nuclear weapons for them? If not, what should be done to prevent the Soviets from doing this?

As many of those who've focused closely on European arms control have remarked, the most likely cause of a nuclear war is escalation from a conventional war. If the INF Treaty promotes stability it deserves our support. If it does not, it should not be ratified. I look forward to these hearings showing that it does, and that that ratification will quickly follow.

Thank you.

LETTER FROM SENATOR JESSE HELMS

January 22, 1988

The Honorable William Webster
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

I am attaching classified and highly sensitive material which discloses a major violation by the Soviet Union of the proposed Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces.

Please confirm before Secretary Shultz appears before the Committee on Foreign Relations on Monday whether the matter I am transmitting is accurate.

If this information is confirmed, I shall urge Chairman Pell to ask you to appear on an immediate basis, perhaps as soon as Monday afternoon, before the Committee on Foreign Relations sitting in closed session in a secure facility.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

LETTER FROM WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

January 25, 1988

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Helms:

I am responding to your letters of January 22, 1988 to General Odom and me. We have reviewed the highly sensitive classified information cited in the attachment to your letter. This information is, in fact, contained in a recent draft of Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 4/11-88. The information is substantively accurate, although the final wording in the published version will, in some cases, be slightly different. In some cases, the citations omit reference to important caveats and additional observations. These statements are excerpts from a much broader set of judgments and issues regarding the monitoring of the INF Treaty and, in my view, by themselves do not constitute a sufficient basis on which to draw conclusions about the overall monitorability of the Treaty. This volume of the NIE, which contains highly source-sensitive information, has not yet been published. The judgments and information therein have been briefed to policy officials, negotiators, and in response to requests from members of Congress and security-cleared staff. A summary has been published.

I and my colleagues from the Intelligence Community will be prepared to discuss the issues you have raised during my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 29. However, it is my understanding that intelligence monitoring capabilities will be discussed in detail in several hearings scheduled by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I would ask you to consult with Chairman Pell, SSCI Chairman Boren, and SSCI Vice Chairman Cohen regarding the appropriate forum for detailed discussion of sensitive intelligence information regarding the monitorability of the INF Treaty.

Sincerely,

William H Webster

William H. Webster

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MAX M. KAMPELMAN

I am privileged to be invited to testify before you in support of the INF Treaty. As Counselor of the Department of State and Head of the United States Delegation on the Nuclear and Space Talks since they began in 1985, I have been deeply involved in these negotiations. I am accompanied today by Ambassador Maynard Glitman, our negotiator for the INF talks who will discuss the detailed history of the negotiations in which he played a significant role from the beginning, their purpose and objectives and the effects of these negotiations on United States and Allied interests. Here too, his significant service in NATO is of value. We both want to be helpful to your Committee.

Yesterday, Secretary Shultz discussed the INF Treaty very fully, including the background of the INF negotiations in important detail. I will try not to cover the same material but will review some highlights of the original 1981-1983 negotiations and the resumed negotiations from 1985-1987, including the Soviet efforts to link INF to other nuclear negotiations. I believe it is also appropriate that I comment on our continuing negotiations now underway in Geneva on the strategic arms and defensive systems.

Negotiations: 1981-1983

In retrospect, we can see why our initial INF negotiating effort in 1981-1983 had little hope of success. We were, in effect, attempting to persuade the Soviets to trade a bucket of coal for a bucket of ashes. We had no negotiating assets; only implied threats and promises. We had no Long-range Intermediate Nuclear Force missiles (range 1000-5500 km) on the ground in Europe. European basing countries had made political commitments for deployments, but such commitments were under fire from domestic critics willing to make non-deployment an election issue. The theme from the Soviets and their sympathizers was that U.S. deployments would make an INF agreement impossible. Does any one wonder that the Soviets thought that a walkout from the negotiations could be an effective tactic against deployments by Western democracies facing elections?

In any event, the Soviets had little to lose and much to gain. If the Allies or the U.S. had broken ranks and altered their deployment commitments, the Soviets would have effectively reversed a major NATO security decision. And if Western cohesion held, Moscow could always return to the negotiating table. For the long term objective of preserving Western security, we were fortunate that we and our Allies held firmly to our commitment to deploy while still seeking negotiations to limit these systems at the lowest possible level. Furthermore, the Soviet walk-out soon proved to be a serious political blow to them in Europe.

Resumed Negotiations and Linkage

To slightly modify an old adage, "The Soviets follow the election returns." Indeed, quickly after the U.S. 1984 Presidential elections, the Soviets renewed their interest in nuclear arms control negotiations. Although they insisted on "new" INF negotiations which would be combined with negotiations on strategic systems and defensive space systems under the umbrella of "Nuclear and Space Talks", it was not easy for them to sit down in the same seats they had earlier dramatically vacated; and there was no need for us to sharpen the point.

The main Soviet theme of these resumed negotiations was tight "linkage" between the three areas: INF; START and Defense and Space. In contrast, the U.S. urged that we make progress in each negotiation independently, reaching agreement in each area as it was ripe. Frequently during the negotiations, the Soviets sought to hold agreement or progress on INF and strategic arms issues hostage to U.S. concessions on SDI. They sought to maximize joint negotiating sessions integrating INF, START and Defense and Space. For a time at the outset, they sought to limit opportunities to address specific individual negotiations. The most blatant public illustration of this tactic was General Secretary Gorbachev's linkage of the progress achieved on INF at Reykjavik in October 1986 to U.S. restrictions on SDI. At that juncture, clearly the Soviets were hoping to generate pressure from NATO allies anticipating an INF agreement to force the U.S. to accept restrictions on SDI. The U.S. rejected such a linkage as did our Allies and the Soviets ultimately "delinked" in February 1987, resuming their pre-Reykjavik agreement that an INF Treaty could be negotiated independently.

The Soviets attempted not only to link INF to other nuclear arms control negotiations, but, within the INF negotiations, they repeatedly attempted to link discussions on INF missiles both to the nuclear systems of other NATO nations (the UK and France) or to other U.S. nuclear systems, such as dual-capable aircraft. Indeed, we were battling linkage in one form or another virtually until the end of the negotiation. Its final manifestation for INF was repeated Soviet pressure for a specific Treaty commitment to "follow-on" INF negotiations, a major element of which would have been dual-capable aircraft. The Soviets did not drop this demand until the Geneva discussions I held with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov on November 15-17, 1987.

Effect of INF on the NATO Alliance

Although Ambassador Glitman will review in detail the effect of the INF agreement on the NATO Alliance, I wish to emphasize one point in particular. A repeated canard suggests that under various conditions an INF agreement could be dangerous to the NATO alliance. Critics are contending that the Treaty should carry some sort of political label "Caution, INF Treaty could be dangerous to your security". Let me here clearly assert that U.S. government officials have been keenly aware throughout the INF negotiations of the need to maintain the U.S. spectrum of deterrence -- nuclear and conventional, strategic and tactical -- to prevent Soviet intimidation of friends and allies and to maintain deterrence. We have moved to reinforce U.S. commitments. These include our long standing political and military alliances, the maintenance of more than 300,000 American troops and about 4000 nuclear weapons, including a variety of nuclear delivery systems in Europe. I can assure you that our government's commitment to NATO's strategy of flexible response remains firm.

And we are continuing to pursue NATO's long-standing conventional and nuclear improvements program to assure deterrence. The effectiveness of our commitments is highlighted by the fact that those most directly affected by the Treaty -- the Europeans themselves -- fully support the agreement. This is clear to me as I have traveled in Europe. Every European country has endorsed it. Every major political party and political leader in and out of power within the NATO countries strongly backs the INF Agreement. Polls suggest that an overwhelming majority of European public opinion supports the agreement. While an unpopular position should never deter a critic, it is useful for us all to realize that the critical view is a distinctly minority one.

Beyond "Trust but Verify"

It has also been suggested that implementation of the INF Treaty will engender differences of opinion between the U.S. and Moscow on one point or another. Naturally we hope this will not be the case; nor do we assume it as a "given". While details of implementation will need to be discussed and we cannot exclude possible disputes, provisions of the inspection regime are designed to limit the scope of potential disagreement.

The detailed network of verification, with its wide range of movement notifications and inspection arrangements, required a new, continually operating communications link. Rather than devise a separate body, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which had their impetus from Congress, appeared the most efficient mechanism for day-to-day transactions.

The sides agreed, however, to constitute a separate body, the Special Verification Commission, to "resolve issues related to compliance" and "agree...upon measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness ..." of the Treaty. We do not anticipate that activity of this body will be an everyday affair. It is not necessary to review the experiences associated with the Special Consultative Commission to recognize that a fresh start can be useful. The Verification Commission has an opportunity to write its own record, free from the burden of political confrontation associated with the SCC. In any event, the United States, mindful of previous difficulties over the Soviet record of noncompliance with previous arms control agreements, must be vigilant in its monitoring of Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty.

Next Steps

Whatever the merits of the INF agreement -- and I think they are many -- it is only one element in the spectrum of arms control negotiations. The Treaty stands on its own as a contribution to our security. It is not an end, but rather hopefully a beginning and a first step toward a more secure and stable peace.

Let me now specifically address the next steps as they pertain to the Nuclear and Space Talks.

The President places the highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear arms. In particular, we are seeking reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear weapons -- heavy, intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

There has been considerable progress in the START negotiations. Our negotiators in Geneva are now working from a Joint Draft Text which reflects areas of agreement reached between the President and Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva (November 1985) and at Reykjavik (October 1986) for 50% reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. Specifically, this draft text reflects agreement on ceilings of 6000 warheads on 1600 deployed delivery vehicles for each side, a ceiling for heavy ballistic missiles and their warheads, and counting rules for heavy bombers and some of their armament.

At the December Summit in Washington there was further START progress including agreement on a sublimit for ballistic missile warheads of 4900, a procedure for counting warheads on existing ballistic missiles, and, building on the INF Treaty verification provisions, guidelines for verification.

Important differences remain: on mobile ICBMs; a warhead sublimit for ICBMs; sea-launched cruise missiles; and the details of an effective verification regime. The verification regime for START is a much more difficult problem than for INF, since a large strategic nuclear force will remain in contrast to all INF systems being eliminated; and it is simpler to verify a zero than a fixed number.

We believe it is possible to reach a START agreement this year, but I make no such prediction. The task is formidable and we must protect our interests. Both sides have instructed their negotiators to work to complete such an agreement, if possible, in time for signature in the first half of 1988. But our overriding guidance from the President is "better no agreement than a bad agreement".

Our Geneva negotiators are also continuing work on strategic defense issues. At the recent Washington Summit, the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to try to work out an agreement to commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

Simultaneously we are seeking to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offenses and defenses. We wish to discuss how, if effective defenses prove feasible, the U.S. and Soviet Union could jointly manage a transition to deterrence based increasingly on defenses rather than the threat of nuclear retaliation. One point should be clear to all of us. Modern technology and science are moving at an unbelievably rapid pace. New developments will affect the military force structures of both the U.S. and the USSR. The great challenge we all face is how to make certain that the impact of the new technologies will be stabilizing.

Our negotiations in Geneva resumed during the second week of January when Round IX opened. I have only recently returned from the opening sessions of these negotiations. On January 22, we tabled a draft Treaty in the Defense and Space negotiations embodying agreed principles. Our START negotiating team is at work on the Joint Draft Treaty. Both we and the Soviet delegation understand there is a great deal of work to be done. We are proceeding seriously and carefully. I assure you our delegation is well prepared.

I would like to conclude with a special note of tribute to Ambassador Glitman and the INF Delegation. Since the INF negotiations resumed in 1985, Mike has provided the vigorous, dedicated professional leadership necessary to drive the Treaty toward a successful conclusion. His leadership was complemented by a highly qualified interagency delegation characterized by their exceptional energy and ability. Both Mike and his Delegation have much of which to be proud. I am proud to have been associated with them.

Let me now turn to Ambassador Glitman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MAYNARD W. GLITMAN

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to testify in support of the INF Treaty.

Introduction

Soviet INF missile systems, defined as those ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5500km, have posed a major problem for United States and Alliance security for many years. We sought on several occasions to constrain these systems via arms control negotiations. But they escaped capture. For almost two decades the Soviets had a virtual monopoly on longer-range INF missiles, free from any limitations.

Then, during the time when the Soviet Union began to reach strategic parity with the United States, the SS-20 made its appearance. That in turn triggered off the series of events which culminated nearly over eleven years later in the signing of the INF Treaty.

That Treaty not only captures INF missile systems, it provides for their elimination. The class of Soviet nuclear weapons which for decades has threatened our Allies in Europe and Asia, decoupling weapons with a proven capability for political intimidation, will cease to exist under this agreement. In accepting this Treaty, providing for the demise of this class of weapons, the Soviet Union recognizes the legitimacy of the United States and its NATO Allies joining together in collective security arrangements to deter Soviet pressure against NATO Europe via the deployment in Europe of United States nuclear forces.

The INF Treaty, which accomplishes this result, comprises 125 pages of single-spaced text. The Treaty proper is accompanied by an Inspection Protocol, outlining the detailed modalities of the inspection regime; an Elimination Protocol covering how each Treaty-banned item will be eliminated; and a Memorandum of Understanding on Data declaring type, number and location of each item to be eliminated.

The Treaty is a legal document and its detail and phrasing reflect this. But in its essence it incorporates the basic arms reductions goals and policy that the United States, in close consultation with its Allies, has pursued since the formal INF negotiations opened in late 1981. These goals and this policy in turn had their basis in NATO's December 1979 decision to overcome the challenge posed to Alliance security by the Soviet intermediate-range missile force, through a dual track approach of counter deployments and negotiations.

The United States Approach to the INF Negotiations

The negotiating approach the United States and its Allies agreed upon was based on five principles: 1) equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union; 2) limitations on United States and Soviet systems only; 3) global application of limitations; 4) unweakened maintenance of NATO's conventional defense capability; and 5) effective verifiability of any agreement. In addition to these principles, the United States and its NATO Allies also made inclusion in the INF Treaty of constraints on shorter-range INF missiles a basic tenet of the United States approach to the negotiations.

President Reagan made clear from the outset to his negotiators that any INF agreement must fully incorporate these criteria. There was to be no agreement just to have an agreement. The President's approach blending statesmanship, fortitude and enlightened self-interest were to be our guideline throughout the six years of the negotiations.

Equal Rights and Limits

This fundamental principle is grounded in the United Nations Charter's provision for the right of collective defense. In concrete terms, it provides the foundation for the United States and its Allies joining together to protect their freedom and independence, including through the basing of United States forces and systems in Europe. A substantial portion of the negotiation was devoted to achieving Soviet recognition of this principle.

The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles that could strike targets in Europe (and Asia) but not, it was claimed, the United States. Thus, so the Soviets contended, dealing with such Soviet systems was essentially an intra-European affair. However, United States systems deployed in Europe, it was argued, were more akin to strategic forces since they could strike the Soviet Union. Hence, the very basis for a negotiation on United States and Soviet INF systems was denied.

The deployment in the mid-1970s of the mobile, accurate, triple-warhead SS-20 capable of threatening targets throughout Europe, and elsewhere on the periphery of the Soviet Union, including much of Asia, marked a fundamental point in the area of INF missiles. In the context of Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the United States, and as the Soviet SS-20 missile force grew, our European Allies became concerned that with no comparable United States INF force on the ground in Europe and with no limitations on Soviet INF missiles, Moscow might come to believe--however mistakenly--that United States forces could be "decoupled" from the defense of Europe. Consequently, Western European leaders stressed the need for a NATO response to Soviet SS-20 deployments to foreclose a potential perceptual gap in NATO's deterrence as well as to address the military threat posed by the SS-20.

Well over a year of intensive Alliance consultations culminated in NATO's December 1979 two-track decision. One track would redress the imbalance of INF through modernization and deployment in Western Europe of 572 United States longer-range INF missiles (eventually defined as "Intermediate-range missiles" with ranges between 1000 and 5500 km). On the second track, the United States would call for negotiations with the Soviets to establish a global balance in United States and Soviet longer-range INF missiles at the lowest possible level, which was understood to include zero.

The Soviets initially refused to negotiate, attempting to impose the condition that NATO must first renounce its modernization track. In essence this argued that the United States had no right to deploy INF systems in Europe to help its NATO Allies counter the threat of the SS-20 and similar Soviet systems. The opening Soviet position thus directly challenged the principle of equal rights and limits.

Finally, during the summer of 1980, the Soviets agreed to negotiate. A short set of preliminary talks was held that fall. Formal negotiations with the Soviet Union began in November 1981.

From the outset, the United States, under President Reagan's leadership, stressed the principle of equality and proposed the global elimination of all United States and Soviet longer-range INF missile systems. This equal global "zero option" remained the United States' preferred outcome throughout the negotiations. The Soviets for their part called in essence for a moratorium on INF deployment in Europe. This would have codified the Soviet INF missile monopoly which NATO had just rejected and in effect would have denied legitimacy of the equal rights and limits principle. Obviously it was not acceptable.

In March 1983, in an effort to find common ground with the

Soviet side, the United States, while continuing to prefer a zero outcome, proposed an interim agreement for equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads at any number below the planned United States deployment level. Both of these proposals, equality at zero or at a number above zero, were rejected by the Soviet side.

Soviet unwillingness to accept the fundamental principle of an equal outcome made the negotiations untenable. Eventually the Soviets, unable either to impose their negotiating position on us or to derail the deployments, walked out of the negotiations in November 1983.

In March 1985, contrary to the prediction of some and to their own rhetoric, the Soviets came back. Not the least of the reasons for their return to the negotiating table was the recognition that, absent an equal outcome, the full deployment of United States INF missiles would take place.

During the course of the renewed negotiations, the United States continued to stress that any INF agreement had to be based on equal rights and limits. The Soviets, after renewing their freeze proposal, came up with several variations on a theme--the theme being to force the removal of United States INF missiles from Europe while the Soviets retained their monopoly.

Thus, we were offered a zero outcome: a zero for the United States and a zero-plus for the Soviet Union, with this plus being equal to United Kingdom and French nuclear forces. We were also told that equality meant equal reductions, not an equal outcome. Despite the obvious one-sidedness of this and similar Soviet approaches, it took months of persistent effort inside and outside the negotiations to persuade the Soviets that neither the United States nor its Allies would accept any result along these lines.

That effort was ultimately successful. Slowly but surely the Soviet position began to evolve until by the summer of 1986 the issue of equality was in essence resolved on the basis of the principle of equal rights and limits between the two Parties to the negotiations, i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union. That principle is now fully incorporated in the INF Treaty. Its focus is on an equal outcome between the United States and the Soviet Union, not on equal reductions. Indeed, by its very nature, the Treaty will strengthen the precedent for asymmetrical reductions to an equal level.

Exclusion of Third Country Systems

This principle is closely connected to and indeed is a subset of the issue of equal rights and limits for the Parties to the Treaty. As part of its argument that the INF issue was an intra European affair and that the Europeans and Americans had no need (or right) to join in a collective approach to counter Soviet INF, the Soviet side for much of the negotiations argued for the inclusion of, or compensation for, British and French systems. The United States insisted that any INF agreement, like the negotiations themselves, must be bilateral and limited only to United States and Soviet systems.

Behind this argument lay the conviction of the United States and its Allies that United States INF deployments provided a legitimate counterweight to Soviet INF capable of reaching the European and Asian Allies of the United States, but not (so the Soviets claimed) the United States itself, and that any negotiations concerning nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union should deal only with the systems of those two countries.

For much of the six years spent at the negotiations, this issue was the prime topic of discussion. The Soviets sought to use the inclusion of United Kingdom and French forces as a means to prevent or remove United States INF deployments under the guise of an "equal" outcome among "European" states. In effect they sought to balance off only a non-strategic class of Soviet weapons against the entire British and French strategic arsenal, to gain leverage on the size and shape of British and French nuclear forces via their negotiations with us, and to establish the principle that INF was an intra European matter in which the U.S. was an outsider, a principle which, had it been accepted, would have called into question the very foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as our security arrangements with Asian allies.

What followed was a major effort in Geneva and in the public arena to persuade the Soviets that an agreement was only possible if third country systems were completely excluded. But here again, that effort was successful. Beginning with General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Paris in October 1985, where he offered separate negotiations with the French and British, the Soviet position began to evolve.

Still, it took another year before the Soviets in essence adopted our approach. The INF Treaty is a purely bilateral one. The British and French nuclear forces are not included in any manner. Neither, as Secretary Shultz spelled out in his testimony, are the Pershing missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany under an existing program of cooperation, included in the Treaty. The principle that nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union will deal only with the forces of those two countries has been accepted and incorporated in the final outcome.

The Global Application of Limitations

The capability of the SS-20, especially its range, mobility and transportability permitted it to impinge on the security of the United States and its Allies in Europe and Asia, regardless of its deployment location. Yet for most of the negotiating period, the Soviet Union rejected United States proposals to apply limitations on INF missiles on a worldwide basis and sought to limit the Treaty to Europe. In contrast, the United States argued that an INF agreement limited to Europe and not leading to reductions in Asia would neither provide real security for Europe nor provide equal treatment for Asia.

The United States held firm to this principle throughout the negotiations. The first hint of Soviet recognition that the United States argument had validity came in mid-1982 with the Soviet willingness to include a part of its territory east of the Urals under the INF agreement. The next sign of movement came in October of 1983 when the Soviets offered to freeze their INF deployments in Asia upon entry into force of an INF agreement covering Europe. While not meeting our requirements, the Soviets did thus implicitly acknowledge that their Asian systems were relevant to the INF negotiations.

During the resumed negotiations the Soviet argument shifted somewhat. They asserted that Soviet SS-20s in Asia should be kept out of an agreement because they were deployed solely to counter U.S. naval and air forces in the Pacific--conveniently ignoring their counterpart air and naval forces and the questionable military utility of using SS-20s against ships. However, they also reaffirmed their earlier freeze offer (and its implications). The United States, for its part, remained firm--INF limits would have to apply on a global basis; anything less would not meet our or our Allies' security requirements.

No real movement was made in this area for several months with Soviet proposals continuing to be variations on the same theme: implying recognition that their Asian SS-20s were part of the INF problem, but not putting this into meaningful concrete terms. Again we remained firm. Equality in Europe but inequality globally was not an acceptable outcome.

Not until the Reykjavik meeting did the Soviets finally accept in essence our position--an equal global ceiling putting concrete limits on Soviet INF missiles in Asia as well as in Europe and providing for a similar number of United States INF missiles to be deployed in the United States. The final outcome, however, went beyond this. We secured not only global limits on Soviet long-range INF missiles, but on Soviet shorter-range INF missiles as well. As a result, the INF Treaty fully incorporates the principle of global limitations which we and our Allies had sought from the outset of the negotiations.

Maintain NATO's Conventional Capabilities

This principle is directly related to the question of whether to include dual capable aircraft in the INF negotiation.

The Soviets initially argued for their inclusion. In essence the Soviets sought to create an equation between only some of their INF aircraft on the one hand and all dual capable United States, British and French aircraft on the other. Moreover, the level they proposed would have effectively left little or no room for United States aircraft in Europe.

The United States firmly rejected this patently one-sided approach. Instead the United States argued that an INF agreement should focus on missiles only, the most capable element in the INF force, and stressed a determination not to accept an outcome which would weaken the United States contribution to NATO's conventional defense.

In the fall of 1983 the United States, in an effort to find common ground, offered to discuss inclusion of selected INF aircraft in an agreement but at levels that would not impact on NATO's conventional defense. The Soviets refused to discuss our proposal. They did, however, offer a counter-proposal which moved somewhat in our direction, both in terms of coverage and levels, but continued to include Allied aircraft and United States sea-based systems in the permitted "NATO" total, with the result that our contribution to NATO's conventional defense would have been weakened.

The aircraft issue reappeared when the talks resumed in 1985. However, the Soviets soon began to deemphasize the subject, concentrating as did we on missiles. Indeed by mid-1985 the subject ceased to be a matter of serious discussion, and thereafter effectively disappeared from the negotiations.

The end result--the INF Treaty covers only missiles, United States aircraft levels are not affected by the Treaty, and United States dual-capable aircraft are available to help strengthen NATO's deterrence and conventional capabilities.

Effective Verification

Effective verification is the keystone of arms control. "Trust but verify" is more than a watchword for the United States; it is a practical recognition of the problems created by Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements and the need to ensure that compliance problems do not create a situation in which an agreement becomes a source of misunderstanding and tension rather than a force for improved relations. As I will detail below, the procedures for verification in the INF Treaty are more comprehensive than for any previous agreement. The complex of constraints, inspections and notifications coupled with National Technical Means will greatly help ensure compliance with the Treaty.

Getting to this outcome, however, took patience and persistence. The Soviet position as the talks opened was to argue that National Technical Means was sufficient to verify compliance. The United States, while not discounting the value of NTM, argued that given the relatively small and mobile nature of INF missiles, and given the record of compliance problems, more would be needed for INF verification, to include on-site inspection.

The United States sought from the outset to engage the Soviets in full discussion of verification. The Soviets resisted, arguing that verification could not be considered until there was agreement on reductions and limitations. While much of the discussion was one-sided, we continued to put forward our views and to urge the Soviets to join us in concrete negotiations on verification provisions. Nevertheless, at the time of the Soviet walkout, the question of verification, because of the Soviet stance, had not been given the full treatment it required.

The pace of work on verification began to pick up with the resumption of the talks in 1985. Soviet public rhetoric began to shift toward acceptance of more stringent provisions until eventually even on-site inspection was not precluded. Inside the negotiations the Soviets continued to shy away from discussing concrete measures, but they did state a willingness "in principle" to accept effective verification measures.

The United States worked to transform the Soviet public support for effective verification into real treaty provisions. In February 1986 we tabled the elements of a comprehensive verification regime. These eventually became the foundation for the INF Treaty verification provisions, but the initial Soviet reaction was to say in effect yes in principle but no to working on the issue. Indeed, they suggested putting off developing key provisions until after the Treaty was signed and assigning this task to the SCC. We continued to argue for concrete work on all aspects of verification during the negotiations, in parallel with work on other Treaty provisions.

Progress was made at Reykjavik with the Soviets moving in the direction of matching practice to rhetoric. Data exchanges, on-site observation of elimination, and OSI of the remaining inventories were accepted in principle. But the details remained open. The United States continued to press for deeper negotiations on verification, putting forward in March of 1987 a further elaboration of our approach to verification. We added that verification could be better facilitated in a zero environment citing this as an additional reason for the Soviets to agree to eliminate the 33 deployed SS-20s in Asia, which they would have been entitled to keep under the Reykjavik formula.

Finally in April of 1987 the Soviets tabled their own draft verification regime. While it followed the structure of the United States approach, it was more generalized than the United States proposal. Among other aspects, it omitted OSI of baseline data, but called for OSI of United States military bases in third countries. Many details were left for an Inspection Protocol which was not provided.

Nevertheless, the sides had begun to engage on the subject. In subsequent months, with the United States taking the lead. specific articles on verification were tabled, along with the MOU on Data and the elimination and inspection protocols. By the summer of 1987 the Soviets had joined us in moving ahead on fleshing out the details. This effort continued until the end of the negotiations.

In the process new ground was broken for the construction of the unprecedented stringent verification regime of the INF Treaty. The principle of effective verification is thus fully incorporated in the Treaty.

Shorter-Range INF Missiles

From the outset of the negotiations in 1981, the United States called for treaty provisions placing constraints on Soviet shorter-range INF missiles (eventually defined as shorter-range missiles with ranges between 500 and 1000 km). This was necessary because Soviet shorter-range INF missiles could perform many of the same missions as Soviet longer-range INF missiles. Thus, if left unconstrained, Soviet SRINF could undermine the effectiveness and viability of the treaty. After some hesitation, the Soviet side agreed with the concerns expressed by the United States and indeed included provisions dealing with shorter-range INF missiles in its initial draft INF treaty. The United States for its part agreed to the application of such constraints to its shorter-range INF missiles.

However, while the United States remained constant in its view of the need to constrain these systems, the Soviet Union, when the talks resumed in 1985, raised objections to including shorter-range INF missiles in the proposed treaty. Instead, the Soviets argued that these missile systems should be dealt with in a follow-on negotiation.

For well over a year the Soviets once again applied the technique of producing variations on the same theme, including a freeze proposal which would have legitimized a Soviet preponderence in this area, while maintaining their essential posture of putting off negotiations on shorter-range INF missiles until after the conclusion of an INF Treaty.

At Reykjavik the sides agreed on the need to place constraints on shorter-range INF missiles in an initial INF agreement but disagreed on the level; the United States insisting on the right to match the Soviet level, the Soviets insisting on a freeze at current levels, i.e., zero for the United States and thousands for them. In early 1987, the Soviets backed away from even this limited area of convergence, calling again for separate negotiations on shorter-range INF missiles.

Finally, beginning in the spring of 1987, the Soviet position began to evolve with the first hints that the Soviet side would be willing to consider the elimination of its SRINF missiles at least in Europe as part of an INF outcome. By mid-year the Soviets had moved to accept the global elimination of shorter-range INF missiles, which the United States, in close consultation with its Allies, was also prepared to accept.

The result is fully incorporated in the INF Treaty. Not only does it constrain Soviet shorter-range INF missiles concurrently with limitations on longer-range INF missiles, but it provides for their elimination along with the elimination of the longer-range INF missiles. In a situation where we had zero deployed shorter-range INF missiles and of non-deployed missiles in storage in Colorado, the Soviets accepted in effect an asymmetrical reduction which approached the unilateral.

The Treaty Provisions

As for the Treaty itself, it will:

(A) Totally eliminate in three years all United States and Soviet INF ballistic and cruise missiles, i.e., those ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5500 km (about 300-3300 miles); deployed Soviet shorter-range missiles (500-1000 km range) will be moved to elimination facilities within 90 days, and the entire shorter-range missile force will be eliminated in 18 months. Longer-range INF missiles (1000-5500 km range) will be eliminated in two phases. The first, lasting 29 months, will bring the sides to equal force levels prior to total elimination at the end of three years. Altogether over 1835 Soviet missiles, capable of delivering over 3000 nuclear warheads, will be destroyed, along with over 850 United States missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

(B) Prohibit production and flight testing of these systems or development of "new types".

(C) Institute restrictions on the deployment and movement of INF missile systems until they are eliminated, including an extensive process of notifications for and limitations on any movements.

(D) Update the data provided in the Memorandum of Understanding on Data which includes a fully itemized declaration of the location, number and technical specifications of all Treaty-limited systems, support structures and equipment.

(E) Provide detailed procedures for the elimination of INF missiles, launchers, support equipment and unique support structures.

(F) Provide a complex, overlapping inspection regime to assist in the verification of compliance, to include several kinds of on-site inspection. The Treaty also sets up a Special Verification Commission as one means of addressing as necessary compliance concerns.

Just as its provisions calling for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons are unique, the Treaty's extensive verification provisions break new ground. The verification regime, lasting 13 years and covering nine countries is the most comprehensive and stringent ever agreed upon. It will consist of:

(A) "Baseline" inspections, to be conducted shortly after the INF Treaty enters into force to verify the number of missiles and launchers at "declared" facilities, including bases at which missiles are operating, repaired and stored.

(B) An annual quota of short-notice, on-site inspections of these INF facilities both for the three years during which all INF missile systems and facilities are eliminated and for ten years afterwards. These inspections will help monitor United States and Soviet INF missile systems until all are eliminated and ensure that no such systems are produced.

(C) On-site inspections to monitor the elimination of missiles and launchers, and elimination of specific structures at missile bases. Each side will also be permitted to eliminate up to 100 longer-range INF missiles in the first six months by launching them under restrictive conditions and monitored by on-site observation.

(D) A separate "close-out" inspection to ensure that only when all INF-associated activity has indeed terminated a declared site be deactivated and removed from the list of declared facilities.

(E) A continuous portal monitoring regime under which the United States will be able to monitor, for up to 13 years, the key Soviet missile assembly plant at Votkinsk or any other plant where the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any stage of which is outwardly similar to a solid propellant GLBM listed in Article III, is accomplished. This monitoring will include the permanent presence of United States inspectors at the Soviet facility. Votkinsk was chosen because the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20, they will be able to weigh and measure Soviet canisters and open up eight such canisters per year as they leave the plant to ensure the "non-production"of SS-20s. The Soviet Union will similarly be permitted to monitor a former Pershing-II production facility in Utah.

To complement this inspection regime, and as a further step to help ensure that SS-20 missiles are not covertly deployed with SS-25 or other road-mobile ICBM missiles, the Soviet Union has agreed to the establishment of a program of enhanced National Technical Means. Six times a year for three years or until entry into force of a START agreement (whichever comes sooner), the United States can require the Soviet Union on short notice to open retractable roofs and display missile systems at selected Soviet road-mobile ICBM bases.

In sum, the verification regime of the INF Treaty provides an extensive network of checks and cross checks, appropriate to a zero level environment where the production, flight testing, indeed the very existence of INF missiles is prohibited. It dramatically reduces the possibilities of maintaining a militarily useful covert INF missile force and serves as a deterrent to cheating.

The Future

The INF Agreement is of historic proportions. It is not hyperbole to note that never before have two world powers agreed to eliminate an entire category of existing weaponry, whether the weapons were battleships, bombers or ballistic missiles. The suggestion that INF missiles are superfluous when compared with the vast number of strategic systems begs the question of why they were built and deployed in the first place and forgets the deep concern which Soviet INF missiles engendered in Europe and Asia.

Elements of the INF Treaty can provide useful precedents for the emerging conventional stability negotiations as well as for START. Each of these negotiations, of course, has its own dynamics and requirements. Neither envisages a zero outcome. Nevertheless, recognition of the principle of equal rights and limits and of asymmetrical reductions to reach equality can be useful precedents in other arms control negotiations. The sides could also draw upon procedures in the INF Elimination Protocol and build on aspects of the INF Inspection Protocol in future negotiations.

More generally, the INF Treaty is a positive example of United States and Soviet determination and ability to resolve controversial issues. The United States and the Soviet Union have worked to resolve a security problem, long considered intractable, involving key Allies both in Europe and Asia.

Other issues will not necessarily be easier to negotiate, but at a minimum the INF Treaty will demonstrate that difficult problems can be solved.

In addition, while our experience with previous nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has not always been a happy one, successful implementation and full compliance with the INF Treaty will provide an opportunity to establish a different record.

It remains fundamentally true that improved East-West relations cannot be based solely on arms control. Arms alone do not create insecurity. Arms are as much, if not more, a manifestation of tension as the cause of tension. Progress in arms control alone cannot therefore resolve United States-Soviet differences if we remain at odds over the rest of the spectrum of our relationship. To be of lasting benefit, movement in arms control must be paralleled by the resolution of problems in other areas such as human rights and regional issues.

Nevertheless, while there is more to be done in these fields as well as in arms control, the successful negotiation of the INF Treaty demonstrates and illustrates the point that even though initially separated by major political and security differences, the United States and the Soviet Union can ultimately find the way to agreement. The knowledge that agreement can be achieved in a sensitive area despite major obstacles should be among the most important legacies of the INF negotiations and Treaty.

Conclusion

I would like to close by reflecting on a few points and lessons. My own involvement with INF dates back to the summer of 1976 when the United States first briefed its NATO Allies on the SS-20. From that time until the present, whether in Washington, at NATO in Brussels or at the Geneva negotiations, I participated in the work which led to the deployments, to the negotiations and eventually to this Treaty.

Over this period, the United States maintained tactical flexibility, but there was constancy in our strategic approach. Our goal, and NATO's goal, was to preserve and strengthen our mutual security by overcoming the challenge posed to that security, to our freedom and to the peace by Soviet INF missiles. That goal was articulated in the 1979 NATO decision to deploy and to negotiate.

We and our Allies carried through on both tracks. The provisions of this Treaty are not only consistent with the 1979 decision, they are based on it, in spirit and in letter. The constancy of our strategic approach to the INF issue, to the deployment and negotiating tracks, provided the essential basis for achieving the results of this negotiation. NATO's 1979 decision has been carried out.

The INF negotiations had a very high political content. This is not to underplay the enormous destructive potential of INF missiles. Indeed, without that potential they would have had little political impact. But their ability to intimidate, their potential for inciting fear of decoupling the United States from its Allies, are what gave Soviet INF missiles their real force. They did not have to be used to be effective. They just had to be seen to exist in a situation where they were uncontrolled and unmatched.

Because of the importance of the political aspect of the INF issue, perceptions, for example, of NATO's ability to deter Soviet pressure, or the United States' willingness to continue to join with its Allies in supporting that deterrence, or of our and our Allies' view of how best to deal with the problems posed by Soviet INF missiles, played and still play, a key part--even today as we debate the Treaty--in determining how the INF issue impacts on our security relations with our NATO and Asian Allies.

The political content of the INF issue also created a situation where the INF negotiations were conducted almost as much in the public arena as at the negotiating table. The democratic governments of the West carried the greater burden, but also garnered the greatest gain, from this phenomenon. For while our open societies engender open, often raucous, debate, they also provide, via the ballot box, a clear-cut and powerful indication of how our peoples want an issue to be resolved. In the case of INF this was unequivocal: deploy and negotiate but only accept an agreement which incorporates NATO's agreed criteria.

Furthermore, in entering the public debate, the Soviet Union also, to an important extent, found itself forced to play by the rules. It could not, for example, expect to sway our publics when it made positive statements about verification in public but did not follow through at the negotiating table or when it called in public for improved relations with Asian states but sought to retain a residual force of SS-20s capable of being targeted against those states. It could not, as we pointed out to the Soviets and to the public at large, expect to maintain negotiating positions at variance with its public statements without having to change one or the other.

The INF Treaty meets the negotiating requirements we and our Allies established in 1979. It effectively counters the threat posed by the Soviet INF missile force by eliminating that force. In so doing it will remove a major source of concern to our Allies. It will deprive the Soviet Union of the ability to think it could create a fear in the minds of our Allies that, because its INF missiles were not "aimed" at the United States, the United States would be less likely to come to their aid were they threatened by these weapons: in other words to create an atmosphere of decoupling in capital letters.

While the Treaty does what we set out to have it do, it cannot be expected to overcome other problems affecting Western security interests, be they in the conventional, chemical or strategic areas. Nor will it relieve the United States and its Allies from the continued need to maintain a solid defense so long as fundamental differences in other areas such as human rights and regional matters, continue to be a source of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty will eliminate some options for us and our Allies, but more importantly it will eliminate far greater Soviet forces as well as Soviet military and political options and opportunities. How we and our Allies respond to the continuing challenges of maintaining deterrence, the perceptions we Americans and our Allies create, concerning the roles each of us is prepared to play in meeting these challenges, our joint willingness to ensure that the heart of our security relationship remains solid, all this remains very much in our hands and well within our ability to resolve effectively. The successful conclusion of the INF agreement, the strength of purpose, the constancy and solidarity we and our Allies maintained throughout a long period of trial are proof that the heart of our relationship is strong and that we can meet the remaining challenges.

LETTER FROM SENATOR PELL

November 30, 1987

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Over the past several weeks, I have had an opportunity to discuss consideration of the anticipated Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the full Senate with Committee Members and other Senators. I am now beginning to organize the hearings and Committee work.

I anticipate that hearings will begin on January 19 with an appearance by you, either jointly with Secretary of Defense Carlucci, or alone. The hearings will continue throughout January and into February. We will need the full support of the Department throughout that process.

The Committee's consideration of the negotiating record of the treaty will be of central importance. Accordingly, I would ask that you direct the Legal Adviser to prepare, in consultation and coordination with the legal counsels of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a legal analysis covering the full scope and precise content of all obligations undertaken by each party to the treaty, the protocols on inspection and elimination, and the Memoranda of Understanding on data exchange. This analysis should be based on a thorough review of all treaty documents, including instructions, minutes of the negotiations, all records kept by the U.S. side, and exchanges of notes with nations affected by the treaty.

The Legal Adviser should be prepared to appear before the Committee on or about February 18 to present the review, together with all documents relied upon to support the findings of the review.

It should be understood and explicitly stated that the documents provided with the review constitute a full and comprehensive record of the negotiation of the obligations undertaken in the treaty, and that documents not provided have no legal relevance to the obligations imposed by the treaty and its related documents.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell
Chairman

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT DOLE

MR. CHAIRMAN, SENATOR HELMS, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, AND SECRETARY SHULTZ:

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STATE MY STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE INF TREATY IS IN AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST; AND THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO ITS RATIFICATION. AS LEADER OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE SENATE, I HAVE PLEDGED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT I WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH HIM TO ACHIEVE THAT IMPORTANT GOAL.

200 YEARS AGO, THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION DECIDED THAT THE SENATE SHOULD HAVE A CENTRAL, UNIQUE ROLE IN THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS. THROUGHOUT TWO CENTURIES, THE SENATE HAS TAKEN ITS ROLE VERY SERIOUSLY; AND MADE MANY, MANY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR NATION -- BY CONSIDERING; BY ADDING TO; AND, ON A FEW OCCASIONS, BY REJECTING TREATIES BEFORE IT.

EVERY ONE OF THE 100 AMERICANS WHO ARE PRIVILEGED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE TODAY INTEND TO PERFORM THEIR ROLES IN THAT SAME TRADITION.

IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE SIGNATURE OF THIS TREATY BY THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, I UNDERTOOK MY OWN INTENSIVE STUDY OF IT.

ALTHOUGH STRONGLY DISPOSED TO SUPPORT MY PRESIDENT WHENEVER I CAN, I WAS DETERMINED TO REACH AN INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT ON THE TREATY'S MERITS. THE PEOPLE FROM KANSAS THAT I REPRESENT; AND THE REPUBLICANS THAT I LEAD IN THE SENATE -- EXPECT, AND INDEED DEMAND, NO LESS FROM ME.

SO I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE TREATY WITH SOME OF THIS NATION'S MOST PROMINENT LEADERS, INCLUDING FORMER PRESIDENTS NIXON AND FORD. I MET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI, AND WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER POWELL. I WAS BRIEFED BY ADMIRAL CROWE AND THE HEADS OF SEVERAL OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES; AND BY MAX KAMPELMAN, WHO HEADS OUR GENEVA NEGOTIATING TEAM. AND I TALKED TO MANY DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL SPECIALISTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERMENT: FOR EXAMPLE, MY FELLOW KANSAN, GENERAL BERNARD ROGERS; HENRY KISSINGER; AND JEANNE KIRKPATRICK.

IN LIGHT OF THE INTENSE IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY TO OUR NATO ALLIES, AND IN THE FACE OF CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN VIEW OF INF, I ALSO TALKED WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER GORIA, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, AND GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL -- EACH OF WHOM CONFIRMED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY.

IN SHORT, I DID MY HOMEWORK. AND BECAUSE I DID, I CAN SAY NOW WITH CONFIDENCE: THIS IS A GOOD TREATY -- GOOD FOR AMERICA; GOOD FOR NATO.

WHAT MAKES IT A GOOD TREATY?

IT IS THE FIRST AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ACTUALLY REDUCE -- AND NOT JUST LIMIT THE GROWTH OF -- THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES OF THE SUPERPOWERS. IT IS THE FIRST AGREEMENT WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE ELIMINATION OF TWO ENTIRE CLASSES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

JUST AS IMPORTANT, IT IS AN AGREEMENT WHICH FIRMLY ESTABLISHES THE PRINCIPLE THAT -- IN ARMS CONTROL -- EQUAL REDUCTIONS DO NOT ALWAYS MEAN FAIR, OR STABILIZING, OR ACCEPTABLE REDUCTIONS. IN FACT, WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE, THEY MUST REDUCE MORE. ANYTHING LESS WILL NOT PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT THAT PRESERVES THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND THE ALLIANCE.

THIS CONCEPT -- ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS -- IS A PRINCIPLE THAT WE MUST ADHERE TO, AS WE MOVE FORWARD ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE.

FINALLY, INF IS AN AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE VERIFIED. BECAUSE THE TREATY'S "DOUBLE-GLOBAL-ZERO" LEVELS EASE THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM, THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS I CONSULTED ASSURED ME THAT -- WITH ADEQUATE RESOURCES -- THEY CAN DO THE VERIFICATION JOB.

SO THOSE ARE MY BASIC CONCLUSIONS -- THE BASIC REASONS WHY I BELIEVE THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THIS TREATY.

BUT LET ME ADD THIS: I NOT ONLY BELIEVE THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT TO THIS TREATY. I BELIEVE WE CAN STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PRESIDENT'S HAND IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS -- AS WE HAVE DONE WITH MANY OTHER TREATIES THROUGHOUT OUR HISTORY. I BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE CONSTRUCTIVE ADDITIONS TO THIS TREATY -- IN WAYS THAT WILL NOT REQUIRE RENEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

ON DECEMBER 17th, WHEN I MET WITH THE PRESIDENT TO ADVISE HIM OF MY DECISION TO SUPPORT THE TREATY, I ALSO TOLD HIM OF CONCERNS WHICH I -- AND OTHER SENATORS -- HAVE WHICH THE SENATE WOULD WANT TO ADDRESS. I SUGGESTED THAT THE SENATE VERY LIKELY WOULD SEEK TO MAKE ADDITIONS TO THE TREATY -- ADDITIONS WHICH COULD TAKE THE FORM OF RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS, DECLARATIONS, OR EVEN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION. BUT ADDITIONS WHICH WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE, AND AIMED AT STRENGTHENING OUR OVERALL POSITION -- NOT AT "KILLING" -- THE TREATY. PRESIDENT REAGAN ASSURED ME HE WAS PREPARED TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE SENATE, IN JUST THAT VEIN.

SO LET ME OUTLINE THREE AREAS WHICH I HAVE IDENTIFIED TO DATE IN WHICH I BELIEVE THE SENATE CAN -- AND OUGHT TO -- ACT.

FIRST, TREATY COMPLIANCE. THE SIMPLE FACT IS: THE SOVIET TREATY-COMPLIANCE RECORD IS DISMAL. I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE INF TREATY WE RATIFY THIS YEAR -- TURN UP ON THE FIRST COMPLIANCE REPORT THE NEXT PRESIDENT SENDS TO THE CONGRESS.

THE SOVIETS NEED TO UNDERSTAND -- UP FRONT -- THAT THERE WILL BE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR CHEATING ON THIS TREATY. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE TO CRAFT LANGUAGE WHICH WILL ADDRESS THIS IMPORTANT NEED.

AT A MINIMUM, THE SENATE SHOULD GO ON RECORD, FIRST, THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD VIEW A VIOLATION AS AN "EXTRAORDINARY EVENT" -- JUSTIFYING OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY; AND SECOND, DEMANDING, AT THE LEAST, THAT WE SUSPEND OUR TREATY OBLIGATIONS OR TAKE SOME OTHER PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE, IN CASE OF A SOVIET TREATY VIOLATION. THAT KIND OF DECLARATION WOULD SEND A STRONG POLITICAL MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE SENATE WILL BACK ANY AMERICAN PRESIDENT WHO TAKES A TOUGH STANCE IN REACTION TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS.

THIS COMMITTEE WILL ALSO BE WORKING WITH THE INTELLIGENCE AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES, IN ADDRESSING TWO OTHER AREAS WHICH I BELIEVE NEED TO BE ADDRESSED: VERIFICATION, AND THEATER FORCES IN EUROPE. I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU, AS I WILL LATER WITH THOSE COMMITTEES, MY CONCERNS ON THESE MATTERS.

ON VERIFICATION, I BELIEVE WE MAY WELL NEED TO BEEF UP OUR OWN CAPABILITY TO INSURE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION UNDER THE REGIME ESTABLISHED IN THE INF TREATY. HERE I REFER BOTH TO TECHNICAL SYSTEMS; AND TO STEPS WHICH WILL INSURE THE RETENTION OF THE SKILLED, EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONALS WE NEED TO DO THE JOB.

EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WILL NOT COME CHEAP; BUT INEFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WOULD EXACT A COST FAR HIGHER THAN THIS NATION CAN EVER AFFORD TO PAY -- THE COST OF A LESS SECURE AMERICA.

ON THEATER FORCES, WE SHOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY THE INF TREATY DEBATE AFFORDS US TO EXAMINE NATO'S OVERALL SECURITY POSTURE. ELIMINATING INF SYSTEMS FROM EUROPE REQUIRES THAT WE FOCUS OUR ATTENTION ON THOSE FORCES WHICH WILL REMAIN; AND WHICH WILL BEAR THE BURDEN OF DISCOURAGING -- DETERRING -- WARSAW PACT ATTACK.

WE SIMPLY CANNOT ALLOW OUR THEATER FORCES TO BE IN A STATE WHICH INVITES SOVIET ATTACK, SOVIET THREATS, OR SOVIET BLUFFS. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THE SENATE MUST FOCUS ON THREE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE THEATER FORCES ISSUE.

FIRST, WE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR RESIDUAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE -- SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING DUAL-PURPOSE AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY -- WILL REMAIN IN EUROPE UNTIL THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS IMBALANCE IS REDRESSED.

SECOND, WE SHOULD DECLARE OUR READINESS TO UNDERTAKE THOSE THEATER FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO INSURE THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENCE. WE SHOULD EXPECT NO LESS FROM OUR NATO ALLIES.

AND, FINALLY, WE SHOULD STRESS THAT A CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT -- COVERING THE AREA FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS; AND BASED ON THE INF PRINCIPLE OF "ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL AND STABILIZING LEVELS -- IS THE HIGHEST ARMS CONTROL PRIORITY FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, LAST TUESDAY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, I SPOKE AT GREATER LENGTH ABOUT SOME OF THESE SAME SUBJECTS. IN THE HOPE THAT MY COMMENTS MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO THE COMMITTEE, I WOULD LIKE TO PUT THE TEXT OF THAT SPEECH IN THE RECORD.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE INF TREATY IS A MILESTONE ACHIEVEMENT. BUT IT IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP ON A LONG AND UNCERTAIN ROAD.

I THINK THERE IS PROBABLY UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT IN THIS COMMITTEE; IN THE SENATE; AND IN THIS COUNTRY -- ABOUT WHERE WE WOULD LIKE THAT ROAD TO TAKE US: TOWARD GREATER SECURITY FOR AMERICA; TOWARD GREATER PEACE FOR THE WORLD.

BUT GETTING THERE IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY.

WE HAVE LEARNED SOME LESSONS FROM THE INF EXPERIENCE; LESSONS ABOUT DEALING FROM STRENGTH; ABOUT PRESERVING THE DETERRENCE WHICH HAS KEPT US FREE, AND AT PEACE. LESSONS ABOUT STANDING TOGETHER, AS AN ALLIANCE AND AS A COUNTRY; AND ABOUT STICKING TO OUR PRINCIPLES, WHEN WE ARE RIGHT. THE FACT IS THAT -- IN THE FACE OF PERSISTENT CRITICISM -- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STEADFAST PURSUIT OF A GOOD AGREEMENT -- AND NOTHING LESS -- IS WHAT MADE THE INF TREATY REALITY.

I HOPE THE SENATE WILL TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THOSE LESSONS, AND LET THEM POINT THE WAY FOR OUR OWN DELIBERATIONS.

MORE IMPORTANT, I HOPE THE COUNTRY WILL CONSIDER THESE LESSONS, TOO. AND THAT THEY WILL SHAPE OUR OWN STRATEGIES AND POLICIES AS WE CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS; AS WE SEEK TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCES; AND AS WE LOOK AT FURTHER ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, TO MAKE OUR COUNTRY AND OUR FREEDOM MORE SECURE.

NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE 1990'S

49 YEARS AGO, A FINE YOUNG ATHLETE FROM THIS UNIVERSITY TRAVELED TO NEW YORK -- TO RECEIVE AN AWARD AS THE BEST COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYER IN THE LAND. WITH WAR ALREADY RAGING IN EUROPE, NILE KINNICK ACCEPTED THE HEISMAN TROPHY WITH THESE WORDS: "I THANK GOD I WAS BORN TO THE GRIDIRONS OF THE MIDDLE WEST -- AND NOT TO THE BATTLEFIELDS OF EUROPE."

NOT LONG AFTER, AMERICA WAS AT WAR, TOO. AND NILE KINNICK, AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER YOUNG AMERICANS, WENT OFF TO FIGHT FOR THEIR COUNTRY.

BOB DOLE WAS AMONG THAT CROWD. WE WEREN'T ANXIOUS TO GO OFF TO WAR. WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO STAY AT HOME; TO FINISH OUR EDUCATIONS; TO GET GOOD JOBS.

BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE THAT OPTION. NILE KINNICK DIDN'T. BOB DOLE DIDN'T.

OUR COUNTRY WAS AT WAR.
THERE WAS NO CHOICE.
SO WE WENT TO WAR, TOO.

SACRIFICE

I WAS AMONG THOSE FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO RETURN; TO RESUME A LIFE WHICH HASN'T ALWAYS BEEN EASY -- BUT WHICH, FINALLY, HAS BROUGHT ME HERE TO IOWA CITY TODAY.

NILE KINNICK WAS NOT SO LUCKY. AS A NAVY PILOT, OPERATING OFF THE CARRIER LEXINGTON, NILE KINNICK'S PLANE WAS LOST AT SEA.

AND, TODAY, THINKING BACK ON THE SACRIFICE THAT NILE KINNICK MADE; THINKING BACK ON MY OWN EXPERIENCE, IN THE WAR AND AFTER -- IF THERE IS ONE THING ABOVE ALL THAT I LEARNED, IT IS THIS: THE ONLY THING MORE TERRIBLE THAN WAR -- IS TO LOSE YOUR FREEDOM.

FREEDOM

FREEDOM IS WHAT THIS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS ALL ABOUT.

AND RIGHT NOW, FREEDOM IS FACED WITH A WHOLE NEW SET OF CHALLENGES -- CHALLENGES I WANT TO TALK ABOUT TODAY.

FIRST, I WANT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE CHALLENGE OF REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS -- WITHOUT INVITING AGGRESSION; THE VERY AGGRESSION WE SOUGHT TO DETER, BY ACQUIRING THOSE ARMS IN THE FIRST PLACE.

INF

RONALD REAGAN'S ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY HAS YIELDED A MILESTONE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT: THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY.

IT IS THE FIRST AGREEMENT TO ACTUALLY REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE WORLD; THE FIRST TO WIPE OUT AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AND, IMPORTANTLY, THE FIRST TO REFLECT THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE: IT IS NOT REDUCTIONS, PER SE, WHICH MAKE THE WORLD SAFER; BUT ONLY REDUCTIONS WHICH MORE NEARLY EQUALIZE THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS -- AND THUS CREATE GREATER STABILITY. THAT IS THE ESSENTIAL LOGIC BEHIND THE INF TREATY.

I HAVE DONE MY HOMEWORK ON THIS TREATY. AND BECAUSE I HAVE, I CAN SAY TO YOU CATEGORICALLY: THIS IS A GOOD TREATY. IT CAN BE VERIFIED. AND IT WILL ENHANCE THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS A GOOD TREATY; WHICH WILL BE STRENGTHENED FURTHER IN THE SENATE; AND THEN SHOULD BE APPROVED.

AND BECAUSE I HAVE DONE MY HOMEWORK -- AND THE SENATE REPUBLICANS I LEAD KNOW I HAVE DONE MY HOMEWORK -- I CAN MAKE TO YOU TODAY THE SAME PLEDGE I MADE TO RONALD REAGAN: I WILL LEAD THE FIGHT TO WIN SENATE APPROVAL OF THE INF TREATY.

AND THE TREATY WILL BE APPROVED -- WITH AN OVERWHELMING, BIPARTISAN VOTE.

CAUTION

BUT INF IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP; BECAUSE THIS TREATY -- AS WELCOME AND IMPORTANT AS IT IS -- AFFECTS ONLY 6% OF THE TOTAL NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. IT AFFECTS NOT AT ALL THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AIMS AT THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS A BEGINNING. BUT THE JOURNEY AHEAD IS LONG AND UNCERTAIN.

NOW LET ME SAY: WE MUST GO FORWARD ON THAT JOURNEY. I DO WANT A START AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD YIELD 50% CUTS IN LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT IS A GOOD GOAL; AN ACHIEVABLE GOAL.

BUT I MUST ALSO SAY THIS: WE MUST GO FORWARD CAUTIOUSLY -- KNOWING CLEARLY WHERE WE WANT TO GO; AND KNOWING CLEARLY HOW TO GET THERE SAFELY.

WE CANNOT FINALIZE A START AGREEMENT UNTIL WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF TWO THINGS.

FIRST, THAT THE AGREEMENT CAN BE VERIFIED. AND THERE IS A LIGHT YEAR OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VERIFYING AN INF AGREEMENT WHICH REDUCES LEVELS TO ZERO; AND A START AGREEMENT WHICH, EVEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED, WOULD LEAVE HALF OF EXISTING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN PLACE.

AND LET ME SOUND THIS SMALL ALARM, TOO: UNLESS WE MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO SHORE UP OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES TO VERIFY NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS -- I HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS THAT ANY VERIFICATION REGIME THE SOVIETS WILL AGREE TO WILL BE ADEQUATE TO THE TASK OF VERIFYING START.

DETERRENT

SO VERIFICATION IS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL. BUT IT IS FAR FROM OUR ONLY CONCERN; IT IS NOT THE WHOLE ANSWER.

A BAD AGREEMENT, EVEN IF IT IS VERIFIABLE, IS STILL A BAD AGREEMENT.

SO, SECOND, AND IN ADDITION TO AIRTIGHT VERIFICATION, WE ALSO HAVE TO BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE AGREEMENT LEAVES US WITH A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT. ANY START AGREEMENT FROM THE ON-GOING GENEVA TALKS MUST MEET THIS VITAL STANDARD -- THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT, PERIOD.

LET US AGAIN RECALL THE AXIOM I MENTIONED BEFORE. REDUCTIONS, PER SE, MAY NOT BE STABILIZING; MAY NOT MAKE US SAFER; MAY NOT REDUCE THE CHANCES OF WAR.

INDEED, IF THE RESIDUAL FORCES ON EACH SIDE ARE MISALIGNED; IF OURS ARE LEFT MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY THEIRS; OR IF WE FAIL TO ADEQUATELY FUND PROGRAMS WHICH INSURE THE SURVIVABILITY AND UTILITY OF OUR DETERRENT FORCES -- UNDER ANY OF THOSE

CIRCUMSTANCES: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DETERRENCE WOULD BE REDUCED, EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE FEWER WEAPONS.

AND, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES -- UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES -- IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT WE HAVE NO START AGREEMENT AT ALL.

CAVEATS

LET ME ADD JUST TWO ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS IN THE START CONTEXT. (1) UNDERSCORING MY CONCERNS ON START IS THE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES -- AN IMBALANCE WHICH MUST BE DEALT WITH IN ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS OR FUTURE SUMMITS WITH THE SOVIETS. I WILL SPEAK MORE ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN A MOMENT.

AND (2) IN MY VIEW, THE AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF S.D.I., LEADING TO THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT, IS THE SINGLE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION WE CAN MAKE TO INSURING THE CREDIBILITY OF AMERICAN DETERRENCE.

SO THIS, THEN, IS THE FIRST CHALLENGE: MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS -- BUT IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES DETERRENCE AND ENHANCES OUR SECURITY.

GORBACHEV

AND THE SECOND GREAT CHALLENGE IS: HOW TO MANAGE SUCCESSFULLY OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AS WE TRAVERSE THE NEXT DECADE, AND ENTER THE NEXT CENTURY. AND AS WE CONFRONT WHAT, TRULY, ARE SOME NEW MODES OF THINKING IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND A NEW STYLE LEADER IN MR. GORBACHEV.

GORBACHEV IS DYNAMIC; HE'S ARTICULATE; HE'S SMART.

AND HE WILL BE A MORE ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR RESPECT AND CREDIBILITY.

I'M NOT MUCH OF A BELIEVER IN POLLS, BUT I AM ALARMED BY POLLS SHOWING GORBACHEV REGARDED BY MANY IN THE NATO COUNTRIES AS A "PEACEMAKER."

AND WHAT ALARMS ME MOST IS THAT MR. GORBACHEV, FOR ALL THAT HE BRINGS THAT IS NEW, ALSO BRINGS SOMETHING THAT IS VERY, VERY OLD: THE CONVICTIONS OF A COMMITTED, DEDICATED, TOUGH-AS-NAILS COMMUNIST.

HE IS A COMMUNIST STILL. IN HIS HEAD. IN HIS HEART.

COMMUNISM

NOW, MR. GORBACHEV IS A GOOD SALESMAN -- BUT WE CAN NEVER LET THE WORLD FORGET: HIS PRODUCT IS COMMUNISM.

NO ONE IS GOING TO BUY THE SOVIET BRAND OF OPPRESSION, OR THE SOVIET MODEL OF ECONOMIC STAGNATION. NOT IF THEY CAN GET THROUGH THAT NICE WRAPPING PAPER THAT GORBACHEV USES, AND SEE WHAT'S INSIDE THE BOX.

AND THAT'S ONE BIG JOB OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: TO RE-ARTICULATE TO THE WORLD WHAT SOVIET COMMUNISM IS ALL ABOUT. WHAT FREEDOM IS ALL ABOUT; AND WHAT'S AT STAKE -- WHAT'S STILL AT STAKE -- IN THE COMPETITION BETWEEN OUR TWO SYSTEMS.

TO REMIND THE WORLD THAT A NATION THAT REFUSES TO PERMIT THE EMIGRATION OF ITS OWN CITIZENS; THAT REPRESSES RELIGION; THAT INVADES ITS NEIGHBORS; AND THAT SOWS SEEDS OF VIOLENCE AND HATE AROUND THE WORLD -- THAT SUCH A NATION IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM US.

THAT'S NOT COLD WAR RHETORIC; IT'S A COLD, HARD FACT.

SUPERPOWERS

NOW LET ME STRESS HERE: I AM BY NO MEANS SUGGESTING THAT WE CAN'T, OR SHOULDN'T TRY TO, WORK WITH THE SOVIETS.

IN FACT, I WOULD SAY THE OPPOSITE: THE EMERGENCE OF MR. GORBACHEV IS A POWERFUL INCENTIVE TO WORK EVEN HARDER FOR NEW AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIETS.

I DON'T TRUST MR. GORBACHEV OR ANYONE ELSE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

BUT THAT DOESN'T CHANGE THE FACT THAT WE HAPPEN TO RESIDE ON THE SAME PLANET, AND CAN'T AVOID DEALING WITH EACH OTHER.

AND THERE MAY BE SOME AREAS WHERE GORBACHEV WILL BE MORE OPEN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION THAT HIS PREDECESSORS. HE DOES HAVE SOME NEW, AND MORE SOPHISTICATED, NOTIONS ABOUT WHAT CAN SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS. HE IS MORE DECISIVE THAN HIS PREDECESSORS WERE. AND HE APPEARS TO HAVE A GREATER UNDERSTANDING THAN THEY DID OF THE URGENCY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT COMMUNISM HAS WROUGHT IN THE SOVIET UNION.

SO IT IS IN OUR INTEREST -- AMERICA'S INTEREST -- TO SEE WHAT MAY BE POSSIBLE. TO SEE IF WE CAN ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS WHICH SERVE AMERICAN SECURITY AND PROSPERITY.

AND LET ME REPEAT HERE A SUGGESTION ON MANAGING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS THAT I HAVE MADE BEFORE. RONALD REAGAN HAS ACHIEVED GREAT PROGRESS IN HIS SUMMITS WITH MR. GORBACHEV. BUT THE ADVENT OF A POTENTIALLY LONG-TERM, STABLE SOVIET LEADERSHIP GIVES US THE CHANCE TO REPLACE THE ROLLER-COASTER OF ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN SUMMITRY -- WITH THE MORE BUSINESSLIKE, AND PRODUCTIVE, COURSE OF REGULARLY SCHEDULED, ANNUAL SUMMITS.

I HAVE ALREADY HAD A TASTE OF DEALING WITH MR. GORBACHEV. HE'S A WORTHY ADVERSARY.

BUT WE HAVE A BETTER CASE. WITH CONTINUED STRONG LEADERSHIP, WE CAN SELL THAT CASE AROUND THE WORLD.

ALLIES

SO THAT IS CHALLENGE NUMBER TWO: DEALING PRODUCTIVELY WITH A CHANGING SOVIET UNION -- WITHOUT FORGETTING SOME FUNDAMENTALS THAT HAVE NOT CHANGED.

AND THAT BRINGS ME TO THE THIRD AND FINAL CHALLENGE: MAKING SURE THAT THE FREE WORLD -- THE ALLIANCE STRUCTURE THAT HAS KEPT US FREE AND AT PEACE -- MAKING SURE IT, TOO, IS READY TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE 1990'S.

SO LET ME CONCLUDE BY TOUCHING ON WHAT I SEE AS THE THREE MOST PRESSING TASKS FACING NATO AND THE U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

FIRST, WE HAVE TO MAKE SURE WE'RE ON THE SAME ESSENTIAL WAVELENGTH, IN CONFRONTING SUCH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AS ARMS CONTROL, DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, AND TERRORISM.

LET ME SAY THIS FRANKLY. IN HANDLING OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE SOME MISTAKES. ON ARMS CONTROL, WE MUST NOT ONLY CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES -- WE MUST DO SO SERIOUSLY AND VISIBLY; AND BEFORE OUR PROPOSALS ARE PRESENTED TO THE SOVIETS.

AND THERE IS JUST NO EXCUSE FOR THE DISASTROUS ARMS SALES TO THE AYATOLLAH -- OR TO ANYONE ELSE IN IRAN. THOSE SALES KNOCKED INTO A COCKED-HAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FORMAL U.S. POLICY OF NO CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS.

SO WE HAVE BEEN DOING SOME FENCE-MENDING. AND I COMMEND THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS DILIGENT EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

BUT THERE IS STILL WORK TO BE DONE. THAT IS WHY I HAVE URGED, AND I URGE AGAIN HERE TODAY, THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT BE AN ALLIANCE SUMMIT; BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

AND I AM PLEASED THAT BRITISH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS JUST ENDORSED THIS PROPOSAL; AND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS NOW SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING IT.

CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE

THE SECOND URGENT PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIANCE IS DEALING WITH THE THEATER FORCE IMBALANCE IN A POST-INF EUROPE -- INCLUDING THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMBALANCE I MENTIONED BRIEFLY BEFORE.

DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM MEANS, INITIALLY, THAT WE DRAW THIS FIRM LINE IN THE SAND: THERE CAN BE NO MORE DRAWDOWNS IN RESIDUAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, UNTIL THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IS RECTIFIED. OUR BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS; OUR DUAL PURPOSE AIRCRAFT -- THEY MUST REMAIN IN PLACE.

AND THEN WE NEED TO GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN FORCES TO ACHIEVE MORE NEARLY EQUAL LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES. AND THE REDUCTIONS MUST BE REAL, WHOLE UNIT ELIMINATION OF THE MOST THREATENING FORCES: DIVISIONS, TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. NOT JUST SHAM WITHDRAWALS, SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES TO THE EAST.

BURDEN-SHARING

THE THIRD ALLIANCE PROBLEM WHICH NEEDS WORK IS BURDEN-SHARING. BURDEN-SHARING IS NOT JUST A SLOGAN -- IT IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF ANY PARTNERSHIP.

BUT RIGHT NOW, THERE JUST ISN'T ENOUGH SHARING GOING ON.

THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE MISTAKES; BUT WE HAVE NEVER AVOIDED OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, OR BEEN AFRAID TO ASSUME THE RISKS. WE HAVE NEVER FAILED TO PAY OUR SHARE -- AND A LOT MORE.

WE HAVE IOU'S -- MONETARY IOU'S; MILITARY IOU'S; POLITICAL IOU'S -- SCATTERED ALL OVER THIS GLOBE.

IT IS TIME TO CALL THEM IN.

IT IS TIME FOR COUNTRIES WHO OWE THEIR FREEDOM TO AMERICA'S DEFENSE SHIELD; WHO OWE THEIR PROSPERITY TO AMERICA'S FOREIGN AID AND TRADE -- IT IS TIME FOR THEM TO REALIZE THAT THERE IS A "DEPOSIT" WINDOW, AS WELL AS A "WITHDRAWAL" WINDOW, AT ALLIANCE BANKS.

I KNOW THAT SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE MEETING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. I KNOW THAT MORE THAN A FEW ARE MAKING SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, IN TERMS OF DOLLARS, OR MANPOWER, OR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HOST FOREIGN BASES AND FORCES.

BUT I ALSO KNOW -- AND, MORE IMPORTANT, THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER KNOWS -- THAT WHEN IT IS ALL TOTED UP: UNCLE SAM PAYS MORE THAN HE SHOULD. IN DOLLARS, IN RISK, IN RESPONSIBILITIES.

PLAN OF ACTION

I HAVE SOME IDEAS ON HOW THE ALLIES COULD PAY THEIR MORE EQUITABLE SHARE:

-- THROUGH AN ALLIANCE STRATEGIC OIL RESERVE, FINANCED BY WEALTHY NATIONS LIKE JAPAN;

-- THROUGH INCREASED ECONOMIC AID TO RECIPIENT NATIONS LIKE THE PHILIPPINES, WHO NOW RELY PRIMARILY ON U.S. AID;

-- BY PAYING A GREATER PORTION OF THE COST OF STATIONING AMERICAN TROOPS OVERSEAS;

-- BY INCREASING THE OPERATIONAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR TROOPS;

-- AND BY DEDICATING A PORTION OF THE REVENUES FROM THEIR GROWING TRADE SURPLUSES TO ALLIANCE NEEDS.

OTHERS MAY HAVE OTHER IDEAS. BUT THE KEY IS: LET'S GET THIS DONE, NOW.

U.S. BASES

AND, AS A FINAL WORD ON BURDEN-SHARING, LET ME POINT OUT THAT OUR ALLIES -- BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A UNIT IN NATO -- MUST BECOME MORE RESPONSIVE, AND RESPONSIBLE, IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF AMERICAN BASES. SPAIN CAN'T CLAIM THE BENEFIT OF AMERICA'S DETERRENT POWER -- WHILE THROWING OUT THE HARDWARE AND PERSONNEL WHICH ARE THE ESSENCE OF THAT POWER. AND NATO CAN'T DEMAND THAT AMERICA BE THERE IN A CRUNCH -- BUT THEN PRETEND THAT THE BASES WHICH ARE THE CENTERS OF OUR PRESENCE ARE NOT THE BUSINESS OF NATO; BUT ONLY A BILATERAL AFFAIR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN.

WE'RE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER. AND WE BETTER START ACTING THAT WAY.

SUMMARY

SO THESE ARE THE CHALLENGES:

MOVING FORWARD RESPONSIBLY ON ARMS CONTROL.

REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS IMBALANCE.

FORGING REALISTIC, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

AND KEEPING OUR ALLIANCES UP TO THE TASKS OF THE 1990'S.

THE KINNICK CHALLENGE

FIVE DECADES AGO, NILE KINNICK JUST WANTED TO STAY HERE IN IOWA -- AND MAKE A LIFE. BUT HE HAD TO GO FIGHT IN A WAR -- THAT COST HIM HIS LIFE.

NILE KINNICK HAD A CHALLENGE -- TO STAND UP FOR HIS COUNTRY. NILE MET THAT CHALLENGE.

NOW IT'S OUR TURN.

AS WE ENTER THE LAST DECADE OF THIS CENTURY, AS WE FACE UP TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEXT -- LET US REMEMBER NILE KINNICK'S EXAMPLE; AND LET US DO OUR DUTY, AS WELL AS HE DID HIS.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD

MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS MONTH I ENTER MY EIGHTH YEAR OF SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND ON THIS COMMITTEE. STILL, THIS IS THE VERY FIRST TIME THAT I HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY, AS A SENATOR AND A MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE, TO REVIEW AND PASS JUDGMENT ON A NEW ARMS CONTROL TREATY THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO THE SENATE.

THIS IS ALSO THE FIRST TIME, EVEN FOR THE MOST SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, THAT A TREATY ELIMINATING A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SUBJECTED TO THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THIS BODY. THESE TWO "FIRSTS" INDICATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS SERIES OF HEARINGS FOR ME, AS WELL AS FOR THE SENATE, AND THE WHOLE NATION.

I WANT TO COMMEND THE PRESIDENT, AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WHO IS BEFORE US TODAY, FOR THEIR PERSISTENCE IN PURSUING THIS AGREEMENT AND THE SUPERB NEGOTIATING SKILL WITH WHICH THEY ACCOMPLISHED THIS MONUMENTAL TASK. THEY DESERVE FULL CREDIT FOR THE SUCCESS.

IT IS NOT MY INTENTION, HERE AND NOW, TO DETRACT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S HARD EARNED CREDIT. HOWEVER, FOR THE HISTORICAL RECORD, I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY ASSERTIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY WAS SOMEHOW "VINDICATED" BY THE CONCLUSION OF THIS TREATY. THIS PERCEPTION IS MISLEADING IF IT REFERS TO CONGRESS' ROLE IN THE PROCESS. THIS PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT CARTER BEFORE HIM ENJOYED SOLID BIPARTISAN SUPPORT ON THE INF ISSUE EVERY STEP OF THE WAY. WE BACKED THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION, WE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EUROMISSILES, AND WHEN THE SOVIETS WALKED OUT IN GENEVA, TOGETHER WITH MOST OF MY COLLEAGUES I PUT THE BLAME SQUARELY ON THE SOVIET UNION. SECRETARY SHULTZ GENEROUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS THIS MORNING, AND THE RECORD OUGHT TO SHOW THAT THIS TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED AGAINST A BACKDROP OF SOLID BIPARTISAN SUPPORT, AND RIGHTLY SO. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE THE SECURITY AND SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION IS AT STAKE, MUST BE THE LAST PLACE FOR PARTISAN BICKERING.

THIS TREATY CALLS FOR DISMANTLING AND ELIMINATING A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS A FIRST STEP BEFORE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR WEAPONRY ARE SOUGHT. WHILE I HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED, AND ONE DAY THESE WEAPONS MAY EVEN BE ERADICATED, I HARBOR NO NAIVE ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY AND INTRICACY OF THIS TASK. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT WEAPONS ARE NEVER THE ILLNESS ITSELF, THEY ARE THE SYMPTOMS. SYMPTOMS OF THE DEEP DIVISIONS AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS, OF TOTALITARIAN DESIGNS. WE WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO CURE THE DISEASE BY TREATING THE SYMPTOMS ONLY.

I DO NOT LIKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND I DO NOT KNOW ANYONE IN HIS OR HER RIGHT MIND WHO DOES. STILL, IT IS AN UNDENIABLE FACT THAT THEY HAVE KEPT THE PEACE IN EUROPE FOR OVER 42 YEARS NOW. THEY HAVE FULFILLED AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION AND WE CANNOT DO AWAY WITH THEM BEFORE WE FIND SOMETHING ELSE THAT CAN SERVE IN THAT FUNCTION EQUALLY WELL. IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO RECALL THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE NOT CONCEIVED IN SIN. THEY WERE CONCEIVED TO PRE-EMPT ADOLF HITLER, TO END OR SHORTEN WORLD WAR II, ALL NOBLE OBJECTIVES AT THE TIME. SADLY, WHAT WAS UNLEASHED YESTERDAY CANNOT BE UNLEARNED TODAY.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE INSURED THE PEACE BY PROVIDING A CERTAIN STABILITY AND BALANCE, ALBEIT A BALANCE OF TERROR. THOSE OF US WHO STRIVE TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST TAKE ON, WITH EQUAL VIGOR, THE OBLIGATION TO INSURE A NEW BALANCE IN A WORLD WITHOUT THIS WEAPONRY. MOREOVER, WE MUST INSIST ON MAINTAINING STABILITY NOT ONLY AT THE STARTING POINT, AND NOT ONLY AT THE FINISH LINE, BUT AT EVERY POINT ALONG THE WAY. THIS IS LIKE THE PRECARIOUS DISASSEMBLY OF A HOUSE OF CARDS. CARD BY CARD, IT MUST BE

DISENGAGED, WITHOUT EVER LETTING THE HOUSE COLLAPSE, UNTIL THE LAST TWO ACES, LEANING AGAINST EACH OTHER, ARE REMOVED.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE PORED OVER THIS TREATY REPEATEDLY, AND I BELIEVE IT IS A GOOD, SOLID ACCORD, THAT WILL ULTIMATELY GAIN MY FULL SUPPORT. BEFORE I REACH THAT DECISION, HOWEVER, I WANT TO HEAR MY COLLEAGUES' VIEWS AND THOSE OF ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES AND OTHER EXPERTS WHO WILL APPEAR BEFORE US. BEFORE GAINING FULL U.S. APPROVAL, I WANT TO INSURE THAT THIS TREATY CANNOT BE MADE MORE PERFECT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AND IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT ABM CONTROVERSY, I ALSO WANT ASSURANCES THAT THE HAND THE SENATE AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE PLAYING WAS NOT DEALT FROM A STACKED DECK, AND THERE ARE NO FALSE CARDS HIDDEN UP ANY SLEEVES THAT CAN BE DRAWN OUT IN YEARS TO COME.

FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL BE MOST DILIGENT AND RIGOROUS IN ASSURING THAT RATIFICATION OF THIS TREATY SERVES THE INTEREST AND SECURITY OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AS MUCH AS IT SERVES OURS, THAT IT WILL ADD TO INSTEAD OF DEDUCTING FROM THE COHESION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THAT IT FITS INTO A COHERENT VISION OF THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

I AM AMUSED, AND A LITTLE DISTURBED, AT THE MANNER IN WHICH WE SOMETIMES REFER TO THESE WEAPONS AS SORT OF SECOND TIER, THEATER, TACTICAL, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS, AS OPPOSED TO THE REAL THING, TRIDENTS, B-1'S, MX'S. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE GERMANS, FOR INSTANCE, WHOSE WHOLE COUNTRY, EAST AND WEST, CAN BE WIPED OUT BY A FEW OF THESE SMALL POTATOES, CANNOT ENTIRELY APPRECIATE OUR FINE DISTINCTIONS HERE. FOR THEM, AND FOR OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES, THESE ARE ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THE ABOVE DISTINCTION IS WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU AND OUR COLLEAGUES ON THIS VERY IMPORTANT UNDERTAKING. THANK YOU.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

MR. CHAIRMAN: THIS IS AN HISTORIC MOMENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE POST-WAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, WE HAVE BEFORE US A TREATY THAT WOULD NOT SIMPLY SLOW THE RATE OF GROWTH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT WOULD ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF THOSE WEAPONS.

THIS IS A TIME OF GREAT HOPE AND GREAT TREPIDATION.

GREAT HOPE, BECAUSE THIS TREATY AND THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA SEEM TO HOLD THE HOPE OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF BOTH TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
AND GREAT TREPIDATION BECAUSE MOST AMERICANS AND MOST EUROPEANS HAVE LIVED THEIR ENTIRE LIVES UNDER A SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR DETERRENTS WHICH THE GREAT POWERS NOW SEEM TO BE DISMANTLING.

THIS IS NOT A TIME FOR THOSE OF US, HERE IN THE SENATE, WHO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE OUR CONCURRENCE ON THIS TREATY TO BE CAUGHT UP IN THE EUPHORIA OF THE SUMMIT PROCESS. IT IS ALSO NOT THE MOMENT WHEN WE SHOULD BE OVERWHELMED WITH A GLOOM LAID ON US BY THE DOOMSAYERS. IT IS RATHER A MOMENT FOR CAREFUL REASONED ANALYSIS OF THIS TREATY AND OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH IT POINTS.

WE MUST CONSIDER WHETHER A WORLD, OR EVEN A EUROPE, FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN FACT A SAFER PLACE; WE MUST MEASURE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WILL EXIST AFTER THESE INTERMEDIATE AND SHORT RANGE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED; AND WE MUST CONSIDER WHAT REQUIREMENTS WOULD EXIST WITH THE CONCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL TREATIES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE USSR.

WE KNOW THAT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, A NUCLEAR WAR IS A NO-WIN PROPOSITION FOR ALL CONCERNED, BUT WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE TWO GREATEST WARS OF ALL TIME BEGAN, IN THIS CENTURY, IN A NUCLEAR FREE EUROPE WHERE SOMEBODY THOUGHT THAT HE COULD WIN.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING THIS RATIFICATION PROCESS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SURELY SEE THESE HEARINGS AND THE DEBATE WHICH WILL FOLLOW AS A MARK OF THE SUCCESS OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. DECISIONS OF THIS IMPORTANCE ARE NOT, IN THIS COUNTRY, MERELY TAKEN BY THE EXECUTIVE, BUT INVOLVE THE DIRECTLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, AS WELL.

IT IS ESSENTIAL, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THOSE WHO WATCH US IN OTHER NATIONS UNDERSTAND THIS POINT AS WELL. NOTHING THAT WE SAY OR DO HERE, NO DISAGREEMENT THAT IS AIRED, SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A SIGN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ITS OWN DEFENSE AND THAT OF ITS ALLIES. THE FACT THAT WE ARE GIVING THIS VITAL TREATY SUCH CONSIDERED ANALYSIS SHOULD NOT LEAD ANYONE TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT CAPABLE OF MAKING QUICK AND CLEAR JUDGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO OUR SECURITY.

THE UNITED STATES ENTERED IN TO THE TREATY NEGOTIATION PROCESS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. THIS RATIFICATION PROCESS IS A FURTHER ELEMENT OF OUR STRENGTH AS A DEMOCRACY.

THIS IS A POLITICAL YEAR IN THE UNITED STATES, MUCH WILL BE SAID AND DONE THAT WILL REFLECT DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF OUR POLITICAL LIFE. ONE THING REMAINS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE COMMITTED TO THEIR DEMOCRACY AND ARE PREPARED TO DEFEND IT.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I WOULD CAUTION MY COLLEAGUES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT TO BE SO SWEPT UP IN THIS TREATY PROCESS THAT THEY LOSE SIGHT OF OTHER CRITICAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES WHICH REMAIN UNSETTLED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THERE ARE KEY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

IN NICARAGUA THERE IS A GROWING SOVIET, CUBAN, AND LIBYAN MILITARY PRESENCE. IT IS THIS OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE THAT HAS REINFORCED EFFORTS MADE IN THE PAST BY THE SANDINISTA'S TO REPRESS DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AMONG THEIR PEOPLE. CONTINUED SOVIET ASSISTANCE WILL GIVE THEM THE ABILITY TO SUBVERT THEIR NEIGHBORS EVEN IF THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS IS A SUCCESS.

IN ADDITION TO THESE KEY POLITICAL ISSUES BETWEEN US, THERE ARE OTHER MATTERS OF A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL NATURE WHICH NEED EXPLORATION AND RESOLUTION. WHILE SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, THE PLIGHT OF SOVIET JEWS WHO WISH TO EMIGRATE IS A CONSTANT CONCERN. IN MY OWN STATE WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OTHER SEPARATED FAMILIES WHO YEARN TO BE REUNITED, EVEN IF FOR SHORT VISITS.

TRUE PEACE COMES FROM UNDERSTANDING, SIMPLY ELIMINATING ONE CLASS OF WEAPON DOES NOT ADVANCE PEACE. PEACEFUL CULTURAL CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES ARE IMPORTANT BUILDING BLOCKS TO TRUE PEACE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONSIDER HOW THIS TREATY PROCESS AND THE SUMMIT MEETINGS THAT ACCOMPANY IT CAN ADVANCE THESE IDEAS AS WELL.

MR. CHAIRMAN, TURNING BACK TO THE TREATY ITSELF, A KEY CONCERN OF ALL AMERICANS IS THAT WE MUST BE ABLE TO VERIFY CONCURRENCE WITH ITS TERMS. I WILL BE USING MY TIME AS A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION IN DEPTH.

AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE, HOWEVER, WHICH I LOOK TO THIS COMMITTEE TO EXPLORE IN DEPTH, IS THAT OF ENFORCEMENT. THE TREATY ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR HOW VIOLATIONS DISCOVERED BY THE VERIFICATION SYSTEMS ARE TO BE HANDLED. THESE EXACT PROCEDURES ARE PRESUMABLY TO BE WORKED OUT. WE CANNOT ENTER INTO THE TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS WITHOUT KNOWING AND HAVING ON THE RECORD THE PARAMETERS OF THE ENFORCEMENT METHODS THAT WILL BE APPLIED.

IN SUMMARY, MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS TREATY PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES INVOLVING THE US - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE TREATY PROMISES THAT THE STRATEGIC REALITIES OF THE NEXT CENTURY WILL BE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT HAVE OBTAINED DURING THE LATTER HALF OF THIS CENTURY. THESE HEARINGS PROMISE TO PROVIDE A WATERSHED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THOSE REALITIES AND I AM ANXIOUS TO BEGIN.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

We embark today on something novel: the destruction of nuclear weapons.

In 1979, I wrote an article for the New Yorker in which I argued that for all its virtues, the SALT II Treaty did nothing to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Ronald Reagan called me in August of that year to express his agreement with my view. Now, this Committee has before it an historic INF Treaty in which the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to the actual destruction of an entire class of nuclear weapons.

In 1977, the Soviets suddenly began to deploy the new mobile SS-20, aimed at Western Europe. In 1979, NATO responded with a "dual track" strategy. President Carter promised the United States would send intermediate-range Pershing II's and ground launched Cruise missiles to Europe, but offer to stand down if the Soviets would do likewise. Formal negotiations began on INF in November, 1981. I watched as a member of the bipartisan Arms Control Observer Group since 1985.

This treaty has two special features. First: in the technical term, "asymmetry." The Soviets will take down four times as many INF warheads as we will. Second: verification. If we spot even one Soviet INF missile, it is by definition a violation. The new agreement provides for unprecedented on site inspections, including sudden, unannounced visits.

I support the treaty. I know what is in it, I have watched it be negotiated. Now, let us proceed to its approval and ratification.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL

MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR FORTY YEARS THE STURDY FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE HAS BEEN NATO'S EVOLVING POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. WHEN NATO WAS CREATED, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SOUGHT TO EXTEND U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER AND PROTECTION TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER. AS SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITY EVENTUALLY MATCHED AND IN THE CASE OF SOME WEAPONS SURPASSED OURS, NEW REQUIREMENTS EMERGED. IN RESPONSE TO THIS CHANGE, THE 1970'S USHERED IN NATO'S "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" AND THE RESTORATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION. WITH MEDIUM AND SHORT RANGE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, NATO WAS IN A STRONG POSITION TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. AS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAS EVOLVED, ONE FACT HAS REMAINED CRYSTAL CLEAR: IT WORKS; THE SOVIETS AND THE WARSAW PACT HAVE BEEN KEPT AT BAY AND PEACE HAS BEEN PRESERVED FOR FORTY YEARS.

WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAS NOT BEEN A STATIC POLICY - IT HAS BEEN DYNAMIC. AND WITH THE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY ON DECEMBER 8, THIS POLICY HAS REACHED A NEW MILESTONE. IN FACT, SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE TREATY BRINGS US TO A CROSSROADS: WE EITHER SUSTAIN THE POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OR ABANDON IT.

AS WE CONSIDER THIS TREATY, THERE ARE A MULTITUDE OF ISSUES BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS HOW WILL THE ACCORD CONTRIBUTE TO A RECORD OF RELATIVE SUCCESS. WE MUST EXAMINE WHETHER THE TREATY SUPPORTS OR UNDERMINES NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DETERRENCE CAN BE MAINTAINED WITH DUAL-CAPABLE BOMBERS AND BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN EXTENSIVELY ON

THE NEED TO MODERNIZE THESE EXISTING CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO ASSURE PEACE AND SECURITY. WE MUST THEN ASK OURSELVES WHETHER SUCH AMBITIONS ARE POLITICALLY ACHIEVABLE? REMEMBERING THE PROTESTS OVER PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS, WILL WE FACE SIMILAR CHALLENGES WITH EFFORTS TO UPGRADE BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS? MOREOVER, WILL THESE EFFORTS INTENSIFY THE DEBATE OVER DEFENSE BURDEN SHARING AND SHARPEN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND EUROPEAN CAPITALS? I THINK WE WOULD ALL AGREE THAT THIS TREATY MUST NOT HAVE THE LONG TERM RESULT OF DIVIDING THE ALLIANCE.

AS WE EXPLORE WHETHER THE TREATY MAKES EUROPE SAFER AND THE ALLIANCE STRONGER, I THINK WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER WHAT BROUGHT THE SOVIETS TO THIS POINT. SECRETARY GORBACHEV IS NO PHILANTHROPIST. WHAT IS IN THIS AGREEMENT THAT SERVES SOVIET INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES? ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV MAY WANT TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS TO AFFORD HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO TURN TO AN URGENT DOMESTIC AGENDA, STANDING ALONE THIS IS NOT AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION. WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY BE GIVING UP MORE TARGETS THAN NATO, ARE WE SIMPLY MAKING EUROPE SAFE FOR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK? I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT THE SOVIETS HOPE TO ACHIEVE WITH THE TREATY'S IMPLEMENTATION BEFORE WE REACH A FINAL DECISION.

I HAVE OUTLINED TWO BROADER CONCERNS THAT I INTEND TO PURSUE IN THESE HEARINGS, BUT I AM ALSO INTERESTED IN THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE AGREEMENT. SERIOUS QUESTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN THE PRESS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE DATA THAT THE TWO PARTIES HAVE EXCHANGED. IF THE FOUNDATION FOR THE TREATY IS WEAK, THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE WILL UNDERSTANDABLY BE CALLED INTO DOUBT. I ANTICIPATE THE NEXT TWO MONTHS WILL ADDRESS THESE DETAILS TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND THE PUBLIC.

MR. CHAIRMAN, TO THEIR CREDIT, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS NEGOTIATORS HAVE WORKED FOR SIX DIFFICULT YEARS TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT. IT IS

A REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENT. HOWEVER, I FIND MYSELF CAUTIONED BY A COMMENT MADE BY A FRENCH INTELLECTUAL, ANDRE GLUCKSMAN. HE NOTED THAT DETERRENCE IS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THOSE WHO CAN'T COMMUNICATE. WE HAVE FINE TUNED THIS NON-COMMUNICATION SO SUCCESSFULLY THAT PEACE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED FOR FORTY YEARS.

RECENTLY, WE ALL OBSERVED AND MANY ENJOYED THE UNPRECEDENTED GOOD WILL AND GOOD WISHES THAT CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY GORBACHEV. PERHAPS WE HAVE FINALLY ESTABLISHED GROUNDS FOR COMMUNICATION OR PERHAPS THE TREATY IS YET ANOTHER PHASE IN THE EVOLVING POLICY OF DETERRENCE. IF INDEED, IT IS THE LATTER CASE AND THE TREATY AND SUMMIT MARK A DEPARTURE FROM OUR POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, LET US FULLY UNDERSTAND BOTH THE POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES BEFORE WE REACH A FINAL JUDGMENT.

THANK YOU.

Ratio of Nuclear Warheads Preserved by INF Treaty



Ratio of Nuclear Explosive Power Preserved by INF Treaty*

* Kilotons



PREPARED STATEMENT OF CYRUS VANCE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

I am pleased to share with you my views on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. These hearings, and the discussion and debate that will follow, provide a rare and valuable opportunity not only to carefully examine the Treaty before you, but also to illuminate the road ahead, as we strive to build a safer world into the next century.

Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly endorse the INF Treaty as signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In my considered judgment, it advances America's security interests. It is militarily sound. It is the fruit of a decade of sharply tested Allied resolve and unity. And it provides fresh impetus to the process of arms control that can lead to broader agreements that enhance our security.

Let me begin with some historical perspective, because this Treaty represents the successful culmination of a decade's effort to deal with the problems posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe. A clear picture of the rationale for the deployment of our Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing II's is critical to understanding how this Treaty manifestly serves our security objectives.

Soviet introduction of highly accurate, multiple warhead missiles in Europe during the mid-70s created a new challenge to the balance of power in Europe and to the effectiveness of NATO's deterrence strategy. In the context of the strategic parity the Soviets already had achieved, this new element in the defense equation was deeply troubling to our allies and to us. It became clear that we needed to counter this incipient Soviet advantage -- by negotiations if possible, but by arms deployments if necessary.

This was the heart of the "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in December 1979. In this decision, the Alliance resolved to develop its own offsetting nuclear force while at the same time seeking to neutralize the threat of the SS-20s through negotiations.

That decision and the subsequent deployments created painful political problems for some of our allies and brought efforts by the Soviets to exploit those difficulties. But the Alliance held its course, through two American administrations. That steadfastness now has been vindicated, with an Agreement that achieves NATO's essential strategic objective -- elimination of a class of missiles which, because of their accuracy and short warning time make crisis more dangerous.

Seen in this light, the INF Treaty is a victory for Allied cohesion and resolve. It would be ironic indeed if we now snatch defeat from the jaws of victory and unilaterally deny what the Allies have achieved together.

Mr. Chairman, this Agreement is important for its own sake. But it also represents a positive reaffirmation of the arms control process, a process that now is deservedly high on the agenda of both superpowers. The Treaty provides valuable new building blocks, blocks that can be used by this and future administrations to construct, through the painstaking process of negotiation, more comprehensive agreements that serve our mutual interests. In particular, the verification provisions that have been achieved in this Treaty break significant new ground that can enhance the mutual confidence essential to progress in other arms control arenas.

Let me make a final point. Senate ratification of this Treaty, the product of a decade-long effort pursued by two administrations of different parties, can send a powerful message to the world that the United States is a consistent, reliable negotiating partner, capable of speaking with an enduring voice. To approve this Treaty in an election year will vividly demonstrate that on vital issues of national security the United States can act with bipartisan unity.

In this context, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that the Senate will not burden this Treaty with reservations or amendments that would require renegotiation with the Soviets, jeopardizing what this Treaty embodies.

What we must now do to strengthen conventional deterrence in Europe and to deal with the Soviets on other issues are vital concerns. They require practical, creative and level-headed discussion and debate. But this agreement should and does stand on its merits. It serves our national interest. And to demand progress on every front as a precondition for progress on any front is a prescription for paralysis.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Committee and I urge the Senate to provide this agreement with the enthusiastic support it merits.

I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. ROGERS

I appear here today in support of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles.

The treaty will eliminate an entire category of weapons on an asymetrical basis so that the Soviet Union over a three year period will be required to eliminate a much larger number of weapons than the United States - on the order of four times as many. This feature of the treaty must have been a difficult pill for the Soviets to swallow especially in light of the effort they made a few years ago in strongly opposing the deployment of our Pershing missiles in Europe.

We all remember what a massive effort that was. The Soviets, joined by their satellites and by many persons here in the United States and in Europe - especially Germany - loudly proclaimed that the deployment of the Pershings would be an act that could well lead to war or, at best, would be very destabilizing and would would greatly worsen the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This treaty gives the lie to all of those claims.

President Reagan, supported by the Congress, and by courageous friends and allies in Europe, pressed forward and successfully deployed Pershings in Europe. In part, at least, this treaty results from that effort.

In 1979 the Soviet Union had deployed a large number of SS20s directed against Western Europe and this caused great concern. It was based on the fear that the weapons might be used against our allies in Europe and because the United States had no weapons in that category deployed in Europe, the only adequate counter-force would be our ICBMs.

This raised the following question -- Was it creditable to believe that the United States, in the defense of Europe, would risk using ICBMs - with all the horrors that would entail?

The SS20s became successful weapons of intimidation and had the potential of weakening NATO or even possibly causing it to disintegrate. So the Pershings were deployed by the United States to allay that fear and in our own self-interest to signal to the Soviet Union our deep commitment to our NATO allies.

Now that deployment has been successful and the Soviets have agreed to eliminate all of the SS20s and similar missiles in exchange for our eliminating the Pershings, that particular fear has been allayed and we have started a process that may result in the further reduction of both nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

It should be noted here that the Soviets also dropped their insistence that missiles from other countries be included in the negotiations. This, of course, was an important and necessary concession.

So, on the numbers alone, I think this treaty is a good one.

However, to my mind, possibly the most significant feature of the treaty may be the provision for on-site inspection. I remember hearing President Eisenhower once say that he doubted that the United States could ever have a meaningful arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union because the Soviets would never agree to on-site inspection. And he believed we could never agree to arms reductions with the Soviet Union without on-site inspection. Now that the Soviets and the United States have agreed to on-site inspection I believe that a precedent has been established that holds out great promise for mankind.

In all likelihood, future treaties between the two nations will include similar or improved provisions. With adequate on-site inspections and full use of the latest technical methods, adequate and reliable verification should be possible. Thus the prospects for further progress in arms reductions seem to be good if the Soviets are prepared to make mutual and balanced reductions in both nuclear and conventional forces.

If the climate between the United States and the Soviet Union continues to improve, we should encourage it. At the same time make certain that our overall strength remains great and that we maintain the strength and cohesion of our alliances.

We have one significant advantage - Communism doesn't work. It isn't working in Russia or North Korea or Cuba or in any of the Eastern bloc countries. Gorbachev's new book attempts to chart a course for the Soviet Union which would make it possible for the Soviets to benefit from the advantages of a free market place for goods and services and - at the same time - maintain a controlled society for individuals and for ideas. Of course it won't work. In the long run either Gorbachev will be removed from his office, as Khruschev was, or Russia will become a much different society. If he remains in office and the society becomes more open - depending on the degree of openness -- a new challenge will face the United States.

We will have to constantly remind ourselves that a system which has openly and consistently espoused world domination doesn't easily change its spots - or if it does, in all likelihood it will be a temporary change.

So our emerging policy should be one of wary flexibility. We should attempt to resolve, by mutuality, some of the sources of conflict in the world between the superpowers - but we should always require money in the bank - let's not rely on checks in the mail.

Finally then - this INF treaty is a modest step on a path toward further arms reduction. It could be a precursor of much larger steps.

We must be willing to accept the possibility of what appears to be a major foreign policy change in the Soviet Union and welcome it.

Let's continue to negotiate in a business-like way. If we can make a good deal, make it - if we can't, don't. If we can negotiate a satisfactory START treaty this year - that is in our own best interests - fine -- if not, wait until we can. Let's not be under any pressure because it's an election year or for any other reason. Success depends on the effect of a treaty - not on who makes it or when it is made.

There are those who would argue that the treaty should have been more comprehensive, or that it should have dealt with strategic arms in the first instance or that conventional weapons and troop strength should have been included. Who can be sure? What I feel certain about is that no all encompassing arms reduction treaty would have been possible - and I'm convinced that this treaty which has the support of our military leaders and our allies is a good one. The fact is that this is a good treaty on its own terms and should be ratified on its own terms. If crippling amendments are attached or if it dies in its crib from inordinate delay, the chances for arms reductions in this century may have been lost and the chances for what appears to be a window of opportunity for peace may be closed. So I strongly support the treaty and respectfully urge the Senate, after full and careful consideration, to ratify it.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR EDWARD L. ROWNY

The last time I appeared before this Committee for an arms control treaty ratification hearing I was not a witness for but against ratification of the fatally flawed SALT II agreement. Now however, after a great deal of careful consideration, I appear as a witness for ratification of the INF Treaty. I support the INF Treaty and welcome this opportunity to present my views on why it should be ratified. This accord is sound and serves our nation's security interests. It is a success that truly has many fathers. It could not have been completed and signed without bipartisan congressional support and the support of allies and friends. But most of the credit is due Ronald Reagan and his administration for their fortitude and patience.

You have all heard the history of the negotiations in considerable detail. I will not review these details again. Rather I would like to relate to you why I personally feel this is an agreement worthy of ratification.

I support this Treaty because it achieves the objectives that we and our allies established when we entered negotiations with the Soviets in 1981:

- There must be equality of rights and limits.
- The negotiations must deal with U.S. and Soviet systems only.
- Limits must be global, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, or vice versa.
- There must be no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability.
- An agreement must be effectively verifiable.

The Treaty is the first ever to reduce nuclear-armed missile arsenals rather than simply set limits on their growth. Not only will there be equality of INF missiles, at the zero level, but zero shorter-range missiles as well -- those with a range between 500 and 1000 kms. We will be eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. Moreover, we will arrive at global zero by asymmetric reductions. The Soviets will need to eliminate deployed missiles capable of carrying more than 1600 nuclear warheads -- approximately four times as many as on the missiles the United States will eliminate. Invoking this principle of unequal reductions to equal levels will be critical to the success of a number of other arms reductions efforts involving conventional forces, chemical weapons and START.

This Treaty also calls for the elimination of these missile systems on a global basis. At the President's request I have undertaken almost 300,000 miles of consultative travels in the last four years to allied and friendly capitals both in Europe and in Asia. From my many consultative trips to Asian capitals it was clear that they most strongly supported "global zero" over any interim solution that would not eliminate the SS-20 threat to this region. I related their concerns to the President and pressed for a global zero outcome. In the end the Soviets agreed to eliminate their INF missiles, capable of carrying over 500 warheads, which today threaten our allies and friends in Asia. As a consequence I can assure you that this Treaty rightly enjoys global support.

This Treaty is bilateral and covers only the INF missiles of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This outcome was attained in spite of Soviet attempts over the years to retain unjustified offsets for systems of third parties. We saw this Soviet attempt to get something for nothing as a tactical ploy and remained patient until the Soviets backed down.

This Treaty also satisfies our requirement to maintain deterrence and coupling while not undermining our conventional forces. Imbalances in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces exist today and will continue to exist after the missiles are eliminated. But deterrence is assured by the fact that NATO will retain those nuclear weapons required to prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of their superior conventional power. Flexible response will continue to be a viable NATO strategy, employing a mix of nuclear weapons on shorter-range Lance missiles, on artillery-fired atomic projectiles and on aircraft capable of striking the Soviet homeland. In addition some sea-launched ballistic missiles remain committed to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In fact, once all our INF missiles are removed, we will still retain in Europe about 4000 nuclear warheads on a variety of allied and U.S. systems. Our strategic nuclear systems, the ultimate guarantor of deterrence, are unaffected by this Treaty.

Thus the "coupling" of the United States to Europe will remain after INF missiles are eliminated. Our commitment to Europe is not based only on nuclear weapons. Indeed the most potent sign of U.S. commitment to Europe remains the presence of over 300,000 combat-ready U.S. troops on the ground. Moreover, NATO will receive a bonus benefit from the elimination of the shorter-range Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. These systems are capable of delivering not only nuclear warheads but also conventional and chemical warheads on key NATO targets including depots and airfields vital to our conventional reinforcement capabilities.

In the final analysis, the INF Treaty must be followed by a strong effort to redress the existing conventional imbalance. The hard facts are that without a concerted NATO effort to strengthen its conventional capabilities, the Soviets lack a strong incentive to reduce the offensive threat posed by their conventional forces advantage in Europe. They are gambling that NATO will not rise to the occasion and reduce the imbalance. Looked at objectively, there is no reason why European NATO with more population and larger total gross product than the Soviet Union cannot do its part to meet this challenge. With American help, it can and must be met. And on this point I would call to the Committee's attention that much valuable thinking on how to address this problem is contained in the Secretary of Defense's recently submitted report titled "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's."

Of course, in addition to the INF Treaty we are seeking strategic reductions. The Soviets are gambling that we are so eager to enter into an agreement on 50% reduction of strategic offensive weapons that we will compromise our ability to conduct the research necessary for strategic defenses. A START Treaty as proposed by the United States would benefit both the U.S. and the USSR. It should stand on its own merits and not be linked, as the Soviets continue to demand, to crippling limits on our Strategic Defense Initiative. Under no circumstances should we allow a START agreement to become hostage to such limits on our ability to defend ourselves and our Allies from a ballistic missile attack.

The last objective I want to address is one close to my heart - verification. I agree with the President that we "trust but verify." Notwithstanding the General Secretary's complaint that this is said too frequently, I believe the President's maxim cannot be repeated too often.

It must be recognized that no "air-tight" verification regime in an arms control agreement is possible with so secretive a society as the Soviet Union. The INF verification package, however, is so extensive that it satisfies reasonable criteria of effectiveness. The verification elements of the treaty combine in such a fashion as to raise the cost and difficulty of cheating and the risk of getting caught.

* For the first time in a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement, each side will send on-site inspection teams to help verify the data provided by the other, and thus provide greater confidence in the agreement's data base.

* Inspectors from each side also will be permitted to observe the elimination of the missiles and related equipment throughout a three-year period.

* Even after all the missiles have been eliminated, U.S. inspectors will remain for up to 10 more years at the Votkinsk final assembly facility to assure that SS-20 production has ceased. Since the SS-20 first stage is outwardly similar to that of the long-range SS-25, our inspectors at Votkinsk will be permitted to measure and weigh all SS-25 canisters leaving the facility. In addition as a further safeguard against Soviet cheating we are permitted eight times per year randomly to open and inspect the contents of an SS-25 canister leaving the portal.

* Each side will be permitted "short notice" inspections at present and former INF facilities during the entire 13 years of on-site monitoring. Thus for 10 years after the missiles have been destroyed, we can inspect to insure that no INF missiles are illegally located at these locations.

* Perhaps most important of all, the treaty also provides for a ban on flight-testing of INF missiles. Without flight tests, the Soviets cannot remain confident of the safety and reliability of any illicit missiles for more than a few years.

Since so many verification details of the INF Treaty are without precedent, the accord will provide a test of verification procedures applicable to future agreements. This is especially critical to START, which will pose more complex verification problems than INF. It will be harder to verify a 50 percent reduction which will permit continuing production, testing and deployment than an outright ban with a reduction to zero.

Even when President Reagan expressed his greatest satisfaction with this agreement, he took pains to remind us that the INF agreement is but a single step forward in arms reductions. More importantly, President Reagan has reminded us that arms reductions are but one element in the full context of our relationship with the Soviet Union. In order to secure a broad improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, significant changes in Soviet behavior in the other important areas of our relationship such as human rights, bilateral issues and regional issues are needed.

In conclusion let me repeat that I support the Treaty. I welcome the opportunity that these hearings afford to advance a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms and a correction of the imbalance of conventional forces. At the same time, I urge that the INF Treaty before you be ratified without crippling conditions or amendments.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID M. ABSHIRE

I AM PRIVILEGED TO TESTIFY BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON IN SUPPORT OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY. I WANT TO DO SO IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT I BELIEVE MUST BE DONE TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE AND IMPROVE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

BY THE TIME THIS COMMITTEE CONCLUDES ITS HEARINGS YOU WILL

HAVE HEARD A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS ON THE INF TREATY. WHAT ARE YOU TO MAKE OF THE SOMETIMES CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY YOU WILL HEAR FROM THESE EXPERTS? HOW CAN YOU BEST UNDERSTAND THE REASONS BEHIND THESE DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS?

LET ME SUGGEST THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION AT ISSUE IN THIS DEBATE IS DETERRENCE, AND THAT THE BASIC REASON WHY THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS WILL DIFFER IS THAT THEY BRING TO THEIR ANALYSES FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT VIEWS ON HOW DETERRENCE IS ENHANCED AND MAINTAINED. SOME WILL TESTIFY AS IF THEY BELIEVE DETERRENCE IS PURELY A MILITARY PHENOMENON. SOME, WHOSE VIEWS ARE MORE NARROW STILL, WILL IMPLY THAT DETERRENCE RESIDES IN A PARTICULAR WEAPON SYSTEM OR CATEGORY OF WEAPONS. OTHERS WILL STRESS THE POLITICAL NATURE OF DETERRENCE IN MAKING THEIR ASSESSMENTS. ALL NEED TO TAKE A BROADER VIEW.

DETERRENCE MUST BE VIEWED IN A BROAD FRAMEWORK, ONE WHICH ENCOMPASSES POLITICS, STRATEGY, AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES. IT NEEDS TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE, NOT TO THE PAST. FOR NATO, THE QUESTION IS HOW WE CAN CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN -- BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY -- THE VIABILITY OF ITS STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE BASED ON FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE. THE QUESTION IS, HOW CAN WE MAINTAIN THE COHESION AND STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE AS THE FUNDAMENTAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE SEEK TO PROVIDE A STABLE DETERRENCE. THE QUESTION IS, HOW CAN WE MAINTAIN DETERRENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW.

IT TAKES DISCIPLINE TO LOOK AHEAD, TO SEE THAT WHERE WE ARE GOING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHERE WE'VE BEEN. BUT TOO MANY TIMES, WHEN WE PROFESS TO BE LOOKING FORWARD, WE ARE REALLY LOOKING THROUGH THE REAR VIEW MIRROR, ANALYZING EVENTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN, NOT AS THEY ARE AND AS THEY MIGHT BE. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, DEMAND THAT THOSE WHO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU LOOK AHEAD, NOT THROUGH THEIR REAR VIEW MIRRORS.

Let me give you a concrete example. Many critics of the INF accord are dissatisfied precisely because they are looking through a rear view mirror at the forever-lost strategic nuclear conditions of the 1960s. They believe that the INF treaty upsets a particular system of nuclear deterrence that they believed was here to stay indefinitely. Critics suggest that the "double zero" outcome removes two rungs of a precise escalation ladder over which we have complete control. This image of rungs in a ladder of escalation emerged in the 1960s when the United States enjoyed superiority at each rung of the ladder, at each level of escalation. The plain fact today is that the West no longer enjoys "escalation dominance" as it did then.

The Pershing II is a tremendously able weapon in terms of military capabilities. But we must not lose sight of the fact that it was deployed primarily for political purposes. Other nuclear weapons, including those that will remain in Europe, will be able to hold the Soviet Union at risk -- to deny the Soviets the solace that the Soviet homeland will become a sanctuary should they attack Europe. In face of the military and political implications of the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in the late-1970s, the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles did restore needed political and military flexibility to the West. But to continue to believe that these weapons remain an essential condition for the maintenance of deterrence, even if the SS-20s are removed, is another example of rear view mirror thinking.

I have suggested we need to broaden our horizon; to accept that reality has changed; to understand that the loss of nuclear superiority has important implications. Does this mean that NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response is outmoded? Not at all. What it does mean is that we need to look to the future, not to the past, in undertaking policies to maintain the credibility of NATO's strategy.

IN MAINTAINING DETERRENCE IN EUROPE, THE PROBLEM IS UNEQUAL CONDITIONS, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. WITH THIS INF TREATY -- ESPECIALLY ITS CODIFICATION OF MAJOR UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS -- WE HAVE TAKEN A MAJOR STEP TOWARD DEALING WITH NUCLEAR INEQUALITY. WHAT REMAINS IS A SERIOUS IMBALANCE ON THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL, AND NATO'S PRIORITY MUST NOW BE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS IMBALANCE THROUGH A COMBINATION OF FORCE IMPROVEMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL. ARMS CONTROL ALONE IS NOT THE ANSWER. INDEED, WE MAY NEVER ACHIEVE THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES WE HAVE UNLESS WE UNDERTAKE NEEDED CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.

IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES IS NOW THE WAY TO REGAIN THE FLEXIBILITY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE DO SO, FOR IT IS AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL, THE LEVEL WHERE WAR WOULD ACTUALLY START, THAT NATO INFERIORITIES ARE MOST GLARING AND POTENTIALLY MOST DANGEROUS. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE INF TREATY DID NOT CREATE THIS PROBLEM, AND THE REQUIREMENT TO TAKE ACTION FACES THE ALLIANCE REGARDLESS OF HOW THE SENATE VOTES ON THE TREATY. IMPROVING CONVENTIONAL FORCES IS THE WAY -- AND THIS MAY SEEM PARADOXICAL -- TO LENGTHEN THE LIFE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SO THAT ANY DECISION TO DELIBERATELY ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE MADE MUCH LATER THAN IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE PERSISTS.

WHENEVER I MENTION THE WORD "IMPROVEMENTS", CRITICS SHAKE THEIR HEADS AND SAY: "IT CAN'T BE DONE -- THERE'S NO MONEY." I SAY: "THINK SMARTER, NOT RICHER, AND IT CAN BE DONE."

SO THE INF TREATY MUST BE SEEN AS JUST PART OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE ALLIANCE STRATEGY FOR THE WAY AHEAD. THE FIRST STEP IN THAT JOURNEY WILL BE THE NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SUMMIT IN MARCH. NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN FORGING A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO CONFRONT THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING THE ALLIANCE: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION, CONVENTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND ARMAMENTS COOPERATION.

IN MARCH, ALLIANCE LEADERS NEED TO GIVE URGENT AUTHORIZATION TO MINISTERS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS ON INTENSIVE STUDY USING ALL THE ELEMENTS OF NATO MACHINERY. I NEED NOT REMIND YOU THAT WHEN NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MANDATED SUCH A STUDY IN 1984 IT RESULTED IN AN ACTION PLAN THAT MOVED THE ALLIANCE FORWARD WITH THE ADOPTION OF A CONCEPTUAL MILITARY FRAMEWORK, A NEW EMPHASIS ON ARMAMENTS COOPERATION, AND THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS (CDI) EFFORT. THE MARCH SUMMIT CAN GIVE RISE TO ANOTHER ROUND OF FORWARD THINKING IN NATO. LEADERS SHOULD NOW ALSO AGREE TO A SECOND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SUMMIT A YEAR FROM NOW IN ORDER TO REVIEW NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING THEIR ACTION PLAN AND CHART THE WAY AHEAD.

THESE SUMMIT MEETINGS SHOULD BUILD UPON THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE 1967 HARMEL REPORT, OF STRENGTH AND NEGOTIATION. AT THEIR 1984 MEETING IN WASHINGTON, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THE SO-CALLED HARMEL DOCTRINE WHICH ADDED THE EMPHASIS THAT STRENGTH AND COHESION COME FIRST AND MUST BE THE FOUNDATION FOR EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. FINALLY, A SUMMIT MEETING IN MARCH, FOLLOWED BY A SECOND A YEAR FROM NOW, WILL GIVE OUR ALLIES A SENSE OF CONTINUITY THROUGH OUR ELECTION PERIOD AND TRANSITION OF GOVERNMENT.

I AM HERE TO TELL YOU THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ARE POSSIBLE -- EVEN IN A TIME OF LIMITED RESOURCES -- AND THAT SMALL STEPS TAKEN NOW WILL PAY BIG DIVIDENDS IN THE FUTURE.

AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES HERE IN WASHINGTON, I LEAD A PROJECT ON A DEFENSE INVESTMENT STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. OUR FIRST REPORT IDENTIFIES A WIDE RANGE OF LOW-COST AND NO-COST IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S FORCE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS, IN ALLIANCE

FORCE STRUCTURE, AND ARMAMENTS COOPERATION WHICH COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A NATO ACTION PLAN WHICH MEETS THE CHALLENGES OF THE POST-INF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE.

LET ME BRIEFLY MENTION ONLY SIX MEASURES NATO COULD PURSUE AT NO COST. THESE CAN BE MANDATED AT A NATO SUMMIT, BUT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START IMMEDIATELY.

FIRST, NATO MUST UNDERTAKE A NET APPRAISAL OF THE DYNAMIC BALANCE OF FORCES FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL. THE NATO APPRAISAL MUST SHOW STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND TRENDS ON BOTH SIDES AND EMPHASIZE THEIR MEANING FOR CONVENTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL. WE HAVE RECENTLY COMPLETED SUCH AN UNCLASSIFIED NET ASSESSMENT AT CSIS. IN FACT, PHIL KARBER AND I BRIEFED THE HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR CONCLUSIONS TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE THIS MORNING. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST TO MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE AND WOULD BE PLEASED TO PRESENT IT TO YOU.

SECOND, A THOROUGH REVIEW OF NATO'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY IS CRITICAL. THE THREAT OF A WARSAW PACT REDUCED-WARNING ATTACK IN CENTRAL EUROPE IMPOSES ENORMOUS NEW PRESSURES ON NATO'S LESS THAN STREAMLINED CRISIS MANAGEMENT MACHINERY.

THIRD, A SPECIAL STUDY SHOULD BE MANDATED ON HOW NATO SHOULD FACE UP TO THE POTENTIALLY PRECARIOUS MALDEPLOYMENT AND READINESS PROBLEMS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY GROUP AREA. BOTH SACEUR AND THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE NEED TO IDENTIFY HOW THE DANGER OF SOVIET ARMORED BREAKOUT IN THE NORTH, WHICH WOULD INVALIDATE ALL COUNTRIES' INVESTMENT IN NATO, CAN BE MET MORE COLLECTIVELY.

FOURTH, THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD ENGAGE CONGRESS IN FINDING MORE NEW TRADE-OFFS WITH THE ALLIES, SUCH AS TRANSFERRING LESS-PREFERRED AMMUNITION TO A WAR RESERVE STOCK FOR NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS IN RETURN FOR RATIONALIZATION OF NATIONAL LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

Fifth, NATO needs a second effort on armaments cooperation. A cooperative effort under the Balanced Technology Initiative in addition to ongoing Nunn-Roth-Warner programs would emphasize to Europeans our determination to target our technology investment to correct conventional imbalances.

Sixth, we need a mandate for longer-term discussions involving both government and industry for better use of defense resources. This could include emphasis on more off-the-shelf purchases as well as a search for more trade-offs like the Roland/Patriot deal with Germany.

Having seen NATO make real progress in recent years, I am not prepared to throw up my hands and say that nothing can be done to improve our conventional forces or to better use our collective resources. The six steps I have mentioned are short-term, no-cost remedial measures with potential great returns in improved conventional defense capability. The challenge of the 1990s is to think smarter, not richer, as we look to the emerging security environment in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces remains the essential element of instability in Europe. In the 1990s, NATO must come to grips with the Warsaw Pact's emerging capability to execute a shorter-warning, blitzkrieg-like attack with its forward deployed troops.

While there are differing opinions on the implications of the Soviet conventional force buildup in Central Europe, an unclassified military appraisal produced by CSIS points to an alarming Soviet capability to threaten NATO's weakest sectors with a heavily armored attack with little warning. This is not to say the Soviets are planning a war. Capability and use are not the same. But capability combined with instability can lead to miscalculation and war. We saw that in 1914.

Conventional improvements and arms control must therefore go hand in hand to eliminate this destabilizing Warsaw Pact capability. The NATO Foreign Ministers recognized this in their December 1986 Declaration on Conventional Arms Control by urging priority attention to the "elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large scale offensive action."

The lesson of the INF Treaty for conventional arms control is clear. Force improvements and modernizations at the conventional level are necessary as leverage for meaningful negotiations. The kinds of conventional improvements I have mentioned today are key to the success of NATO's negotiating strategy.

The second pillar to NATO strategy must be a conceptual framework for conventional arms control. At CSIS, we are working with many of the experts in and out of government to develop a framework for evaluating arms control proposals, whether they come from East or West.

Further, I believe it will be necessary to resist negotiations on short range nuclear systems -- the "third zero" -- until we have achieved substantial conventional reductions. Maintaining and modernizing NATO's nuclear arsenal, agreed upon at Montebello in 1983, complement conventional improvement efforts and provide the West with increased leverage for conventional negotiations with the Pact.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I regard the INF Treaty now before the Senate as the fruit of difficult labor within the Atlantic Alliance and believe it should be ratified. There is, however, no cause for complacency within our Alliance. Neither is there reason to doubt NATO's ability to deal with the many challenges of the 1990s.

AS WE SHIFT OUR FOCUS TO CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS, WE MUST REMEMBER THE LESSONS OF HARMEL AND SEEK TO DEAL FROM STRENGTH. CONVENTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS AND NUCLEAR MODERNIZATIONS MUST GO HAND IN HAND WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COHERENT APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL IF WE ARE TO REALIZE THE PROMISE OF THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA.

THE TREATY BEFORE US IS HISTORIC NOT BECAUSE IT IS THE END OF AN OLD PROCESS, BUT BECAUSE IT IS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ONE. WE HAVE MOVED FROM SALT I -- WHICH WAS CHARACTERIZED BY SENATOR HENRY JACKSON AS AN AGREEMENT BASED ON "SUB-PARITY FOR OUR SIDE" -- TO A VERY DIFFERENT KIND OF AGREEMENT, BASED UPON UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS AND PARITY. EVEN SO, THERE ARE DANGERS ON THE HORIZON IF WE DO NOT MOVE FORWARD WITH A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. TO SIMPLY DEPEND UPON GORBACHEV'S GOOD WILL WOULD DEFY EVERY LESSON WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE HARMEL DOCTRINE AND WOULD UNDO THE SUCCESS WE HAVE JUST ACHIEVED. IF WE DO MOVE FORWARD WITH A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, THERE IS A GREAT PROMISE OF REPEATING AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED WITH THE INF AGREEMENT.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PAUL H. NITZE

I am pleased to be here today to testify in support of the INF Treaty. In my prepared remarks, I would like to describe the verification regime mandated by the Treaty and to explain why I believe that regime will allow us effectively to verify Soviet compliance with the obligations established by the Treaty.

The Requirement for Effective Verification

Since this Administration began arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have insisted that any agreement must be effectively verifiable if it is to improve stability and to make a lasting contribution to peace and security. President Reagan has made it clear that he would settle for nothing less.

What do we mean by effective verification? We mean that we want to be sure that, if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation. Of course, our ability to detect and respond to violations helps to deter the other side from committing them in the first place.

How Effective Verification is Achieved

In order to achieve an effective INF verification regime, the Administration set the following negotiating goals:

- establishment of obligations that are defined as precisely as possible;
- negotiation of cooperative measures (such as on-site inspection, locational restrictions on Treaty-limited items and enhancements of national technical means) and provisions providing for unimpeded use of unilateral measures (such as satellite imagery and other national technical means) that will significantly enhance our ability to monitor Treaty-related activities;
- negotiation of provisions that, combined with the aforementioned measures, will increase the cost, complexity, and probability of detection, of Soviet cheating, and thus help deter it.

We also wanted to establish reliable procedures and channels for pursuing resolution of any Treaty compliance problems.

Finally, we recognized the need to demonstrate our determination to adopt appropriate countermeasures in the face of uncorrected Soviet violations, should any occur.

The INF Treaty satisfies the first four requirements by establishing precise, unambiguous obligations, by creating a network of interrelated constraints and measures that allow careful monitoring and reinforce one another in such a fashion as to raise the cost and difficulty of cheating and the risk of getting caught, and by creating a mechanism for addressing compliance concerns. The final goal is served by the US Government's compliance policy.

Precise Treaty Obligations

The primary obligation of the INF Treaty is clear and unambiguous precisely because of its sweeping nature: the parties are required to eliminate within eighteen months all of their shorter-range (500-1000 KM) missiles and launchers, and within three years all of their intermediate-range (1000-5500 KM) missiles and launchers. These missiles and launchers are to be eliminated according to detailed, specifically agreed-upon procedures.

At the end of three years, the entire class of US and Soviet INF missile systems, whether deployed or non-deployed, must be totally eliminated. Thus, if even a single Soviet INF missile or launcher is observed after the elimination period, that will constitute clear, unequivocal evidence of a violation of the Treaty.

The Treaty also requires the parties to eliminate elements of the INF infrastructure, including certain structures, support equipment, and missile-related activity at facilities, that make the INF missile systems a viable military force. It clearly identifies each of these elements and establishes precise procedures for either destroying it or, in the case of certain INF facilities, converting it to non-INF uses.

Finally, the Treaty bans upon entry into force any further production of INF launchers or missiles and any further flight testing of INF missiles, either present types or new types.

Monitoring Treaty-Related Activities

To enhance significantly our ability to monitor Treaty-related activities, we negotiated an extensive set of rigorous measures enabling us to verify Soviet-declared numbers of INF missiles, launchers and support equipment, to account for them while they await elimination, to ensure they are eliminated, and to strengthen our ability to detect any other such items that might be clandestinely maintained in the future.

Establishing a Baseline Count of INF Missiles, Launchers and Support Equipment. To establish a reliable baseline count of the declared Treaty-limited items of the other side, we incorporated the following measures:

- -- An initial exchange of data, recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of INF missiles, launchers, support structures and equipment, and related facilities. This exchange has occurred, with data current as of November 1, 1987, and the data provided by the Soviet side is, on the whole, within the bounds of our intelligence estimates.
- -- An update of this data, to occur 30 days after the Treaty enters into force.
- -- A series of baseline, on-site inspections during the period from 30 to 90 days after entry into force to confirm the validity of the updated data. These

inspections will occur at key missile support facilities (other than production facilities) and bases listed in the MOU; in addition to the US and the Soviet Union, they are located in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslavakia.

Accounting for Treaty-Limited Items While They Await Elimination. The process of eliminating declared Treaty-limited items will extend over three years from entry into force. During this period, we will account for these items through the following measures:

- Continuous updates of the data exchanged between the sides, to reflect, among other things, the net effect of elimination activities. This will include a complete update every six months.
- Restrictions on the location of missiles and launchers to agreed facilities and deployment areas declared in the data exchanges.
- Restrictions on the movement of missiles and launchers. Such movements will be permitted only between or among declared support facilities and deployment areas or to elimination sites, and a side must notify the other of such transits within 48 hours after their completion. These notifications must include the numbers of missiles and launchers moved, the mode of transport, the points, dates and times of departure and arrival, and the locations and time at those locations of transported items at least every four days during transit.
- Short-notice, on-site inspections to confirm the number of Treaty-limited items at declared sites. During the three-year elimination period, each side

will be allotted 20 inspections per year for this purpose and also to inspect declared sites at which INF activity already has ceased. We and the Soviets have agreed on standardized procedures for such inspections, to include the size and makeup of inspecting teams, means of facilitating their movement and operation, permitted inspection equipment, boundaries of the inspection sites, and the rights of the inspectors at the sites. Most importantly, we have agreed on provisions designed to ensure that these inspections are truly short-notice. The Soviets will not know where such an inspection will take place until after the inspection team has arrived in the USSR. Once the location is revealed to the Soviets, they must prohibit movement of Treaty-limited items from the site within one hour and they must ensure that the inspection team can arrive at the site in question within 9 hours.

Ensuring Treaty-Limited Items are Eliminated. The measures for verifying the elimination of Treaty-limited items are as follows:

-- Advance notification each time elimination is to occur, including the date and location of the elimination and, for missile systems, the number and types to be eliminated.

-- Elimination of missiles, launchers and support equipment only at specified elimination facilities.

-- Mandatory on-site inspection to observe the elimination of missiles and launchers. As I indicated earlier, detailed procedures for the destruction of missile systems have been established; inspectors will observe these procedures, and the inspecting party must confirm in writing that the systems have been eliminated.

- On-site inspection to confirm the elimination of INF support structures and equipment by agreed procedures for destruction or conversion.
- On-site closeout inspections to verify the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities by the removal or destruction of all Treaty-limited items and the cessation of all INF-related activities.

Detecting a Clandestine INF Force. Even after all INF missiles, launchers and related support equipment and facilities declared in the MOU have been eliminated, we must still be concerned lest there be any Soviet attempt clandestinely to maintain an INF force.

Were the Soviets to make such an effort, they might try to take advantage of the assets remaining at their former INF facilities or to exploit their SS-25 ICBM force, which uses a missile stage similar to an SS-20 stage and is deployed at some former SS-20 bases. As means of detecting such eventualities or other attempts to maintain a clandestine force, the Treaty includes the following measures:

- Short-notice inspection of sites previously declared to be INF sites and subsequently eliminated, i.e. formerly declared sites. These inspections would help ensure that Treaty-limited items had not been returned to the inspected sites. During the three-year elimination period, these inspections will be included in the quota of 20 short-notice inspections per year that applies also to still-existing facilities. After the elimination period, these inspections will continue for ten years, with an annual quota of 15 per year for the first five years and ten per year for the final five years. The procedures for these inspections will be as I outlined earlier.

-- Inspection by means of continuous portal monitoring, for up to 13 years after the Treaty enters into force, of any ground-launched ballistic missile final assembly facility at which missiles with stages outwardly similar to stages of a Treaty-limited missile are assembled. Under this provision, the US is permitted to monitor the Soviet SS-25 final assembly plant at Votkinsk. Our inspectors will monitor all SS-25 ICBMs that exit the Votkinsk facility and will have the right to use various types of sensors to confirm that no INF missiles or missile stages are leaving the plant disguised as SS-25s. If a side has no facility that meets the definition in this provision, the other side is permitted to monitor one agreed former missile production facility. Accordingly, the Soviets will monitor a missile production plant in Magna, Utah, where rocket motors for US Pershing missiles were formerly produced.

-- Agreed procedures for enhancing the capability of national technical means to monitor SS-25 bases that are not former INF bases and therefore not subject to short-notice on-site inspections as formerly declared facilities. These procedures include the right to request six times a year, on short notice, an open display of SS-25s at their bases for 6 hours. Combined with short-notice, on-site inspections of SS-25 bases that are former SS-20 bases, these procedures will increase our confidence that the Soviets are not attempting to use an SS-25 base to maintain SS-20s.

-- A prohibition on interference with verification by national technical means. This provision enhances our likelihood of detecting illegal activity at locations other than SS-25 bases or former INF facilities.

Deterring Soviet Violations

As I stated earlier, our third goal for the INF verification regime was to negotiate provisions that, combined with the monitoring measures, will increase the cost, complexity, and probability of detection of Soviet cheating, and thus help deter it. The INF Treaty does this by eliminating elements of the INF infrastructure and banning the activities that are necessary to support a militarily significant INF force.

Structures identified as crucial to supporting INF missiles and launchers will be eliminated by agreed procedures so they cannot be used for INF systems.

Activities associated with INF facilities will cease. Repair, storage and deployment of INF missiles will not be permitted once all missile systems are eliminated. Production and flight testing will be banned.

And these restrictions will be monitored according to the procedures I have outlined.

This does not, of course, guarantee that some INF missiles cannot be hidden away somewhere within the great expanses of the Soviet Union. No verification regime could provide such assurance. It does, however, ensure that the Soviets could maintain a clandestine, militarily significant force only at great cost and risk, and with steadily decreasing reliability.

One of the most difficult problems for the Soviets would be the requirement to flight-test the missiles to avoid a degradation in their reliability, which would increase over time. Such testing would involve great risk, since the Treaty's ban on flight testing is readily verifiable by national technical means. Without the ability to flight-test the missiles, the Soviets would question the effectiveness of these forces and their military value, especially over time.

Faced with this and other obstacles, the Soviets should conclude that the costs and risks of detection are too high compared to any benefits. This, in turn, should help to deter them from violating the Treaty.

A Compliance Forum

Should Treaty compliance problems arise in the future, we wanted to have in place reliable procedures and channels for pursuing resolution of those problems. This goal is satisfied by Article XIII of the Treaty.

Article XIII establishes the Special Verification Commission, and specifies that the Commission will meet whenever either side requests a meeting. It further specifies that the purposes for such a meeting will be to resolve questions relating to Treaty compliance and to agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Under this provision, if the US detects suspicious activity on the part of the Soviet Union at any place or at any time, we can request a meeting of the Special Verification Commission to address our concerns, and the Soviets will be obligated to attend. At the meeting, we can indicate our concerns and request an explanation and, if appropriate, corrective action.

If we deem it necessary, we can also propose new measures to supplement or clarify the Treaty's provisions.

We cannot, of course, force the Soviet Union adequately to explain or to correct instances of suspicious activity. But both sides recognize their obligation to respond to concerns of the other side, and they realize that there are consequences for a failure to do so. These consequences reflect the final aspect of our verification policy, our approach to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance.

Response to Noncompliance

Our final goal for INF verification was to demonstrate our determination to adopt appropriate measures to protect US and allied security in the face of uncorrected Soviet violations, should any occur. As I have explained, Treaty provisions that make violations complex and costly, and monitoring rights that create a significant risk that they will be detected, help to deter potential Soviet violations. But the encouragement of compliant Soviet behavior goes beyond Treaty language; it rests as well on Soviet knowledge that the US has the will to take firm action in response to violations.

We have demonstrated such determination in several ways. We have reacted vigorously to questionable Soviet activities in the bilateral compliance forum, through diplomatic channels, in our reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, and in our extensive consultations with our allies. Where we have determined that a violation has been committed, we have demanded corrective action. And where we have concluded that our efforts to elicit corrective actions have failed, as with Soviet violations of SALT II, we have taken appropriate and proportionate responses.

We are still faced, unfortunately, with Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, most notably in the instance of the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets have halted further construction of that radar, but the violation will continue to exist until the radar is effectively dismantled. We will continue to insist that the Soviets deal with that violation satisfactorily. However, because the INF Treaty provides us substantial security benefits in its own right, and because INF systems are not directly related to strategic ballistic missile defenses, it is our judgment that immediate implementation of the Treaty would be in the net security interest of the US and its allies.

As a result of our approach to questionable Soviet activities in the past, the Soviets should understand well that any noncompliance with the INF Treaty will produce a determined US response.

Benefits for the Future

Beyond the value of the Treaty's verification provisions for enabling us effectively to verify Soviet compliance with Treaty obligations are certain other benefits that should not be overlooked. One such benefit is the precedential value for other arms control negotiations. The US is currently seeking Soviet agreement to on-site inspection and other cooperative and intrusive measures in a number of areas, including strategic arms reduction, nuclear testing, and conventional arms control. Having established a regime employing such measures in the INF Treaty, we should find it easier to negotiate similar measures in these other areas.

An example of the precedential value of the INF regime was provided during the recent Summit, when the Soviet side agreed readily to a partial list of verification measures for START that was derived in part from those established for INF. These measures, incorporated into the Summit Joint Statement, include data exchanges, baseline and elimination inspections, continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities, short-notice on-site inspections, prohibitions on interference with verification by national technical means, and measures to enhance observation by national technical means.

Of course, specific limits in the START Treaty, as well as in other treaties, will require their own verification provisions. In START, because weapons systems would be limited, not banned, because infrastructures would not be removed, and because continued testing would be allowed, the challenge to design truly effective verification will be much more difficult and the verification requirements even more stringent.

The Administration is continuing to study this problem as it works to flesh out the full regime that will be necessary for effective verification of a START Treaty. Nevertheless, the INF Treaty provides an excellent base on which to build.

Another benefit of the INF regime is the experience we will gain from implementing it. This experience will be valuable in designing verification packages for other agreements.

The US and the Soviet Union will receive their first technical and political experience in using the systematic application of on-site measures to supplement national technical means of verification. This experience should guide us well in devising the best possible verification regimes in the future.

Finally, there is the more general benefit deriving from the increased openness created by the verification provisions. In the data exchange alone, the Soviets are providing us with information about their military programs far more extensive than anything they have previously disclosed. Coupled with the wide range of inspections mandated by the Treaty, this promises to produce a more open environment in which the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation is significantly reduced.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in establishing its requirements for an acceptable arms control agreement at the beginning of its term, this Administration set a high standard for verification. We insisted that any Treaty would require verification measures going far beyond anything that had been negotiated before. In response to resistance from the Soviets and skepticism about negotiability from other quarters, we held to our views. Now we have achieved our goal; we have the most comprehensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control agreement in history. If the INF Treaty is ratified and implemented, we will be able effectively to verify Soviet compliance with its provisions.

NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) held its Autumn Ministerial meeting at Montebello, Quebec, Canada on 27th and 28th October, 1983. Spain attended as an observer.

Ministers discussed a wide range of security matters. In particular, they discussed a comprehensive study prepared by the High Level Group. The terms of the Montebello Decision taken on 27th October, 1983 which resulted from this are set out in full at Annex to this Communiqué.

Ministers reaffirmed that the supreme objective of the Alliance is the maintenance of peace in freedom. A stable military balance to be established at the lowest possible level is essential to this objective. They emphasized that it was not necessary for the Alliance to match the Soviet Union system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead. Although nuclear forces at all ranges play an important role in maintaining an unbroken spectrum of deterrence, only the minimum number of these forces necessary to support the Alliance's agreed strategy of deterrence and defence should be retained in NATO's inventory.

Ministers noted that, in contrast to NATO's policy of restraint, the Soviet build-up is continuing relentlessly at all levels. In recent months the Soviet Union has continued construction of at least three new SS-20 bases east of the Ural Mountains, in addition to the already deployed 351 operational SS-20 launchers comprising 1,053 warheads. They are also retaining a large number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and are replacing older shorter-range missiles by a new generation of more accurate systems, namely the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23, which have been under development for a number of years. SS-21s have already been forward deployed in Eastern Europe for some time. Ministers noted that the Soviet Union has recently threatened to deploy forward additional shorter-range missiles and to adopt other military and political measures should NATO proceed as planned with the deployment of LRINF in Europe. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to match NATO's restraint and to reduce rather than increase the levels of its nuclear weapons.

Ministers supported the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain the deterrent capabilities of their strategic forces, while recognizing that only the strategic forces of the United States have the capability to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for all members of the Alliance. At the same time, they welcomed the proposals the United States has made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks to reduce the most destabilizing weapons and to reduce substantially the level of United States and Soviet strategic arms, including the "build-down" concept recently tabled in Geneva. Ministers agreed that such proposals could serve as the basis for an effective agreement which would enhance the stability and security of all countries concerned.

Ministers emphasized their determination to move ahead with the dual-track approach of modernization and arms control with respect to LRINF. They noted with satisfaction that the flight testing of both the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in the United States had been successfully completed, that production of the missiles is on schedule and that the preparations in the European basing countries would permit initial operational capability, as planned. Ministers emphasized NATO's commitment and determination that, in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement obviating the need for that deployment, deployment of a mixed force of ballistic and cruise missiles as decided in the dual-track decision of 1979 will begin by the end of the year.

Ministers reaffirmed that the United States proposal in the INF negotiations, developed in close consultation with the Allies, to eliminate the entire category of United States and Soviet land-based longer-range INF missiles remains the best and most equitable outcome. They welcomed the continuing close consultations within the Alliance on the negotiations. Ministers fully supported the United States' offer of an interim agreement providing for United States and Soviet equality in missile and warhead numbers. They also supported the United States determination in Geneva to explore every proposed solution for an INF arms control agreement that meets the legitimate security concerns of the Alliance. The basic criteria of such an agreement are: significant reductions based on equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion of or compensation for third-country systems, global limitations, no weakening of the United States contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defence, and effective verification.

Ministers welcomed the latest United States initiatives which address concerns that the Soviet Union has expressed in Geneva on aircraft, geographic scope and reductions of the Pershing II as well as cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated similar flexibility. Each Soviet modification of their original proposal made so far would have the same basic outcome: the prohibition of any NATO LRINF missile deployments while the Soviet Union retained a monopoly in such missiles. This is because of their insistence to take into account British and French forces and their refusal to accept the principle of equality in LRINF missile deployments. The Alliance cannot accept this Soviet approach which is apparently intended to further their long-term aim of dividing the Alliance and to erode seriously the linkage between the United States strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe. This linkage is essential for NATO's security.

Ministers noted with attention the most recent Soviet proposals. The Soviets are invited to explain fully their proposals at the negotiating table. Ministers stated that NATO would continue to examine carefully all proposals in light of the Alliance's agreed criteria described above. As reported, however, the Soviet Union regrettably continues to insist on a monopoly in land-based LRINF missiles. The West has continued to negotiate for two years while the Soviet SS-20 build-up has continued. The Soviets therefore have absolutely no justification for breaking off negotiations as NATO's deployment goes forward, as they have threatened. Ministers stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would continue even after initial deployments and that they remain willing to reverse, halt or modify deployments - including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed - if and when a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement is achieved in Geneva.

Ministers accepted with pleasure an invitation from Mr. Ü. Haluk Bayülken, the Turkish Minister of National Defence, to hold their next meeting in Turkey in Spring 1984.

The Danish Minister of Defence repeated Danish Government support for the double track decision but at the same time he recalled the motion passed by the Folketing on May 26.

Greece has expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes.

THE MONTEBELLO DECISION

At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministers declared that the policy of the Alliance is to preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.

Consistent with this policy the Alliance since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed at assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces.

On the basis of the initial results of these analyses, the Alliance decided in December 1979 that, unless obviated by successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, the deployment of longer-range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) was essential to restoring the balance and maintaining the integrity of NATO's deterrent posture. The Alliance remains committed to the dual-track decision and its implementation. * At the same time Ministers decided to reduce the NATO stockpile by 1,000 warheads. This withdrawal has been completed. Moreover, Ministers mandated further analysis to determine whether the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1,000 then decided could be accomplished safely, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons.

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* Greece has expressed its views in the minutes of the NPG at Montebello.

With the Alliance analysis now complete, the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th October, 1983 to withdraw 1,400 warheads during the next several years. This Ministerial decision, taken together with the already accomplished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads will bring to 2,400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.

The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. NATO's military authorities should report their findings at a future NPC meeting.

Recognizing that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective, Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The Alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the example set by the Alliance, to halt and reverse its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO in the search for a safer future.

SS-20 PRODUCTION



Source: INF Treaty MOU

Source: DIA SMP '81-'87

Source: William Beecher "Soviet Mobile Missile Worries US," Boston Globe, Sept. 5, 1976, various press

ARMS NEGOTIATORS WARN SENATE ON TYING INF PACT TO BROADER ISSUES

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senior U.S. arms negotiators warned emphatically yesterday against attempts by liberals and conservatives in the Senate to link the new U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons treaty to broader military and arms-control issues.

Such provisos could delay implementation of the pending Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and divert energies from negotiations to reduce strategic nuclear forces, negotiators Max M. Kampelman and Maynard W. Glitman warned in the second day of Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the INF pact.

Their warnings came as most Democrats and Republicans on the committee teamed up with the negotiators to squelch criticism from Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) that the INF Treaty would destroy missiles while leaving their nuclear warheads, including fissionable material and guidance systems, available for use on other weapons.

A "red herring," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.). A "crimson whale," added Sen. Daniel J. Evans (R-Wash.), contending that it takes more than a "pile of powder and a bullet" to make a weapon.

Responding to Helms' contention that it is the warhead that "goes boom and kills people," Kampelman noted wryly that "they don't go boom by themselves . . . . It's very hard to pick up this nuclear warhead and throw it at someone."

The nuclear explosive section of the missile was exempted from destruction for a variety of reasons, including reluctance of U.S. as well as Soviet officials to expose their most secret weaponry to each other during joint verification procedures, Kampelman said.

Helms, who has attempted to upstage treaty proponents with a barrage of charges against the pact, was not deterred. Hardly missing a beat, he moved on to a new charge that as nuclear material is removed from the missiles and retained in some fashion it would enlarge nuclear stockpiles.

"He's now created a stockpile gap," exclaimed Biden. "We've created a scrap-iron gap too," added Glitman, trying to emphasize the importance of scrapping the missiles as opposed to warheads. In a gentle gibe, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) suggested that concern over nuclear stockpiles used to be a preoccupation of liberals, not conservatives such as Helms.

At another point, Biden suggested that Helms, in his concern over expanding nuclear stockpiles, was making a powerful case for the push by Biden and other liberals to impose interim restraints on strategic weapon deployments during START negotiations on reduction of long-range nuclear arsenals. Helms said he was "astounded" at Biden's logic.

It was Biden's push for stop-gap strategic-force limits—as well as a proposal from Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) to tie INF reductions to a strengthening of the relative balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces—that prompted warnings against "linkage" from the negotiators.

Although Senate leaders expect the treaty to win the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification, many treaty proponents fear that conditions on popular issues may be adopted by a simple majority vote in a way that could torpedo or at least complicate implementation of the INF reductions.

"Having prevailed in our successful negotiating approach in Geneva, you can perhaps understand why we are reluctant to see the reintroduction of linkage as part of the ratification process," said Kampelman in reference to earlier Soviet efforts to tie INF reductions to concessions on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and other issues.

In response to Biden's proposal for interim strategic limits, Kampelman said that with problems over verification and other issues, it could delay rather than expedite strategic arms reductions. Instead, he said, the United States and Soviet Union should "concentrate our energies" on achieving a START agreement by the middle of this year, noting there is no guarantee the Soviets would agree to interim restraints in any case.

Biden had argued that such restraints were necessary to prevent the Soviets from using nuclear materials and devices that would be stockpiled under the INF accord to strengthen its strategic forces aimed at the United States.

As for Pressler's proposal, Kampelman said that negotiations over conventional arms reductions "would take years," and linkage of INF and conventional-force reductions would mean the INF pact "would not be put into practice for quite some time."

Any such INF amendment dealing with the conventional arms issue would be "highly unfortunate," said the negotiator.

In their testimony, Kampelman and Glitman repeated earlier administration assurances that verification and compliance procedures are sufficient to ward off Soviet cheating. The treaty's verification regime "dramatically reduces the possibilities of maintaining a militarily useful covert INF missile force and serves as a deterrent to cheating," said Glitman.

Acknowledging the United States has had complaints about Soviet compliance with past treaties, Kampelman said, "The United States, mindful of previous difficulties over the Soviet record of noncompliance with previous arms control agreements, must be vigilant in its monitoring of Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty."

Safeguards written into the treaty reflect "wariness on our part" over Soviet compliance as well as efforts to prevent ambiguities from arising in connection with the INF compliance by both countries, Kampelman said.

In a related hearing held by the Senate Armed Services Committee, former defense secretary James R. Schlesinger, in supporting the treaty, said the INF pact "on balance should have a favorable impact on the military security of the Western world."

If carried out, he said, the Soviets would give up 1,600 nuclear warheads compared with 400 for the United States.

"This 4-to-1 ratio is a remarkable achievement; quite astonishing in light of prior Soviet behavior in negotiations and probably quite implausible to those American officials who proposed the Zero Option in 1981," he said.

The Soviets appear to have an inordinate fear of the Pershing II ground-based missiles in West Germany, Schlesinger observed. Those missiles would be scrapped under the INF Treaty.

During yesterday's hearings, Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.) issued a statement complaining that the panels' witnesses "seem to be stacked in favor of the INF Treaty."

Meanwhile, the conservative-led effort outside of Congress to defeat the treaty intensified as conservative activist Richard Viguerie announced formation of a group called "Americans Against Appeasement" to campaign by direct mail, telephone and commercials and circulate a weekly newsletter entitled "Peace in Our Time," featuring a weekly "Apostle of Appeasement Award."

HELMS CRITICIZES ARMS NEGOTIATORS ON ISSUES OF WARHEAD DESTRUCTION

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — Senator Jesse Helms, the conservative North Carolina Republican, stepped up his attacks on the new missile treaty today by assailing American negotiators for concluding an accord that does not require destruction of missile warheads.

The warhead issue has unexpectedly dominated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings for the last two days, overshadowing questions about whether the treaty can be adequately monitored and other important issues that experts had expected would preoccupy the panel.

"The part of nuclear weaponry that kills people and destroys property are excluded," Mr. Helms complained, embracing a criticism often made by liberals. Mr. Helms, who is the ranking Republican on the committee, has made it clear that he will raise a variety of arguments to mobilize opposition to the agreement.

On the issue of the nuclear warheads, American negotiators told the committee today that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted to destroy the warheads completely.

Democratic committee members asserted that Senator Helms, who is leading a campaign against the treaty to ban Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles based on land, was trying to create a false issue. By the end of the day, even some Republican members echoed this criticism.

"I fear that we will spend most of our hearings over the next several weeks trying to respond to red herrings that are strewn across the path of these treaty negotiations," said Senator Daniel J. Evans, a Washington Republican.

'A Crimson Whale'

Mr. Evans said Mr. Helms's charge about the warheads was "more than red herring; I'd call it a crimson whale."

"I think it is time to get over the rhetoric" and "get down to the facts," said Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana. Mr. Lugar defended the treaty provisions on warheads.

American negotiators were deferential to Senator Helms. But they appeared to be exasperated with his success in shaping the committee's agenda. Maynard W. Glitman, who led the American delegation that negotiated the new treaty, and Max M. Kampelman, the senior American arms negotiator, testified before the committee.

On the issue of destroying warheads, the negotiators noted that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to destroy the casing of the warhead, which holds the fissionable material and the guidance systems. This, in addition to the destruction of the missiles under the treaty, deprives each side of a usable military capability, the negotiators said.

Reasons for Provision

They added that the two sides had agreed not to destroy the fissionable material and the guidance systems inside the warhead for several reasons.

The negotiators said that the United States did not want to allow Soviet inspectors to inspect the design of American warheads, which they asserted would have been necessary if the warheads were destroyed.

In addition, the negotiators argued that destroying the fissionable material would have been difficult and might have created a problem of what to do with the nuclear waste.

A further point is that both sides want to be able to use the fissionable material and guidance systems in weapons not covered by the treaty.

'Shortage' of Material

Mr. Glitman said that the United States has "some shortage" of fissionable material. The United States," he added, "perhaps more than the Soviet side has an interest in retaining this material."

The United States also protected its right under the treaty to reuse some missile components. Despite initial Soviet resistence; the United States preserved the right to salvage the engines in its ground-launched cruise missiles, which are to be destroyed under the treaty, so that the engines can be used in the United States sea-launched cruise missiles.

In the committee hearings, the warhead dispute overshadowed key issues.

Some important issues, such as the question of whether the United States engaged in hasty negotiations to meet the summit deadline, were addressed in some detail only late in the afternoon. The negotiators denied this charge and said that they had protected the American position.

Audience at Hearings Dwindles

By late afternoon only a handful of members were present and the audience, never very large, had dwindled.

Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, noted shortly before the hearings ended late this afternoon that the hearing was going on in "almost an empty room."

"But there are four television cameras and my mother is watching," said Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, referring to the broadcast of the proceedings live on C-Span and the presence of network television cameras.

On other issues touched on today, American negotiators defended the Administration's decision to back away from its initial proposal for wide-ranging short-notice inspections virtually anywhere in the Soviet Union.

Total Ban on Missiles

Mr. Glitman said that this was done after Moscow agreed to a total missile ban which he pointed out was easier to monitor than a limit on missiles.

Mr. Glitman also alluded to the fact that the Administration scaled-back its verification demands after American intelligence agencies and military officials objected to giving Soviet inspectors the right to visit sensitive American installations.

He said that after review, "it became clear that we were not prepared" to allow Soviet inspectors such wide-ranging inspection rights.

NEGOTIATORS ARGUE FOR INF TREATY AS HELMS REBUFFED

By Mary Belcher
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

U.S. arms negotiators pushed the merits of the new U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons agreement to a receptive Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, as senators from both parties turned against the treaty's most vocal opponent.

Testifying on the second day of hearings on the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, negotiator Maynard Glitman said the removal of the missiles from Western Europe would soothe NATO fears. The Europeans are concerned that the United States might not come to their defense because the Soviet missiles now covered by the treaty could not reach American soil.

"Their [the INF missiles'] ability to intimidate, their potential for inciting fear of decoupling the United States from its allies, are what gave Soviet INF missiles their real force," he said.

His fellow negotiator Max Kampelman warned against conditioning INF ratification on progress in ongoing strategic arms reduction talks [START] or negotiations on the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

"The INF treaty stands on its own feet," Mr. Kampelman said. The philosophy behind arms-control talks, he said, is "one step at a time."

In a parallel hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said the INF treaty should be ratified. But the United States must assure its NATO allies in Western Europe that it remains committed to providing a nuclear deterrence to Soviet attack, he said.

Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations panel, continued to fault the treaty because it would allow the Soviet Union and United States to preserve the nuclear warheads of the medium-range missile systems scheduled for elimination.

"A missile is a carrying [illegible] warhead is the thing that goes 'boom' and kills you," Mr. Helms said. "A missile doesn't kill you unless it falls on your head and cracks it open."

But Mr. Kampelman and Mr. Glitman noted that warheads are impotent without a missile to deliver them to their targets and cause them to explode.

"They [the nuclear warheads] do not go boom by themselves," Mr. Kampelman said.

Mr. Glitman said the destruction of nuclear materials is not practical. "It is not possible to simply take a sledgehammer and crush the front end [the warhead] of a missile, because no one wants to be around — it isn't healthy," he said.

Other Republicans on the Foreign Relations committee quickly distanced themselves from Mr. Helms' arguments.

Sen. Dan Evans, Washington Republican, said the warheads issue was not just a "red herring" but a "crimson whale."

"The illusions are all falling," Sen. Richard Lugar, Indiana Republican, told the treaty negotiators. "This is very hard for people who think in cartoons and symbols to grasp."

But Mr. Helms kept pounding the treaty from all angles, raising prospects of Soviet cheating and the possibility that the warheads removed from medium-range missiles could simply be rebolted on longer-range missiles.

He also suggested that the Soviets could secretly continue to build medium-range missiles because U.S. observers will only be allowed to inspect those sites the Soviets allow them to inspect.

"You cannot expect to go any time any place in the Soviet Union unless you're willing to let them do the same thing," Mr. Glitman said, adding that the United States "still has some secrets" that should not be shared.

Mr. Kampelman resisted suggestions by Sen. Joseph Biden, Delaware Democrat, that the United States and Soviet Union agree to limit the production of long-range strategic weapons until they come to a final agreement on weapons cuts in ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START].

Mr. Kampelman said President Reagan has received no assurances from the Soviet Union that it would agree to such an interim freeze. He said seeking such an agreement could sidetrack START negotiations.

"Our feeling is that we have a good shot at getting a START treaty in the next few months, and we would rather put our energies into that highly complicated process," Mr. Kampelman said.

Mr. Helms is expected to propose so-called "killer" amendments to the arms pact that would force renegotiation with the Soviets. Mr. Biden's concerns are more likely to be expressed in legislation that would not force the superpowers back to the table.

Senate leaders predict that they will have the 67 votes needed to approve the treaty by mid-April. But they also are trying to keep it free of "killer" amendments, which would require approval by a simple majority of 51 senators.

INF TREATY PRESERVES NUCLEAR WARHEAD AT U.S. INSISTENCE, OFFICIALS SAY

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

A provision in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty allowing reuse of nuclear warheads and guidance mechanisms—a point of contention in the first two days of Senate hearings on the treaty—was pushed primarily by the United States, not the Soviet Union, U.S. officials said yesterday.

The provision was drafted in part to ease an impending shortage of nuclear materials for new U.S. weapons, and to safeguard secret information about their design, the officials said.

The Reagan administration is also considering reusing the warheads from INF missiles on new, shorter-range nuclear systems for Europe, but Congress has not authorized the systems.

The controversy erupted dramatically yesterday; as Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) asked why the treaty does not eliminate "the part of nuclear weaponry that kills people and destroys property."

The treaty demands instead that all parts of the medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles and launchers besides "warhead devices" and "guidance elements" be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion, all under observation by U.S. and Soviet inspectors. Each side is allowed to remove the warheads and guidance devices before these inspections begin.

Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) said Monday during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that "I found an appalling number of people I talked to . . . who were not aware that this treaty does not destroy one single nuclear explosive device."

Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci responded that "this basically was done at our behest."

Alluding to a shortage of nuclear materials such as plutonium and uranium that has been projected by the Reagan administration for the 1990s, Carlucci said, "It is clearly in our interest to be able to retain" the nuclear warheads from the 859 Pershing IA, Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) to be destroyed under the INF Treaty.

U.S. officials and independent experts said the administration's projection of a shortage in nuclear materials stems in part from environmental and safety concerns that last year caused the administration to close two nuclear reactors used to produce these materials and to lower power levels of the three remaining U.S. military production reactors.

Carlucci cited "the problems we have in manufacturing special nuclear material," and also suggested that the Soviet Union could now produce new nuclear materials more readily than the United States.

Maynard W. Glitman, chief U.S. negotiator in the INF talks, also told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday that it obviously "is not possible to take a sledgehammer and smash the front end of a nuclear missile because nobody wants to be around when that nuclear material is spread about."

Glitman was referring to the health risks of exposure to radioactive nuclear materials in the warheads.

Glitman added that if the warhead was required to be destroyed under inspection by the other side, "you'd be giving them information on bomb designs."

U.S. officials said another reason, unmentioned at the hearings, is that the United States is considering using Pershing II and GLCM warheads in new short-range Lance and air-to-surface nuclear missiles that are under study by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for deployment in Western Europe.

"We have just begun to study" this potential reuse of the warheads, said Paul Brown, an assistant associate director for arms control at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, one of the nation's two nuclear weapons design facilities.

Brown and other officials said neither U.S. nor Soviet warheads could simply be "rebolted" to weapons that are not covered by the INF agreement, as some Senate treaty critics suggested. The warheads will instead have to be taken apart and the components repackaged before used with other weapons, the officials said.

SOVIET PLANS TO SUBMIT ARMS PACT FOR CONSIDERATION BY LEGISLATURE

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 26 — The Soviet Union plans an extensive public examination of the treaty eliminating land-based intermediate-range missiles and may amend the pact before it is formally ratified, Soviet officials said today.

The Soviet plans for handling the treaty, which include nationally televised hearings and expert testimony critical of the accord, mark a departure from previously closed ratification procedures. The result, however, will still be controlled by the Communist Party leadership.

The plans were designed to allow Moscow to parallel the United States Senate's consideration of the accord and to keep open the option of adding amendments if the Senate does, the officials said.

The officials said ratification was not in doubt, but that Moscow wanted to maintain some leverage in case the Senate insists on significant changes. The treaty, which would eliminate land-based missiles with a range of between 300 and 3,400 miles, was signed in Washington in December by President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader.

Apparently convinced that in the past the United States has dominated the handling of treaties once they are signed, and, in the Soviet view, manipulated senate ratification to obstruct arms control accords, Mr. Gorbachev and the party leadership decided to use the Presidium and relevant bodies of the Supreme Soviet as a countervailing mechanism.

Moscow has long maintained that Senate resistance to the second strategic arms limitation agreement, signed by President Jimmy Carter and Leonid I. Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979, was a deliberate effort by the United States to undermine the arms-control process and superpower relations.

Withdrawel of Earlier Treaty

The Carter Administration withdrew the treaty from consideration after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979.

The revised Soviet process is also intended as an object lesson for Russians in more open debate about issues of national interest.

Yuri Korolyov, head of an administrative department of the Presidium, told Tass, "It can be expected that the treaty will be ratified in the Soviet Union approximately at the same time as this will be done in the United States."

SUMMIT TREATY SPURS BONN TO PLAY THE FIELD FOR DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

Special to The New York Times

News Analysis

BONN, Jan. 26 — The West Germans seemed to be busy on every diplomatic front at once last week.

First there was the visit to Bonn by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, the most tangible harbinger to date of a new warming in Soviet-German relations. Then Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was in Washington, urging the Senate to ratify the treaty on eliminating land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. His visit was followed by the announcement today that Chancellor Helmut Kohl would call on President Reagan from Feb. 17 to 19.

And before the week was out, Mr. Kohl was in Paris with President François Mitterrand celebrating the 25th anniversary of their reconciliation and signing agreements to set up a joint army brigade, as well as joint military and economic councils. Their agreements formally inaugurated an effort to shape the new nucleus of a European cooperation on security.

The flurry of initiatives emanating from Bonn to the East, the United States and Europe [illegible] the complex strategic and political shifts for which the Washington summit meeting appears to have served as a catalyst, and in which West Germany, by virtue of its geography, wealth, politics and history, is again at the epicenter.

The treaty signed in Washington played to the yearning for détente and disarmament of a divided nation straddling the front line of the East-West conflict, and it fanned the suspicion that the United States will not stand sentinel over West Europe forever.

The West Germans have probably ranked among the most enthusiastic Western boosters of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his domestic and foreign policies. Polls have found that the West Germans view the Soviet leader as having greater credibility than Mr. Reagan. Probably more significantly, they have shown that only 24 percent consider the Soviet Union as a threat today, compared with 55 percent five years ago.

The most dramatic recent evidence of the German attitude was the enthusiasm with which Franz Josef Strauss, the Bavarian leader and the staunchest of West Germany's old cold warriors, returned from a visit to Moscow late last month. Mr. Strauss sang Mr. Gorbachev's praises while saying that Mr. Reagan was "unpredictable."

In Bonn last week, Mr. Shevardnadze continued the courtship by professing ardent interest in eliminating the weapons that worry Germans most, short-range nuclear rockets and chemical weapons, and urging the Government to fight Washington for a less restrictive list of sensitive goods barred from export to the Soviet Union.

Moscow's Key to the Wall

The Germans' excitement was not a surprise. For one thing, they have always believed that Moscow holds the real key to the wall dividing their nation. For another, "Ostpolitik" has always held that the Germans, with their Middle European heritage, can serve as a bridge between East and West.

Soviet policy toward West Germany has been less benign, wavering between sweet words and dire threats. The latter dominated in recent years as Moscow tried to intimidate Bonn out of accepting new American medium-range missiles, and Mr. Gorbachev has avoided Bonn in his travels.

But experts always presumed that Moscow would not stay contentious forever. For one thing, West Germany will be critical to any future arms-control negotiations on short-range, chemical or conventional weapons. More important, West Germany is the Soviet Union's leading and [illegible] partner in Western Europe.

Accordingly, Moscow signaled a new equanimity last summer by receiving President Richard von Weiszäcker, and then finally allowing the East German leader, Erich Honecker, to visit Bonn in September.

As always, Bonn's revived Ostpolitik has sounded alarms in Washington, Paris and London. Among other things, the allies are afraid that Moscow will entice Bonn into pressing for negotiations on short-range and chemical weapons, issues on which the other allies would prefer to pause while shaping a consensus on how to deal with the imbalance in conventional arms.

But some diplomats cautioned against sounding too shrill an alarm.

"If the Germans move a bit to the right," a diplomat said, "we scream, 'German nationalism is reviving.' If they shift a bit left, we shout 'they're going neutral.' We give them a very narrow range of accepted behavior. But it's part of the basic structure of the American-German relationship that we get worried about each other from time to time."

More significant was that the new opening to the East coincided with the growing awareness in West Germany and in the North Atlantic alliance that Europe's dependence on a generous American nuclear umbrella cannot last forever.

Within West Germany, the treaty on withdrawing medium-range missiles also touched a lingering fear of being designated as a battleground in a limited war by the other allies. Without the medium-range missiles, the argument goes, the remaining tactical and chemical weapons are intended for use on German soil.

Genscher Rebukes Washington

Alone among the allies, the Germans demanded immediate negotiations to fix ceilings on short-range weapons, and Mr. Genscher publicly rebuked the Americans for dragging their feet on chemical weapons.

The notion that withdrawal of the missiles somehow "decoupled" Bonn's defenses from Washington's and left it to take the brunt of war was disputed by those who argued that 300,000 Americans and a profusion of other weapons remaining in West Germany gave the United States an ample stake there.

But the release this month of the report of a high-level United States commission on long-term strategic planning added to questions about the Washington's relationship with Bonn because it emphasized the growing importance to American national interests of the Pacific and other regions outside Europe.

The establishment with France of a joint military council and a joint brigade, to be stationed in West Germany under rotating command, has been a source of some irritation and befuddlement, especially in Britain. Among the questions are how the brigade, or the joint council, would function in war, when West German forces are entirely integrated in NATO while France pursues an independent defense policy.

But the project has been welcomed by Washington, which has long urged Europe to take some independent steps, as the nucleus of a European security system that will bring France and its missiles back into the fold and reassure the Germans that they are not being abandoned.

"If we agree that the West needs to realign its defenses, then the French-German cooperation has to be the driving engine for more integration in European defenses," said Karl Kaiser, director of the German Society for Foreign Policy.

For the West Germans, he said, France and its independent nuclear force were a critical component in any strengthened European defense. And for France, which has always had the strongest doubts about the steadfastness of its big Eastern neighbor, it was vital to insure that a nonnuclear Germany is not driven too far toward the East by insecurity.

SOVIETS BEGIN TOUR OF NEVADA TEST SITE

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

MERCURY, Nev. — Soviet experts began yesterday their comprehensive tour of America's only nuclear proving ground, a Rhode Island-sized complex whose secrets the United States has jealously protected for years.

Using this Energy Department-owned hamlet in the southeast corner of the Nevada Test Site as a base, the Soviets will spend four days learning how America prepares, conducts and measures its nuclear tests.

"It is sensitive information, yes," James Magruder, an assistant test site manager, said when asked if the 20-man Soviet team would encounter any classified data.

A U.S. team toured the tightly guarded Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, 2,000 miles southeast of Moscow, two weeks ago.

The reciprocal visits are aimed at preparing joint nuclear explosions at both sites as a step toward further verifying existing limits on such blasts and possibly agreeing to new ones.

Experts from the superpowers began nine hours of technical exchanges yesterday with a handshake between Igor M. Palenykh, the chief Soviet representative and the Kremlin's top negotiator on nuclear testing, and Troy Wade, assistant secretary of energy for defense programs.

The Soviets arrived Sunday in Las Vegas, 65 miles to the southeast, and were bused to Mercury early Monday evening.

Later this week, they will venture farther onto the test site, an 800,000-acre expanse of snow-capped peaks and desert pockmarked with the telltale craters of underground nuclear detonations.

American Peace Test, an anti-nuclear group, plans to demonstrate today near the test site's front gate, Energy Department spokesman Chris West said. The protest marks the 37th anniversary of the first of an estimated 791 underground and atmospheric nuclear tests conducted here.

Extra measures have been taken to protect the Soviet delegation, said Chuck McWilliam, chief of the site's logistics branch. Testing-related activities, however, will not be disrupted.

The two delegations also have agreed to tightly restrict press coverage of the visit here.

The tour, by all accounts, will be detailed and extensive. That, U.S. officials say, describes their visit to Semipalatinsk.

"Without exception, everything we agreed to see, we saw," said Robert Jeffries, director of verification and safeguards at Los Alamos National Laboratory. "I was struck by the similarity, as much as anything, of the way we do things."

Details of what the two teams would be allowed to see were worked out in advance in Geneva.

The Soviets, accompanied by officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Energy, Defense and State departments, will inspect facilities here for drilling holes up to 12 feet wide and hundreds of feet deep. They also will see nuclear tests in various stages of preparation.

The Soviets probably will visit the site's nerve center, Control Point No. 1, from which tests are detonated and monitored, Mr. West said.

They will not, however, be allowed to visit Rainier Mesa, where U.S. and captured Soviet equipment is subjected to the effects of radiation in long tunnels. Nor will they learn anything about American nuclear weapons design.

Much of the visit will focus on CORRTEX, a system that the Reagan administration judges superior to seismology in gauging the size of nuclear blasts.

The Soviets are thought to object to the intrusiveness of the system, which requires a foreign presence at the other side's test site. But Los Alamos' Mr. Jeffries said, "I'm unaware of any specific objections to CORRTEX."

"The question of intrusiveness has been addressed by our visit to the Soviet Union two weeks ago," he said without elaborating.

CORRTEX measures the size of a

nuclear blast through use of a calibrated cable near the explosion site.

The Soviets are being housed on the bottom floor of a two-story dormitory here. The U.S. delegation is staying on the top floor. Each of the building's 53 rooms contains its own bathroom, a television with three cable channels and a stocked refrigerator.

Mr. McWilliam declined to provide a cost estimate for hosting the Soviets, but said it already has been exceeded.

While the Soviets will be permitted to wander around Mercury — which has its own bowling alley, track, movie theater and post office — in the evening "any room that has classified information will be closed," he said.

EUROPESSIMISM TAKES TURN FOR THE WORSE

By Karen Elliott House

BONN—Europessimism. It's as old as the Western Alliance itself. But something very different and much more ominous is festering in European capitals today. Normally, when Europeans are fearful, they come whimpering and wheedling to Uncle Sam; this time they aren't.

Instead, the allies — especially the French and Germans—are gritting their teeth and groping among themselves for new alliances and alignments that can substitute for their traditional dependence on America. The current European mood goes beyond pessimism to something much more serious—a conclusion that survival depends less on America and more on some combination of their own political ingenuity and Soviet good will.

This conclusion comes from talks in Bonn, Paris and London with many of Europe's leading security experts and policy makers. These included, among others, the national security advisers to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand; former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing; and, in Germany, Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner and opposition defense spokesman Karsten Voigt.

Slipping Away From Europe

From this side of the Atlantic, the Reagan-Gorbachev treaty removing intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe is generally seen as just one more piece of evidence that America is pulling back. For public consumption, European officials offer a lukewarm endorsement of a treaty they already view as a fait accompli. What they say in private is very different.

The INF Treaty actually is viewed as part of Uncle Sam's long, slippery slide these past 18 months away from a traditional commitment to Europe. First came the superpower summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, when President Reagan expressed willingness to do away with all nuclear weapons, thus leaving Europe at the mercy of the Warsaw Pact's massive superiority in conventional forces. In European eyes, the Reykjavik meeting lives in infamy.

"It was Yalta II," says a French official involved in national security policy. "The two superpowers got together and in two days, without any consideration, without any consultation with us, sold out Europe again."

Since then, several other things have reinforced the fear and trembling in Europe. Following last month's Reagan-Gorbachev summit, America now actually is pulling its INF missiles out of Europe, not just talking about it. Then, too, the humbled economic circumstances of America and its once dominant dollar encourage the conclusion that a U.S. troop pullout from Europe will come next. Additionally, the siren song of glasnost suggests to many Europeans, especially the Germans, that the Soviet bear isn't really all that threatening anymore. On top of all that, this month's landmark Pentagon study by such prestigious strategists as Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski concluding that the U.S. must refocus its defense priorities away from Europe to conflicts in the Third World is another sign to Europeans that America is abandoning them.

All this could have had positive consequences. The U.S. decision to withdraw its INF missiles and the talk of broader nuclear reductions could have led the Europeans toward a commitment to more military self-reliance. That would have made it more difficult for the U.S. to think seriously about reducing its troop presence in Europe. In turn, the sense of a firm and lasting U.S. presence could have further reinforced European efforts to do more for their own defense.

But that constructive cycle hasn't materialized. Instead, the catch phrase here these days is, "No Nukes, No Troops," meaning that America isn't about to leave its troops exposed to the Warsaw Pact's superior forces without the protection of nuclear weapons in Europe. It is an analysis that has all the earmarks of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Europeans are starting to act on the basis of what they fear will happen.

In short, they are running to each other, but heavily burdened with the suspicions and rivalries that have characterized European power politics for centuries. Without America in its traditional parental role, the Europeans are beginning to behave with all the familial intrigue of characters on "Dynasty" or "Dallas."

France and Germany are proclaiming themselves the twin pillars of a new European order. Their leaders talk of going beyond economic cooperation into an era of military integration. So far, however, only one joint brigade exists—even on paper. Indeed, the only thing the French and Germans really share is a common fear of American abandonment.

The Germans, always eager to find some way to reunite their divided nation, see glasnost as making that possibility somewhat more likely. But Germany's dream of reunification is France's nightmare. The French view a closer Franco-German alliance as a leash to restrain West Germany's pull toward the East. Paradoxically, the Germans see greater cooperation with France less as a defense shield against the Russians than as a screen behind which they can carry on flirtations with the Soviets while being protected from American protestations.

"We don't want any distrust in America that we are changing our position," says a senior West German official. "Getting rid of this distrust is essential to get room for maneuver in our relations with the East. The backing of the French socialist president makes that easier."

As the Germans maneuver behind their French shield, they expound other virtues of closer Franco-German relations. The French, they explain in loud stage whispers, are the *enfants terribles* of Europe and someone has to tame them into closer cooperation with the NATO military alliance. The problem, of course, is that the last thing the French want is to be lured into NATO.

There are other limits on France's military commitment to Germany. With the U.S.-Soviet INF agreement, France's nuclear missiles take on added significance. Despite all the talk of Franco-German cooperation, President Mitterrand has made it clear that France's strategic nuclear forces won't be used automatically to save Germany. Germany, he says, must look for protection under the American nuclear umbrella.

"Mitterrand asks America, which is far away, to do what he refuses to do for a neighbor," says a top West German official.

If Germany is concerned about French egocentrism and France is fretting over German flirtations with the Soviets, Britain is worried about even the talk of Franco-German cooperation. That's partly because closer Franco-German ties relegate Britain to a peripheral role in European affairs. But it's more because the British fear that the more Europe talks of alliances to defend itself, the more budget-conscious U.S. congressmen will be inclined to let Europe do precisely that. Once again, this could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, Mrs. Thatcher is the only Western leader publicly calling for no more nuclear disarmament in Europe and the upgrading of the missiles that remain after the INF pullout.

Yet the Soviets seem closer than ever to their ultimate goal of denuclearizing Western Europe. Messrs. Gorbachev and Reagan are expected to meet again at midyear to conclude a treaty that would cut in half the superpower strategic nuclear arsenals. This would affect the core of those arsenals—intercontinental-range missiles targeted by the two superpowers on each other. Soviet willingness to make such deep cuts is seductive stuff to European public opinion.

At the same time, the Soviets seem virtually certain this year to offer substantial cuts in conventional weaponry. This, too, the Europeans will find beguiling.

The catch is that the Soviets want removal not just of INF missiles, but also of what soon will be the last remaining U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe—those, based mostly in Germany, with a range of under 500 kilometers. The official NATO strategy is to "modernize" these remaining missiles and aircraft to give them greater range and penetration capability. That would make them a more potent threat to Soviet aggression—or at least a bigger bargaining chip in conventional arms-reduction talks.

That strategy, however, already is being undercut. Key decision makers in France and Germany are deeply divided over whether to a) modernize the short-range nuclear missiles, b) bargain them away for cuts in Soviet conventional weapons, or c) get rid of them as relics that have outlived their usefulness in a new age of glasnost. The Soviets, who are pressing for immediate negotiations on the short-range missiles, can afford to be magnanimous in such talks since they have roughly 1,300 such missiles, compared with the 88 Lance missiles in West Germany. "Deep cuts," the current catch phrase, would mean the effective end of all Western nuclear missiles.

Not a Credible Prospect

If short-range missiles follow the INF missiles out, Europe, which is unwilling to spend more on conventional defense, would have to depend on American willingness to use its strategic nuclear forces—and risk global nuclear war—in the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. In short, Europe would be dependent on America's willingness to sacrifice, say, Boston, for Bonn. Germans never before have found that prospect credible, which is the reason the U.S. put nuclear weapons in Europe in the first place.

Nonetheless, public determination remains high in West Germany to get rid of the remaining nuclear weapons, because, if used, they would land mostly on either East or West Germany. The Germans summarize their distaste for this prospect with the phrase: "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans."

If these last short-range nuclear missiles go, as seems probable, Western Europe's security will depend on one of two possibilities: the chance that the U.S. would be willing to risk all-out nuclear war or the hope that the Soviets have dropped their goal of dominating Europe.

RESPONSES OF MR. KAMPELMAN AND MR. GLITMAN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PRESSLER

Q1. An Evans and Novak column on December 21 stated that on December 3 "Soviet negotiators warned that if the INF agreement could not be signed on December 8, when Mikhail Gorbachev joined Ronald Reagan in the White house, 'there would be no treaty.'"

a. Mr. Ambassador did the Soviets make such a threat -- explicitly or implicitly -- on December 3 or any other date?

The Soviets made a statement to the effect that if the INF Treaty were not signed on 8 December, it would not be done. This had no effect on the U.S. negotiators. The U.S. continued, as it had done throughout the negotiations, to reject Soviet attempts to set artificial deadlines. If we had not achieved our substantive objectives, we would not have signed the Treaty.

b. Why Mr. Ambassador, in the closing days of the negotiations did the State Department give up on the longstanding U.S. position to require advance notice of transit routes of SS-20 missiles?

The U.S. never sought advance notice of transit routes for SS-20 missiles. To have done so would have required reciprocal notification for U.S. systems which would have presented security problems for the U.S.

c. As a part of the negotiating record provided to the Committee, have you included the details on when certain provisions were finalized? Were there almost 100 unresolved, or "bracketed", issues as late as late November or even early December before the summit?

The negotiating record includes information on when each aspect of the Treaty was agreed. As a guide to the negotiating status, prior to the 23-24 November Ministerial in Geneva between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the U.S. Delegation compiled a list of approximately 95 points in the text of all four Treaty documents requiring final agreement on text. Many of these points were interconnected topics in which the resolution of one point resolved a number of other points.

d. Mr. Ambassador, is it true that the Soviets provided to the U.S. at least four different versions of their SS-20 arsenals, culminating in the final number specified in the treaty of 650 missiles? Why should we believe this figure any more than the lower numbers previously supplied by the Soviets?

The Soviets provided MOU data in four separate installments on October 26, November 18 and 21 and again on December 2. There were four instances of inconsistencies among these data. The data indicate that the inconsistencies are largely a result of recategorization by the Soviets of known and declared equipment. The instances were as follows:

-- In the totals for December 2, the Soviets indicated that the number of deployed SS-20 and SS-4 missiles had increased from 457 to 470 and that the number of deployed launchers for these two systems had increased from 457 to 484. The data breakdown shows, however, that this increase over the November 21 data represents a recategorization from nondeployed to deployed of 13 SS-4 missiles and 27 SS-4 launchers that were in storage at missile operating bases. The INF Treaty defines missiles located at missile operating bases as deployed, even when in storage, and the revised figures reflect the Treaty definition.

-- The data of December 2 show a significant drop in the total number of nondeployed SS-20 and SS-4 missiles, from 558 to 356 and a decrease of 27 nondeployed SS-4 and SS-20 launchers. The data breakdown shows this decrease is due to the recategorization of the 13 SS-4 missiles and 27 launchers cited above, and the removal from the nondeployed total of 42 SS-20 and 147 SS-4 "training missiles" in accordance with Treaty definitions. The INF Treaty requires that each side declare such training equipment but these are differentiated from nondeployed missiles and are listed separately. The Treaty also provides for the elimination of training equipment subject to on-site inspection.

-- In all installments, the Soviet data for shorter-range missiles, deployed and nondeployed, totaled 926, with a launcher total of 237. In the initial installment the subtotal for deployed missiles was 172 with 754 nondeployed. For launchers, the breakdown was 172 deployed, and 65 nondeployed. In the November 18 data, 215 missiles and 25 launchers had moved from the nondeployed to deployed categories. We believe the adjustment of this subtotal within the constant aggregate total may reflect an adjustment in response to the Treaty definition of deployed and nondeployed, similar to that in the case of the change in the SS-4 numbers described above.

-- In the November 18 data, the Soviets listed one SS-20 launcher at the Volgograd launcher production facility. In the December 2 data, this entry was deleted although the aggregate total for nondeployed launchers did account for it. In the final December 8, 1987 data, the Volgograd launcher was listed and that omission in the 2 December data appears to have been inadvertent.

The U.S. did not recategorize Treaty-limited items in the same way as the Soviets. We did make adjustments to our data, for example, when we notified the Soviets that there were additional Pershing IA missile stages located at the Longhorn facility where they were produced. These defective stages meet Treaty definitions and must be eliminated under the Treaty.

Finally, I want to emphasize that once the Treaty has entered into force, we will be able to verify Soviet data thru OSI.

Q2. Mr. Ambassador, was it not the original U.S. position that the warheads on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles should be destroyed? How and why did we change that position to permit each side to retain these warheads?

a. What does the United States intend to do with our nuclear warheads? What does the State Department expect the Soviets to do with theirs?

It was never the position of the United States, or of the Soviets in Geneva, to call for the destruction of INF warheads. The INF Treaty does not require physical destruction of the actual nuclear explosive devices (called "nuclear warhead devices" in the Treaty--the packages containing the fissionable material). For a number of reasons, such destruction was never proposed by either side in Geneva.

The Treaty does require destruction of front sections on deployed missiles, including reentry vehicles and warhead sections, that house these nuclear materials -- they must be crushed or flattened. The nuclear explosive devices and the guidance elements will be removed from these front sections prior to their destruction. With the destruction of these front sections, and the missiles, launchers, support equipment and support structures governed by the Treaty, along with the elimination of the support facilities for these missile systems, both sides will be eliminating an entire classe of missiles designed and deployed to deliver INF nuclear explosive devices. Without delivery vehicles, of course, nuclear explosive devices do not constitute a credible threat.

We have no information on what the Soviets plan to do with their warhead packages in the future.

Q3. Mr. Ambassador, Secretary Shultz noted yesterday (on page 32 of his testimony that "Mr. Gorbachev would not have signed it if he did not feel that it served his interests to do so." What would you assess as some of the Soviet interests that are advanced by the treaty?

A major military objective for the Soviets in an INF Treaty was to remove the 108 Pershing II missiles from Europe, given the missile's accuracy and its fast flight time in reaching targets in the Western USSR. They were also concerned about the less immediate but formidable threat of the U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles, which, when fully deployed, would number 464 at five West European basing countries.

Soviet SS-20s were a political as well as military weapon, meant to intimidate Europe and inspire a sense of "decoupling" from the U.S. This tactic of intimidation backfired. Contrary to the predictions of many, NATO was able to respond and to stay united on its dual-track decision of 1979 which called for deploying and negotiating. The Soviets, therefore, in reversing their course and signing a treaty which would eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles may have sought to recoup the damage the SS-20s were doing to their political interests in Europe and at the same time reap political goodwill, especially in terms of public opinion in Western European countries.

The Soviets may be hoping that the INF Treaty will create momentum toward the denuclearization of Europe. However, this is one goal to which we will not subscribe. NATO needs a nuclear deterrent. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group is currently examining NATO force posture adjustments to ensure the Alliance retains a credible spectrum of nuclear deterrent options at all ranges. NATO will retain a broad spectrum of theater and strategic nuclear capabilities, able to hold at risk targets throughout the Warsaw Pact. Continued modernization of these forces will ensure they provide an effective deterrent.

Q4. Mr. Ambassador, did I understand from Secretary Shultz' testimony yesterday, (p.32) that the Soviets' draft treaty of April 1987 ultimately formed the basis of the final proposed treaty that is now before the Senate?

No. The INF Treaty now before the Senate is based on the U.S./Soviet Joint Draft Text agreed to by the sides on June 1, 1987. That, in turn, is based largely on the U.S. draft treaty tabled in Geneva in March 1987.

Q5. Mr. Ambassador, could you elaborate on how the treaty's banning of shorter-range missiles "improves NATO's conventional military posture, by eliminating systems which could target nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads against NATO's ports and airfields" as stated by Secretary Shultz yesterday? (p. 40)

At least some of the Soviet SRMs eliminated under the Treaty are triple-capable. Because the Treaty requires their elimination, part of the conventional and chemical threat to NATO ports and airfields is also being eliminated, thereby improving our conventional situation, including our reinforcement capabilities.

Q6. Could you elaborate, Mr. Ambassador, on Secretary Shultz' contention yesterday (p. 42 of his testimony) that "increasing the likelihood of getting caught clearly decreases the attractiveness of cheating." What is the United States going to do if we discover a Soviet violation?

The proper U.S. response to a future violation would depend on decisions made at that time after considering a number of factors, including the nature of the violation. Other factors would include the willingness or unwillingness of the Soviet Union to resolve and reverse the violation and perhaps most importantly, the nature of the threat to U.S. and Allied security at the time the violation is detected and assessed. It is difficult to predict what the factors may be in the abstract, and how we will want to respond at some unspecified time in the future.

We must and will in all cases react vigorously to questionable Soviet activities, and press them on our concerns. In the case of a Soviet action that seems in violation of INF Treaty obligations, we will press them for an explanation or appropriate action to return to compliance using diplomatic channels including ministerial levels. We could also use the Special Verification Commission (SVC) created by the Treaty particularly in clarifying technical aspects of specific compliance issues or in developing procedures to reduce the possibility for future ambiguous situations.

There are a number of options to respond proportionately and appropriately to any Soviet violations. Under customary international law, a Party has the ultimate right to withdraw from a Treaty in the event of a material breach. In the case of the SALT II Treaty, the President determined that the U.S. would no longer observe the terms of a Soviet-violated and unratified agreement.

Soviet violations of arms control agreements have been selective and specific. We must be prepared to respond accordingly, with the focus squarely on our own interests. If there is cheating, the President must be able to count on Congress to help him with the measures necessary to preserve our security and that of our Allies.

We will continue to pursue a vigorous compliance policy including pressure on the Soviets to end violations of existing agreements. We will, as we have in the past, report on Soviet non-compliance.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BIDEN

I. Meaning of the Treaty/Sofaer Doctrine

Q1. Mr. Secretary, as you know, earlier this year the question of the proper role for the Senate in the treaty-making process was fully explored in joint Foreign Relations Committee and Judiciary Committee hearings, which I co-chaired. That inquiry was necessary because of the Reagan Administration's unconstitutional reinterpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. That reinterpretation raises the specter of some future administration changing the meaning of the INF Treaty. Therefore, at the outset, I would like your responses to the following questions regarding how the meaning of the INF Treaty should be determined.

Introductory Comment. We strongly disagree with Senator Biden's unfounded assertion that the Administration's interpretation of the ABM Treaty is "unconstitutional." The Administration's analysis-- which is sound as a matter of domestic and international law and supported by the facts-- appropriately recognizes the legal authority of the Senate as well as that of the President.

Q2. We have not received the legal analysis based on the negotiating record we requested. We have copies of the treaty text, the Protocols to the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding, the President's transmittal letter, and the Article by Article analysis of the treaty's obligations. Are there any other documents a Senator needs, in addition to your testimony and the testimony of other Executive Branch witnesses, in order to be able to determine the proper meaning of this treaty?

The Senate and the Executive Branch each have a strong interest in ensuring that the Senate is in a position to give a full and fair consideration of the INF Treaty. In furtherance of this important goal, we have provided or will be providing, the Senate with the documents and testimony you mentioned, responses to individual Senator's questions, and access to the INF Treaty negotiating record. We believe the Treaty, the Protocols thereto, the Article-by-Article Analysis, and the negotiating record provide an accurate account of the Treaty.

Q3. In accordance with 200 years of Executive-Legislative relations is it correct that your testimony, the testimony of other Executive Branch witnesses as to the meaning of this treaty, and any submissions for the hearing record will be authoritative and Senators can rely upon them to determine the obligations assumed by the United States under this treaty?

It is correct that Executive Branch witnesses will give authoritative testimony, within their authorized scope, about U.S. Treaty obligations in order to assist the Senate in its consideration of the Treaty.

Q4. Is the Administration firmly committed that no interpretation for the treaty different from that presented to the Senate will be adopted without the approval of the Senate? Would any new interpretation be presented as an amendment or protocol requiring two-thirds approval?

The Reagan Administration will in no way depart from the INF Treaty as we are presenting it to the Senate.

Q5. Is it necessary for the Senate to incorporate its understanding of the meaning of this treaty into our resolution of ratification to prevent future Presidents from adopting a meaning different from the one you are presenting here today?

Administration testimony and materials for the record can be regarded as authoritative, as described above, without the need for the Senate to incorporate them in its Resolution of Ratification. Of course, we cannot bind future Administrations.

II. Military Impact of the INF Treaty

Q1. Purpose of Reducing SS-20s. You have suggested that part of the reason this treaty is in our security interest is because the Soviet Union will be obligated to reduce far more nuclear systems than the United States. President Reagan has touted this agreement as eliminating an entire class of nuclear systems.

a. Will not the Soviet Union still maintain thousands of strategic systems which can serve the same military function? Can it be said that we are eliminating a significant part of U.S. or Soviet military capability?

b. Since the elimination of Soviet missiles may not significantly reduce Soviet target coverage, even in Europe, what is the military value in reducing Soviet intermediate and shorter-range missiles?

The INF Treaty does not solve all our security problems. It was never meant to. But it does eliminate a class of weapons which the Soviets saw fit to deploy for over 30 years. Clearly, the Soviets saw utility in these systems, or they would not have deployed and modernized them.

As a result of the Treaty, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters to strike many of our Allies. In addition, in Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites, and debarkation points, both ports and airfields.

Additionally, we have long been concerned about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter-range delivery systems for chemical and conventional weapons (SS-12s and SS-23s) will be removed from the Soviet order of battle as a result of this Treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-12 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and airfields. In essence, the Treaty will assist in facilitating our reinforcement of Europe.

In East Asia, elimination of the SS-20 prevents the Soviets from holding at risk over 500 targets in that region. When coupled with the elimination of 300 Soviet shorter-range missiles in the Asian-Pacific theater, the elimination of all Soviet ground-based INF missiles represents a significant reduction in the threat to our Asian friends and allies.

Q1c. Could you please explain how the reduction of Soviet SS-20s and shorter-range missiles fits into our overall goals and objectives for strategic arms control?

The President's long-standing goal, and that of the Alliance, has been to achieve stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty clearly contributes significantly to that goal by completely eliminating a class of such weapons. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev, as well as NATO's Foreign Ministers, have repeatedly stated that the next step in this process should be 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and Soviet Union. US and Soviet negotiators are back at the table now in Geneva working toward that end.

The INF Treaty will have a considerable beneficial effect. It will strengthen our national security and that of Western Europe. Its contribution will be enhanced, however, if it is complemented by progress in the other arms control deliberations as well as in the other areas of US-Soviet relations.

Strategic Arms

Q2. In May 1986, President Reagan announced that the United States would abandon its policy of informal adherence to the limits of SALT II. Because of this action, the Soviet Union can, if it chooses, add new strategic forces to compensate for reducing its SS-20s. Those new strategic forces could be programmed to cover the same targets as the SS-20.

a. In the absence of a new agreement covering strategic arms, should some informal arrangement be negotiated to prevent the Soviet Union from taking such actions which would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the INF Treaty?

b. If we do not achieve a START agreement, could this loophole become increasingly important? What action is the Administration prepared to take in order to forestall a potential build-up in Soviet strategic forces?

c. What would be the risk of the Senate conditioning its approval of the INF Treaty on a formal agreement by both parties not to increase the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in existence at the time of ratification?

We do not favor an informal arrangement of this sort. Such arrangements do not necessarily build confidence and are difficult to verify. There is no way to hold the Soviet Union accountable, but it gives the Soviet Union a pretext for attacking measures we and our Allies take to protect our security which are fully consistent with this Treaty.

The INF Treaty was never intended to limit strategic nuclear weapons. It deals comprehensively with a part of the Soviet threat that previous treaties did not deal with. Clearly, the effectiveness of the INF Treaty would be enhanced by a START agreement, but each agreement is valid in its own right. From the point of view of the NATO alliance, it makes no more sense to hold an INF Treaty hostage to a START agreement than it would have to have held a START agreement hostage to INF, if the sequence had been reversed.

Conditioning Senate approval of the INF Treaty on a formal agreement by both parties not to increase the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles at the time of ratification would jeopardize a Treaty that stands on its own merits and is clearly in our national security interest. Among other things, jeopardizing prompt ratification places at risk the strength and cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance and the future of all arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

The President's approach to interim restraint has not impeded progress in arms control. In fact, the Soviets have made their most constructive START proposals subsequent to the President's decision. No regime of interim restraint can substitute for the significant reductions in strategic offensive arms that we are seeking and are closer than ever to achieving in START.

Establishing informal adherence to unilaterally imposed and unverifiable sub-limits would prevent the necessary modernization of our strategic deterrent forces and undercut our negotiating leverage to achieve the equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing arms reductions we are seeking in the START negotiations.

III. Implications of the INF Treaty for NATO

The most direct effect of this treaty is on the NATO alliance. A number of factors must be considered to determine its ultimate impact: the original purpose of the deployment of INF missiles, the current ability of NATO forces to deter a Warsaw Pact attack, and NATO's priorities for further arms control negotiations.

1. 1979 Dual-track Decision. Secretary Shultz, as you know some have suggested that the original purpose of NATO's "dual-track" decision was more than simply to respond to the Soviet SS-20s. Some have argued that without the deployment of U.S. INF missiles, NATO's strategy would be undermined. In a recent speech, President Reagan said that "the aim of the (1979) decision was not in itself the deployment of American missiles. That was only to be the means to an end." This statement implies that some deployment was necessary, yet in your transmittal letter, you say that the goal of the negotiating track of the 1979 decision was to establish "a balance in intermediate-range nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level." Your statement implies some deployment was necessary.

Q1a. Can you please elaborate on the original purpose of our deployment of INF missiles?

In December 1979, NATO foreign and defense ministers adopted what has come to be called the "dual-track" decision. On one track, the U.S. would deploy INF missiles in Europe. At the same time, on a second track, the U.S. would attempt to negotiate limits on U.S. and Soviet INF missiles at a lower equal level.

The 1983 Report to Ministers of NATO's Special Consultative Group explains the reasons for NATO's dual-track decision:

> "The Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity with the U.S. in the mid-1970s gave particular importance to the growing disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in theater nuclear forces, particularly in the field of longer-range INF missiles. Although the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Alliance had not changed, there was concern that this emerging situation could give rise to the risk that the Soviets might believe -- however incorrectly -- that they could use long-range forces to make or threaten limited strikes against Western Europe from a 'sanctuary' in the Soviet Union. There could be a misperception that without adequate theater-based systems of its own capable of reaching Soviet territory, and in the era of parity at the strategic nuclear level, NATO lacked credible and appropriate means of response."

The problem, then, was the disparity in "theater nuclear forces, particularly longer-range INF missiles." As we made clear throughout the negotiations, NATO's preferred means of dealing with this disparity was to eliminate it by the zero outcome. But the negotiations also made clear that, without NATO deployments, the Soviets would never have agreed to the zero outcome.

Q1b. Did the United States believe that a serious gap in our deterrent capability existed?

NATO political leaders and military authorities were concerned that, if left unmatched, the new Soviet SS-20 capability could mislead Moscow into believing that it could intimidate the Alliance -- or even cause the Soviet Union to miscalculate the risks of aggression.

Q1c. Did we believe that the Pershing II and GLCMs were a response to the SS-20, or were they necessary to respond to larger concerns related to the achievement of strategic parity by the Soviet Union?

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Q1d. From the standpoint of the original goal of the deployment, would a walk-in-the-woods type deal, in which both sides would have kept 225-300 warheads, have been preferable to the current treaty?

Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. was willing to consider any approach that met our criteria. Those criteria were global limits, U.S./Soviet equality, no compensation for third-country systems, no adverse impact on NATO's conventional strength, and effective verification. But we made clear all along that our strong preference, and that of our Allies, was the "zero outcome" that President Reagan proposed in November 1981.

2. Flexible Response. Since 1967, NATO's official strategy has been "flexible response." Flexible response envisions the

possibility that conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and ultimately the U.S. strategic force would be employed in response to Soviet aggression against NATO.

Q2a. What impact will this agreement have on that strategy?

Flexible response will remain fully valid. NATO will retain sufficiently robust and credible forces to confront a potential aggressor with major uncertainties about the consequences of using or threatening to use nuclear or conventional forces in an attack against NATO. These systems will, of course, have to be maintained and modernized to ensure our ability to execute a strategy of "flexible response."

Q2b. Does this agreement have the effect of removing a critical rung in the ladder of escalation, upon which NATO's security rests?

No. NATO will retain a broad spectrum of theater and strategic nuclear capabilities, able to hold at risk targets throughout the Warsaw Pact. In fact, although NATO is giving up a significant military capability, the Soviets are giving up a greater capability involving deployed missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times more warheads than NATO. With the elimination of the SS-20 and SS-4 systems, the Soviet's ability to strike deep, time-urgent targets in NATO will be reduced. This, coupled with the reduced threat against NATO seaports, airfields and U.S. POMCUS sites from triple-capable Soviet shorter-range missile systems, will increase the sustainability and survivability of our forces.

3. Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in Germany. There is strong public sentiment in West Germany in favor of eliminating the short-range nuclear weapons -- such as nuclear artillery and the Lance missile -- stationed on German soil. As West Germany's deputy parliament leader, Volker Ruhe, has said, "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." Many NATO leaders, however, have stressed the need to modernize these weapons.

Q3a. How should the Alliance approach this sensitive issue?

NATO Defense Ministers have recently reaffirmed the continued importance of the major modernization programs stemming from the Montebello Decision.

NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Reykjavik last June determined that the Alliance's arms control priorities are to pursue:

-- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

-- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Nevertheless, negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of problems which the Alliance must carefully consider.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear forces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

Q3b. How should NATO respond to a Soviet "triple-zero" proposal?

A3b. No such offer has been made.

The United States strongly supports the position that was adopted by the NATO mimisters at Reykjavik to pursue:

- a 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

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Compensatory Measures.

Q4a. Do you think this treaty has weakened NATO's defensive posture in any way?

No. The INF Treaty represents an outcome which NATO has long sought, based on careful consideration of what is best for NATO's defense posture. NATO's Defense Ministers have publicly declared their full support for the agreement. It reduces the threat to NATO and enhances the security of the Alliance.

Q4b. If not, is there any need to take "compensatory measures?" If the treaty does not weaken NATO security, what would we be "compensating" for?

"Compensatory measures" is a misleading term, since the Treaty enhances NATO's security.

With or without an INF Treaty, NATO decisions have been made to strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrent capabilities, including existing short-range systems and dual-capable aircraft. The Montebello Decision of 1983 called for substantial reductions in the size of NATO's nuclear stockpile, as well as necessary modernization measures for remaining systems, in order to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of the nuclear component of NATO's strategy of flexible response. Those reductions have already been made. NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to continue to move forward with these necessary modernization measures as the INF Treaty enters into force.

Similarly, NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to press ahead with conventional defense improvements (CDI) in accordance with the CDI action plan formulated in 1985.

5. Nuclear Force Modernization. Some have suggested that this treaty will increase the urgency of modernizing NATO's nuclear capability.

Q5a. Does the loss of the INF missiles create a new requirement for modernizing NATO's nuclear capability, such as shorter-range nuclear missiles or aircraft-delivered weapons?

No. Prior to the INF Treaty, in conjunction with his 1985 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS-85), SACEUR made a number of recommendations to implement the 1983 Montebello Decision, including development and production of a follow-on to LANCE, a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) and modern artillery-fired atomic projectiles. These modernization requirements remain valid and are independent of the INF Treaty.

Q5b. If so, do you think the Senate should link its consent to the treaty to such a modernization program?

No. The Treaty as it stands is in the best interest of the United States and our Allies. We engaged in six years of arduous negotiations in close consultations with our Allies to ensure that the Treaty is in our interests. We do not believe that it is necessary to add conditions, amendments, reservations or any other changes. We do, however, feel it is essential that the Congress ensure adequate funding for our modernization programs, which meet a requirement independent of the INF Treaty.

Q5c: Do you believe this treaty will make it more or less difficult for our NATO Allies to sustain their existing nuclear and conventional forces?

Throughout the INF process, NATO ministers have consistently stated their support for continuing modernization of NATO nuclear and conventional forces and taken steps to implement that process. NATO Defense and Foreign Ministers have recently reemphasized the importance of this policy. We believe they will continue to do so.

6. Conventional Force Balance. Some have argued that this agreement leaves the West vulnerable to Soviet advantages in conventional forces.

Q6a. How would you respond to these charges?

Although the Treaty improves the nuclear balance, it does not and can not resolve the long-standing conventional imbalance. That was never its intention. But, to the extent that the Treaty eliminates systems which could target nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads against NATO's infrastructure, ports and airfields, it does help improve NATO's conventional posture.

The disparities in the conventional balance are longstanding and the Alliance is taking steps to meet the challenge in these areas.

Q6b. Do you think the Senate should condition its consent to the treaty on improvements in NATO's conventional forces?

No. The Treaty as it stands is in the best interest of the United States and our Allies.

Q6c. Do you think the Senate should link future agreement on START to an improvement in the conventional balance?

No. We and our Allies have consistently resisted Soviet efforts to link various arms control issues. If we reach agreement with the Soviets on an effectively verifiable START treaty, we should not hold that Treaty and its benefits hostage while we try to redress the conventional imbalance.

Q6d. Do you think our Allies have been bearing their fair share of the NATO defense burden?

DoD in its annual report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense concluded that the Allies, collectively, are shouldering roughly their fair share of the defense burden. It also stated, however, that clearly some of the Allies can do more.

We believe we have made some strides forward in encouraging a greater effort by our Allies. Moreover, the Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) program and the armaments cooperation initiatives have enabled the Alliance to more effectively allocate scarce resources. The new NATO Conventional Arms Planning System (CAPS) will deal with the armaments requirements of the Alliance rather than leaving this critical area to individual nations to resolve. We believe that through programs such as these, we will achieve far greater results than by simply telling nations to do more for defense. There are no easy solutions to Allied burdensharing, but we will continue to explore all avenues to persuade the Allies to assume a greater share of the common defense burden.

7. Further Nuclear Reductions in Europe. The question of whether NATO should proceed with further reductions in its nuclear forces has caused some controversy within the alliance.

Q7a. In the absence of agreement on conventional forces, should we proceed with further reductions in nuclear forces, particularly short-range nuclear weapons?

The United States strongly supports the position that was adopted by the NATO mimisters at Reykjavik to pursue:

- a 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Nevertheless, negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of problems which the Alliance must carefully consider.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear forces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

Q7b. How strong is the political momentum in the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO countries for new cuts?

The positions of our NATO Allies are reflected in the arms control priorities established by the NATO ministers at the Reykjavik meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1987, and reaffirmed at the Brussels NAC in December 1987.

They are:

- A 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union;
- The global elimination of chemical weapons;
- The establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of other problems, which the Alliance has not carefully considered.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear forces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

Q8a. Conventional Arms Control. Increasing attention has been focused on the need to improve the conventional force balance in Europe, preferably through reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

How serious are the prospects for agreement in conventional forces? What formulas are most likely to succeed?

A major threat to security and stability in Europe is the Warsaw Pact's substantial conventional superiority together with a war-fighting doctrine that emphasizes rapid offensive operations with massed armored forces. Fourteen years of negotiations at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks indicate that the Soviets have not been seriously interested in reducing their military advantages and building a stable military balance in Europe. Their recent proposals for new negotiations in conventional forces have emphasized nuclear/conventional tradeoffs and have been one sided given existing disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (i.e. equal reductions rather than reductions to equal levels).

Increased stability and security are the West's primary objectives. Force reductions through negotiated agreement can help achieve these objectives, but are not an end in themselves. Given Eastern conventional superiority across the board, even modest reductions in Western forces would reduce Western security and would not promote stability, absent deeper reductions in forces by the East. For negotiations to succeed, they will need to focus on combat decisive conventional ground forces, to include tanks and artillery. Negotiating a stable balance in conventional forces will be complicated enough without mixing nuclear weapons into these negotiations.

The Soviet Union is unlikely to negotiate seriously to redress actual disparities if NATO fails to pursue conventional force improvements. NATO must pursue such improvements vigorously whether or not we achieve arms reductions.

Q8b. Conventional Arms Control. Increasing attention has been focused on the need to improve the conventional force balance in Europe, preferably through reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

When will the West respond to the proposal made by the Soviet Union in this area?

We have yet to receive a constructive Warsaw Pact response to our compromise proposal on conventional forces put forward in MBFR in December of 1985. In June of 1986, the Halifax NAC issued a statement calling for new negotiations on conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a result of this NATO initiative, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact states are now meeting in Vienna to negotiate a mandate for new conventional stability talks covering the whole of Europe. We are working on a mandate and hope to begin actual negotiations this year, if a balanced outcome to the Vienna meeting can be achieved. In general terms they are to concentrate on increasing stability in Europe by removing the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

Although there have been several Soviet references to "eliminating disparities," it seems clear that the Soviets have their own definition of disparities which are biased by qualitative offsets (of unknown dimensions) and false or misleading bases for comparison.

The US is now consulting with our NATO Allies about the specific elements of proposals for these new conventional stability talks. There is already consensus on the major elements of an approach and NATO is developing a sound proposal supporting our goals for the talks.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL

I. Significance of the INF Treaty

Q1a. Recent Developments. We have already seen a number of stories in the press indicating that the treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding contain certain errors.

Were any such errors corrected in the materials officially transmitted to the Senate?

Corrections of U.S. errors in the Treaty were not reflected in the text officially transmitted to the Senate as they have not yet been officially included in the Treaty text. The Soviets have been informed of these corrections and they will be formalized in an Exchange of Notes which will be separately transmitted to the Senate upon conclusion. The errors have been noted in a corrigendum attached to subsequent public editions of the Treaty text.

Q1b. Were any of these errors substantive, as opposed to simple clerical errors? If so, please describe those particular substantive errors.

There were no substantive errors in the MOU. However, the U.S. did note the location, subsequent to signature, of a number of defective PIA missile stages at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas which were produced but never left the production facility. The Soviets have been informed of this error and these defective stages will be eliminated pursuant to the Treaty.

Q1c. Could you explain any difficulties surrounding the pictures provided by the Soviets of two missiles -- the SS-20 and the SS-23?

We expressed to the Soviet Union both before and at the time of the signing of the INF Treaty, the requirement to provide the actual photograph of the SS-20 as quickly as possible. A "fax" copy of the SS-20 photo was delivered at the time of signature and after a U.S. demarche a "glossy" copy shortly thereafter. Concerning the authenticity of the photo, we have thoroughly consulted with the appropriate agencies of the government on this matter, including, of course, the

Intelligence Community. Consequently, we do not now dispute the authenticity of the photograph.

The SS-23 photograph provided by the Soviets depicts a single missile stage without a connector. The length provided by the Soviets in the MOU for the SS-23's single stage, however, includes a connector that joins that stage to the reentry vehicle. The Soviets have recognized this inconsistency and explained the difference between the photograph and the listed stage length which includes this connector. We will be able to further verify the SS-23 data during on-site inspections. Consequently, we do not now dispute the authenticity of the photograph.

Q1d. Is the Executive Branch satisified that all the data provided by the Soviet Union is accurate? Are we planning to request any further clarifications from the Soviets?

The data provided by the Soviet Union in the MOU fall generally within the bounds of U.S. intelligence community estimates. These data are subject to ongoing evaluation as we continue to monitor Soviet activities. In this connection, we note that updated data will be provided within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and will be confirmed by U.S. inspectors during baseline inspections.

Q1e. Have there been any new developments since the signing of this treaty on December 8 about which the Senate should be aware?

There are no developments of which the Senate is not aware relating to the INF Treaty since December 8.

2. Effect of the Treaty on U.S. Security. The precise effect of this treaty on U.S. security seems to have been somewhat obscured in the debate over the treaty's political effect on NATO.

Q2a. Could you please explain to the Committee why you believe this treaty improves the security of the United States?

This is a question which could be answered at considerable length. Briefly, however, as Secretary Shultz has noted, the INF Treaty enhances U.S. and Allied security and contributes to greater international stability. It may be opening a new chapter in arms control -- the beginning of reductions. It reduces U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, rather than setting guidelines for their future growth. It achieves U.S.-Soviet equality by eliminating substantially more Soviet missile systems than American ones. And it contains the most stringent and extensive verification provisions in arms control history, including several kinds of on-site inspection. It accomplishes the goals we and our Allies set for ourselves eight years ago with the NATO dual-track decision. In short, the Treaty -- as our NATO Allies stated last December -- is an achievement "without precedent in the history of arms control."

Q2b. Can any of the missiles which are being eliminated by the Soviet Union strike the U.S. homeland? To what degree will this treaty reduce the nuclear threat to the continental United States?

SS-20's stationed in the Asian portion of the Soviet Union can strike targets in Alaska. They could be deployed to cover even more of the U.S. Thus, the INF Treaty will eliminate missiles capable of delivering several hundred warheads against the U.S.. Of course, many more Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles which are not constrained by the INF Treaty remain.

Q3. Purpose of Reducing SS-20s. You have suggested that part of the reason this treaty is in our security interest is because the Soviet Union will be obligated to reduce far more nuclear systems than the United States. President Reagan has touted this agreement as eliminating an entire class of nuclear systems.

a. Will not the Soviet Union still maintain thousands of strategic systems which can serve the same military function? Can it be said that we are eliminating a significant part of U.S. or Soviet military capability?

b. Since the elimination of Soviet missiles may not significantly reduce Soviet target coverage, even in Europe, what is the military value in reducing Soviet intermediate and shorter-range missiles?

The INF Treaty was never intended to limit strategic nuclear weapons. It deals comprehensively with a part of the Soviet threat that previous treaties did not address. Clearly, the effectiveness of the INF Treaty would be enhanced by a START agreement, but the INF agreement is valid in its own right. From the point of view of the NATO Alliance, it makes no more sense to hold an INF Treaty hostage to a START agreement than it would to have held a START agreement hostage to INF, if the sequence had been reversed.

The Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters to strike many of our Allies. In addition, in Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe.

Additionally, we have long been worried about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter-range delivery systems for chemical and conventional weapons (SS-12s and SS-23s) will be removed from the Soviet order of battle as a result of this Treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-12 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and airfields. In essence, the Treaty will assist in facilitating our reinforcement of Europe.

In East Asia, elimination of the SS-20 prevents the Soviets from holding at risk over 500 targets in that region. When coupled with the elimination of 300 shorter-range missiles in the Asian-Pacific theater, the elimination of all Soviet ground-based INF missiles represents a significant reduction in the threat to our Asian friends and allies.

Q4. Reducing the Risk of War. The most important criterion used to judge an arms control agreement in the past has been whether or not it reduces the risk of nuclear war. Normally, we make this judgment by asking ourselves whether the incentives to initiate a nuclear war, or the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation, have been reduced.

a. How will the elimination of INF missiles affect the calculation to initiate a nuclear war?

b. Have we reduced the incentives for preemption by either side?

c. Have we reduced the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation?

d. What do you see as the effect upon the nuclear threshold?

The INF Treaty promises to bolster NATO security, and thereby reduce the risk of war, by enhancing the political credibility of NATO as a whole. Deterrence is based not only on NATO's military capability, but also on its collective political will. The INF experience demonstrated to the Soviets that our nations have the political resolve to make -- and stand by -- the tough decisions necessary to ensure our security.

The Treaty also strengthens NATO militarily thereby reducing the risk of any war. The agreement will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to execute rapid strikes throughout Western Europe without resort to its strategic weapons. While relieving pressures on our own nuclear forces and elements of their command and control, this should increase the survivability of the airbases, ports, depots, and other facilities vital to NATO's conventional defenses.

The INF Treaty meets the negotiating requirements we and our allies established in 1979. It effectively counters the threat posed by the Soviet INF missile force by eliminating that force. In so doing, it will remove a major source of concern to our Allies. It will deprive the Soviet Union of the ability to think it could create a fear in the minds of our Allies that, because its INF missiles were not "aimed" at the United States, the United States would be less likely to come to their aid were they threatened by these weapons; in other words, to create an atmosphere of decoupling in capital letters.

Because many of the Soviet INF misiles can reach a large portion of Asia, the INF Treaty will also enhance the security of our friends and allies in that part of the world.

5. Pershing IA. The question of whether this treaty would affect our program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany to provide them with nuclear warheads for their Pershing IA missiles has been somewhat controversial.

Q5. Have we given the Soviet Union any direct or inferred assurances whatsoever with regard to our Pershing IA program of cooperation with West Germany? For example, have we told them that if the German Pershing IA missiles are not eliminated in the final weeks of the three year elimination period that they can stop their elimination of certain missiles, or that they can take any other compensatory steps?

No. The Treaty will not affect our existing pattern of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany. The U.S. RVs now associated with this POC are not subject to Treaty limits until the RVs are released from the POC by unilateral FRG decision. Activities associated with the current POC are not limited by the Treaty. By the time of Treaty signature, the existing program had already reached a point where further production of Treaty-limited items was not contemplated. The Germans have made it clear that only with the elimination of Soviet INF missiles will they undertake the elimination of their Pershing IA missiles.

II. Verification and Arms Control

Q1a. Could you please explain why you think the verification provisions in this agreement are adequate to protect our security.

Two elements go into determining whether an agreement is effectively verifiable. The first is a technical evaluation of present and planned U.S. resources for data collection, processing, analysis and reporting based on the constraints imposed by the Treaty. The second is how these capabilities are enhanced by specific verification provisions in the Treaty.

Both aspects must take into account credible cheating scenarios and the high standard of evidence required within the U.S. Government for decisions about non-compliance. Taken together, U.S. National Technical Means and the verification measures provided for in the INF Treaty, including the extensive data exchanges and on-site inspections, will facilitate the detection of significant Soviet violations in a timely fashion so as to protect U.S. and Allied security. At the same time NTM and the Treaty's verification measures will also serve as a deterrent to Soviet cheating. It is clear that the high verification standards embodied in the INF Treaty meet those required in a "double zero" environment to assure that an undetected violation does not pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. and Allied security.

Q1b. Can this agreement protect us from a determined Soviet effort to cheat?

No agreement is ever 100% verifiable and there is no way to ensure that the Soviets will never cheat. However, we feel that the measures in this Treaty taken together create major disincentives to Soviet cheating by raising significantly the cost that the Soviet Union would have to incur in order to covertly deploy a significant force of banned missiles and raising the probability of getting caught if they do cheat. This is particularly true because of the flight testing and production bans which, over time, would impair the military utility and viability of any covert force. In addition, the total ban on systems covered by this Treaty and the on-site inspection regime will enhance U.S. capabilities to detect cheating that is extensive enough to pose a threat to U.S. or Allied security.

2. Last Minute Concessions. Some critics have suggested that in the final weeks of the negotiations the Administration made important concessions in the area of verification. Specifically, some have suggested that we should have insisted upon our proposal to send our inspectors to locations in the Soviet Union where we suspected covert production or deployment was taking place.

Q2a. Why didn't you insist on the right to inspect any "suspect site," including installations in the Soviet Union not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding?

We have long stated that the INF verification regime should be tailored to the detailed limitations of the Treaty. In the context of an INF agreement that would have permitted the United States and Soviet Union to retain missiles and launchers capable of carrying 100 warheads, the United States proposed inspection of any site in either country where such missiles and launchers could be located -- suspect sites. After the Soviets agreed to the long-standing U.S. preference for global zero, in July 1987, the U.S. re-examined our proposals for inspections of suspect sites. We had to balance our security concerns against potential verification benefits. In that context, we determined that on balance, overall U.S. interests were served by on-site inspections short of "anywhere, anytime" inspections. Moreover, nothing in the Treaty prevents us from challenging the Soviets if we detect what we believe to be suspicious or Treaty-prohibited activities at a non-declared site. We would pursue such questions through diplomatic channels or through the SVC specially created for the purpose of discussing compliance concerns, until our concerns are satisfied.

2b. Did any changes occur in the final period which could affect our ability to detect potential Soviet non-compliance?

There were no developments in the final weeks of negotiations which negatively affected our ability to detect Soviet non-compliance or which undermined the clear military and political benefits of the Treaty for NATO.

3. Soviet Cheating

Q3a. What is a militarily significant number of SS-20s or other missiles?

Judgments about the military significance of Soviet cheating must be made on a case by case basis. In determining the military significance of any given case of cheating, numerous factors must be considered including the quantitative level and the threat posed to the U.S. and NATO; the types of weapons involved, as well as the state of readiness and training; additional military capabilities of other systems available; countermeasures available to the U.S. and NATO; and the overall political and military situation surrounding the discovery of possible Soviet cheating.

3b. If the Soviet Union made a determined effort to do so, could it covertly hide or produce a militarily significant number of SS-20 or shorter-range missiles and launchers?

The answer depends on, in part, judgments concerning the size of a militarily significant force. We note, however, that other factors to be considered are the readiness of the covert force, and the fact that the reliability and operability of covertly-maintained systems would degrade over time because of the ban on production and flight-testing. A more detailed response can be provided on a classified basis.

Q3c. How does the verification regime in this agreement protect us from that possibility?

The interlocking web of verification provisions -- including on-site inspection, continuous portal monitoring, notifications and enhanced NTM -- would make such an attempt more difficult, costly and uncertain. The verification regime would make maintenance of a force, particularly a large force in a high state of readiness, extremely difficult. Moreover, they would have to question the effectiveness of systems which could no longer be flight tested. Once Treaty-limited items have been eliminated, the Treaty also bans all IRM and SRM launchers, missiles and equipment required for training, a measure which would further undermine Soviet confidence in their ability to maintain a covert force.

OSI of elimination will allow us to confirm the elimination of missiles and launchers declared in the MOU -- items which could otherwise be added to a covert force. OSI of declared facilities and bases will increase our chances to detect prohibited activities occurring there; it also serves as a deterrent to such activities.

Production of missiles, launchers, and stages is banned upon entry into force of the Treaty. Flight testing is also banned. The plant in Votkinsk that has assembled the SS-20 will be monitored by a continuous U.S. on-site presence, to help ensure that SS-20s are not exiting that facility. The production ban, test ban, and continuous monitoring at Votkinsk act in concert to help deter cheating.

4. Data Exchange. This agreement includes an extensive exchange of data. The Soviets have given us details about the number, the characteristics, and the location of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and associated equipment.

a. How do we know that the data provided by the Soviet Union is correct?

b. What level of confidence do we have in the validity of the Soviet data?

c. Do the initial base line inspections allow us to verify the accuracy of that data? Can the Soviets make sure that we see precisely what they have said existed?

d. In particular, with regard to the number of non-deployed missiles, how do we know they gave us a full accounting of stored missiles? Could they have stockpiled a large number of non-declared missiles?

We are continuing to monitor the data and Soviet activities carefully. This data is, of course, subject to an ongoing evaluation. In this connection, we note that updated data will be exchanged within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and will be confirmed by U.S. inspectors during baseline inspections. Further details on this will have to be addressed in a classified form, primarily by the Intelligence Community.

5. Challenge Inspections

a. Do you believe absolute verification is possible?

b. Would "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspections be part of an absolute verification regime?

There is no such thing as absolute or 100% verification. That would essentially be a case of proving a negative which is difficult if not impossible. However, one can make judgments about the disincentives to Soviet cheating and about U.S. capabilities to detect violations which pose a threat to U.S.

and Allied security in order to state that the INF Treaty meets the criteria of effective verification. It is our judgement that the Treaty contains measures for effective verification of compliance.

Because a verification regime is reciprocal, we had to weigh verification benefits against US and Allied security concerns. In the context of the Soviet acceptance of our "double zero" proposal, we concluded that "anytime, anywhere" inspections were not essential given the extensive and unprecedented nature of our verification procedures as a whole. We believe the right balance was struck. Moreover, even with such inspections, you could not have "absolute" verification.

5c. What are the risks to U.S. security associated with giving the Soviet Union free reign to roam around our country investigating sensitive military facilities under "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspections?

There are both political and practical problems associated with "anytime, anywhere" inspections. The Soviets strongly objected to such inspections on their own territory but proposed that U.S. operated sites in Allied basing countries should be subject to inspection. Practically, in our own country, we faced the problems of permitting unlimited Soviet inspections of sensitive U.S. facilities. In short, we did not feel that "anytime, anywhere" inspections offered sufficient offsetting advantages given the potential problems and the already extensive verification provisions.

5d. Would "anytime, anywhere" inspections compromise U.S. security?

It was the conclusion of the Administration that, in the context of the INF Treaty, "anytime, anywhere," inspections added little to the already extensiveand unprecedented INF verification regime when balanced against the possible risks to other U.S. and Allied security interests which they raised.

6. Internal Debate on Challenge Inspections

a. Could you please explain why various agencies in the U.S. Government expressed opposition to such challenge inspections?

b. Presumably, the President concluded that we are better off without such challenge inspections. Could you explain the reasoning behind that decision?

We do not comment on internal executive branch deliberations. For the reasons cited earlier, we are convinced that the right balance between our verification needs and security concerns was achieved and that the INF Treaty is effectively verifiable without "anytime, anywhere" inspections.

6c. In your opinion, does the inspection regime provided for in the Treaty give the Soviet Union access to any sensitive U.S. facilities?

Obviously a number of the facilities listed by the United States in the Memorandum of Understanding and thus subject to various types of inspection are sensitive U.S. facilities. However, we believe that the rules and other measures developed for inspections at these sites protect U.S. security interests. These measures were developed in consultation with agencies concerned with counter-intelligence and sensitive U.S. programs and they take account of their concerns.

7. Standard for Verification

a. Could you tell us how the current standard differs from that applied to past arms control agreements?

b. The Administration has emphasized its desire for "effective" verification. What is the difference between effective and adequate verification?

During the course of its arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has stressed that any new agreement would have to be effectively verifiable. What we mean by effective verification is if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation. Our ability to detect and respond to violations helps to deter the other side from committing them in the first place. In any case, since we are concerned with substance rather than semantics, our approach called for verification measures well beyond those found in previous arms control efforts.

The INF Treaty goes well beyond simple reliance on NTM. The specific INF requirements for cooperative efforts, such as extensive data exchanges, various types of on-site inspections, and enhanced NTM, will make it more difficult for the Soviets to engage in illegal activities and elude detection. The INF verification regime thus goes beyond the measures employed in previous arms control treaties and meets our standards for effective verification.

7c. What is your standard for "effective" verification?

Our standard for effective verification goes beyond simple reliance on National Technical Means (NTM). The specific INF requirements for cooperative measures, such as extensive data exchanges, various types of on-site inspections, continuous portal monitoring, enhanced NTM, and most importantly, the flight test ban, will make it difficult for the Soviets to engage in illegal activities and elude detection. The INF verification regime thus goes well beyond the measures employed in previous arms control treaties and meets our standards for effective verification.

7d. The on-site inspection provisions in this agreement obviously go far beyond those which we negotiated in the past on other matters. Are these on-site inspections central to the verification regime?

The verification measures in the INF Treaty are designed to operate together so that the sum of the measures results in the overall effectiveness of verification in the INF Treaty. This clearly includes the various on-site inspection measures, different types of which provide different contributions to the overall verification regime. On-site inspection measures, in particular, create an element of uncertainty in the Soviet mind and thus deter cheating because of the possible risk of detection.

7e. Are we basically relying on our intelligence capabilities, rather than on-site inspections, to detect any Soviet effort to covertly produce and deploy SS-20s or shorter range missiles?

While NTM will play a major role in detecting any covert force of systems limited by the INF Treaty, other verification measures including on-site inspections have been agreed on to supplement and enhance our NTM capabilities. This combination of NTM and on-site inspections and other measures adds to the complications and cost that the Soviets would have to incur in order to produce, deploy, and maintain a covert force. The combination of verification measures will thus have a significant deterrent effect on possible Soviet violations.

8. Military Significance of Verification

a. Could you please discuss with us the distinction between detecting militarily significant violations and detecting violations of lesser importance? How should we judge the verification provisions in this Treaty?

We would regard any cheating with the greatest concern and will insist on full compliance. Judgments about the military significance of Soviet cheating must be made on a case-by-case basis. We do not want to be explicit in defining "militarily significant" in the abstract. In determining the military significance of any given case of cheating, we would take into account the following kinds of factors:

- The quantitative level of cheating and the overall threat it posed to US and NATO defenses.

- Qualitative factors, including the kind or kinds of weapons involved in any cheating and their specific capabilities for target coverage, survivability, etc.

- Our assessment of the state of readiness and training of a cheating force.

- The extent to which other forces available to the Soviets render a cheating force largely redundant or conversely comprised a significant additional military capability.

- The extent to which the US and its Allies possessed existing military forces or surge capabilities which could permit an effective counter to a Soviet cheating force.

- The overall political and military situation surrounding the discovery of Soviet cheating, e.g., whether that situation was one of relative stability, one of tension, etc.

8b. If our goal is to protect against militarily significant violations, why could this not have been done with our existing national technical means of verification?

As noted above, any violation would be considered to be a very serious matter and our goal is to deter the Soviets from violating the Treaty by raising the risk of detection. NTM is a vital part of the interlocking web of INF verification procedures, but alone it does not suffice to achieve that level of verification.

8c. Could our national technical means of verification detect any potential Soviet activities which pose genuine security risks?

National Technical Means are an important part of U.S. capabilities to verify the INF Treaty and the Treaty prohibits any interference with them, whether deliberate or not. The specific capabilities of U.S. national technical means are classified, but it is our view that NTM alone would not be sufficient. All elements of verification related to the INF Treaty together make it effectively verifiable. This would certainly include the timely detection of any Soviet activities which would pose genuine security risks.

9. Compliance

a. Why should we enter into a new agreement with the Soviet Union when the Administration has charged that the Soviets have extensively violated past agreements?

The President signed the INF agreement because its provisions serve U.S. and Allied interests. By eliminating Soviet INF missile systems, the Treaty will remove a significant threat to the U.S. and our Allies. It also establishes the precedent of asymmetrical reductions to equal levels and detailed on-site verification procedures which will provide important precedents for verification regimes for future agreements.

Moreover, this Treaty is not based on trust, but on the most stringent verification provisions in history. While the INF Treaty does not guarantee Soviet compliance -- no treaty can -- it builds on lessons of the past and its provisions increase the cost of trying to cheat and likelihood that violations will be detected through using a combination of enhanced national technical means, cooperative measures, and on-site inspections.

We are and will, however, continue to press the Soviets to end their noncompliance with arms control agreements.

9b. What accounts for this change in Presidential policy? Has the Administration re-examined these charges and come to different conclusions as to the soundness of its case and the significance of Soviet actions? Are we no longer concerned about alleged Soviet violations of past arms control agreements?

There has been no change in our policy or our findings with respect to Soviet noncompliance. Presidential reports, both classified and unclassified, continue to outline to the Congress the Administration's specific concerns with Soviet violations of previous arms control agreements. The basic conclusions of those reports including the most recent ones presented in December have not changed and continue to show our deep concern about Soviet violations.

9c. The one violation about which most seem to agree is the Krasnoyarsk radar. It seems clear that the Krasnoyarsk radar violated Article VI of the ABM Treaty. Should the Senate condition its advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty on a resolution of the Krasnoyarsk radar problem?

We believe that the INF Treaty stands on its own merits and should not be linked to other arms control agreements or issues. We have made known to the Soviets our concerns over the Krasnoyarsk radar in many fora and will continue to press for resolution of this violation.

10. Enforcement

a. Given your view of the record of Soviet behavior, how will the Administration respond, if despite all the verification provisions, we detect ambiguous activities that may violate the Treaty?

We will react vigorously to questionable Soviet activities. This Administration has made energetic efforts to get the Soviets to take corrective actions. We have used diplomatic channels with the Soviets, we have reported the facts candidly to the Congress, and we have consulted extensively with our allies.

If we detect a Soviet action that seems in violation of their INF Treaty obligations, we will press them on it. Besides regular diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, we will have a new compliance forum. Article XIII of the Treaty establishes the Special Verification Commission, or SVC.

At the SVC, we can describe our concerns and press for a response. The Soviets may be able to demonstrate that the activity in question was not a violation.

The Administration has shown its determination to take the actions necessary to safeguard our security. Faced with continuing Soviet refusal to live by the rules set by SALT II, the President took an appropriate and proportionate response. Specifically, he decided in May 1986 that future U.S. decisions on strategic forces would be based on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat-- not on standards set by a treaty that was being selectively violated by the Soviet Union.

We will respond to uncorrected violations on a case-by-case basis in an appropriate manner, and consult with the Congress on these issues.

10b. What avenues for resolution will we seek?

With regard to making our concerns known to the Soviets, our recourse would be to pursue such questions and issues through diplomatic channels. This would include elevating such matters to appropriately high levels, including the ministerial level, if necessary, to resolve these issues. In this connection, the SVC could have a role, for example, either in clarifying technical aspects of specific compliance issues or, alternatively, in developing procedures and understandings to clarify and reduce the possibility for future ambiguous situations.

10c. At what point is it appropriate for the Administration to make public charges of Soviet violations?

Any decision on how to deal with compliance charges, including making them public, must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis taking into account all the particulars of the situation, including the Soviet response to concerns we have raised.

10d. Even with all of the on-site inspection in this agreement, ultimately isn't it presumed that ambiguous activities would be brought to the Special Verification Commission (SVC)? Therefore, does not the functioning of this Treaty partially depend on the successful operation of the new joint commission?

As indicated previously, the SVC is not the only channel in which the U.S. can raise compliance concerns. We would also have recourse to diplomatic channels, including at the ministerial level, if appropriate.

The SVC could have a role in clarifying the technical aspects of specific compliance issues and in developing procedures and understandings to reduce the possibility of future ambiguous situations. Moreover, under the terms of the Treaty, neither side is permitted to refuse a request for a meeting of the SVC to discuss compliance concerns. The Soviets cannot refuse.

10e. How does this commission differ from the standing consultative commission established under the ABM Treaty?

The INF Treaty provides for the establishment of the Special Verification Commission (SVC). The SVC differs from the Special Consultative Commission (SCC) in that it will not have regular meetings but can meet any time at the request of either party, and the level of representation can be adjusted as appropriate. Neither side can refuse a request for such a meeting. Many of the tasks given to the SCC in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, such as development of procedures for the elimination of Treaty-limited systems, have already been negotiated and are contained in the INF Treaty.

11. Standing Consultative Commission. According to a 1978 report by the Carter Administration, the SCC worked extremely well. The report states that both countries brought up issues before the commission and "In each case, the activity in question has ceased or additional information has allayed the concern." A somewhat different view of the SCC was contained in a November 1985 memorandum to the President by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, which was leaked to the press. Mr. Weinberger told President Reagan:

> The SCC has failed to resolve any significant compliance issue in the approximately 1,500 days that it has been in session over the last 13 years. A less productive forum for the resolution of disputes would be difficult to find....The SCC has become a diplomatic carpet under which Soviet violations have been continuously swept, an Orwellian memory-hole into which our concerns have been dumped like yesterday's trash.

a. Which of these two views comes closer to your opinion about how the past joint compliance commission operated?

b. How has the SCC dealt with the Krasnoyarsk radar dispute?

Overall we have been disappointed that the SCC has not been able to resolve the many questions we have raised in it about Soviet compliance with past arms control agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar dispute is a case in point. We have discussed it extensively in the SCC but to no avail. We will continue to press the Soviets in every way possible, however, to end their noncompliance.

11c. What lessons do you think that we can draw from past operations to predict how a similar commission might function in implementing the INF Treaty?

The experience we have had with the SCC led the U.S. to make some of the changes which were adopted in the INF Treaty for its Special Verification Commission and to include in the Treaty itself more stringent verification provisions. We see the SVC as one of a number of mechanisms that we can utilize if we have questions about Soviet noncompliance or suspicious activities with respect to the INF Treaty. The convening of the SVC will be on an ad hoc basis.

12. Guaranteed Response. The question of how the United States should respond to potential Soviet violations is critical in understanding how this treaty will function. In May 1986, the United States decided to abandon informal adherence to SALT II because of alleged violations of that agreement. Some have suggested that the Senate should condition its approval of this agreement on a guaranteed proportionate U.S. response to potential Soviet violations of the INF Treaty.

a. Do you believe the Senate should condition its approval of the INF Treaty on a policy of guaranteed proportionate responses?

We do not believe that such a condition is necessary or useful. We would hope that Congress would express its willingness during the INF Treaty debate to work closely with this or future administrations in reaching agreement on responses which would be appropriate should Soviet violations of the INF Treaty occur.

12b. What would be the risks of such a condition? To what extent could we be locking in a certain response even if that response was not in our security interest?

We would wish to determine our response on a case-by-case basis as actual problems are unlikely to fit hypothetical scenarios determined in advance. Consequently, we require the flexibility to deal with compliance issues as they might arise, and need the cooperation of Congress in implementing the appropriate response.

12c. How, in your opinion, should proportionate responses be determined? Should such determinations be made in consultation with the Congress?

We believe that proportionate responses should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Once the Administration reaches the decision determining that a violation has occurred we would work with the Congress in implementing an appropriate response.

III. Implications for Future Arms Control

1. Further Nuclear Reductions in Europe. The question of whether NATO should proceed with further reductions in its nuclear forces has caused some controversy within the alliance.

In the absence of agreement on conventional forces, should we proceed with further reductions in nuclear forces, particularly short-range nuclear weapons?

NATO ministers established their arms control priorities at the Reykjavik meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1987, and reaffirmed them at the Brussels NAC in December 1987.

They are:

-- A 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- The global elimination of chemical weapons;

-- The establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Nevertheless, negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of problems which the Alliance must carefully consider.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear fofrces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

Q1b How strong is the political momemtum in the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO countries for new cuts?

The positions of our NATO Allies are reflected in the arms control priorities established by the NATO ministers at the Reykjavik meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1987, and reaffirmed at the Brussels NAC in December 1987.

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Negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of other problems, which the Alliance has not carefully considered.

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-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

2Q. Conventional Arms Control. Increasing attention has been focused on the need to improve the conventional force balance in Europe, preferably through reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

a. How serious are the prospects for agreement in conventional forces?

The major threat to security and stability in Europe is the Warsaw Pact's substantial conventional superiority together with a war-fighting doctrine that emphasizes rapid offensive operations with massed armor forces. Fourteen years of negotiations for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction indicates that the Soviets have not been seriously interested in reducing their military advantages and building a stable military balance in Europe. Their recent proposals for new negotiations in conventional forces have emphasized nuclear/conventional tradeoffs and have been one sided given existing disparities (i.e. equal reductions rather than reductions to equal levels).

Increased stability and security are the West's primary objectives. Force reductions through negotiated agreement can help achieve these objectives, but are not sufficient of themselves. Given overall Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, even modest reductions in Western forces would reduce Western security and would not promote stability, absent larger steps from the East. For negotiations to succeed, they will need to focus on conventional ground forces, and particularly combat decisive forces like tanks and artillery. Negotiating a stable balance in conventional forces will be complicated enough without mixing nuclear weapons into these negotiations.

As the INF negotiations have shown, the Soviet Union is unlikely to negotiate seriously to redress actual disparities if NATO fails to pursue conventional force improvements. NATO must pursue such improvements vigorously whether or not we achieve arms reductions.

Q2b. What kinds of proposals have been made by the Soviet Union in this area?

On June 11, 1986 the Warsaw Pact countries made a statement known as the "Budapest Appeal." It calls for each alliance to cut 100,000-150,000 troops on each side "within a year or two," followed by the reduction of ground and tactical air forces to 25% below current levels by the early 1990's "simultaneously with" reductions of tactical nuclear systems. The Soviets have also publicly discussed redressing disparities in individual weapon systems through reductions by the side that has a numerical advantage.

Equal numerical NATO/Pact cuts would leave NATO in a weaker position vis-a-vis the Pact, and are not acceptable to the West. Dealing with conventional forces will be complicated enough, without mixing nuclear weapons into the negotiations.

2c. When will the West respond to the Soviet proposals?

We have yet to receive a constructive Warsaw Pact response to our compromise proposal on conventional forces put forward in MBFR in December of 1985. In June of 1986, the Halifax NAC issued a statement calling for new negotiations on conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a result of this NATO initiative, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact states are now meeting in Vienna to negotiate a mandate for new conventional stability talks covering the whole of Europe. We hope to reach agreement on a mandate and begin actual negotiations this year, if a balanced outcome to the Vienna meeting can be achieved. NATO's objectives are to concentrate on increasing stability in Europe by removing the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

Although there have been several Soviet references to "eliminating disparities," it seems clear that the Soviets have their own definition of disparities which are biased by qualitative offsets (of unknown dimensions) and false or misleading bases for comparison.

The US is now consulting with NATO about the specific elements of proposals for these new conventional stability talks. There is already consensus on the major elements of an approach and NATO is developing a sound proposal supporting our goals for the start of talks.

2d. What formulas are most likely to succeed in this area?

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The Soviet Union is unlikely to negotiate seriously to redress actual disparities if NATO is unwilling to pursue conventional force improvements. NATO must pursue such improvements vigorously whether or not we achieve arms reductions.

3. Purpose of Reductions

Q. Could you please explain how the reduction of Soviet SS-20s and shorter-range missiles fits into our overall goals and objectives for strategic arms control?

The President's long-standing goal, and that of the Alliance, has been to achieve stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty clearly contributes significantly to that goal by completely eliminating a whole class of U.S. and Soviet weapons. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed, and NATO Foreign Ministers have also approved, that the next step in this process should be 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Soviet Union. U.S. and Soviet negotiators are at the negotiating table now in Geneva working toward that end.

The INF Treaty, standing alone, will have a considerable beneficial impact. It will strengthen our national security and that of Western Europe. Its contribution will be greatly enhanced, however, if it is complemented by progress in the other arms control negotiations as well as in the other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Q3b. How important is achieving a START agreement to making the INF Treaty strategically significant?

c. Does the ultimate impact of this treaty depend on whether or not there is a START agreement?

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4. Verification Standard

a. How will the verification standards you have established for the INF Treaty affect a potential START agreement?

Obviously the same standards of effective verification discussed above will be applied to any START agreement. In the Joint Statement issued after their December 1987 summit, the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev stated that START verification would "build upon the provisions" of the INF Treaty. Their statement recognizes that, while the INF negotiations have provided a solid foundation for drafting START verification procedures, START and INF represent fundamentally different verification challenges. First, START involves a greater diversity of systems. More importantly, unlike INF systems, START systems will continue to exist and be modernized. In START, therefore, we must verify continuing compliance with numerical and other limits on systems, rather than simply confirming their elimination. Because of the greater challenge this presents, START verification provisions are likely to be different and more complicated than INF verification provisions.

Challenge Inspections in START

Q5. The joint statement issued at last month's summit meeting outlining the terms of a potential START Treaty included a requirement for, "short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring."

a. Is there a risk such a provision would compromise U.S. security by allowing Soviet inspectors to examine sensitive U.S. facilities?

b. Please explain why challenge inspections of suspect sites were not included in the INF Treaty but should be included in the START Treaty?

The INF Treaty does include provisions for short-notice on-site inspection and other cooperative measures at specified locations. For example, we will be able to inspect on short-notice all active missile operating bases as well as those at which INF Missile activity ceases. We will also have the right to demand, on short-notice, open displays of specified road-mobile strategic missiles on launchers and their launch garages.

The U.S. initially proposed for INF an even more intrusive inspection regime which included challenge inspections at any location at which a violation was suspected. However, following Soviet acceptance of double global zero, we were able to simplify the verification regime required. We are convinced that the right balance between our verification needs and security concerns was achieved in the Treaty.

In START, however, both sides will retain a large number of missile systems and their infrastructure; the verification regime required in such an environment will have to be considerably more extensive than the one crafted for INF's double global zero situation. We are therefore working to develop procedures that strike the appropriate balance between our concerns regarding sensitive U.S. facilities and the need to verify Soviet compliance with a START agreement. That work is proceeding and will be reflected in the START Treaty.

Dual-Capable Systems

Q6. The prohibitions in the INF Treaty apply to all intermediate and short-range missiles, regardless of the armament they carry. Reportedly, there was some debate within the Administration as to the desirability of limiting conventionally-armed GLCMs.

a. Could you please describe the reason why we decided to ban both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles in the INF Treaty?

b. Given the enormous difficulties associated with verifying the armament of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, will that principle be carried over into the START negotiations?

In addition to the enormous verification problems that would have been involved in permitting conventionally-armed ground-launched cruise missiles in the INF range band while banning such nuclear-armed missiles, our INF approach in this matter took into account both Soviet and U.S. programs. Neither side had deployed any conventionally-armed ground-launched cruise missiles in the INF range band, although the Soviets had an INF cruise missile on the verge of deployment and might have assigned it conventional as well as nuclear roles. The U.S. had no plans to do so. In light of all the above, we agreed to ban all ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

The situation in START is completely different. The U.S. has a substantial force of conventionally-armed sea-launched cruise missiles which comprise an important element of our naval capabilities. We are considering prospects for a conventionally-armed air-launched cruise missile that would address other pressing requirements. We are discussing with the Soviets in Geneva various approaches that would take such realities into account when establishing the basis of effective verification provisions.

7. British and French Forces. The question of whether British and French nuclear forces would be included in the INF Treaty either directly or through implicit compensation was an important issue early on in the negotiations.

Q7. Have we provided the Soviet Union with any assurances regarding British or French forces, such as a guarantee that those forces would be taken into account in future agreements like the START Treaty?

No.

SALT II Limits

Q8. In May 1986, President Reagan announced that the United States would abandon its policy of informal adherence to the limits of SALT II. If the Soviet Union rejected informal restraint, it could add new strategic forces to compensate for reducing its SS-20s. Those new strategic forces could be programmed to cover the same targets as the SS-20.

a. In the absence of a new agreement covering strategic arms, why was an arrangement not negotiated to prevent the Soviet Union from taking such actions which would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the INF Treaty?

b. What would be the risk of the Senate conditioning its approval of the INF Treaty to a re-establishment of informal adherence to the numerical sublimits contained in SALT II?

c. If we do not achieve a START agreement, could this loophole become increasingly important?

d. What action is the Administration prepared to take in order to forestall a potential build-up in Soviet strategic forces?

We do not favor an informal arrangement of this sort. Such arrangements do not necessarily build confidence and are difficult to verify. There is no way to hold the Soviet Union accountable, but it would give the Soviet Union a pretext for attacking measures we and our Allies take to protect our security which are fully consistent with this Treaty. Moreover, the time and energy needed to reach such arrangements would be better spent pursuing the negotiations on strategic arms reductions already underway in Geneva.

There is no loophole here. The INF Treaty was never intended to limit strategic nuclear weapons. It deals comprehensively and decisively with a part of the Soviet threat that previous treaties did not deal with. Clearly, the effectiveness of the INF Treaty would be enhanced by a START agreement, but each agreement is valid in its own right. From the point of view of the NATO alliance, it makes no more sense to hold an INF Treaty hostage to a START agreement than it would have to have held a START agreement hostage to INF, if the sequence had been reversed.

Conditioning Senate approval of the INF Treaty on a formal agreement by both parties not to increase the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles at the time of ratification would jeopardize a Treaty that stands on its own merits and is clearly in our national security interest.

The President's approach to interim restraint has not impeded progress in arms control. In fact, the Soviets have made their most constructive START proposals subsequent to the President's decision. No regime of interim restraint can substitute for the significant reductions in strategic offensive arms that we are seeking to achieve in START.

Establishing informal adherence to unilaterally imposed and unverifiable sub-limits would prevent the necessary modernization of our strategic deterrent forces and undercut our negotiating leverage to achieve the equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing arms reductions we are seeking in the START negotiations.

IV. Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations

1. Improving the relationship. At the signing ceremony for the INF Treaty, President Reagan said, "We can only hope that this history-making agreement will not be an end in itself, but the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other urgent issues before us." The hope for improved relations is one which we all share.

Q: a. Can you please discuss the Administration's current evaluation of the state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship?

In his address to the nation following the Washington summit, the President said that our efforts to establish a broad agenda with the Soviet Union -- an agenda that encompasses arms control, human rights, regional conflicts, and people-to-people contacts -- have put Soviet-American relations on "a candid and far more realistic footing".

At the same time, the President made clear that while there has been movement in the arms reduction area, much more remains to be done in all aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, including arms control.

Q1b. How can the INF Treaty serve to improve the overall nature of the relationship?

We do not believe the Treaty has altered the fundamentally competitive nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, although it will result in a real reduction in nuclear arsenals. Other difficult problems remain, many of them arising from the Soviet Union's continued willingness to use force or intimidation in dealing with its own people and with other countries.

Nevertheless, we believe the INF Treaty can contribute to better relations by removing a specific problem, by demonstrating that serious differences can be resolved through negotiation, and by establishing important precedents for future arms control efforts.

The INF Treaty thus is an important step in its own right and as a part of a broader, long-term process aimed at building and sustaining a more peaceful and constructive relationship. It shows that concrete, far-reaching achievements that benefit both East and West are possible with creativity, hard work and patience.

It also shows, as set forth in NATO's 1967 Harmel Report, that progress in East-West relations must be based on a demonstrated commitment by NATO to provide for its defense.

Q1c. To what extent do you believe arms control treaties, such as the INF Treaty, lessen tensions between the superpowers?

The U.S. believes that equitable arms control agreements with provisions that are effectively verifiable will, if complied with, enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.

Arms control agreements, however, address only one -- albeit important -- source of tension and mistrust in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. That is why we have insisted that a sustained improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations must include progress in all four areas of our broad agenda with the Soviet Union: human rights; settlement of regional conflicts; and development of bilateral relations; as well as arms control.

Qld. Will this treaty lessen or increase the chances of an armed conflict between the superpowers?

As the President said after the Washington summit, the INF Treaty "will not only lessen the threat of war; it can also speed along a process that may someday remove the threat of war."

The Treaty eliminates an important category of Soviet nuclear missiles arrayed against the U.S. and its Allies.

In addition, it is a concrete achievement in a process aimed at building a realistic and sustainable foundation for better relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Qle Where do you believe the relationship is going? Are we likely to see the improvement of which the President spoke?

We have made clear to the Soviet Union that for sustained improvements in the relationship, there must be progress in all areas of our broad agenda -- arms control, human rights, settlement of regional conflicts, and development of bilateral relations.

Given the profound differences between the two sides, we view the effort to develop more constructive relations as a long-term process, but steady progress is possible if the Soviet Union is willing to reach realistic, concrete agreements that address Western concerns.

We have also established a framework -- our four-part agenda -- and an active dialogue that has resulted in advances to date and creates a basis for further progress.

Our immediate objectives are set out in part in the Washington summit statement, which records, inter alia, areas for priority work in the Nuclear and Space Talks, as well as an ambitious program of bilateral cultural, scientific, and people-to-people exchanges.

We have established a frank dialogue on human rights and on regional questions. The Administration will continue to press for concrete progress in these areas.

In sum, while there is no guarantee of ultimate success, we believe that there is a good basis -- and good prospects -- for continued progress.

2. Linkage. The question of whether the United States should link progress in arms control to improvement in other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship has always been somewhat controversial. Recently, President Reagan categorically rejected the principle of linking arms control agreements to improvements in other areas of the relationship.

a. Can you please elaborate on the reasons why the Administration believes arms control should not be linked to progress in other areas?

b. Should the Senate condition its approval of this treaty on improved Soviet behavior in the Third World? Please explain.

c. Should the Senate condition its approval of the INF Treaty on a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan? Please explain.

d. Should the Senate condition its approval of the INF Treaty on a halt to Soviet military assistance to the communist government in Nicaragua? Please explain.

e. Should the Senate condition its approval of the INF Treaty on an improvement in the human rights situation? Please explain.

A. The Treaty on its own is in the U.S. national interest. Moreover, we and our Allies have consistently resisted Soviet efforts to link INF to other issues.

As is well known, the Treaty will eliminate all Soviet intermediate and shorter-range missiles worldwide, including the SS-20. The Soviets will also have to destroy deployed INF missiles capable of carrying over 1600 warheads, while the U.S.

will eliminate about 400 deployed single warhead missiles. Each side will also destroy its nondeployed missiles.

The Treaty establishes an important precedent for future U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations -- asymmetric reductions to equal levels. Moreover, the Treaty establishes the most stringent, intrusive verification regime in the history of arms control.

Finally, as our Allies have stated, the Treaty is itself a major political victory for NATO. It validates the NATO dual-track decision of 1979 and demonstrates to Allied leaders and publics that we achieve our best results in dealing with the Soviets from a position of strength and Allied unity.

We should not defer or give up the benefits of an INF Treaty, but we will continue to resolve bilateral and regional issues which are important elements of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship.

3. Soviet Objectives. Given the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept a proposal some deem lopsided and non-negotiable and to agree to unprecedented on-site inspections, General Secretary Gorbachev's motivations bear examination.

Qa What do you believe Gorbachev's aims are with respect to the United States and Europe?

We cannot know what motivates the Soviet leader. The General Secretary has spoken of concepts such as "interdependence" among states, and he has advanced a number of initiatives ostensibly aimed at improving the Soviet Union's political and economic relations with other countries. He has also advocated more stable, predictable and peaceful relations with the United States and Europe.

In addition, since Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, there has been progress in various aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, including, of course, the INF Treaty.

Similarly, Gorbachev's domestic reform program entails concepts such as "restructuring", "democratization", and "openness" that are still evolving but that appear to address concerns we have long expressed about the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Gorbachev has made clear that the purpose of his effort to revitalize the Soviet Union is to ensure that it remains competitive with the West in all areas -- military, political, economic, technology, ideology. We have no evidence that the Soviet Union has reduced its military efforts or changed its long-term objective of dividing the United States and Western Europe.

But, the Administration strongly believes that American policy must continue to rest on the principles of strength, realism and dialogue.

Q3b Why do you think Gorbachev made the large number of concessions he did during the negotiations?

The Soviet Union obviously concluded that an INF Treaty was in it's interests.

While we do not know all the considerations involved on the Soviet side, we believe Allied solidarity was a primary factor in getting the Soviets to accept the essential elements of the U.S. zero-zero proposal outlined in 1981.

In any case, both sides contributed to the successful effort to reach an agreement.

Q3c Is it possible that Gorbachev seeks to promote a stable Europe and a more constructive East-West relationship?

3d What else might he have as objectives?

We cannot know what motivates the Soviet leader. The General Secretary has spoken of concepts such as "interdependence" among states, and he has advanced a number of initiatives ostensibly aimed at improving the Soviet Union's political and economic relations with other countries. He has also advocated more stable, predictable and peaceful relations with the United States and Europe.

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But, the Administration strongly believes that American policy must continue to rest on the principles of strength, realism and dialogue.

V. NATO Political Issues

1. Political Effect. Many have suggested that this agreement has a much larger political component than most arms control agreements.

Q1a. Do you believe this agreement is primarily a political agreement with only marginal military significance?

The agreement has both political and military significance.

The INF negotiations had a very high political content. Of course, INF missiles have enormous destructive potential. Indeed, without that potential they would have had little political impact. But their ability to intimidate, their potential for inciting fear of decoupling the United States from its Allies, are what gave Soviet INF missiles their real force. They did not have to be used to be effective. They just had to be seen to exist in a situation where they were uncontrolled and unmatched. That is why NATO made its "dual-track" decision, which had both a military and a diplomatic track.

Q1b. Can you please describe for the Committee the views of the Western European Allies on the INF Treaty?

Our Allies all fully support the Treaty. Every Allied leader and many opposition leaders have made public statements to this effect, and opinion polls consistently show European publics strongly in favor of the Treaty.

Q1c. What have the Europeans told you about their view of this treaty? Are they privately squirming over the prospect of the removal of American INF missiles?

Our Allies, with whom we consulted extensively throughout the negotiating process, fully support the INF Treaty, both in public and in private. The Treaty is a triumph for NATO which, through its determination to adhere to the 1979 "dual-track" decision, has achieved the elimination of the special threat posed by Soviet INF missiles.

2. Ratification

Q2a. What are the risks to our standing in Europe if the Senate does not approve this Treaty?

If the Treaty were not ratified, or were otherwise crippled, the threat posed by Soviet INF missiles would remain. In fact, the Soviets would likely continue to build up these forces, deploying the already-tested SS-20 follow-on and SSC-X-4 ground-launched cruise missile and continuing deployments of the recently-introduced SS-23. The solidarity of the NATO Alliance, and the bilateral security relationships between the United States and its Allies, would be weakened. This could undermine the ability of the Alliance to sustain the determination and resolve to counter Soviet INF capabilities, as well as to move forward in other vital areas of NATO defense.

Q2b. Dr. Henry Kissinger has written that failure to ratify the INF Treaty would "wreck the alliance." Do you agree with that assessment?

Failure to ratify would be a serious blow to our standing in the Alliance, and would dissipate the hard won gains achieved because of Alliance unity and steadfastness during the negotiations. But ratification of this Treaty will vindicate our friends, particularly in the INF basing countries, who stood by their convictions and their commitment to NATO's dual-track decision.

VI. NATO Security Issues

1. 1979 Dual-track Decision. Secretary Shultz, as you know some have suggested that the original purpose of NATO's "dual-track" decision was more than simply to respond to the Soviet SS-20s. Some have argued that without the deployment of U.S. INF missiles, NATO's strategy would be undermined. In a recent speech, President Reagan said that "the aim of the (1979) decision was not in itself the deployment of American missiles. That was only to be the means to an end."

Q1a. Can you please elaborate on the original purpose of our deployment of INF missiles?

In December 1979, NATO foreign and defense ministers adopted what has come to be called the "dual-track" decision. On one track, the U.S. would deploy INF missiles in Europe. At the same time, on a second track, the U.S. would attempt to negotiate limits on U.S. and Soviet INF missiles at lower equal levels.

The 1983 Report to Ministers of NATO's Special Consultative Group explains the reasons for NATO's dual-track decision: "The Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity with the U.S. in the mid-1970s gave particular importance to the growing disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in theater nuclear forces, particularly in the field of longer-range INF missiles. Although the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Alliance had not changed, there was concern that this emerging situation could give rise to the risk that the Soviets might believe -- however incorrectly -- that they could use long-range forces to make or threaten limited strikes against Western Europe from a 'sanctuary' in the Soviet Union. There could be a misperception that without adequate theater-based systems of its own capable of reaching Soviet territory, and in the era of parity at the strategic nuclear level, NATO lacked credible and appropriate means of response."

The problem, then, was the disparity in "theater nuclear forces, particularly longer-range INF missiles." As we made clear throughout the negotiations, NATO's preferred means of dealing with this disparity was to eliminate it by the zero outcome. But the negotiations also made clear that, without NATO deployments, the Soviets would never have agreed to the zero outcome.

Q1b. Did the United States believe that a serious gap in our deterrent capability existed?

NATO political leaders and military authorities were concerned that, if left unchecked, this new Soviet capability could mislead Moscow into believing that it could intimidate the Alliance -- or even cause the Soviet Union to miscalculate the risks of aggression.

Q1c. Did we believe that the Pershing II and GLCMs were a response to the SS-20, or were they necessary to respond to larger concerns related to the achievement of strategic parity by the Soviet Union?

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Q1d. From the standpoint of the original goal of the deployment, would a walk-in-the-woods type deal, in which both sides would have kept 225-300 warheads, have been preferable to the current treaty?

Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. was willing to consider any approach that met our criteria -- global limits, U.S./Soviet equality, no compensation for third-country systems, no adverse impact on NATO's conventional strength, and effective verification. But we made clear all along that our strong preference, and that of our allies, was the "zero outcome" that President Reagan proposed in November 1981.

2. Flexible Response. Since 1967, NATO's official strategy has been "flexible response." Flexible response envisions the possibility that conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and ultimately the U.S. strategic force would be employed in response to Soviet aggression against NATO.

Q2a. What impact will this agreement have on that strategy?

Flexible response will remain fully valid. NATO will retain sufficiently robust and credible forces to confront a potential aggressor with major uncertainties about the consequences of using or threatening to use nuclear or conventional forces in an attack against NATO. These systems will, of course, have to be maintained and modernized to ensure our ability to execute a strategy of "flexible response."

Q2b. Does this agreement have the effect of removing a critical rung in the ladder of escalation, upon which NATO's security rests?

No. NATO will retain a broad spectrum of theater and strategic nuclear capabilities, able to hold at risk targets throughout the Warsaw Pact.

In fact, although NATO is giving up a significant military capability, the Soviets are giving up a greater capability involving missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times more warheads than NATO. With the elimination of the SS-20 and SS-4 systems, the Soviet's ability to strike deep, time-urgent targets in NATO will be reduced. This, coupled with the reduced threat against NATO seaports, airfields and U.S. POMCUS sites from triple-capable Soviet shorter-range missile systems, will increase the sustainability and survivability of our forces.

3. Coupling. Many have suggested that this Treaty has the effect of decoupling the security of Western Europe from the security of the United States.

Q3a. Precisely what couples U.S. and allied security?

Coupling depends on many factors including:

-- a militarily credible deployment of U.S. troops in Europe;

-- U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe;

-- a functioning Alliance defense structure with institutionalized consultations, planning, and exercises; and

-- survivable U.S. strategic forces capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

These elements will remain even when U.S. and Soviet INF systems are eliminated.

Q3b. Is coupling as much a political calculation as a military one?

Both the presence of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces in Europe and the perception of a continued political commitment to keep them there are important.

The basic fact underlying coupling is the existence of a community of shared security interests -- and shared values -- that underlies the Atlantic Alliance.

4. Denuclearization. It has been suggested that this Treaty will encourage further calls for denuclearization of Europe.

Q4. Does this Treaty place the West on a path toward denuclearization?

No. NATO has agreed that deterrence will continue to rest on a balanced mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

Moreover, NATO Defense Ministers have stated their determination to continue to implement those measures required to maintain the effectiveness, responsiveness and survivability of Alliance nuclear forces.

5. Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in Germany. There is strong public sentiment in West Germany in favor of eliminating the short-range nuclear weapons -- such as nuclear artillery and the Lance missile -- stationed on German soil. As West Germany's deputy parliament leader, Volker Ruhe, has said, "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." Many NATO leaders, however, have stressed the need to modernize these weapons.

Q5a. How should the Alliance approach this sensitive issue?

NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Reykjavik last June determined that the Alliance's arms control priorities are to pursue:

-- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

-- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet

Nevertheless, negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of problems which the Alliance must carefully consider.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear forces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Q5b. How should NATO respond to a Soviet "triple-zero" proposal?

No such offer has been made.

The United States strongly supports the position that was adopted by the NATO mimisters at Reykjavik to pursue:

- a 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of other problems, which the Alliance has not carefully considered.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear forces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

6. Compensatory Measures

Q6a. Do you think this treaty weakened NATO's defensive posture in any way?

No. The INF Treaty represents an outcome which NATO has long sought, based on careful consideration of what is best for NATO's defense posture. NATO's Defense Ministers have publicly declared their full support for the agreement. It reduces the threat to NATO and enhances the security of the Allies.

Q6b. If not, is there any need to take "compensatory measures?" If the treaty does not weaken NATO security, what would we be "compensating" for?

"Compensatory measures" is a misleading term, since the Treaty enhances NATO's security.

With or without an INF Treaty, NATO decisions have been made to strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrent capabilities, including existing short-range systems and dual-capable aircraft. The Montebello Decision of 1983 mandated substantial reductions in the size of NATO's nuclear stockpile, while calling for necessary modernization measures for remaining systems, in order to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of the nuclear component of NATO's strategy of flexible response. Those reductions have already been made. NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to continue to move forward with these necessary modernization measures as the INF Treaty enters into force.

Similarly, NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to press ahead with conventional defense improvements (CDI) in accordance with the CDI action plan formulated in 1985.

7. Nuclear Force Modernization. Some have suggested that this treaty will increase the urgency of modernizing NATO's nuclear capability.

Q7a. Does the loss of the INF missiles create a new requirement for modernizing NATO's nuclear capability, such as shorter-range nuclear missiles or aircraft-delivered weapons?

No. Prior to the INF Treaty, in conjunction with his 1985 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS-85), SACEUR made a number of recommendations to implement the 1983 Montebello Decision, including development and production of a follow-on to LANCE, a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) and modern artillery-fired atomic projectiles. These modernization requirements remain valid and are independent of the INF Treaty.

Q7b. If so, do you think the Senate should link its consent to the treaty to such a modernization program?

No. The Treaty as it stands is in the best interest of the United States and our Allies. We engaged in six years of ardouous negotiations in close consultations with our Allies to ensure that the Treaty is in our interests. We do not believe that it is necessary to add conditions, amendments, reservations or any other changes. We do, however, feel it is essential that the Congress ensure adequate funding of our modernization programs.

Q7c. Do you believe this treaty will make it more or less difficult for our NATO Allies to sustain their existing nuclear and conventional forces?

Throughout the INF process, NATO ministers have consistently stated their support for continuing modernization of NATO nuclear and conventional forces and taken steps to implement that process. NATO Defense and Foreign Ministers have recently reemphasized the importance of this policy. We believe they will continue to do so.

8. Conventional Force Balance. Some have argued that this agreement leaves the West vulnerable to Soviet advantages in conventional forces.

Q8a. How would you respond to these charges?

The Treaty improves the nuclear balance. It does not and cannot resolve the long-standing conventional imbalance. That was never its intention. But, to the extent that the Treaty eliminates systems which could target nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads against NATO's ports and airfields, it does help improve NATO's conventional posture.

The disparities in the conventional balance are longstanding and the Alliance is taking steps to meet the challenge.

Q8b. Do you think our Allies have been bearing their fair share of the NATO defense burden?

DoD in its annual report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense concluded that the Allies, collectively, are shouldering roughly their fair share of the defense burden. It also stated, however, that clearly some of the Allies can do more.

We believe we have made some strides forward in encouraging a greater effort by our Allies. The Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) program and the armaments cooperation initiatives have enabled the Alliance to more effectively allocate scarce resources. The new NATO Conventional Arms Planning System (CAPS) will deal with the armaments requirements of the Alliance rather than leaving this critical area to individual nations to resolve. We believe that through programs such as these, we will achieve far greater results than by simply telling nations to do more for defense. There are no easy solutions to Allied burdensharing, but we will continue to explore all avenues to persuade the Allies to assume a greater share of the common defense burden.

Q8c. Do you think the Senate should condition its consent to the treaty on improvements in NATO's conventional forces?

No. The Treaty as it stands is in the best interest of the United States and our Allies.

RESPONSES OF MR. KAMPELMAN AND MR. GLITMAN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL

I. U.S. Objectives and Results

Q1. Original Goals What would you describe as our original objectives when these negotiations began in March 1985?

In pursuing an INF Treaty, U.S. negotiators were guided throughout by clear goals initially set forth by NATO in 1979 and further developed by NATO's SCG, the Alliance forum for INF consultation. Basic U.S. and Alliance objectives towards the INF talks were five-fold.

Equality. We insisted U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control agreements must be based on bilateral equality. The Soviets argued that INF parity must be measured between Moscow and NATO as a whole. The Soviets also refused to reduce -- or even constrain -- their shorter-range INF missiles. In the end, the Soviets accepted U.S.-proposed equality which required remarkable Soviet asymmetrical INF reductions: roughly 4:1 in the deployed missile warhead-carrying capability.

Globality. The Soviets insisted INF was exclusively a European issue and Soviet systems located in Asia should be excluded. We insisted on a global approach because anything less would risk transferring the threat from Europe to Asia. Moreover, SS-20 range, mobility and transportability would permit Asian-based SS-20s to threaten Europe in a crisis. U.S., NATO, and Asian pressure ultimately motivated Gorbachev to accept the elimination of his SS-20 force in Asia.

No Third Country Systems. For years the Soviets argued they required compensation for French and UK nuclear forces. The U.S. position was that INF was a bilateral, not a multilateral negotiation and that the U.S. was not empowered to negotiate on behalf of third countries. Thanks to Allied solidarity and a steadfast U.S. negotiating position, the INF Treaty limits only

U.S. and Soviet forces with no reference to UK or French nuclear forces.

No Reduction in NATO's Conventional Capabilities. The Soviets sought to include U.S. dual-capable aircraft, even carrier-based, regardless of location. We rejected such proposals because dual-capable aircraft play a key role in NATO's conventional defense. They are not affected by this agreement.

Effective Verification. U.S. negotiators sought and obtained a verification regime of unprecedented scope and stringency despite Soviet arguments that verification provisions should be postponed until after an agreement was reached. It includes a ban on INF missile production and flight testing; detailed data exchange; and several forms of on-site inspection to help verify this data, the elimination of systems and subsequent compliance.

Q2. Evolution of Objectives How did these objectives change over the course of the negotiations and why?

As the foregoing indicates, the U.S. did not change its basic objectives during the course of the negotiations: equality; globality; no third country systems; no reduction in NATO's conventional capabilities; and effective verification. We persistently maintained our negotiating objectives and with patient negotiating eventually successfully secured them.

Q3. Interim Proposals. Please describe the various U.S. proposals for an interim agreement, short of the zero option? Why did we pursue these interim solutions? Why was that approach abandoned?

While the zero option for intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) had been the preferred U.S. outcome since November 1981, at various times in the negotiations the U.S. advanced interim solutions to move the negotiations toward our ultimate goal.

It should be noted that all interim U.S. proposals explicitly included a provision for follow-on negotiations that would result in a zero-zero outcome.

In March 1983, the United States proposed an interim agreement on INF that would establish equal global limits on U.S. and Soviet warheads on deployed intermediate range missiles at the lowest mutually acceptable number with follow-on limits leading to zero. This U.S. proposal was, in effect, an offer to reduce substantially the number of warheads on the planned INF deployments in Europe, provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of warheads on its IRMs to an equal number on a global basis. In tabling this proposal in May 1983, the U.S. did not advance a specific warhead level, indicating that it was prepared to consider any level between zero and 572 acceptable to the Soviet side. When the Soviet side refused to advance a number, the U.S. negotiators suggested a series of alternate levels between 50 and 450. However, the Soviet side rejected any U.S. deployments.

In September 1983, President Reagan elaborated on the interim agreement proposal by offering to address stated Soviet concerns on aircraft, geography, and the composition of the NATO IRM force. These proposals, tabled on September 22, were rejected by the Soviet side.

On November 15, 1983, the United States specifically suggested an equal global ceiling of 420 IRM warheads, a number corresponding to the level the Soviet side had suggested for their SS-20 deployments in the Western USSR. The Soviet side also rejected this proposal.

When the INF talks resumed in March 1985, the U.S. reaffirmed the continuing validity of its draft treaties of

1982, for the global elimination of all IRMs, and of 1983, for an interim outcome if the Soviets were unprepared to accept a zero/zero outcome consistent with the goal of equal global limits on IRM warheads.

On November 1, 1985, the U.S. proposed that the U.S. would be prepared to cap its IRM launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December 31, 1985 (140 P-II and GLCM launchers) and to discuss a mix of Pershing II/GLCM launchers which would result in equal levels between 420 and 450 warheads. In return, the Soviets would have to agree to reduce SS-20 missiles within range of NATO Europe to the same number. Under this approach, the USSR would be required to reduce the number of SS-20s in the Eastern portion of the USSR in the same proportion as it reduced SS-20s in its European portion.

The concluding Joint Statement of the Geneva Summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, November 19-21, 1985, called for an "interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces." The Soviets outlined a proposal on January 16, 1986 for the elimination of U.S. and Soviet IRMs in Europe as part of a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. On February 24, the U.S. responded by proposing the phased elimination of all U.S. and Soviet IRMs by 1989.

Agreement was reached at the Reykjavik Summit on the outline of an interim agreement calling for equal global ceilings of 100 IRM warheads on each side, none of which could be deployed in Europe. The Soviets thus agreed to reduce their total SS-20 force to a level of 100 warheads (i.e., 33 missiles) and to remove all SS-20s from Europe.

In July 1987, the Soviets accepted our double global zero solution, thus ending the need for an interim agreement.

Q4. Impact of U.S.-Soviet Summits. To what extent were the key decisions in the negotiations made during the three Reagan/Gorbachev summit meetings in November 1985, October 1986, and December 1987?

a. To what extent were key decisions made at the Foreign Ministers' meetings?

b. Did these meetings simply confirm issues already agreed at Geneva or did they tend to drive the negotiations in Geneva?

The summit meetings in 1985 and 1986 set the direction for the negotiations in Geneva. It was at the 1985 summit, for example, that the two leaders called for early progress on "the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the two sides appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement." The 1986 summit, among other things, unalterably established the Soviet commitment to undertake deep reductions in Soviet INF forces in Asia-- a commitment we eventually were able to translate into global zero.

The ministerial meetings, supplemented by experts meetings, helped to resolve issues that had proven intractable in the Geneva negotiations. A significant result of one such meeting, the Shultz/Gromyko meeting of January 7-8, 1985, was the agreement on a mandate for the new set of Geneva negotiations -- after the 1983 Soviet walkout -- that reconvened about two months later.

Q5. Effect of Final Deadline Clearly, it was important to the Administration to wrap up this agreement.

a. To what extent did the deadline of the third summit affect the pace of your work in Geneva?

The United States always clearly stated that we were not working under a deadline. We operated under President Reagan's injunction that it would be better to have no treaty than a bad treaty. Both sides worked very hard to resolve remaining differences and complete the many procedural hurdles prior to the Washington Summit. Consequently, the delegations in Geneva and the interagency community in Washington worked long hours and devoted many resources to completing the task. Nevertheless, we were prepared to have no agreement rather than a bad one.

b. Did the fact of the deadline help you bring the negotiations to a close?

We concentrated our efforts prior to the Summit, but we were prepared to hold the Summit with or without an INF Treaty to sign. Furthermore, this concentration of effort on the U.S. side alone, however, would not have been sufficient to produce an agreement if the Soviets had not adjusted their positions to accept fundamental U.S. requirements.

c. Some fear that the pressure of a deadline caused unnecessary concessions on the part of the United States. How would you respond to that concern?

President Reagan stated on a number of occasions that the U.S. was not interested in an arms control agreement that does not reflect basic U.S. principles. Over the course of the negotiations, the Soviets used various tactics, including artificial deadlines, to attempt to achieve their aims. In all instances we rejected such tactics.

In the closing period of any negotiations among equals, there inevitably will be a dynamic of moving to compromise to complete the agreement. INF was no exception. During the final weeks, both sides engaged in give and take and modified positions. However, no changes made to U.S. positions in this period moved the U.S. from its basic principles or changed important political and security benefits derived from the Treaty.

d. Reportedly, work on the treaty continued even as the treaty was being flown to Washington from Geneva. Is that correct? What type of work was being done on the plane

The Treaty was substantively complete prior to leaving

Geneva. Procedural requirements, for example, typing the Treaty in the appropriate form on the correct paper and proofreading, delayed official initialing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Data and the Inspection Protocol until the morning of 7 December. As the initialing ceremony would have taken some time and the Soviet delegation did not have dedicated air transportation to bring it and its copies of the Treaty to Washington, the U.S. delegation proposed to bring the Soviet ambassadors with them on the U.S. aircraft. Consequently, the Delegations agreed to initial the remaining already completed documents on the aircraft while flying to the United States. No substantative work was done on the airplane.

Q6. Back Channel Negotiations During the SALT I negotiations, the U.S. Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Gerard Smith, was reportedly quite upset over the degree to which important negotiations took place through a back channel.

a. Are you aware of any back channel negotiations which occurred? If so, were the negotiators sufficiently apprised of what transpired during such negotiations?

We did not follow the SALT precedent. Throughout the negotiations, the negotiators remained closely in touch with the Washington policy community and were kept well informed of policy developments.

Q7. Specificity of Treaty. This treaty is far more specific and detailed than other arms control treaties, even though its basic obligation is rather straightforward.

a. Could you please explain the reasoning behind the level of specificity in the treaty?

b. What danger is there that the specific nature of the numerous provisions could invite compliance controversies?

It is true that the basic obligation of the Treaty is straightforward: to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and not have such systems thereafter. The specificity and detail of the Treaty is designed to enhance the Parties' confidence that this obligation is in fact being met.

The detailed provisions of the INF Treaty, particularly those related to verification, represent a significant advance in this regard over previous arms control treaties. While we cannot, of course, predict with confidence that compliance disputes will not occur under the INF Treaty, we believe its level of specificity and detail will help minimize the frequency of such disputes and to permit the constructive resolution of any that may arise.

c. Were elaborate verification provisions contained in this treaty necessary in order to ensure compliance with the treaty's obligations? Are there additional verification provisions you would like to have seen? Do they invite compliance disputes?

To achieve an effective verification regime, the Administration set the following negotiating goals:

--establishment of obligations that are defined as precisely as possible;

--negotiation of cooperative measures (such as on-site inspection, locational restrictions on Treaty-limited items and enhancements of National Technical Means) and provisions providing for unimpeded use of unilateral measures (such as National Technical Means) that will significantly enhance our ability to monitor Treaty-related activities;

--negotiation of provisions that, combined with the aforementioned measures, will increase the cost, complexity, and probability of detection of possible Soviet cheating and thus help deter it.

The INF Treaty satisfies these requirements.

In addition, we wanted to establish reliable procedures and channels for pursuing resolution of any Treaty compliance issues, should they arise. Thus, in addition to the use of regular diplomatic channels, the Treaty also establishes the Special Verification Commission to address compliance concerns.

Q8. Major Compromises. What were the major compromises made by the United States during the course of the negotiations?

We do not believe there were "major compromises" by the U.S. during the course of the negotiations. While no negotiator gets 100% of everything which he may seek, the U.S. clearly identified its goals at the beginning of the negotiations (equality; globality; no third country systems; no reduction in NATO's conventional capabilities; and effective verification plus concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles); persistently maintained our negotiating objectives; and ultimately successfully secured them.

Q9. Omissions. Did the Soviet negotiating team make any comments during the talks which could be construed as casting doubt on our interpretation of the treaty's terms?

Differences of interpretation, when they surfaced, were negotiated long and hard until resolved.

II. Soviet Approach to the Negotiations

Q1. Soviet Objectives. What do you believe the Soviet objectives in the negotiations were? Did their objectives change over time?

Although it is difficult to speculate accurately on Soviet motives and goals, at the outset of the INF negotiations, we believe the Soviets objectives essentially were the reverse of U.S. objectives. They appeared to seek

-- Inequality. An agreement either preventing any U.S. INF missile deployments or assuring Soviet superiority in INF missiles.

-- Regional Agreement. An INF agreement limited to Europe which would leave them free to deploy SS-20 missiles in Asia.

-- Compensation for Third Country Systems. The Soviets sought to include UK and French nuclear systems in the negotiations either directly or indirectly.

-- Inclusion of U.S. Dual-Capable Systems. They attempted to include U.S. dual-capable aircraft and carrier aircraft wherever stationed while excluding their own.

-- Minimal Verification. Soviets either ignored U.S. verification concerns or wanted to handle them with vague "principles" to be fleshed out after an agreement.

-- Avoiding Concurrent Constraints on Shorter-Range Missiles.

Clearly Soviet positions evolved over time. Before U.S. INF deployments began, the Soviet Union clearly sought to use the negotiation to maintain their monopoly in INF missiles and undercut the Alliance's will to deploy its own systems. Presumably, it became clear to Moscow that the U.S. INF deployments could not be stopped by a propaganda campaign or walk-out from the talks. Therefore, the Soviets finally agreed to an equal, global, effectively verifiable agreement.

Q2. Soviet Negotiating Tactics. Could you discuss any particular tactics the Soviets pursued during the negotiations and how you dealt with those tactics? For example, did the Soviets seek to revisit issues which had previously been resolved by casting doubt on their interpretation of particular provisions?

There was nothing extraordinary or unique about Soviet negotiating tactics during the INF negotiations. They were representative of Soviet tactics in earlier negotiations. For example, they emphasized the virtues of specific positions they were pressing at great length. In response, we noted the liabilities of these positions and the strengths of our own. They suggested that we could make unilateral decisions for the members of NATO. We rejected such positions. When the Soviets attempted to reopen already agreed issues, we stressed strongly that decisions had been made and that they should return to agreed positions. In any event, we emphasized they would get no concession for resuming previously agreed positions.

Q3. Effect of Gorbachev. Did you discern significant changes in the pace and seriousness of the Soviet negotiators after the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 and his subsequent consolidation of power?

a. Following Gorbachev's January 1986 acceptance of the zero option in Europe as part of his overall plan for nuclear disarmament, did the Soviet negotiators noticeably pick up the pace? At what point did the Soviet side get serious?

b. Did you sense that the Soviet negotiators in Geneva were hamstrung by Gorbachev's tendency to announce significant changes in the Soviet negotiating position from Moscow?

Any comment regarding the "pace and seriousness of the Soviet negotiators" is necessarily speculative and subjective. However, it is clear that the Soviets, having realized that their walk-out in November 1983 was totally counter-productive and that NATO deployments were going to continue, were more serious in the INF negotiations following their return to the negotiating table in March 1985. This change was, in part, due to Alliance solidarity on the INF issue.

Gorbachev's overall influence on the negotiations was positive. While negotiators certainly influence the formulation of policy, in the final analysis policy -- for both sides -- is determined in capitals.

Q4. Second Zero. It seems clear that the initiative for eliminating intermediate-range missiles came from the United States. In his testimony, Secretary Shultz seemed to be suggesting that the idea of eliminating shorter-range missiles was a U.S. proposal. Clearly, the principle of global reductions was a result of U.S. initiative, but the extent of those reductions in shorter-range missiles may not have been.

a. Was the elimination of shorter-range missiles the result of a Soviet initiative? Did the Soviets first propose double zero? If so, what was our response?

The U.S. had always made clear to the Soviets that it was interested in equality at the lowest possible levels of intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) and concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles (SRMs), including zero. When in early 1987 the Soviets signaled that they would be willing to consider a zero SRM option, we quickly initiated consultations with our NATO Allies.

These consultations considered how to implement the principle of equality which was the centerpiece of the U.S. position. The Alliance choice was between the right to equal deployments of SRM systems, or to press for their complete elimination. These consultations took several months of intense discussions both within the Alliance and within individual countries. The final decision was reached at the Reykjavik Ministerial in June, where NATO opted to support the complete elimination of the shorter-range missile systems of the United States and USSR on a global basis. Since the U.S. had no such missiles deployed, this meant in practice unilateral Soviet reductions.

This position was formally tabled as a U.S. proposal in Geneva on June 16.

Negotiations entered a new phase when Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev accepted the goal enunciated by President Reagan in November 1981 for the elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range missile systems (IRMs). In a lengthy interview in the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka carried in TASS on July 22, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviets were willing to agree to a "double global zero" treaty to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range INF missiles, in effect accepting the U.S. position to eliminate IRMs and SRMs globally. On July 23, Soviet negotiators in Geneva confirmed this position.

On July 27, President Reagan announced the tabling in Geneva the following day of a U.S. proposal for implementing the double global zero outcome.

5. Soviet Negotiators. Could you describe your impressions of the seriousness and effectiveness of the Soviet negotiators?

Soviet negotiators were competent and effective. They had mastered their substantive material, worked very hard and devoted long hours to the negotiations.

a. What effect did the Soviet penchant for secrecy have on their negotiators? Did they make any specific comments to you about the significance of their providing detailed data about their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles?

Negotiating information did not always appear to be as widely shared within the Soviet delegation, occasionally leaving working level Soviet negotiators at something of a loss concerning recent developments. This circumstance tended to limit their tactical flexibility in working groups. Clearly, the Soviets were keenly aware of the highly secret nature of the material they were supplying in the exchange of technical, numerical and locational data.

b. What is your overall assessment of the manner in which the Soviet negotiators comported themselves?

The Soviets handled themselves with professional competence and skill.

Q6. Major Concessions. What were the principal concessions made by the Soviet Union during the negotiations? And when did they occur?

The record of Soviet movement toward U.S. positions on key INF issues in the negotiations attests to the importance of U.S. firmness and Allied solidarity.

From the outset of the negotiations, the U.S. defined its goals, and held firm to them in the pursuit of a meaningful and effectively verifiable arms reduction agreement. The U.S. position called for: (1) equal, global limits on U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF systems; (2) exclusion of third country forces in a bilateral negotiation; (3) reductions to zero in U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) and constraints on shorter-range missile (SRM) systems; (4) exclusion of aircraft; and (5) effective verification provisions.

While the Soviet Union initially objected to these positions, they eventually accepted them.

Highlights of Soviet Movement.

1. Zero-zero: At the beginning of the INF negotiations, the U.S. proposed a zero-zero solution, calling for the elimination of both U.S. and Soviet IRMs. After the Soviets had rejected this position for almost six years, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on July 22, 1987 to the complete elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

2. Equal limits on SRMs: From the outset of the negotiations, the US proposal called for constraints on shorter-range missile systems to be included in any INF agreement. The Soviet Union agreed to this in July 1987 as part of their acceptance of the "double global zero" formula.

3. Global solution: The Soviet Union sought to retain some IRM missiles in Asia, while indicating willingness to negotiate them out of Europe. At the Reykjavik meeting of October 1986, the Soviet Union agreed to the elimination of IRMs in Europe, and to equal limits of intermediate-range missiles and launchers capable of carrying 100 warheads, for the USSR in Soviet Asia and for the U.S. on its territory. The Soviets finally agreed to the global elimination of U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missiles in July 1987.

4. Effective verification measures: The U.S. had long insisted that verification obligations should be integral to any INF Treaty, and that detailed verification procedures be agreed before a treaty entered into force. The Soviets initially resisted, and sought to delay negotiation of verification until after the Treaty was completed. At Reykjavik, the Soviet side accepted the US proposed principles of effective verification, but subsequently resisted specific elaboration at the Geneva negotiations. By March 1987, the Soviets stopped actively resisting integration of verification obligations in the Treaty. They also agreed to the Treaty structure the U.S. proposed, consisting of basic obligations, a Memorandum of Understanding on Data, an Elimination Protocol, and an Inspection Protocol. Finally, in late September 1987, Soviet agreement was obtained on specific verification provisions, including data exchange, notifications, restrictions on location, baseline inspection, inspections of declared facilities, on-site inspection of elimination, and short-notice inspections. They also began to move toward acceptance of close-out inspection and portal monitoring, and finally accepted U.S. proposals on these issues in the last weeks of the negotiations.

5. Exclusion of Third Country Forces: For the first years of the negotiations, the Soviets insisted on including the independent British and French nuclear deterrent forces in the negotiations -- a position which the U.S. and the NATO Allies resolutely rejected. The first sign of the breakthrough in securing Soviet agreement to drop this demand came with General Secretary Gorbachev's October 1985 announcement in Paris. However, until the Reykjavik meeting in October 1986, Soviet negotiators sporadically returned to this issue, suggesting some residual links to

UK and French nuclear forces. At the Reykjavik meeting, however, they dropped their insistence on compensation for third-country forces.

6. INF delinked from Defense and Space: Until the Geneva Summit in November 1985, the Soviets sought to link conclusion of an INF agreement to resolution of certain issues in the Defense and Space negotiations. They delinked them at the Geneva Summit. At the Reykjavik meeting of October 1986, they again asserted that agreement on INF was contingent on conclusion of a "package deal" which required the U.S. to abandon the SDI program. The Soviets finally dropped their insistence on linking an INF agreement to Defense and Space issues in Gorbachev's TASS statement of February 28, 1987.

7. INF delinked from START: In addition to their attempts to link INF to Defense and Space issues, the Soviets also proposed linking an INF agreement to strategic arms reductions beginning in January 1986. The Soviets signaled their willingness to delink INF from START at the Geneva Summit in November 1985, and again in the summer of 1986, when they dropped their demand for inclusion of forward-based systems (FBS) and longer-range INF from their strategic arms reduction position. This was confirmed in October 1986 at Reykjavik, where agreement was reached to negotiate strategic arms reductions on the basis of 50 per cent reductions which excluded forward-based systems and intermediate-range missiles, although at Reykjavik the Soviets made all reductions part of the "package deal" referred to above. After Reykjavik, the Soviets no longer linked INF to START.

8. Missiles Only: The Soviets initially insisted on including medium-range aircraft in the INF negotiations, a demand which could have seriously damaged NATO's conventional defense posture. By mid-1985, the Soviets omitted, though never explicitly retracted, their earlier insistence on inclusion of aircraft in the INF negotiations. Soviet agreement to "missiles only" was confirmed at the Geneva Summit.

7. Effect of Deadline. We have heard a great deal about the effect of the impending Washington Summit on the U.S. negotiators. What effect did the final deadline have on the Soviet negotiators? Did they behave as if they were under the gun?

The forthcoming Summit had an impact on Soviet negotiators. They repeatedly referred to reported directives from Shevardnadze to complete the agreement. They noted the existence of a high level group in Moscow devoted solely to working on INF issues. Clearly they were devoting all the resources necessary to reach decisions and provide instructions to their negotiators. This did not, however, prevent protracted Soviet tactical haggling over many issues or their efforts to alter previously agreed positions.

2. Challenge Inspections In the past, some Administration officials have suggested that a prerequisite for arms control agreements was full, total or thoroughly-reliable verification. Presumably, "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspections would be part of an absolute verification regime.

-- Do you believe an absolute verification regime could have been negotiated?

-- Do you believe "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspections could have been negotiated?

-- What is the Soviet view of "anytime, anywhere" inspections?

-- In the event we desired additional inspections not provided for in the treaty, what kind of Soviet response could we expect?

A. There is no such thing as "absolute" or 100% verification. That would essentially be a case of proving a negative which is difficult if not impossible. However, one can make judgments about the disincentives to Soviet cheating and about U.S. capabilities to detect violations that pose a threat to U.S. and Allied security. It is our judgment that the INF Treaty contains measures for effective verification of compliance.

Because a verification regime is reciprocal, we had to weigh the verification benefits of "anywhere, anytime" inspections against U.S. and Allied security concerns. In the context of the Soviet acceptance of our "double zero" proposal, we concluded that "anywhere, anytime" inspections were not essential given the extensive and unprecedented nature of our verification procedures as a whole. We believe the right balance was struck. Moreover, even with such inspections, you could not have "absolute" verification.

For their part, the Soviets never accepted a bilateral "anytime, anywhere" provision. However, they did propose an inspection of only U.S. military bases located anywhere in the world, a proposal which was unacceptable to the U.S.

Moreover, nothing in the Treaty would prevent us from seeking to satisfy our concerns if we detect suspicious or Treaty-limited activities at a non-declared site. We would seek clarification and pursue the matter through diplomatic channels or the SVC created specially for the purpose of resolving compliance questions. We would also take whatever steps we felt were necessary to protect U.S. and Allied security.

3. U.S. Position on Challenge Inspections. According to a number of accounts, the U.S. position on short-notice inspections evolved considerably between August 1987 and the completion of the treaty. Reportedly, the United States initially sought short-notice inspections of any site where intermediate-range missiles or equipment were thought to be located. Then, the U.S. apparently began circumscribing the definition of suspect sites, first to be ICBM sites, second to mobile ICBM sites, third to road-mobile ICBM sites, and finally to formerly declared facilities included in the MOU.

-- Is this an accurate characterization of the evolution of the U.S. position on this subject?

-- Could you describe the reasons for the evolution?

--What effect, if any, does essentially losing the right to inspect "suspect sites" have on our ability to verify the terms of the treaty?

A. We have long stated that the INF verification regime should be tailored to the detailed limitations of the Treaty. In the context of an INF agreement that would have permitted the United States and Soviet Union to retain missiles and launchers capable of carrying 100 warheads, the United States proposed inspection of any site in either country where such missiles and launchers could be located -- suspect sites.

After the Soviets agreed to the long-standing U.S. preference for global zero, in July 1987, we re-examined our proposals for inspections of suspect sites. We had to balance our security concerns against potential verification benefits. In that context, and balancing the potential impact on U.S. and Allied security of allowing reciprocal inspection rights to the Soviet Union, we determined that overall U.S. and Allied interests in INF were served by on-site inspections short of "anywhere, anytime." Finally, inspection of formerly declared facilities included in the MOU has always been part of the inspection regime, and was thus not a "compromise" inspection provision.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union eventually agreed to baseline inspections, inspecting the elimination of Treaty-limited items, close-out inspections of eliminated facilities, and inspection of formerly declared facilities, along with portal monitoring of the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk and enhancement of national technical means of verification at SS-25 bases.

Moreover, nothing in the Treaty would prevent us from seeking to satisfy our concerns if we detect suspicious or Treaty-limited activities at a non-declared site. We would seek clarification and pursue the matter through diplomatic channels or the SVC created specially for the purpose of resolving compliance questions. We would also take whatever steps we felt were necessary to protect U.S. and Allied security.

IV. Implications for Future Arms Control

1. Defense and Space.

-- What real progress, if any, has been made in the talks on defense and space?

-- Are we at the point yet of discussing specific activities that might or might not be allowed?

-- Do you view some further agreement on research, development and testing of strategic defenses as necessary to achieve a START agreement?

-- If so, what do you see as the options? If not, are you assuming the Soviets will drop their insistence on such a linkage?

During the Washington summit, the leaders issued a joint statement indicating their agreement on a number of points: an unspecified period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty during which both sides would continue their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty; conducting intensive discussions on strategic stability no later than three years prior to the end of the nonwithdrawal period; the freedom of each side to choose its own course of action at the end of the nonwithdrawal period unless otherwise agreed; and the need to discuss measures to enhance predictability.

We have called on the Soviet side to join with us to work constructively towards a joint text of a new and separate Treaty. Such a joint text would be based upon the areas of agreement reached at the Washington summit. The U.S.-proposed draft Defense and Space Treaty, tabled in Geneva on January 22, reflects and builds upon those areas of agreement.

The U.S. proposals now on the table in Geneva provide a solid basis for resolving our remaining differences. It was agreed in Washington that both sides would have the right to conduct research, development, and testing as required. There is no need, in effect, to renegotiate the ABM Treaty by enumerating specific allowed activity.

As we have said on numerous occasions, our first priority is to complete a verifiable START Treaty implementing the principle of 50 per cent reductions. It should be completed and ratified independent of a Defense and Space Treaty, since offensive arms reductions are in both sides' interest.

START reductions should go forward based on their own merits. The ABM Treaty is now 15 years old and was supposed to lead to such reductions long ago. That promise should be fulfilled without any further restrictions on defense.

The U.S. would rather have no agreement than accept a bad one. SDI offers the hope of a safer world, one in which Western security would rely less on the threat of retaliation and increasingly on defenses, which threaten no one. That is the framework in which the U.S. is proceeding, and we are hopeful that the Soviet Union will join us in this effort.

RESPONSES OF MR. KAMPELMAN AND MR. GLITMAN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Q1. West German Pershing IA Missiles. Earlier this summer, the question of whether the West German Pershing IA missiles would be covered by this agreement was very controversial. The Administration has studiously insisted that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would not affect our programs of cooperation with various West European countries. Section II, paragraph 9 of the Elimination

Protocol on the U.S.-German Pershing IA program of cooperation reads "During the last fifteen days, a party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section."

a. Please describe the negotiations which led to this provision?

The Soviets raised the issue of the FRG Pershing IA missile force after having agreed to the double global zero formula, which the U.S. had proposed. The FRG Pershing IA missiles had not been an explicit part of the previous Soviet attempted linkage of its own INF force levels to those of third countries, such as the UK and France. The U.S. negotiators had made it clear throughout that any INF agreement would affect only U.S. and Soviet forces, and could not include third country forces, nor affect existing U.S. programs of cooperation with allies.

In his statement of August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl established conditions for the dismantling of German Pershings. He stated that after all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles have been eliminated, then the Federal Republic will dismantle its Pershing IA force. At that point, this U.S./FRG Program of Cooperation will end and all U.S. reentry vehicles associated with the West German Pershing IA program will be withdrawn. We have agreed with the Soviets that all U.S. and Soviet missiles will have been eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the elimination period.

The Soviets returned to this issue again at the Moscow Ministerial in late October, linking it to a resolution of the phasing of reductions issue. The U.S. and Soviet Union agreed in Moscow that the elimination of all Treaty-limited intermediate range-missile systems would actually be completed fifteen days prior to the end of the three year overall period of elimination. This would satisfy the conditions established by the FRG for the termination of the POC. Further, within the remaining fifteen days of the elimination period, a Party to the Treaty would withdraw to its national territory the missile reentry vehicles unilaterally released from POCs (e.g., the US RVs associated with the FRG Pershing IA Program of Cooperation). Moreover, it was agreed that these reentry vehicles would then be eliminated within the same time frame (i.e., the remaining fifteen days of the overall period of elimination) in accordance with procedures for elimination that are the same as those defined in the Treaty, in particular in the Elimination Protocol, Section II.

Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. made it clear that the INF Treaty was a bilateral agreement and could have no effect on an existing POC with an ally. For that reason, the Treaty does not constrain the FRG Pershing IA missiles and at no time do these elimination procedures apply to an existing Program of Cooperation.

b. Will this treaty result in the elimination of the 72 West German Pershing IA missiles and the removal of the associated warheads? How will our program of cooperation be affected by the INF Treaty?

The INF Treaty does not constrain the FRG Pershing IA missile nor does it limit the Program of Cooperation. The fate of the Pershing IA missiles will be the result of a sovereign German decision.

In his statement of August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl established conditions for the dismantling of German Pershings. He stated that after all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles have been eliminated, then the Federal Republic will dismantle its Pershing IA force. At that point, this U.S./FRG Program of Cooperation will end and all U.S. reentry vehicles associated with the West German Pershing IA program will be withdrawn. We have agreed with the Soviets that all U.S. and

Soviet missiles will have been eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the elimination period.

c. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany has announced that it will dismantle the Pershing IA missiles during the period when U.S. and Soviet INF missiles must be eliminated. What would happen if the Federal Republic were to reverse this position?

We do not want to speculate on such a hypothetical situation. The FRG has made its position clear, and this is a matter for their sovereign decision.

The Treaty contains provisions for handling any reentry vehicles unilaterally released from existing programs of cooperation. We anticipate that, in line with Chancellor Kohl's decision, U.S. reentry vehicles on FRG PIAs will be handled in this manner. More specifically, however, the timing of the actual destruction of the German missiles and launchers is not a subject governed by the bilateral treaty; it is for Bonn to decide.

d. Are there any private understandings between the United States and the Federal Republic on this matter which are not reflected in the treaty?

No.

e. During the negotiations, did we provide the Soviet Union with any assurances about the German Pershing?

No. The United States made no assurances concerning the FRG Pershings to the Soviet Union.

Q2. Omissions. Earlier this year, the Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees held extensive hearings to discuss the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. As part of its case for the "broad" interpretation, the Administration alleged that the ABM Treaty negotiators represented the meaning of that treaty in a different manner than the Soviet Union understood. For this reason, the question of your precision in defining our obligations under the INF Treaty merits some inquiry.

a. Did the Soviet negotiating team make any comments during the talks which could be construed as casting doubt on our interpretation of the treaty's terms?

Differences of interpretation, when they surfaced, were negotiated and resolved.

Q3. Effect of Gorbachev. Did you discern significant changes in the pace and seriousness of the Soviet negotiators after the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 and his subsequent consolidation of power?

a. Following Gorbachev's January 1986 acceptance of the zero option in Europe as part of his overall plan for nuclear disarmament, did the Soviet negotiators noticeably pick up the pace? At what point did the Soviet side get serious?

b. Did you sense that the Soviet negotiators in Geneva were hamstrung by Gorbachev's tendency to announce significant changes in the Soviet negotiating position from Moscow?

Any comment regarding the "pace and seriousness of the Soviet negotiators" is speculative and subjective. However it is clear that the Soviets, having realized that their walk-out in November 1983 was totally counter-productive and that NATO deployments were going to continue, were more serious in the INF negotiations following their return to the negotiating table in March 1985. This change was, in part due to Alliance solidarity on the INF issue.

Gorbachev's overall influence on the negotiations was positive. While negotiators certainly influence the formulation of policy, in the final analysis policy -- for both sides -- is determined in capitals.

Q4. Second Zero. It seems clear that the initiative for eliminating intermediate-range missiles came from the United States. In his testimony, Secretary Shultz seemed to be suggesting that the idea of eliminating shorter-range missiles was a U.S. proposal. Clearly, the principle of global reductions was a result of U.S. initiative, but the extent of those reductions in shorter-range missiles may not have been.

a. Was the elimination of shorter-range missiles the result of a Soviet initiative? Did the Soviets first propose double zero? If so, what was our response?

The U.S. had always made clear to the Soviets that it was interested in equality at the lowest possible levels of intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) with concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles (SRMs). For most of the negotiations, the Soviets refused to consider any SRM constraints. When in early 1987 the Soviets sent out signals that they would be willing to consider a zero SRM option, we quickly initiated consultations with our NATO Allies.

These consultations considered how to implement the principle of equality which was the centerpiece of the U.S. position. The choice was between the right to equal limits on lower deployments of SRM systems, or to press for their complete elimination. These consultations took several months of intense discussions both within the Alliance and within individual countries. The final decision was reached at the Reykjavik Ministerial in June, where NATO opted to support the complete elimination of the shorter-range missile systems of the United States and USSR on a global basis. Since the U.S. had no such missiles deployed, this meant in practice unilateral Soviet reductions.

This position was formally tabled as a U.S. proposal in Geneva on June 16.

Negotiations entered a new phase when Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev accepted the goal enunciated by President Reagan in November 1981 for the elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range missile systems (IRMs). In a lengthy interview in the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka carried in TASS on July 22, Gorbachev outlined a "double global zero" approach to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range INF missiles, in effect accepting the U.S. position to eliminate IRMs and SRMs globally. On July 23, Soviet negotiators in Geneva confirmed this proposal.

On July 27, President Reagan announced that we would table in Geneva the following day a U.S. proposal for implementing the double global zero outcome.

Q5. Further Nuclear Reductions in Europe. The question of whether NATO should proceed with further reductions in its nuclear forces has caused some controversy within the alliance.

a. In the absence of agreement on conventional forces, should we proceed with further reductions in nuclear forces, particularly short-range nuclear weapons?

NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Reykavik last June determined that the Alliance's arms control priorities are to pursue:

-- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

-- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Nevertheless, negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles pose a number of problems which the Alliance must carefully consider.

-- We must avoid unacceptable constraints on our conventional capabilities for forward defense, because all of NATO's short-range nuclear forces are dual-capable.

-- We must address verification problems which are extremely complicated, because short-range nuclear forces are small, mobile and closely integrated into each side's ground forces.

b. How interested are the Soviets in reducing or eliminating short-range nuclear arms?

Given the Soviet advantages in conventional forces, reducing NATO's nuclear deterrent forces has long been a Soviet goal. A real test of Soviet intentions would be their willingness to accept deep asymmetrical cuts in their conventional forces to equal and stabilizing levels vis-a-vis the West, as they finally agreed to in INF.

Q7. Purpose of Eliminations

a. Could you please explain how the reduction of Soviet SS-20s and shorter-range missiles fits into our overall goals and objectives for strategic arms control?

b. How important is achieving a START agreement to making the INF Treaty strategically significant?

c. Does the ultimate impact of this treaty depend on whether or not there is a START agreement?

d. What evidence do you see at the negotiating table that the Soviets are serious about a START agreement?

The President's long-standing goal, and that of the Alliance, has been to achieve stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty clearly contributes significantly to that goal by completely eliminating a whole class of such weapons particularly threatening to our Allies in Europe and Asia. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev, as well as NATO's Foreign Ministers, have repeatedly stated that the next step in this process should be 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Soviet Union. U.S. and Soviet negotiators are at the negotiating table now in Geneva working toward that end.

The INF Treaty, standing alone, will have a considerable beneficial impact. It will strengthen our national security and that of Western Europe. Its contribution will be greatly enhanced, moreover, if it is complemented by progress in the other arms control deliberations as well as in the other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR KERRY

1. (a) If the Soviet Union were to deploy additional SS-25 missiles on a large scale to replace all the INF missiles they are eliminating under the Treaty, would the U.S. view this to be incompatible with the intent of the Treaty? (b) If both sides were to agree to remain at the totals of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which existed in 1979 and to respect an 820 ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs, a 1200 ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, and a ceiling of 1,320 on MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs, while START negotiations continue, would that prevent the Soviets from circumventing the military impact of the Treaty by deploying SS-25s to replace SS-20s removed under INF? (c) Is Soviet compliance with these limits and sublimits in the interest of the U.S. and NATO while START talks continue?

No. The INF Treaty was never intended to limit strategic nuclear weapons, including the SS-25. It deals comprehensively with a part of the Soviet threat, i.e., eliminating Soviet intermediate-range missiles, that previous treaties did not address.

Conditioning Senate approval of the INF Treaty on negotiating agreed limits at 1979 levels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is not in the interest of the U.S. and NATO. It would jeopardize a treaty that stands on its own merits and is clearly in our national security interest. Jeopardizing prompt ratification would harm the strength and cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance and the future of all arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

Establishing informal adherence to unilaterally imposed and unverifiable sub-limits would also prevent the necessary modernization of our strategic deterrent forces and undercut our negotiating leverage to achieve the equitable, verifiable and stabilizing arms reductions we are seeking in the START negotiations.

In addition, this approach would lock in inequalities in the strategic balance, and undermine our negotiating position at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). Moreover, reaching such an agreement--and effective verification for it which would be the only way to ensure Soviet compliance--would be a complex and lengthy process. Most importantly, the United States is actively seeking substantial reductions in strategic nuclear forces, not merely capping them at their 1979 levels.

OVERALL ALLIANCE SPENDING

Q2a. Over the past ten years, how much has NATO spent on defending Europe? How much has the Warsaw Pact spent on the European Theater?

There is no analytically sound costing methodology that enables us to develop a meaningful estimate of how much of the total defense expenditures of the United States, USSR, NATO Alliance, and Warsaw Pact are allocated to the Central Region or to the Atlantic to the Urals. The analytical problems associated with the requested costing data are essentially the same problems that make it impossible for us to develop meaningful estimates of the portion of the DoD budget that is allocated to NATO. Since many of our forces could be used for non-NATO as well as NATO emergencies, calculating their costs involves a "joint product" problem. There is no immutable NATO/non-NATO dividing line in the U.S. force structure, nor do we allocate funding in our program or budget on a regional or geographic basis. Trying to classify U.S. forces into those that would support a war in Europe and those that would not support such a conflict imposes a misleadingly simple dichotomy. In all likelihood, any conflict with the Warsaw Pact would be a major--perhaps global--war, requiring a full commitment of U.S. and allied resources.

Q2b. Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces outnumber that of NATO in most categories. Why has it cost NATO more to field fewer weapons?

Although the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces do outnumber those of NATO in most categories, it is impossible to assess the real cost of these weapons to the Warsaw Pact. The lack of reliable costing data, imprecise exchange rates, differences in economic systems and acquisition processes make it extremely difficult to analyze any weapons systems costs between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

It should be noted that, although the gap is narrowing, NATO still retains a qualitative edge over the Warsaw Pact in many areas. Many of the advanced systems that NATO has fielded in the last decade, such as the M1 tank, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, MLRS, F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft have significantly increased the military capability of the NATO Alliance. In addition, while manpower costs are higher in NATO, Allied military personnel are generally better trained and more reliable as allies than military personnel from most Warsaw Pact countries.

Q2c. In general, do we still have a technological and qualitative edge?

In many areas, NATO stills retains a qualitative edge over the Warsaw Pact, but the gap is narrowing. NATO has traditionally sought to make up for its numerical disadvantage by maintaining an edge in quality of its forces and equipment. Many of the advanced systems that NATO has fielded in the last decade, such as the M1 tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, MLRS, F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft have significantly increased the military capability of the NATO Alliance. In addition, the quality, training and reliability of the Allied personnel assigned to operate their systems are, we believe, significantly higher than on the Warsaw Pact side.

Unfortunately, the Soviets have also made great strides in improving the quality of their forces and are rapidly closing the gap. They have significantly improved the quality of their tanks, artillery, helicopters, and airborne early warning aircraft. In fighter aircraft, an area where NATO has traditionally held a qualitative edge, the Warsaw Pact is narrowing that gap with the deployment of the MIG-29 and SU-27 fighters. This new generation of fighter aircraft have a look down/shoot down radar and a sophisticated missile capability against aircraft and cruise missiles. Some systems in the Soviet T-80 tank are more advanced than in NATO's M-1 tank, and vice versa. In other areas such as aircraft technology, NATO retains some advantage but we cannot become complacent given Soviet technological efforts.

Q2d. To what extent does the NATO qualitative edge affect the significance of simple quantitative listings reflecting NATO and Warsaw Pact strength?

Generally speaking, qualitative advantages can help make up for quantitative disadvantages. However, at some point a quantitative edge becomes dominant. For example, a fighter aircraft, no matter how technically superior, can only be in one place at a time. At the same time, relying on a few static quantitative military comparisons can be dangerously simplistic. Such "bean counts" ignore a host of factors which can significantly affect military outcomes. In addition to technological edge, such factors include geography, morale, readiness, quality of training and leadership, logistics, sustaining stocks of equipment and consumables, commonality of hardware and doctrine among Allies, reliability of Allies, command and control, etc. Taken together, while we are confident in our ability to deter potential Soviet aggression in Europe, the relevant quantitative and qualitative factors cause some concern for NATO military commanders.

Q3a. The INF Treaty contains no provision permitting the U.S. to inspect sites which we might suspect are being used for Soviet cheating. It has been reported that the Soviet Union was willing to agree to such inspections, but that our military is opposed to such a provision because we do not want Soviet inspectors up close to so many American installations. Is that report accurate?

The Soviets were never willing to accept a bilateral "suspect site" provision. They did, however, propose an inspection of U.S. military bases located anywhere in the world. Of course, such a Soviet provision was unacceptable. For our part, we were concerned about the potential for Soviet hostile intelligence activities. In the context of a double gobal zero outcome and the interlocking web of verification measures in the Treaty, we determined that effective verification of the INF Treaty was possible without "anytime, anywhere" inspections.

Moreover, the U.S. is in no way restricted from challenging the Soviet Union when we detect what we believe are Treaty-prohibited or suspicious activities at non-declared facilities or locations. We would seek to satisfy our compliance concerns through diplomatic channels or the Special Verification Commission (SVC).

b. We decided that on balance the risks associated with "suspect site" inspections were greater than the contributions that such inspections could make to verification in the context of INF double global zero. We are satisfied that the INF Treaty establishes an effective verification regime to deter cheating and enable us to detect violations.

b. What position would the Administration take on an additional provision to the Treaty authorizing the President to seek additional inspections to suspect sites?

The USG decided that on balance the risks associated with "suspect site" inspection for the INF Treaty were greater than any contribution that such inspections could make to INF verification. We are satisfied that the INF Treaty establishes an effective verification regime. In addition, the total ban on systems covered by this Treaty and the extensive, interlocking verification provisions including several kinds of on-site inspections will enhance U.S. capabilities to detect cheating that is extensive enough to pose a threat to U.S. or Allied security.

We believe the Treaty as negotiated stands on its own merits, and that changes to it are unnecessary.

Questions on Treaty Text

Q4a. Article II(2) of the Treaty defines a ground-launched cruise missile as a "ground launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle." Can there be types of ground-launched cruise missiles which have a purpose other than weapons delivery, such as reconnaissance? (b) If either side wanted to build a new type of GLCM for reconnaissance, not interchangeable with current GLCMs and never tested with a weapon, would that be allowed under the Treaty, because it would not be a weapon-delivery vehicle? (c) Could the Soviets, if they chose, deploy reconnaissance GLCMs, or could the US, without violating the Treaty? (d) Was this issue discussed during Treaty negotiations? (e) Is there any common understanding regarding each party's obligations in connection with this provision?

There are three factors that determine whether a cruise missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the cruise missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the cruise missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. The third factor is whether the cruise missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all cruise missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLCMs are those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e. flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof.

Thus, a ground-launched cruise missile falling outside any of these three criteria could be produced and/or deployed by either party -- including for purposes of reconnaissance -- without violating the terms of the Treaty.

This issue was discussed during Treaty negotiations; the results of that discussion are embodied in the relevant Treaty provisions cited above, which reflect the parties' common understanding of their obligations on this matter.

Q4f. Does the U.S. intend to develop reconnaissance GLCMs within the range of missiles prohibited by INF?

No decisions have been made regarding U.S. development of such systems.

However, we reserve the right to produce and deploy such reconnaissance platforms in the future if it is determined to be in the best interest of U.S. and Alliance security. We had to weigh the benefits of retaining this right against any potential difficulty in verifying the distinction between reconnaissance GLCMs and weapons-delivery GLCMs. We concluded that the value of retaining this right outweighed the risks of possible Soviet cheating, especially given the fact that the differences in infrastructure and testing patterns between a reconnaissance GLCM and a weapons-delivery GLCM are significant.

Q4g. Are deployments of reconnaissance GLCMs contemplated by NATO?

No decisions have been made regarding Alliance development or deployment of such systems.

Q5. In Article VII(11) an exception is created to permit tests of GLBM's and GLCM's so long as the launchers are clearly test-launchers which are distinguishable from regular GLBM or GLCM launchers. This exception would permit the testing of SLBM's and SLCM's in a ground-based mode. (a) Could the Soviets use this exception to maintain "test-launchers" which while not regular launchers could be substituted for them? (b) Would this violate the Treaty?

GLBM and GLCM launchers are defined in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article II, respectively, as "a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching" a GLBM or GLCM. Article VII(8) specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM. Such launchers would thus be subject to the Treaty. Launchers to which these terms do not apply are not subject to the Treaty; this would include launchers of the type referred to in Article VII(11), which by the terms of that provision must be "distinguishable from" GLBM or GLCM launchers subject to the Treaty.

Any attempts to evade Treaty restrictions on GLBM and GLCM launchers utilizing the exception for test launchers in Article VII(11) would be a serious compliance issue. We believe that a meaningful evasion of this nature is highly unlikely, however, because the test sites to which this provision refers are very limited in number, their locations are known to both sides, and the number and type of launchers at these sites are monitorable by NTM.

Q5c. Can the U.S. verify whether or not the Soviets are doing this, and if so how?

We assume the question is whether the US is able to monitor Soviet use of test launchers for a covert force of ground-launched missiles of intermediate range. The answer is yes. Details on our capabilities for monitoring current test ranges could be provided in classified form. We would be able to monitor the building of new test ranges and the testing of SLBMs and SLCMs.

Q6a. Article VII (12) provides another exception, giving each Party the right to produce and use for booster systems existing types of booster stages. Why was the provision placed in the Treaty? (b) Among the limits to this exception is the requirement that "booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves." How can we verify this provision and determine whether a booster test has been only for research and development to test an object, and not to test the booster?

The provision in paragraph 12 of Article VII exempts from the Treaty launches of R&D booster systems that might otherwise be considered illegal flight-tests of GLBMs of INF range. Included in this category are booster systems used for research, development and testing of components of strategic missile systems (i.e. those missiles with a range capability greater than 5500 km, which are not covered by the INF Treaty).

Nevertheless, to help verify that such booster system launches are not used illegally for INF flight-testing, the following limitations are placed on these booster systems:

-- stages used in such booster systems must be different from stages used in INF missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty;

-- such booster systems must be used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

-- the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time;

-- the launchers of such booster systems must be fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding;

-- no new types of stages for such booster systems in the INF range band may be produced; and

-- notification of launches must be given ten days in advance.

Given the combination of the above restrictions, including the requirement to notify us of such launches 10 days in advance, we are confident of our ability to detect a Soviet attempt to conduct a program to develop an illegal INF missile system under the guise of such R&D launches.

INF AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

Q7. It has been charged by some that with the elimination of the INF Weapons NATO will be left with fewer bases where nuclear weapons are located and that NATO will therefore present the Warsaw Pact an attractively small number of targets, making preemption by the Soviets of NATO forces in a crisis more likely. Do you agree with this evaluation? If not, why not?

No. Final decisions concerning the future use of the bases covered by the Treaty have yet to be made, but the size and mix of NATO's theater nuclear force after completion of the INF Treaty's reduction will be extensive in terms of numbers and dispersal. The Treaty does not preclude using former INF missile bases for non-Treaty limited systems. Warsaw Pact military planners will still be faced with a formidable array of potential targets in Western Europe. The elimination of Soviet INF missiles systems--including, in the cases of the SS-12s or 23s, their capacity for carrying nuclear, conventional or chemical weapons--is more significant than the reduction in potential NATO targets of these forces. It is of course essential that NATO continue to take measures, in accordance with the Montebello decision, to modernize, to enhance the survivability and to correct the maldeployment of Alliance nuclear forces based in Europe.

Montebello Commitments

Q8. In your testimony you stated, that "we must proceed with Montebello nuclear modernization so that our nuclear forces in Europe maintain their capability to fulfill their mission of deterrence."

a. Does this mean we lose our ability to deter Soviets without nuclear force improvements in Europe?

NATO has always had to maintain strong nuclear and conventional forces in order to deter a Soviet attack. Therefore keeping these forces effective and credible requires modernization. What is required to deter is not a static measure, but an equation which changes as the Soviet threat evolves and changes. The Montebello Decision to modernize NATO nuclear forces predates the INF Treaty. The Montebello

Decision of 1983 called for substantially reducing the size of NATO's nuclear stockpile, and necessary modernization measures for remaining systems, in order to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of NATO's theater nuclear forces. The Montebello reductions have already been made. NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to continue to move forward with the necessary modernization measures as the INF Treaty enters into force.

b. What specific additional improvements does Montebello require?

In conjunction with his 1985 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS-85), SACEUR made a number of recommendations to implement the Montebello Decision. These include:

-- modernization of NATO's dual-capable aircraft and their nuclear weapons;

-- development of a follow-on to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile to replace the LANCE system;

-- development of a tactical air-to-surface missile to replace a portion of the nuclear bombs delivered by U.S. and Allied forces; and

-- production of sufficient modern nuclear artillery rounds to replace older rounds;

-- improvements to command, control, and communications;

-- improvements to nuclear weapon survivability; and

-- correction of maldeployment of nuclear forces between regions.

c. Would new nuclear weapons be required?

Modernized systems, using up-to-date technology, would be required. The ongoing Montebello modernization would require improved delivery systems, including a follow-on to Lance and tactical air-to-surface missile. Moreover, we need to continue to produce and deploy modernized artillery-fired atomic projectiles.

d. What will improvements or new weapons undertaken in connection with Montebello cost?

It is difficult to calculate the overall cost of improvements stemming from Montebello because some have already been undertaken, some are ongoing, and others depend on national decisions. Moreover, because certain improvements involve dual-capable systems, it is difficult to allocate cost between nuclear and conventional missions.

However, the Department of Defense is currently undertaking studies and analyses of how to meet requirements for the air-to-surface missile and the follow-on to LANCE in the most cost effective manner. No funds are currently allocated for development and production of these systems. Plans for production of the W82 155mm nuclear artillery round are funded and on track.

e. Who will pay for this program?

Costs of NATO programs are shared by the U.S., and its Allies, and NATO. Because the U.S. is the major nuclear power in NATO, we bear a substantial portion of the cost of developing nuclear weapons systems. Nevertheless, Allied governments pay for the purchase and operation of certain U.S.-built delivery systems. Some also pay the full cost of systems, such as the Tornado dual-capable aircraft.

f. If we do not implement Montebello nuclear force improvements, does this mean we should not follow through with INF implementation?

No. The INF Treaty enhances NATO security in its own right. So does Montebello modernization. Neither should be made contingent on the other. Failure to follow through on the Montebello improvements would endanger NATO security whether or not the INF Treaty is implemented.

g. Is Montebello implementation a "safeguard" required for the INF Treaty to be in U.S. interests?

No. However, implementation of the improvement measures stemming from the Montebello Decision will allow NATO to maintain deterrence with the lowest possible level of forces.

Q9. It has been suggested that NATO should deploy non-nuclear cruise missiles based on air, sea and land capable of deep strikes against Warsaw Pact air fields, air defense units, command and control bunkers and military choke-points. (a) What would be the advantages and the disadvantages of developing and deploying such non-nuclear systems? (b) What are the likely responses of the Soviets to such deployments? (c) Are there implications for crisis stability if the U.S. and Soviets deploy significant numbers of conventional weapons which cannot readily be distinguished from nuclear weapons?

The INF Treaty bans all ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), whether nuclear- or conventionally-armed, in the INF range band (500-5500 kilometers). The decision to ban conventionally-armed GLCMs in this range band was made because the distinction between nuclear and conventionally-armed GLCMs is not effectively verifiable and because a conventional Soviet GLCM could increase the threat faced by the Alliance. Additionally, to have permitted conventionally-armed GLCMs in the INF range would have required permitting some level of testing and launch facilities. This would potentially offer the Soviets greater advantage than the U.S. if they decided to produce covertly and stockpile nuclear warheads to be placed on those systems in the event of a crisis or war.

With regard to sea and air systems, the U.S. already has a substantial force of conventionally-armed sea-launched cruise missiles which comprise an important element of our naval capabilities. We are also considering prospects for a conventionally-armed air-launched cruise missile that would address other pressing requirements. We have made clear to the Soviets in Geneva our opposition to constraints on conventional SLCMs and ALCMs (neither of which are listed in the INF Treaty). We are committed by policy and, in the case of SLCMs, by the Summit Joint Statement, to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of limits placed on nuclear-armed ALCMs and SLCMs.

Q10. On December 19, Pravda reported that the Soviet Union is prepared to make "cardinal reductions" in the conventional weapons of East bloc forces, stating that "the Warsaw Pact members states are prepared to adhere to the ceilings of sufficiency necessary for defense [and] resolve the problem of asymmetries and imbalances on individual types of weapons through reducing the potential of the one who appears to be ahead." A December 20 article in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution cites a Defense Department official as saying that the Soviets are now willing to identify and discuss disparities in conventional forces in a 180 degree flip from past performance. Has the Soviet Union provided any details to the United States of what reductions if any it is prepared to make to "resolve the problem of asymmetries?"

The Soviet Union has not provided any details to the United States of reductions it is prepared to make to resolve the Soviet's and Warsaw Pact substantial conventional superiority in Europe. The only Soviet proposals in this area are those the Soviets have made publicly.

On June 11, 1986 the Warsaw Pact countries made a statement often called the "Budapest Appeal." It calls for each alliance to cut 100,000-150,000 troops "within a year or two," followed by the reduction of ground and tactical air forces to 25% below current levels by the early 1990's "simultaneously with" reductions of tactical nuclear systems. The Soviets have also publicly discussed redressing disparities in individual weapon systems through reductions by the side that has a numerical advantage.

Equal numerical NATO/Pact cuts would leave NATO in a weaker position vis-a-vis the Pact, and are not acceptable to the West. Furthermore, dealing with conventional forces will be complicated enough, without mixing nuclear weapons into the negotiations

Q11. (a) What are NATO's goals in current talks with the Soviets on conventional weapons? (b) What would we want the Soviets to do to improve stability in the Central Region military balance if we could get them to do it?

NATO's goals are to improve stability and decrease the risk of war by reducing the Warsaw Pact's ability to conduct large-scale offensive surprise strikes against NATO territory.

On December 14, Eastern and Western negotiators reached preliminary agreement on the objectives and methods section of a negotiating mandate for new East-West talks on conventional stability. That text includes the following:

> "The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures, among others."

One major threat to security and stability in Europe is the Soviet Union's substantial forward deployment of armored forces in Eastern European countries. Any real reduction of that threat would require very large cuts in those Soviet forces.

Given overall Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, even modest reductions in Western forces would reduce Western security and would not promote stability, absent larger reductions by the East.

Q12. Is it an objective of U.S. policy in conventional force negotiations with the Soviets to seek to decrease the potential of both alliances to attack with minimum warning?

NATO is a defensive alliance which is committed not to use force except in response to aggression. NATO's goals are to improve stability and decrease the risk of war by reducing the Warsaw Pact's ability to conduct large-scale offensive surprise strikes against NATO territory.

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Q13a. What are the most important areas for reductions to parity besides tanks and artillery? (b) Is it appropriate for negotiations to take place on limiting fighter-bombers? Tactical missiles? Attack helicopters?

NATO's basic policy goals for such negotiations were made clear in the March 2 Summit statement on conventional stability. The conventional stability talks should focus on combat decisive conventional ground forces. The U.S., along with our NATO Allies, is now analyzing what elements of conventional ground forces should be addressed in the talks. Tanks and artillery have already emerged as two central elements of conventional ground forces. Other armored fighting vehicles are being considered for reductions.

In the context of the current conventional imbalance on the European continent, particularly in ground forces, negotiations on aircraft are not appropriate at this time. Because of the mobility of aircraft, simply reducing Soviet numbers west of the Urals would have relatively limited military impact and would be difficult to verify.

Tactical missiles should not be addressed in the conventional stability talks. In the wake of the INF agreement, the Alliance's arms control priorities are to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic arms, establish a stable conventional balance in Europe, and achieve an effective, verifiable global chemical weapons ban. Dealing with conventional forces in the new conventional stability talks will be complicated enough, without mixing tactical missiles into the negotiations.

14. Frank Gaffney, Jr., who left the Pentagon last November, has contended that minor procedural details could so circumscribe U.S. inspectors "as to make on-site inspection really little more than a Potemkin Village drill." How does the Treaty make sure that the inspections are more than facades?

The detailed inspection procedures in the INF Treaty are part of a network of interrelated constraints and measures that allow careful monitoring and that work together to raise the cost and difficulty of cheating and the risk of getting caught. The detailed procedures on inspections contribute to verification by:

--creating an element of uncertainty in the Soviet mind concerning which site we will inspect and thereby deter cheating because of the possible risk of detection;

-- allowing for the expeditious movement of inspectors to the site to be inspected;

-- defining inspection procedures in considerable detail so that, used along with the site diagrams, ambiguity in the conduct of inspections is reduced; and

-- restricting the Soviets' ability to use inspections for hostile intelligence purposes.

In addition, the total ban on systems covered by this Treaty along with the interlocking verification provisions including several kinds of on-site inspections as well as NTM will enhance U.S. capabilities to detect cheating.

In addition to inspections, the U.S. and Soviet Union have agreed to other cooperative measures such as enhancements of National Technical Means, as well as collateral constraints that aid verification, including production and flight-test bans and locational restrictions for Treaty-limited items.

The total ban on systems covered by this Treaty as well as the on-site inspection regime and NTM will ensure that the Treaty is effectively verifiable. Of course, if the Soviets attempted to impede our inspectors from carrying out their inspections as called for by the Treaty, that would be a serious matter, which we would pursue actively as a potential compliance issue.

Q15. An expert in verification has called the INF Treaty "the most intrusive and the most porous nuclear arms agreement ever negotiated," because both sides can substitute other nuclear systems for the INF missiles, retargeting them on all relevant military sites formerly covered by the INF missiles.

(a) Is it fair to say that under the INF Treaty, the Soviets have no incentive to cheat, because they can replace the INF missiles they have destroyed legally with other categories of nuclear weapons?

(b) If the Soviets replace the INF missiles they remove with SS-25s why is the Treaty militarily significant?

(a) The INF Treaty does not solve all our security problems. It was never meant to. But it does eliminate a class of weapons which the Soviets saw fit to deploy for over 30 years. Clearly, the Soviets saw utility in these systems, or they would not have deployed and regularly modernized them over this period.

While the Soviets do have the capability to retarget a portion of their ICBM force to strike targets in Europe and Asia formerly covered by their INF missiles, they would be required to do so, within current ICBM levels, by reducing their coverage proportionately of targets formerly covered by those ICBMs. In addition, the Soviets will not gain the same political leverage on our Allies or create the same sense of decoupling as they did with their INF force, which is uniquely directed against Europe and Asia, not the U.S.

(b) As a result of the Treaty, the Soviets will lose considerable capability in both the European and Asian theaters to strike our Allies. In addition, in Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites, and debarkation points, both ports and airfields.

Additionally, we have long been concerned about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter-range delivery systems for chemical and conventional weapons (SS-12s and SS-23s) will be removed from the Soviet order of battle as a result of this Treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-12 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and airfields. In essence, the Treaty will assist in facilitating our reinforcement of Europe.

In East Asia, elimination of the SS-20 prevents the Soviets from holding at risk over 500 targets in that region. When coupled with the elimination of 300 Soviet shorter-range INF missiles in the Asian-Pacific theater, the elimination of all Soviet ground-based INF missiles represents a significant reduction in the threat to our Asian friends and allies.

The INF Treaty is militarily significant in that it eliminates an entire class of U.S.-Soviet nuclear missiles, and includes precedent-setting verification provisions. However, it is only a first step toward the Administration's goal of enhancing strategic stability through equitable, verifiable arms reductions in the START negotiations. We also cannot lose sight of the political achievements of the INF Treaty. This Treaty will eradicate the missiles the Soviets attempted to use to drive wedges in the NATO Alliance and to heighten fears about the possibility that the U.S. could be decoupled from the defense of Europe. These Soviet attempts were based on the fact that Soviet INF missiles could reach our European and Asian Allies but could not threaten U.S. territory directly.

The INF Treaty will eliminate these missile systems and Soviet attempts to use them to disrupt our alliances. The Treaty leaves intact, however, NATO's long-standing strategy of flexible response and the conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic assets to implement it.

16. It has been reported that at the summit, the two sides agreed to counting rules that change the procedure adopted in SALT II of attributing to each missile the greatest number of warheads it has been tested with. (a) Are these reports correct? (b) Please explain what approaches might be feasible, and how the U.S. could verify a rule that would count fewer than the maximum number of warheads tested on any given delivery vehicle.

In the joint statement from the Washington summit, the two leaders agreed that the sides will proceed from the assumption that existing types of strategic ballistic missiles are deployed with the number of warheads specified for each type. Furthermore, "Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms."

This approach is necessary because, in recent years, the evolution in testing technology has enabled the sides to test missiles with fewer warheads than could be deployed on such missiles. We are working to develop a reliable and accurate method for determining the maximum warhead carrying capability of future types of missiles; the details of such a method are still under careful consideration. Effective verification measures, including on-site inspection, are being examined for counting RVs.

Q17. In your written testimony on Page 7, you stated that "as long as we continue to rely on nuclear weapons to deter aggression, we must test them to ensure that they are reliable". In the past the Administration has said that CTB was still a long-term goal of the U.S. (a) Do you believe that a CTB agreement must wait until all nuclear weapons are destroyed? (b) If not, would a CTB be in the interests of the U.S. following a START agreement?

(a) As long as we are dependent on nuclear weapons to keep the peace, testing will be required in order to ensure the safety, reliability, credibility and effectiveness of our deterrent. A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States. However, such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces.

(b) A START agreement alone would not satisfy all the U.S. requirements for achievement of a CTB. Until these conditions, as outlined above, are achieved, a CTB would not be in the interests of the United States.

FRENCH AND BRITISH COOPERATION

Q18. In December, it was reported that Britain and France are moving toward a new level of defense cooperation that could include joint development of an air-launched nuclear cruise missile, with a range of about 300 miles. The French and British have also been discussing coordinated nuclear submarine patrols, possible with joint targeting.

(a) Do these developments suggest that France and Britain may be moving towards mutual security measures outside the parameters of NATO? (b) What are the implications for NATO of separate agreements by the French and the British? (c) What efforts, if any, is the U.S. making to increase French cooperation with other NATO projects?

The British and the French are as concerned as we are about maintaining modern military forces. To the extent that economic and operational efficiencies can be secured through cooperative armament modernization ventures, Britain and France are seeking enhanced security in mutual security programs.

Such cooperative efforts will not be undertaken at the expense of NATO. On the contrary, such cooperation strengthens overall Western security. Under the auspices of NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors, the U.S. is engaged in many military security enhancement projects with the French including: 155mm Autonomous Precision Guided Munitions; NATO weapon and C3I systems computer support environments; Airborne Radar Demonstration System; Modular Standoff Weapon System; Post 2000 Tactical Area Communications System; and the NATO Frigate Replacement - 1990's Project.

Q19. After the December 1987 summit was concluded, Administration spokesmen told reports that the Soviets had agreed to an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that permitted the U.S. to conduct SDI tests under the broad interpretation. The Soviets denied this. The text of the agreed statement appears to permit testing to take place according to the terms of the ABM Treaty as signed, without resolving the significant difference in interpretation between the administration and the Soviets as to what the Treaty means regarding space-based systems. Is the U.S.-Soviet difference on SDI the principle obstacle to a START Treaty?

No. There are a number of significant differences between the two sides on the START Treaty including such issues as sublimits, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles and the details of effective verification. We have said all along we will not accept an agreement that cripples SDI. Soviet efforts to link a START Treaty with restrictions on SDI beyond those already agreed to in the ABM Treaty only create an artificial obstacle.

Strategic offensive reductions stand on their own merits and are long overdue.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY SHULTZ TO FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS OF SENATOR PELL

7. Standard for Verification

a. Could you tell us how the current standard differs from that applied to past arms control agreements?

b. The Administration has emphasized its desire for "effective" verification. What is the difference between effective and adequate verification?

The approach of this Administration is to provide for verification measures which go well beyond those found in previous arms control agreements. However, it is the substance of these measures and not the semantical difference between "effective" and "adequate" that is important.

We believe that the combination of our intelligence resources and the measures contained in the Treaty are sufficient to deter Soviet violations by creating a significant risk of detection and raising the cost of potential cheating scenarios. We should also be able to detect Soviet violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of any violation.

The INF Treaty goes well beyond the reliance on NTMs which characterized previous nuclear arms control treaties including SALT I and SALT II. In addition, the INF Treaty has a specific cooperative measure to enhance the use of NTM to determine that SS-20s are not at SS-25 bases.

Beyond NTM, the INF Treaty has a number of other specific verification measures which are spelled out in detail to avoid subsequent possible problems with their application. These include bans on production and flight testing of all INF missiles, which are important to preclude the Soviets from maintaining a reliable and viable covert force. The data exchange in the INF Treaty is much more extensive than in previous treaties and provides technical parameters as well as numbers and locations of deployed and non-deployed systems to be eliminated. This, together with the locational restrictions and announced transits in the Treaty, which limit missiles and launchers to deployment areas, support facilities or notified transit, facilitates the detection of an illegal missile or launcher. Moreover, the provision of this data achieves the important objective of encouraging greater Soviet openness in military matters. All items in the inventory are subject to specific elimination procedures which are subject to verification by on-site inspectors. Finally, there is a wide variety of on-site inspection measures geared to specific Treaty provisions, including monitoring of the final assembly site for a non-INF missile which uses a stage that is outwardly similar to but not interchangeable with the first stage of the SS-20.

Thus the structure of the verification regime has deliberate redundancies. Such double-checking is what provides its power. One layer of the regime builds on another, to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Consequently it is clear that in the INF Treaty, we achieved a much more extensive verification regime than sought in past arms control agreements and one that meets the more stringent standards which this Administration has applied to arms control.

2. Linkage The question of whether the United States should link progress in arms control to improvement in other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship has always been somewhat controversial. Recently, President Reagan categorically rejected the principle of linking arms control agreements to improvements in other areas of the relationship.

a. Can you please elaborate on the reasons why the Administration believes arms control should not be linked to progress in other areas?

b. Should the Senate condition its approval of this Treaty on improved Soviet behavior in the Third World? Please explain.

d. Should the Senate condition its approval of the INF Treaty on a halt to Soviet military assistance to the communist government in Nicaragua? Please explain.

e. Should the Senate condition its approval of the INF Treaty on an improvement in the human rights situation? Please explain.

Linking the INF Treaty to any of the issues noted above is neither necessary nor useful. The Treaty stands on its own merits and is in the interest of the U.S. and our Allies. It is not a favor to the Soviet Union. The U.S. and our NATO Allies sought and consistently negotiated for an INF Treaty in order to remove the threat posed by a particular category of Soviet missiles but we do not believe that any one agreement can be used to solve all our security problems. We and our Allies have consistently resisted Soviet efforts to link agreement on INF to other objectives they have sought, including concessions on START and efforts to cripple SDI.

Thus we should not defer or give up the benefits of an INF Treaty. However, we will continue to seek to resolve human rights, bilateral and regional issues which are important elements of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. Indeed we are fully conscious of the fact that arms control is only part of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and that a lasting and long term improvement in the relationship cannot be expected unless and until these other issues are resolved. We will continue to press hard therefore in all four areas of our agenda with the Soviets.

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